Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products US et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION, INC., 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	C.A. No. 17-396-JJM
:
EQUILON ENTERPRISES LLC (d/b/a SHELL 	:
OIL PRODUCTS US), et al., 	:
Defendants. 	:
ORDER REGARDING
RECONSIDERATION OF USE RESTRICTION
PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
Now pending before the Court is the motion (ECF No. 332) of Plaintiff, Conservation
Law Foundation, Inc. (“CLF”), asking the Court to reconsider the portion of its Order of January
27, 2026 (ECF No. 309), as clarified by Text Order on March 11, 2026, (collectively, the
“Order”), which imposes a use restriction on certain raw discovery materials that the Shell
Defendants agree to de-designate (that is, to remove the confidentiality designation previously
applied pursuant to the Court’s Protective Order (ECF No. 67)).
The use restriction states:
[E]ven if no longer designated as confidential, such documents may not be used
by CLF for any purpose other than for use in this case and in the related case
pending in the District of Connecticut.
ECF No. 309 at 4. It was imposed sua sponte by the Court in connection with its consideration
of CLF’s motion for wholesale removal of the confidentiality designation protecting a tranche of
raw discovery materials, which the Shell Defendants had designated as non-public and
commercially sensitive. Mindful of the Shell Defendants’ articulated concern about CLF’s use of
raw discovery for public advocacy and not for litigation, the Court added the use restriction but
Case 1:17-cv-00396-JJM-PAS Document 343 Filed 05/08/26 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
restricted it to documents that the Shell Defendants had properly designated as confidential but
agreed to remove from that status to facilitate their use in connection with the litigation without
cumbersome sealing. Concerned that the Order’s use restriction swept broadly to limit its use of
public documents that are not confidential and/or were not properly designated as confidential
under the Protective Order, CLF sought clarification. ECF No. 311. During the discovery
dispute conference, CLF augmented its concerns about the use restriction with the argument that
it adds an impractical burden in context of this case, as well as that it infringes CLF’s First
Amendment rights. Because these concerns had not previously been presented as developed
arguments, the Court clarified that the use restriction does not apply to non-confidential materials
but also invited CLF to file a further motion for reconsideration to develop its arguments about
practicality and the First Amendment.
That motion is now pending, framed as an objection to the Order, but referred back to me
by the District Court. In response to the motion, Shell argues that the Court acted appropriately
to limit CLF’s stated intent to use raw discovery (that may never become admissible or be
considered in the litigation) for advocacy and fundraising, which is not the purpose of civil
discovery.
The Shell Defendants are right that the Court has the power to restrict use of raw civil
discovery even if it is not confidential – “[l]iberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of
assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes.” Seattle Times Co.
v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984). There is no First Amendment right to disseminate business
information obtained through discovery that is not admitted in the judicial record. Id. at 32-33.
Thus, the Court may act to prevent non-litigation use of raw discovery to protect the producing
party from “try[ing] its case in the court of public opinion” without transgressing the First
Case 1:17-cv-00396-JJM-PAS Document 343 Filed 05/08/26 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Amendment. United States ex rel. Wollman v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., Inc., CIVIL ACTION
No. 15-11890-ADB, 2021 WL 11749764, at *1, 5 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2021) (risk of media focus
on raw discovery is good cause to preclude dissemination of non-confidential materials to
anyone other than government regulators). Such restrictions may be imposed sua sponte.
Mouchas v. Under Pressure Coffee Inc., No. 24 CV 2221-AMD-CLP & 25 MC 2367, 2025 WL
3013450, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court is persuaded by CLF’s argument that the
Court’s sua sponte use restriction is impractical, burdensome, and unnecessary. As CLF points
out, the use restriction would require it to maintain a separate category of produced documents
and to consider whether each document from which the confidentiality designation has been
removed is a sensitive business record (meaning it is subject to the use restriction) or is a public
document that was designated in error (meaning it is not subject to the use restriction). Such a
burden would bog down CLF’s ability to prosecute this already complex case.
Based on these practical considerations, CLF’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 332)
is hereby granted and the sentence (ECF No. 309 at 4) quoted above is hereby deleted from the
Order. In light of this determination, the Court does not address CLF’s First Amendment
argument.
/s/ Patricia A. Sullivan
PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN
United States Magistrate Judge
May 8, 2026
Case 1:17-cv-00396-JJM-PAS Document 343 Filed 05/08/26 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:
<pageID>