Lola's Rendezvous, Inc. et al v. Providence Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
LOLA’S RENDEZVOUS, INC. f/k/a
SILHOUETTES; MIAMI
EMPLOYMENT INC.; THE PINK
BUILDING, INC.; STEVEN
MEDEIROS; and SHAY DIPINA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PROVIDENCE POLICE
DEPARTMENT; THE CITY OF
PROVIDENCE; and PROVIDENCE
BOARD OF LICENSES,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
C.A. No. 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
The plaintiffs, Lola’s Rendezvous, Inc., Miami Employment, Inc., The Pink
Building, Inc., Steven Medeiros, and Shay DiPina (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), bring
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Rhode Island Constitution, alleging
unconstitutional 	enforcement 	actions. 	The 	defendants, 	the 	Providence 	Police
Department, 	the 	City 	of 	Providence, 	and 	the 	Providence 	Board 	of 	Licenses’
(collectively, “the City”) now move for summary judgment. 	For the following reasons,
the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 24.)
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 1 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs operated the adult entertainment club known as Silhouettes at
245 Allens Avenue, “catering to a predominantly African American crowd” from
March 4, 2021, until its closure in October 2022. (ECF No. 28-4 at 2, 5.) Silhouettes
neighbored and was near other adult entertainment businesses in Providence. (ECF
Nos. 25 ¶¶ 23–25; 28-7 at 3.)
Shay DiPina was the manager/promoter at Silhouettes, and he interacted
regularly with the Providence Police Department (“Department”) in that role. (ECF
Nos. 1 at 3–6; 28-4 at 2, 7.) Among the Department’s officers with whom Mr. DiPina
interacted to relay complaints was Deputy Chief Verdi. (ECF No. 28-2 at 3.) During
its operation of Silhouettes, Lola’s had several encounters with the Department in
the context of (1) COVID-19 regulations enforcement; (2) Police details; (3) Police
presence and activities near and at Silhouettes; and (4) the Board of Licenses’ license
denial and related Department enforcement.
A. COVID-19 Regulations Enforcement
Soon after opening during the COVID-19 pandemic, on March 6, 2021, officers
from the Department arrived at Silhouettes to ensure compliance with COVID-19
restrictions. 	(ECF No. 29-1 at 2.) 	Silhouettes was among several establishments
inspected for hookah and COVID-19 regulation compliance. (ECF Nos. 24-9 at 2; 25
¶ 12.) On March 6, Mr. DiPina spoke with officers in person and Deputy Chief Verdi
by phone about capacity limitations and the use of hookah on the premises. 	(ECF
Nos. 30 ¶¶ 27–29; 28-6 at 1.) 	Soon after speaking with Deputy Chief Verdi, the
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 2 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
officers left Silhouettes and declined to take formal enforcement action.1 	(ECF No.
30 ¶¶ 27–29.) 	A similar enforcement encounter relating to COVID-19 capacity
limitations occurred on March 27, 2021. (ECF Nos. 28 at 15; 28-1 at 2.)
B. Police Details
In the first few months of business, Silhouettes requested police details from
the Department on several occasions. (ECF Nos. 25 ¶¶ 14–16; 28 at 17.) During this
period, 	the 	Department 	had 	difficulty 	filling 	police 	detail 	positions 	citywide,
averaging approximately $1 million of unfilled details during consecutive years.
(ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 14–18.) 	Although Silhouettes received several details during this
period, after a breakdown in the relationship between Mr. DiPina and Department
officers, as well as a lack of officers to work the shift ending at 4 a.m., detail requests
largely went unfulfilled. (ECF Nos. 25 ¶¶ 17–18; 28 at 17; 28-4 at 16–17; 28-6 at 2–
3.)
C. Police Presence and Activities Near and at Silhouettes
The area in which Silhouettes is located is known to Department officers as a
“high crime area.” 	(ECF No. 25 ¶ 21.) 	Between March 2021 to October 2022, there
were at least 73 police calls to 245 Allens Avenue (Silhouettes), as well as shootings,
homicides, illegal weapons possession, car break-ins, and disturbances near the club.
