Rhode Island Recovery and Transport, LLC v. Carriage Insurance Agency, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
RHODE ISLAND RECOVERY AND 	)
TRANSPORT, LLC, a Rhode Island 	)
Limited Liability Company, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	C.A. No. 22-117 WES
)
CARRIAGE INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., 	)
an Ohio Limited Liability Company, )
d/b/a RECOVERY INSURANCE SERVICES, )
)
Defendant. 	)
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Senior District Judge.
Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Defendant’s 	Motion”), 	Dkt. 	No. 	25, 	and 	the 	Motion 	for 	Leave 	to
File Second Amended Complaint (“Plaintiff’s Motion”), Dkt. No. 28.
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	no 	hearing 	is 	necessary. 	For 	the 	following
reasons, Defendant’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part,
and Plaintiff’s Motion is denied as moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In late 2017, Plaintiff Rhode Island Recovery and Transport,
LLC (“RIR&T”) was a fledgling car repossession company looking for
insurance. 	Def.’s Statement Undisputed Facts Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(“DSUF”) ¶¶ 4-5, Dkt. No. 26. 	Critically, RIR&T needed insurance
coverage 	for 	not 	only 	itself 	but 	also 	its 	clients, 	who 	would 	be
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named on RIR&T’s policy as “additional insureds.” 	Id. ¶ 7. 	RIR&T
obtained 	a 	policy 	with 	the 	help 	of 	Defendant 	Carriage 	Insurance
Agency 	(“Carriage”), 	which 	did 	business 	as 	“Recovery 	Insurance
Services” to attract repossession companies like RIR&T. 	Id. ¶¶ 1,
6. 	But Carriage failed to ensure that RIR&T’s clients were covered
under 	the 	policy 	as 	additional 	insureds. 	Id. 	¶¶ 8-9. 	This 	came
to 	a 	head 	in 	the 	fall 	of 	2018, 	when 	a 	client 	of 	RIR&T 	discovered
that 	it 	was 	not 	an 	additional 	insured 	while 	defending 	a 	lawsuit
involving a repossession that RIR&T performed on its behalf. 	Id.
¶¶ 15-21; see also Def.’s Statement Disputed Facts (“DSDF”) ¶¶ 34,
39-41, Dkt. No. 38. 	Carriage did not inform RIR&T of its failure
to 	ensure 	that 	RIR&T’s 	clients 	were 	named 	as 	additional 	insureds
on the insurance policy that it obtained for RIR&T. 	See DSDF ¶ 52.
The resulting fallout between RIR&T and its client led RIR&T
to 	threaten 	legal 	action 	against 	Carriage. 	In 	a 	December 	2018
email 	from 	Emily 	Sprague, 	a 	member 	of 	RIR&T, 	to 	Scott 	Manley, 	a
Carriage employee, Sprague wrote:
I 	have 	spoken 	to 	my 	attorney 	regarding 	this 	matter
already and he advised me to contact you first before I
go any further. 	Due to your compan[y’]s negligence [our
client] is withholding $3300.00 of our money and put us
on hold until this investigation is complete because we
did not have an Additionally insured which was provided
to us and them through your company. 	I am losing money
weekly because of this . . . . 	We have a review meeting
with 	our 	attorney 	on 	Friday 	regarding 	this 	matter.
Please get back to me by then. 	If I do not hear we will
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go ahead and start suit against your company.
DSUF Ex. N, Dkt. No. 26-14.
The record suggests neither Manley nor anyone else at Carriage
responded to Sprague’s December 2018 email. 	DSDF ¶ 68. 	RIR&T did
not sue Carriage, however, until March 2022, more than three years
later. 	Compl. 18, Dkt. No. 1. 	In a seven-count Amended Complaint,
RIR&T alleges negligence; breach of contract; both fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentation, including by concealment; and breach
of 	fiduciary 	duty. 	1st 	Am. 	Compl. 	(“Am. 	Compl.”) 	¶¶ 32-62, 	Dkt.
No. 13.
