Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products US et al

1:17-cv-00396RidMar 3, 2026

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
CONSERVATION LAW 	)
FOUNDATION, INC., 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	C.A. No. 17-396 JJM
)
SHELL OIL PRODUCTS US, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
___________________________________ )
ORDER
Before the Court is “Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
Order on their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” (“Defendants’ Motion”) (ECF
No. 304), filed in response to the Court’s recent Memorandum and Order denying
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 	ECF No. 301. 	The Court
determines that a hearing is unnecessary. 	For the foregoing reasons, the Court
denies Defendants’ Motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This dispute arises from Plaintiff Conservation Law Foundation’s action
against Defendants seeking to impose liability for their alleged violations of federal
environmental law.
See generally ECF No. 45. The Court’s prior Memorandum and
Order provided a comprehensive overview of the pertinent facts underlying this
dispute. 	ECF No. 301 at 2-8. 	Specifically, it details the parties’ ongoing factual
dispute concerning the terms included in the relevant permits governing Defendants’
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conduct at the Providence Terminal and whether the terms require Defendants to
consider a variety of factors related to the adverse impacts created by climate change.
Id. 	The Court incorporates the Memorandum & Order’s background facts by
reference and only provides the details necessary to its resolution of Defendant’s
Motion.
After the Court’s denial of Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Defendants moved for reconsideration based on the supposed existence of “newly
discovered evidence.” ECF No. 304 at 1-4. Specifically, Defendants contend that —
almost two months after they filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment —
environmental 	engineers 	employed 	by 	the 	Rhode 	Island 	Department 	of
Environmental Management (“RIDEM”) conducted an inspection of the Providence
Terminal.
	Id. 	Defendants argue that the results RIDEM reached during this
September 16, 2025 inspection absolves them of all potential liability and therefore
warrants summary judgment in their favor.
Id.
Specifically, Defendants claim that this inspection led RIDEM to determine
that they have not engaged in behavior that violated the relevant permits at issue
here.
Id. Despite the ostensible magnitude of this development, Defendants failed to
supplement their pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for over three
months.
Id. Instead, they waited to inform the Court of this development until they
filed the instant motion.
	Id. 	Despite their delay, Defendants seek reconsideration
based on this factual development.
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II. 	DISCUSSION
A 	court’s 	decision 	to 	grant 	a 	motion 	for 	reconsideration 	constitutes 	an
extraordinary remedy.
See Latin Am. Music Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors
& Publishers, 642 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2011). Based on the nature of this relief, courts
should grant litigants’ requests for this relief in a sparing manner.
Id. To succeed in
a motion for reconsideration, moving parties must establish that a manifest error of
law has taken place, or they must demonstrate the existence of newly discovered
evidence.
	Maries v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005).
Critically, “a motion for reconsideration does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo
its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new
evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the
district court prior to the judgment
.”
Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir.
1997) (citation modified).1
The Court’s review of the record and the arguments submitted reveal that
Defendants have failed to demonstrate their entitlement to reconsideration of the
Court’s prior Memorandum and Order. 	Specifically, the Court determines that
Defendants have failed to advance a legitimate justification excusing their failure to
present their evidence of the September 2025 RIDEM inspection, and its alleged
impact, before the Court’s resolution of their motion on December 23, 2025. 	As the
procedural history of this dispute demonstrates, Defendants had more than three
1 In seeking this relief, Defendants’ memorandum omits any discussion or
acknowledgment of the relevant standard of review.
See generally ECF No. No. 304.
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months to apprise the Court of this development and yet they failed to do so. 	This
delay serves as a canonical example of an unexcused, “procedural failure” and
mandates the denial of their motion.
Aybar, 118 F.3d at 16.
Not 	only 	does 	Defendants’ 	impermissible 	delay 	constitute 	a 	“procedural
failure,” it also falls outside the definition of newly discovered evidence.
See Bennett
v. 	Saint-Gobain 	Corp., 	507 	F.3d 	23, 	34 	(1st 	Cir. 	2007) 	(rejecting 	a 	litigant’s
characterization of evidence as newly discovered and determining that “it is clear
from the plaintiff’s own admissions that the additional evidence was merely newly
proffered, not newly discovered.”) 	Since Defendants’ possessed evidence of the
RIDEM inspection for several months during the pendency of their motion, the Court
rejects Defendants’ characterization of this evidence as “newly discovered” and denies
their motion on this basis as well.
Nevertheless, Defendants resist the conclusion that their delay dooms their
attempt to seek reconsideration, and attempt to offer an explanation justifying their
late 	submission. 	Specifically, 	Defendants 	assert 	that 	they 	“were 	preparing 	a
supplement to the record” and had also “anticipated a hearing” where — according to
Defendants — they would have had the opportunity to raise other arguments that
they did not include in their filings.
	See ECF No. 310 at 2. 	The Court rejects this
argument for two primary reasons. First, Defendants fail to direct the Court to any
authority either in the form of caselaw, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, or a local
rule that would permit them to withhold supplemental evidence and then present it
to the Court at a hearing that they did not receive. The absence of any authority that
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would permit this curious course of action seriously undercuts Defendants’ attempt
to justify their delay. Moreover, if Defendants had intended to present this evidence
at a hearing, one could reasonably expect Defendants to provide the Court of with
advanced notice of their intent to do so.
Second, Defendants have failed to explain why the three-month period between
the RIDEM inspection itself and the Court issuing its Memorandum and Order did
not provide them with the ability to either supplement the record or notify the Court
of 	the 	inspection’s 	occurrence. 	Further, 	Defendants’ 	delay 	and 	subsequent
characterization of this evidence as “newly discovered” suggests that the decision to
withhold it was not inadvertent.
Bennett, 507 F.3d at 34 (“Evidence known to a party
and deliberately withheld for tactical reasons cannot plausibly be counted as newly
discovered.”) (citation modified). The Court therefore rejects Defendants’ request for
reconsideration. 2
2 In any event, the Court’s reconsideration of the RIDEM inspection would not
alter its prior denial of partial summary judgment. While Defendants emphatically
argue that the RIDEM inspection serves as a critical development that materially
alters the outcome of their prior motion, Plaintiffs’ opposition contests both the
context in which RIDEM inspected the Providence Terminal and this inspection’s
impact on the parties’ overall dispute. 	ECF No. 304 at 4-6; ECF No. 308 at 4-6. 	At
most, the RIDEM inspection serves as an additional disputed fact that prevents the
Court from granting summary judgment.
Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959 (1st
Cir. 1997) (“At the summary judgment stage, the trial court examines the entire
record in the light most flattering to the nonmovant and indulges all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor. 	Only if the record, viewed in that manner and
without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any
material fact may the court enter summary judgment.”) (citation modified).
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III. 	CONCLUSION
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Defendants 	have 	not
demonstrated their entitlement to reconsideration of the Court’s Memorandum and
Order. As a result, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration, ECF
No. 304.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
March 3, 2026
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