1 The parties disagree whether Silhouettes was “shut down,” although the record
reflects that Mr. DiPina acknowledged that the officers left after he spoke with
Deputy Chief Verdi. (ECF No. 29-5 at 7.)
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 3 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
(ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 22–23).2 	Department officers were often present in this area,
including at Silhouettes and at the parking lot behind the venue, which was used by
patrons of several neighboring adult entertainment businesses like Wonderland,
Mega-Plex, and The Bullpen.3 	(ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 24–25.) 	Department officers
conducted stops and searches of some patrons and sometimes flashed their lights in
the parking lot. 	(ECF Nos. 28-4 at 11; 28-7 at 2.) 	Silhouettes received two
documented instances of potential entertainment license violations in May and
October of 2022. (ECF No. 28-6 at 4.)
D. Board’s License Denial and Related Department Enforcement
On May 12, 2022, Silhouettes applied to the Providence Board of Licenses for
an entertainment license to host a musician known as Rowdy Rebel and were
subsequently denied. (ECF No. 25 ¶ 26.) Although Silhouettes asserts it did not plan
for Rowdy Rebel to perform his music at the venue, he was featured on numerous
advertisements and promotional materials. (ECF No. 30 ¶ 31.) Three other venues
attempted to secure entertainment licenses for Rowdy Rebel but were similarly
2 The Plaintiffs contest that the area was a high crime area by noting that there was
not “a fight, a stabbing, a shooting, a murder” at Silhouettes. 	(ECF No. 28 at 18.)
But this contention misses the mark as the City does not claim that within the
premises 	of 	Silhouettes 	was 	a 	high 	crime 	area 	but 	note, 	and 	Mr. 	DiPina
acknowledges, that there were fights, shootings, and murders in the immediate
vicinity of Silhouettes. (ECF No. 24-2 at 68–88.)
3 The Plaintiffs reference their Complaint to support their allegation of “over thirty
(30) documented instances of the [the Department’s] unlawful conduct” but fail to
support this allegation in the record. (ECF No. 28 at 19.)
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 4 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
denied because of the “proliferation of violence that’s associated with this act.” (ECF
Nos. 25 ¶ 26; 28-4 at 23–26.)
Still, Rowdy Rebel attended Silhouettes at the advertised time and place set
forth in the promotional materials. 	(ECF Nos. 28 at 23; 29-4 at 2–4.) 	Department
officers arrived at Silhouettes to investigate Rowdy Rebel’s appearance and are
alleged to have shut the club down. (ECF Nos. 28 at 23; 28-9 at 6; 28-12 at 4–5.) Mr.
DiPina’s promoter’s license was subsequently suspended by the Board for 30 days.
(ECF No. 28-7 at 5.) 	Department officers had also appeared the previous day to
investigate the appearance of a DJ at Silhouettes. (ECF No. 28 at 23.)
Deputy Chief Verdi and Mr. DiPina discussed the issues arising from the
attendance of Rowdy Rebel and the entertainment license during a phone call. (ECF
No. 28-12). In discussing the difficulties arising related to Silhouettes, Deputy Chief
Verdi encouraged Mr. DiPina to sell the club, in part, because of the difficulties in
ensuring public safety and the “stress,” “frustration,” and “aggravation” that its
operations would cause the deputy chief. (ECF Nos. 28-12 at 5; 28-7 at 5.)
E. This Suit
The Plaintiffs allege that because of the City’s actions, it “suffered significant
economic harm, including business closure, loss of rental income, and diminution in
property value.” (ECF No. 28 at 3.) The Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the City violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as a claim under the Rhode
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 5 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
Island Constitution. (ECF No. 1.) The City now moves for summary judgment. (ECF
No. 24.)
II. 	SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 	An issue is “genuine” if the
evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant, and
a dispute is “material” if it could affect the outcome under governing law.
	Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the initial
burden of identifying the basis for its motion and the portions of the record showing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
	Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986).
When the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may satisfy
its initial burden by showing an absence of evidence supporting the nonmovant’s
position.