Carriage argues that all RIR&T’s claims are time barred under
the applicable statute of limitations, which it contends is three
years. 	Mem. L. Supp. Def.’s Mot. (“Def.’s Mem.”) 2, Dkt. No. 25-
1 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14.1). 	In response, RIR&T asserts
that 	only 	some 	of 	its 	claims 	are 	subject 	to 	a 	three-year 	statute
of limitations and, furthermore, that the statute was tolled until
2022, if not 2025, when RIR&T discovered key facts about the case.
See 	Pl.’s 	Opp’n 	Def.’s 	Mot. 	(“Pl.’s 	Opp’n”) 	15-19, 	Dkt. 	No. 	33.
This “recently discovered evidence” is the basis for RIR&T’s motion
for 	leave 	to 	amend 	its 	pleadings, 	which 	does 	not 	seek 	to 	add 	new
claims or theories of liability but rather supplement the pleadings
with 	facts 	RIR&T 	has 	learned 	since 	filing 	suit. 	Pl.’s 	Mot. 	1-2,
11.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
When 	reviewing 	a 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	a 	court 	must
“examin[e] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant
and draw[] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” 	Hewes
v. Pangburn, 162 F.4th 177, 196 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Quintana-
Dieppa v. Dep’t of the Army, 130 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2025)). 	The
movant 	must 	“demonstrate 	‘that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	dispute 	as 	to
any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.’” 	Id. (quoting Dusel v. Factory Mut. Ins., 52 F.4th 495,
503 (1st Cir. 2022)).
“Where, 	as 	here, 	a 	defendant 	moves 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on
the 	basis 	of 	an 	affirmative 	defense 	— 	like 	the 	statute 	of
limitations — the defendant bears the burden of proof and ‘cannot
attain 	summary 	judgment 	unless 	the 	evidence 	that 	he 	provides 	on
that 	issue 	is 	conclusive.’” 	Ouellette 	v. 	Beaupre, 	977 	F.3d 	127,
135 	(1st 	Cir. 	2020) 	(quoting 	Torres 	Vargas 	v. 	Santiago 	Cummings,
149 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1998)). 	“If the defendant produces such
conclusive 	evidence, 	‘the 	burden 	shifts 	to 	the 	plaintiff 	to
establish 	that 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	does 	not 	apply.’” 	Id.
(quoting 	Asociación 	de 	Suscripción 	Conjunta 	del 	Seguro 	de
Responsabilidad 	Obligatorio 	v. 	Juarbe-Jiménez, 	659 	F.3d 	42, 	50
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n.10 (1st Cir. 2011)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that all but two of RIR&T’s claims are subject
to a three-year statute of limitations, which began to run no later
than December 2018, when Sprague first threatened to sue Carriage
over 	its 	failure 	to 	ensure 	that 	RIR&T’s 	clients 	were 	additional
insureds on RIR&T’s insurance policy. 	Those claims are therefore
untimely, and Carriage is entitled to summary judgment.
As 	for 	RIR&T’s 	two 	remaining 	claims, 	both 	of 	which 	sound 	in
fraud, the Court finds that Carriage has not proven that they are
subject 	to 	a 	three-year 	statute 	of 	limitations. 	The 	Court 	thus
denies summary judgment as to RIR&T’s fraud claims.
Finally, 	the 	Court 	denies 	RIR&T’s 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend
its pleadings.