	Id. at 322–23. 	Once that showing is made, the nonmovant must identify
specific facts, supported by admissible and competent evidence, showing a genuine
issue for trial.4 Conclusory or self-serving assertions are insufficient.
Id. at 322–24.
Summary judgment is therefore appropriate where the nonmovant fails to make a
sufficient evidentiary showing on an essential element of its case.
	See Theidon v.
4 “Hearsay evidence, inadmissible at trial, cannot be considered on a motion for
summary judgment.”
Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990).
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 6 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
Harvard Univ., 948 F.3d 477, 494 (1st Cir. 2020). 	The evidence introduced into the
record by the non-movant—here the Plaintiffs— “is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in [their] favor.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Plaintiffs did not submit a Statement of Disputed Facts as required by
DRI LR Cv 56 and rely at times on the facts asserted in their Complaint.
	See e.g.,
ECF Nos. 28 at 19; 28-2 at 2–4. 	But “[p]leadings, such as complaints . . . are not
‘evidence’ and thus cannot properly support any purported fact used to oppose
summary judgment.”
Gerffert Co., Inc. v. William J. Hirten Co., LLC, No. CA 10-101
S, 2010 WL 11693557, at *2 (D.R.I. 2010) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 324 (1986)). Even so, the Court reviewed and considered the exhibits produced
by Plaintiffs in their response and all justifiable inferences of properly supported and
cited material facts have been drawn in its favor. All properly supported portions of
the City’s Statement of Undisputed Facts that are not contravened by the Plaintiffs’
exhibits are deemed admitted.
A. 	Standing
The City argues that plaintiffs, The Pink Building, Inc. and Shay DiPina, lack
Article III standing because neither alleged a cognizable constitutional injury and
any asserted losses are either derivative of the business or contractual in nature. The
Court disagrees.
To 	establish 	standing, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	demonstrate 	(1) 	a 	concrete 	and
particularized injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3)
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 7 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 559–60 (1992);
Elizabeth Cady Stanton Trust v. Neronha, 691 F. Supp. 3d 432,
438 (D.R.I. 2023).
The 	Pink 	Building 	alleges 	economic 	losses, 	including 	unpaid 	rent 	and
diminution in property value, following the City’s challenged enforcement actions.
Economic harm constitutes a concrete injury under Article III.
	Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560;
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339–40 (2016). 	Accepting the Plaintiffs’
allegations as true for now, the stated losses are fairly traceable to enforcement
actions that purportedly rendered its tenant unable to operate. Traceability does not
require contractual privity, only causal connection.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Because
damages could redress the alleged harm, the Pink Building has standing.
Mr. DiPina alleges that he suffered personal financial loss in the form of
performance-based compensation tied to the business’ profitability. 	Lost economic
opportunity constitutes a concrete injury in fact.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560;
Spokeo, 578
U.S. at 339–40. 	Although the City characterizes him as merely an employee of
Silhouettes, ownership is not required for standing. The relevant inquiry is whether
he personally suffered a concrete and particularized injury fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct.
	Elizabeth Cady Stanton Trust, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 438.
Construed in the Plaintiffs’ favor, the record supports that conclusion.
Accordingly, the City’s motion for summary judgment on standing grounds as
to The Pink Building, Inc. and Shay DiPina is DENIED.
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 8 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
B. 	Counts II and III: § 1983 and State Constitutional Claims
In Count II of their Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert a general claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The City argues that this claim should fail as a matter of law because
it is duplicative of Counts I and IV which specifically assert constitutional violations
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Plaintiffs do not oppose summary
judgment as to Count II to the extent it is deemed duplicative of Counts I and IV.
The Plaintiffs also do not defend their unspecified state constitutional claim in Count
III. 	Therefore, the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts II and III is
GRANTED.
C. 	Counts I and IV: First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
This Court proceeds to evaluate the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims in Count I (First
Amendment) and Count IV (Fourteenth Amendment). To prevail in a § 1983 claim,
a plaintiff must produce evidence that defendants (1) acted “under color of state law”
and (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution.
	Cepero–Rivera v.
Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2005). Here, the City does not dispute Plaintiffs’
assertion that the municipal entities acted under color of state law and that freedom
from racial discrimination and freedom of speech are protected rights, although they
dispute that the Plaintiffs have been deprived of those rights.
The 	City 	raises 	two 	threshold 	issues, 	including 	state 	exhaustion 	and
personhood under § 1983, which the Court considers first.
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 9 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
1. 	State Exhaustion and § 1983
The City contends that, in contravention of R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-15-5, the
Plaintiffs failed to name the City Treasurer as a defendant and to file a claim with
the City Council before bringing suit. (ECF No. 24-1 at 3 n.1.) But a § 1983 plaintiff
need not comply with state presentment or exhaustion requirements before suing in
federal court. 	R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-15-5 governs only state law actions for damages,
not claims brought under § 1983 claim.
Nuey v. City of Cranston, 524 F. Supp. 3d 1,
4 (D.R.I. 2021) (citing
Perez v. Town of N. Providence, 256 F. Supp. 3d 139, 146 (D.R.I.
2017)). 	Accordingly, the Plaintiffs were not required to present a claim to the City
Council or name the City Treasurer before bringing this action for alleged violations
of their constitutional rights.
2. 	The Providence Police Department as a “Person” Under § 1983
The Plaintiffs’ remaining § 1983 claims asserting violations of their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights must meet the prerequisites for municipal liability,
including the requirement that § 1983 claims can only be asserted against “persons.”
“Persons” include municipal entities like the City of Providence, but not subdivisions
like the Providence Police Department.
	Irizarry v. Providence Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
No. 1:21-CV-00081-MSM-LDA, 2021 WL 5040239, at *1 (D.R.I. Oct. 28, 2021)
(collecting cases);
Boudreau v. Petit, No. CV 17-301WES, 2024 WL 5202023, at *1 n.2
(D.R.I. Dec. 23, 2024);
Ligeri v. Rhode Island, No. CA 07-207 ML, 2007 WL 3072061,
at *5 (D.R.I. Oct. 19, 2007) (collecting cases). The Department cannot be held liable
for the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims as it does not qualify as a person, but the City of
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 10 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
Providence can be held liable for the constitutional violations of the Department.
Summary judgment is appropriate for the Department since no other claims remain
against it.
3. 	The Board of Licenses as a “Person” Under § 1983
The Board of Licenses is situated differently from the Department. “Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a municipality is liable for harms caused by its employees when
‘execution of a government[ ] policy or custom ... inflicts the injury.’”
Kurland v. City
of Providence by & through Lombardi, 711 F. Supp. 3d 57, 78 (D.R.I. 2024) (citing
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Municipal
liability may attach where the decision maker possesses final authority to set policy
with respect to the action ordered.
D’Ambra v. City of Providence, No. CA 11-600M,
2012 WL 7220581, at *6 (D.R.I. Dec. 26, 2012) (citing
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (plurality op.)). 	“[E]ven a single decision of limited scope
and no precedential effect may constitute a
Monell policy or custom if the official
making the decision ‘possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with
respect to the action ordered.’”
	Quarterman v. City of Springfield, 716 F. Supp. 2d
67, 76 (D. Mass. 2009) (quoting
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481 (1986)).
This Court has held that the Board of Licenses may be a “final decisionmaker”
for permitting decisions the Board takes in relation to adult entertainment venues.
D’Ambra, 2012 WL 7220581, at *7–8;
Saints & Sinners v. City of Providence, 172 F.
Supp. 2d 348, 349 (D.R.I. 2001). Here, the Plaintiffs claim that the Board’s decision
to deny a license to Rowdy Rebel was part of the City’s custom of discrimination.
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 11 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
(ECF No. 28 at 22.) As the final decision maker for a permit, the Board may be held
liable as a person under § 1983 if their decision violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Count IV: Equal Protection
The Plaintiffs assert that the City’s enforcement actions violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they do not “engage in this
pattern and practice of conduct against any other similarly situated establishments
within the City of Providence.” 	(ECF No. 	1 at 11.) 	The City moves for summary
judgment, arguing that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Silhouettes was
treated differently from other similarly situated entities, on the basis of the race of
its clientele or otherwise. (ECF No. 24-1 at 9.)
The Plaintiffs appear to make a “class of one” claim in their Complaint, but the
focus 	in 	their 	response 	to 	the 	instant 	Motion 	emphasizes 	alleged 	racial
discrimination. 	(ECF No. 28 at 13, 24–25.) 	Under either theory, however, the
Plaintiffs fail to make the required prima facie showing.
i. 	Class-of-One Theory
A class-of-one equal protection claim requires proof that the plaintiff “has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 177
(1st Cir. 2006);
see also D’Ambra, 2012 WL 7220581, at *12–13 (citing
Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000)). 	The plaintiff bears the burden
of showing that the proposed comparators are similarly situated in all respects
relevant to the challenged government action and must identify specific instances in
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 12 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
which such comparators were treated more favorably.
	Gianfrancesco v. Town of
Wrentham, 712 F.3d 634, 639–40 (1st Cir. 2013).
The Plaintiffs identify no comparator evidence from which a jury could
conclude that Silhouettes was intentionally treated differently than other similarly
situated establishments, or that even if they were treated differently, the City had no
rational basis for doing so. 	The conduct the Plaintiffs characterize as selective
enforcement 	occurred 	between 	March 	2021 	and 	October 	2022 	and 	includes
enforcement of COVID-19 regulations, police detail issues, police presence in and
around the premises, and licensing decisions by the Board. 	None of this evidence
demonstrates that Silhouettes was singled out for treatment that was materially
different from that imposed on comparable venues.
To the contrary, the record reflects that the City broadly enforced public safety
and licensing regulations across the City. 	(ECF Nos. 24-9 at 2; 25 ¶ 12; 28 at 15.)
Evidence in the record shows widespread COVID-19 enforcement at entertainment
venues, extensive unfulfilled police detail requests citywide, and police activity in a
high-crime area encompassing multiple adult entertainment establishments. 	(ECF
Nos. 25 ¶¶ 14–25; 28 at 17.) Similarly, the Board denied entertainment licenses for
the 	same 	performer 	(Rowdy 	Rebel) 	to 	multiple venues 	based on 	public-safety
concerns. (ECF No. 25 ¶ 26.)
Further, the Plaintiffs’ claim that the police activity near Silhouettes was “not
replicated at neighboring venues” and that it was “uniquely subjected to this type of
police presence” ignores the practical reality that neighboring venues share the same
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 13 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
streets and parking lot and that police presence on Allens Avenue, Bay Street, Poe
Street, or in the parking lot would almost certainly “subject” those venues to the same
police presence. Perhaps most importantly, the Plaintiffs have not proffered evidence
showing that these venues were similar in relevant respect beyond broad assertions
of target clientele. 	Nor did they produce evidence supporting their contention that
Silhouettes was in fact treated differently than the other venues. The Plaintiffs have
pointed to no facts that would support a finding that the venues in question had
similarities in characteristics such as area crime, clientele, size, or their interactions
with the Department. 	The record also contains no evidence of enforcement actions
considered 	or 	taken 	against 	these 	venues 	for 	violations 	of 	either 	licensing
requirements or City regulations.5
Because the Plaintiffs have not identified similarly situated comparators or
shown irrational or arbitrary treatment, its class-of-one Equal Protection claim fails
as a matter of law.
ii. 	Racial Discrimination Theory
“The 	central purpose 	of 	the Equal Protection 	Clause of 	the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Proof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose is required to establish an Equal Protection violation.
	Vill. of Arlington
5 The Plaintiffs’ claim of being uniquely subjected to constitutional violations by the
alleged police conduct is further undermined in part by the fact that Mega-Plex, also
owned by Mr. Medeiros, is separately alleging that the police discriminated against
it (on the basis of sexual orientation.)
	See Spur Track Properties, LLC et al. v. City
of Providence et al., C.A. No.: 1:24-cv-00010.