A. Defendant’s Motion
In Rhode Island, the general statute of limitations for civil
actions is ten years. 	R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(a). 	Two exceptions
to 	the 	general 	rule 	are 	§ 9-1-14.1, 	which 	imposes 	a 	three-year
statute of limitations on actions for insurance agent malpractice;
and § 9-1-14(b), which imposes a three-year statute of limitations
on actions for personal injuries. 	Carriage argues that § 9-1-14.1
applies 	to 	all 	seven 	of 	RIR&T’s 	claims 	(it 	also 	argues 	there 	was
no 	fiduciary 	relationship 	between 	the 	parties). 	Def.’s 	Mem. 	19-
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20. 	Regarding the applicability of § 9-1-14.1, Carriage contends
that RIR&T’s negligence claim is subject to § 9-1-14.1 because it
is an action for insurance agent malpractice; and, because RIR&T’s
remaining 	claims 	are 	duplicative 	of 	its 	negligence 	claim, 	§ 9-1-
14.1 	applies 	to 	those 	claims 	as 	well. 	See 	id. 	at 	11, 	17. 	In
response, RIR&T concedes that its claims for negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation by concealment
are 	subject 	to 	either 	§ 9-1-14.1 	or 	§ 9-1-14(b). 	Pl.’s 	Opp’n 	35
& 	n.7. 	But 	RIR&T 	contends 	that 	its 	four 	remaining 	claims 	— 	for
breach 	of 	contract, 	fraudulent 	misrepresentation, 	fraudulent
misrepresentation 	by 	concealment, 	and 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty 	—
are not duplicative of its negligence claim and are subject instead
to the general ten-year statute of limitations under § 9-1-13(a).
Id. at 19-21, 35 & n.7. 	It also responds to Carriage’s fiduciary
duty argument. 	See id. at 30-34.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that, when “negligence
claims 	against 	professional 	defendants 	challenge 	the 	quality,
effectiveness, 	nature, 	or 	propriety 	of 	the 	professional 	services
rendered, 	such 	claims 	are 	subject 	to 	the 	applicable 	malpractice
statute 	of 	limitation, 	regardless 	of 	whether 	the 	claimants 	can
establish 	contractual 	or 	professional 	privity 	with 	professional
defendants.” 	Bowen 	Ct. 	Assocs. 	v. 	Ernst 	& 	Young, 	818 	A.2d 	721,
727 (R.I. 2003). 	This Court sees no reason to limit the rule above
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to 	negligence 	claims 	and 	not, 	for 	instance, 	claims 	for 	breach 	of
contract, fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty. 	For one, the final
clause 	of 	the 	rule 	statement 	implies 	that 	claims 	for 	breach 	of
contract 	will 	be 	available 	in 	certain 	professional 	malpractice
actions. 	If that is so, then it would make little sense to require
a negligence claim arising from a cause of action for professional
malpractice to be filed in three years while permitting a contract
claim 	arising 	from 	that 	same 	cause 	of 	action 	to 	be 	filed 	in 	ten
years. 	Furthermore, the Rhode Island General Laws define “medical
malpractice” — which is a specific type of professional malpractice
— 	as 	“any 	tort, 	or 	breach 	of 	contract, 	based 	on 	health 	care 	or
professional services rendered . . . by a physician, dentist,” or
other health care provider. 	R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-1(14) (emphasis
added). 	This suggests that, depending on the circumstances, some
forms of professional malpractice may be actionable as breaches of
contract. 	Finally, 	the 	Rhode 	Island 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	applied
§ 9-1-14.1 to non-negligence claims, including fraud and breach of
contract, 	arising 	from 	a 	plaintiff’s 	“professional 	relationship”
with 	the 	defendant. 	See 	Behroozi 	v. 	Kirshenbaum, 	128 	A.3d 	869,
873 (R.I. 2016) (fraud); Broccoli v. Manning, 208 A.3d 1146, 1149-
50 	(R.I. 	2019) 	(breach 	of 	contract); 	see 	also 	Behroozi, 	128 	A.3d
at 	871 	(noting 	without 	disapproval 	trial 	judge’s 	application 	of
§ 9-1-14.1 to plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty). 	In
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short, 	and 	as 	the 	Rhode 	Island 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	advised, 	“[a]
claimant 	cannot 	evade 	[§ 9-1-14.1] 	merely 	by 	failing 	to 	mention
the 	word 	‘malpractice’ 	when 	drafting 	the 	pleading 	in 	question.”
Bowen, 818 A.2d at 727.