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 14 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. 	To prevail, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that he was
selected for adverse treatment compared with others similarly situated, and (2) that
the selection for adverse treatment was based on his race.”
	Rios-Colon v. Toledo-
Davila, 641 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 	The similarly situated
standard is less demanding here than in a class-of-one claim. 	The question here is
“whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them
roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated.”
	Barrington Cove Ltd.
P’ship v. R.I. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001).
Even under the less demanding standard applicable to racial discrimination
claims, the Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury
could infer discriminatory intent. First, the Plaintiffs have not pointed to any direct
evidence of racial animus. 	Second, the circumstantial evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs, does not create a “convincing mosaic” from which
discriminatory intent could be inferred.
	See Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644
F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Even if the Plaintiffs could
establish that they constitute a protected class because they cater to a particular
racial community, (ECF No. 28 at 14), the Plaintiffs have proffered no evidence, direct
or circumstantial, from which a finder of fact can infer that the City targeted
Silhouettes because of the race of their clientele.6
6 Plaintiffs question whether Department officers properly received anti-bias training
by pointing to testimony of officers who could not recall if they had received the
training to support its argument of “discriminatory and targeted enforcement against
Silhouettes.” (ECF No. 28 at 20–21.) The undisputed record sufficiently reflects that
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 15 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

16
The Plaintiffs point primarily at Deputy Chief Verdi’s expressed opposition to
Silhouettes’ business model and his view that the club’s operations would cause stress
and frustration to support their discriminatory intent argument. (ECF No. 28 at 24–
26.) 	But there is no evidence connecting these views to racial animus or that
demonstrates a connection of these views to a campaign of targeted enforcement
based on the race of Silhouettes’ clientele. 	Indeed, the record reflects that Deputy
Chief Verdi directed officers to cease COVID-19 enforcement at Silhouettes when
contacted and worked with Silhouettes’ management to promote compliance. 	(ECF
Nos. 28-7 at 5; 28-12 at 5; 30 ¶¶ 27–29.)
The Plaintiffs also rely on the Board’s denial of an entertainment license for a
performance by Rowdy Rebel to support their allegation of discrimination. 	The
undisputed record shows, however, that the Board denied license requests for the
same performer at several venues for identical public-safety reasons. (ECF No. 25 ¶
26.) 	Silhouettes’ decision to proceed with hosting the performer without a license,
and the Department’s subsequent enforcement action, does not support an inference
of discriminatory intent.
Because the Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence of differential treatment
among 	similarly 	situated 	establishments 	or 	to 	produce 	evidence 	of 	racially
discriminatory intent, the City is entitled to summary judgment on Count IV.
officers did receive anti-bias training. (ECF No. 29 at 8–9.) Plaintiffs do not provide
other evidence in support of a failure to train claim.
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 16 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

17
D. 	Count I: First Amendment Retaliation
The Plaintiffs allege that the City “targeted enforcement actions against” it to
“force Plaintiffs out of business” as retaliation. (ECF Nos. 1 at 9; 28 at 26.) Plaintiffs
point to (1) Deputy Chief Verdi’s “expressed direct opposition to Silhouettes’ business
model”; (2) Police details; (3) Police presence and activities near and at Silhouettes;
and (4) the Board of Licenses’ license denial to support their claims. (ECF No. 28 at
25–26.) 	The City contends that, even assuming their activity regulates or impacts
speech rather than conduct, the regulations are content neutral and are therefore
subject to intermediate scrutiny which they contend is easily met by their compelling
interest in public safety. 	(ECF No. 24-1 at 19–20.) 	The Plaintiffs argue that the
City’s conduct was not content neutral, nor narrowly tailored, and implicitly argue
that the Court must apply a strict scrutiny standard. 	Because Count I of the
Complaint only alleges the City’s “targeted enforcement actions” violated the First
Amendment, this Court will focus on those enforcement actions.
To begin, the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment argument is devoid of any citations
to the record to show that there is a genuine issue for trial.
	See ECF No. 28 at 25–
26. 	The failure to provide any references in the record or point to any admissible
evidence confirms that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and summary
judgment is appropriate.