As 	stated 	above, 	Carriage 	argues 	that 	§ 9-1-14.1 	applies 	to
RIR&T’s negligence claim and, because RIR&T’s remaining claims are
duplicative 	of 	its 	negligence 	claim, 	§ 9-1-14.1 	also 	applies 	to
those claims. 	Notably, Carriage does not argue in the alternative
that, even if RIR&T’s remaining claims are not duplicative of its
negligence 	claim, 	§ 9-1-14.1 	still 	applies. 	See 	Def.’s 	Mem. 	17-
20. 	The Court starts with RIR&T’s negligence claim, which is based
on Carriage’s alleged breach of its duty to “obey the instructions
that RIR&T provided” and, after “promis[ing] to procure for RIR&T
the 	. . . 	[i]nsurance 	policy 	and 	to 	include 	RIR&T’s 	clients 	as
additional 	insureds, 	. . . 	to 	ensure 	that 	the 	promised 	coverage
was 	in 	fact 	obtained.”1 	Am. 	Compl. 	¶ 33. 	RIR&T 	states 	that, 	as
1 According to the Amended Complaint, RIR&T’s negligence claim
is also based on, “among other things,” either Carriage’s failure
to 	forward 	to 	RIR&T’s 	insurer 	a 	“no 	known 	loss 	letter” 	that 	the
insurer requested from RIR&T or, if Carriage did forward the letter
and 	it 	was 	then 	rejected 	by 	the 	insurer, 	failing 	to 	inform 	RIR&T
about 	this 	issue. 	See 	1st 	Am. 	Compl. 	(“Am. 	Compl.”) 	¶¶ 34, 	39.
RIR&T 	does 	not 	mention 	these 	allegations 	in 	its 	response 	to
Carriage’s motion for summary judgment. 	See generally Pl.’s Opp’n
Def.’s 	Mot. 	Summ. 	J. 	(Pl.’s 	Opp’n), 	Dkt. 	No. 	33. 	In 	any 	event,
the 	Court 	finds 	that, 	because 	this 	aspect 	of 	RIR&T’s 	claim 	also
challenges 	the 	quality, 	effectiveness, 	nature, 	or 	propriety 	of
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a matter of fact:
The 	requirement 	that 	a 	repossession 	business 	name 	its
clients 	as 	additional 	insureds 	so 	that, 	if 	a 	client 	is
sued 	in 	connection 	with 	a 	reposession, 	the 	client
receives a defense and indemnity under the reposessor’s
insurance, 	is 	standard 	operating 	practice 	in 	the
repossession industry.
DSDF ¶ 34 (citation modified). 	Especially in light of the parties’
agreement that procuring an insurance policy which names the policy
holder’s 	clients 	as 	additional 	insureds 	is 	a 	“standard 	operating
practice in the repossession industry,” id., the Court finds that
RIR&T’s negligence claim “challenge[s] the quality, effectiveness,
nature, or propriety of the professional services [that Carriage]
rendered.” 	Bowen, 818 A.2d at 727. 	Therefore, § 9-1-14.1 applies.
The Court next turns to RIR&T’s claim for breach of contract,
which 	is 	based 	on 	the 	same 	allegation 	as 	its 	negligence 	claim,
i.e., that Carriage failed to obtain the proper insurance coverage
for RIR&T and its clients. 	Compare Am. Compl. ¶ 34, with id. ¶ 39.
Indeed, 	the 	only 	difference 	between 	RIR&T’s 	negligence 	claim 	and
its breach of contract claim is that, in the latter, RIR&T frames
professional 	services 	that 	Carriage 	rendered 	to 	RIR&T, 	it 	is
likewise subject to R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14.1’s three-year statute
of limitations. 	See Bowen Ct. Assocs. v. Ernst & Young, 818 A.2d
721, 727 (R.I. 2003). 	RIR&T fails to specify what “other things”
Carriage might have done to constitute breach, aside from allegedly
reneging 	on 	a 	deal 	with 	RIR&T’s 	insurer 	to 	extend 	coverage 	to
RIR&T’s 	client 	at 	Carriage’s 	expense, 	which 	is 	discussed 	in 	the
following section. 	See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4-6.
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Carriage’s obligation to obtain the proper coverage as a “promise”
for which RIR&T paid “good and valuable consideration.” 	Id. ¶¶ 38-
39. 	This 	minor 	shift 	in 	framing 	is 	not 	sufficient 	to 	unhitch
RIR&T’s 	contract 	claim 	from 	§ 9-1-14.’1 	three-year 	statute 	of
limitations. 	Furthermore, 	because 	RIR&T’s 	claim 	for 	breach 	of
fiduciary duty is similarly coextensive with its negligence claim,
the 	Court 	finds 	that 	§ 9-1-14.1 	applies 	to 	that 	claim 	as 	well.
See id. ¶¶ 57-61.
Of 	RIR&T’s 	four 	remaining 	claims, 	two 	are 	grounded 	in 	fraud
– 	fraudulent 	misrepresentation; 	and 	fraudulent 	misrepresentation
by 	concealment 	— 	and 	two 	are 	grounded 	in 	negligence 	— 	negligent
misrepresentation; and negligent misrepresentation by concealment.
See 	Am. 	Compl. 	¶¶ 41-55. 	RIR&T 	has 	conceded 	that 	the 	negligence
claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, whether
by virtue of § 9-1-14.1 or § 9-1-14(b), which governs actions for
personal injuries. 	Pl.’s Opp’n 35 & n.7. 	The Court thus concerns
itself only with RIR&T’s fraud claims. 	In contrast to its claims
for 	breach 	of 	contract 	and 	fiduciary 	duty, 	RIR&T’s 	fraud 	claims
are 	not 	coextensive 	with 	its 	negligence 	claim. 	Rather, 	these
claims are based on allegations that Carriage falsely represented
to 	RIR&T 	that 	it 	obtained 	the 	requested 	coverage 	and 	thereafter
concealed the truth from RIR&T. 	Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42-43, 46-47.
One 	could 	reasonably 	argue 	that, 	like 	RIR&T’s 	other 	claims,
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its fraud claims “challenge the quality, effectiveness, nature, or
propriety 	of 	the 	professional 	services 	[that 	Carriage] 	rendered”
to 	RIR&T. 	Bowen, 	818 	A.2d 	at 	727. 	But 	Carriage 	does 	not 	make
that 	argument. 	See 	Def.’s 	Mot. 	17-19; 	Def.’s 	Reply 	Mem. 	Supp.
Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Reply”) 1-4, Dkt. No. 37. 	Instead, Carriage
argues exclusively that RIR&T’s fraud claims — and its other non-
negligence 	claims, 	for 	that 	matter 	— 	are 	“duplicative” 	of 	its
negligence claim, and are thus subject to § 9-1-14.1 on that basis.
Def.’s Mot. 17-19. 	But as the Court just observed, RIR&T’s fraud
claims 	are 	not 	duplicative 	of 	its 	negligence 	claims. 	The 	burden
falls on Carriage to prove it is entitled to summary judgment based
on the applicable statute of limitations. 	Ouellette, 977 F.3d at
135. 	Because Carriage is right that RIR&T’s claims for breach of
contract 	and 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty 	are 	duplicative 	of 	its
negligence 	claim, 	Carriage 	has 	proven 	that 	§ 9-1-14.1 	applies 	to
those 	claims. 	But 	Carriage 	is 	incorrect 	in 	its 	assertion 	that
RIR&T’s 	fraud 	claims 	are 	duplicative 	as 	well. 	Because 	that
assertion 	is 	the 	only 	argument 	Carriage 	makes 	in 	support 	of
applying § 9-1-14.1 to RIR&T’s fraud claims, the Court finds that
Carriage 	has 	not 	met 	its 	burden 	with 	respect 	to 	those 	claims.
Carriage may have a good argument that § 9-1-14.1 applies. 	Until
it makes that argument, however, RIR&T’s fraud claims may proceed.
Having 	determined 	that 	all 	but 	two 	of 	RIR&T’s 	claims 	are
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subject to a three-year statute of limitations, the Court now turns
to RIR&T’s argument that the statute was tolled until 2022, if not
2025, when it discovered new facts about the case. 	See Pl.’s Opp’n
15-19. 	Section 9-1-14.1(3) provides that —
In 	respect 	to 	those 	injuries 	or 	damages 	due 	to 	acts 	of
medical, veterinarian, accounting, or insurance or real
estate agent or broker malpractice that could not in the
exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the
time of the occurrence of the incident that gave rise to
the 	action, 	suit 	shall 	be 	commenced 	within 	three 	(3)
years of the time that the act or acts of the malpractice
should, 	in 	the 	exercise 	of 	reasonable 	diligence, 	have
been discovered.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14.1(3); see Pl.’s Opp’n 39 (quoting statute).