The Plaintiffs correctly state that adult entertainment is protected by the First
Amendment and that states may impose reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions on protected speech that are content neutral, narrowly tailored and
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 17 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

18
provide alternative channels for communication of the information.
	Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991);
D’Ambra, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 113. Plaintiffs
assert that the City opposed their “business model” and that, although Silhouettes
was “not prohibited from offering exotic dances,” the City’s enforcement actions had
the effect of suppressing “expression through pretextual or retaliatory means.” (ECF
No. 28 at 26–27.)
The Plaintiffs base their argument on the findings in
The Baltimore Sun Co.
v. Ehrlich, where the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
government officials may not retaliate against protected activity by conduct that
would chill or adversely affect it. 	437 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 2006). 	There, the
Governor of 	Maryland directed his 	press 	office 	to 	not 	communicate 	with two
journalists he perceived to be unfair. 	The Governor did not dispute that his office
issued the directive in response to the journalists’ perceived failure “to be objective in
their reporting.”
Id. at 417. The court concluded that the directive imposed, at most,
a
	de minimis burden on the reporters’ First Amendment rights and that the
Governor’s verbal criticism, though “hostile to and in open disagreement” with
reporters’ activities, was not retaliatory.
Id. at 419–20.
Here, the Plaintiffs have not specified what protected speech caused the
alleged retaliation by the City and how the retaliation they cite was connected to that
speech. 	Instead, they allege unspecified discrimination and separately argue that
“adult 	entertainment 	establishments—particularly 	those 	that 	cater 	to 	African
American communities or promote culturally Black music and performers—would
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 18 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

19
reasonably fear the same targeted enforcement and retaliatory treatment.” (ECF No.
28 at 25, 27.) 	But the record is missing any reference to other adult entertainment
establishments fearing “targeted enforcement and retaliatory treatment” and Mr.
DiPina acknowledged that other entertainment venues that catered to a similar
clientele operated without fear of racial discrimination or targeting. 	(ECF No. 28-4
at 9, 24–25) (alleging other promoters had “carte blanche.”) 	Such broad and
conclusory statements, unaccompanied by record support, are not sufficient to show
that there remains a material dispute.
The Plaintiffs next contend that Deputy Chief Verdi’s “expressed direct
opposition 	to 	Silhouettes’ 	business 	model” 	was 	the 	“predicate 	for 	a 	sustained
campaign of state action that culminated in Silhouettes’ closure.” (ECF No. 28 at 27.)
Even assuming Deputy Chief Verdi is a public official, “[a] public official’s malicious
intent, taken alone, cannot amount to a retaliatory response.”
	Goldstein v. Galvin,
719 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting
Baltimore Sun, 437 F.3d at 420.) 	Nor does
the 	record 	demonstrate 	that 	Deputy 	Chief 	Verdi’s 	comments 	translated 	into
retaliatory conduct directed at Silhouettes’ expressive activity. The evidence instead
reflects content neutral public safety enforcement that was broadly applied to
entertainment venues across the city; not a targeted retaliatory campaign waged
against exotic dancing.
The Plaintiffs remaining contentions amount to an argument that because the
Department’s enforcement actions contributed to the closure of Silhouettes, the City
chilled its speech. (ECF No. 28 at 27.) If every content neutral enforcement activity
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 19 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>

20
that burdened expressive activity and that led directly or indirectly to the closure of
a business or its inability to pay rent constituted a violation of the First Amendment,
the First Amendment would completely hamstring the constitutional policing powers
of states and municipalities. 	Here, the City has clearly articulated a compelling
interest in public safety and Plaintiffs’ unsubstantiated assertions that the City’s
restrictions were not narrowly tailored fail as a matter of law.
The Plaintiffs have failed to articulate a viable First Amendment claim that is
supported by the record and that there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact.
Therefore, summary judgment must be granted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24)
is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
Mary S. McElroy,
United States District Judge
March 30, 2026
Case 1:22-cv-00416-MSM-PAS Document 31 Filed 03/30/26 Page 20 of 20 PageID #:
<pageID>