This 	is 	a 	codification 	of 	the 	discovery-rule 	exception, 	which
“serves 	to 	‘protect 	individuals 	suffering 	from 	latent 	or
undiscoverable 	injuries 	who 	then 	seek 	legal 	redress 	after 	the
statute 	of 	limitations 	has 	expired 	for 	a 	particular 	claim.’”
Sharkey 	v. 	Prescott, 	19 	A.3d 	62, 	66 	(R.I. 	2011) 	(quoting 	Canavan
v. Lovett, Schefrin and Harnett, 862 A.2d 778, 783 (R.I. 2004)).
RIR&T argues that the discovery-rule exception applies to its
claims 	because 	it 	did 	not 	“discover” 	key 	aspects 	of 	Carriage’s
alleged 	conduct 	until 	2022, 	“around 	the 	time 	this 	lawsuit 	was
filed,” 	and 	2025, 	during 	a 	deposition 	in 	this 	case. 	Pl.’s 	Opp’n
5-6; 	Pl.’s 	Mot. 	6-7. 	“These 	facts,” 	RIR&T 	argues, 	“clearly 	and
strongly support [its] claims for negligence, breach of contract,
and breach of fiduciary duty, and are not subject to dismissal on
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limitations 	grounds 	because 	[RIR&T] 	did 	not 	discover 	them 	until
2022 	and 	2025.” 	Pl.’s 	Opp’n 	6. 	In 	other 	words, 	RIR&T 	contends
that the statute of limitations on its claims did not begin to run
until three years after it filed them.
That argument is unconvincing. 	“The standard applied to [the
discovery rule-]exception is objective: it ‘requires only that the
plaintiff 	be 	aware 	of 	facts 	that 	would 	place 	a 	reasonable 	person
on notice that a potential claim exists.’” 	Sharkey, 19 A.3d at 66
(emphasis 	added) 	(quoting 	Canavan, 	862 	A.2d 	at 	783). 	Regardless
of what RIR&T may have learned in 2022 or 2025, Sprague’s December
2018 	email 	demonstrates 	that 	it 	was 	“on 	notice 	that 	a 	potential
claim exist[ed]” more than three years before it filed suit. 	Id.
If 	RIR&T’s 	interpretation 	of 	the 	discovery-rule 	exception 	were
correct, 	that 	would 	mean 	a 	plaintiff 	could 	sleep 	on 	its 	claims
indefinitely, provided that, once the plaintiff finally got around
to filing suit, new facts came out during litigation. 	Because the
exception 	is 	not 	designed 	for 	that 	purpose, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that
it 	does 	not 	apply 	to 	RIR&T’s 	claims. 	The 	Court 	therefore 	grants
summary 	judgment 	in 	favor 	of 	Carriage 	on 	all 	but 	RIR&T’s 	fraud
claims.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion
RIR&T only seeks to amend its pleadings with allegations that
are relevant to its claims for negligence, breach of contract, and
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breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty. 	See 	Pl.’s 	Mot. 	11; 	id. 	Ex. 	2, 	at 	10-
11, 	13-14, 	18-19, 	Dkt. 	No. 	28-2. 	As 	discussed 	in 	the 	preceding
section, neither those allegations nor the circumstances of their
discovery 	affect 	the 	timeliness 	of 	RIR&T’s 	claims. 	Because 	the
Court has already determined that Carriage is entitled to summary
judgment on RIR&T’s claims for negligence, breach of contract, and
breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	RIR&T’s 	effort 	to
amend its pleadings is moot.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	above, 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment, Dkt. No. 25, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and
the 	Motion 	for 	Leave 	to 	File 	Second 	Amended 	Complaint, 	Dkt. 	No.
28, is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Senior District Judge
Date: January 21, 2026
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