Sanchez v. Brown University et al

1:23-cv-00343RidOct 4, 2023

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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

JARED PIERCE SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff,

Vv.

C.A. No. 1:23-cv-348-JJM-PAS

BROWN UNIVERSITY; CARE NEW

ENGLAND HEALTH SYSTEMS; and

LIFESPAN CORPORATION,
Defendants.

ORDER

Jared Pierce Sanchez was a medical student at Brown University (“Brown”).
He alleges that Brown, Lifespan Corporation (“Lifespan”), and Care New England
Health Systems (“Care New England”) discriminated against him based on his
religion. Mr. Sanchez alleges he was forced to take a 2-year leave of absence from
school because he refused to be vaccinated against COVID-19. ECF No. 1. Brown
‘gave him an exemption based on his religious beliefs, but Lifespan’s COVID-19
vaccination policy at that time required anyone with access to Rhode Island Hospital
to be vaccinated and it did not recognize any exemptions. Jd. He sues Brown,
Lifespan, and Care New England, claiming a violation of his rights under Titles VI
and VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 (“Title VI,” and “Title VII”), and the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jd, Lifespan moves to dismiss. ECF

No. 6.

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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege facts,
accepted as true, sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcrott v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Bel/
Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court evaluates a pro se
plaintiffs allegations liberally; a pro se plaintiff is held to less stringent pleading
standard but must still allege facts to support a plausible claim. Overton v. Torruella,
183 F. Supp. 2d 295, 303 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-
21 (1972), Lefebvre v. C.LR., 830 F.2d 417, 419 (1st Cir. 1987).
II. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII Claims

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees based on
their race, color, religion, sex (including sexual orientation), or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII defines an employee as “an individual employed by an
employer. . .” and defines an employer as a person engaged in industry affecting
commerce “who has fifteen or more employees” per day. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), (b).
Where a statute defines “employee” in a circular way, the Supreme Court, and the

First Circuit have held that common law agency principles apply.1 Lopez v.

1 The First Circuit looks to a non-exhaustive list of factors outlined in the
EEOC’s Compliance Manual. Lopez, 588 F.3d. at85 (citing Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448-50 (2003)). These include
right to control, the degree of skill required, whether work was performed on
premises, the existence of a continuing relationship, right to assign projects, the
subjective view of the parties, and factors related to hours, duration, payment,

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Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69, 83-86 (Ist Cir. 2009) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). | |

Mr. Sanchez is a medical student enrolled at Brown University. ECF No. 1
at 4. By his own account, he is a “student trainee.” Jd. He explains that he was
“subjected to [Lifespan’s] schedules, responsibilities, and obligations” and that he
operated “under the guidance and supervision of Lifespan’s staff’ but has not alleged
how, specifically, Lifespan exercised control over his working conditions. ECF No. 7
at 2. He has not alleged the existence of a continuing relationship, or any facts
related to hours, duration, payment, or benefits. ECF No. 10-1 at 1. To establish an
employment relationship, he points to his obligations as a student under the Warren
| Alpert Medical School Handbook (ECF No.7 at 2) and seeks a remedy for the
interruption of his educational progression, further suggesting that he a student, not
an employee. ECF No. 10-1 at 1. Because Mr. Sanchez has not alleged that he was
employed by Lifespan, he was not protected under Title VII, and therefore has no

cause of action against it

B. Title VI Claim

Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI does not cover discrimination based

taxation, and provision of benefits, which are evaluated based on a totality of the
circumstances. Jd.

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on religion. Because Mr. Sanchez’s claim is based on his religion, he fails to state a

claim under Title V1.

C. First Amendment Claim

“The First Amendment prohibits government from ‘abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.” Am. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta,
141 S. Ct. 2373, 2382 (2021) (emphasis added). Here Mr. Sanchez does not allege any
governmental action that inhibited his rights under the First Amendment. Under
the public-function test, however, a private actor may be subject to constitutional
constraints if it exercises powers “traditionally exc/usively reserved to the State.”
Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)) (intermediate citation omitted). Offering

clinical rotations is not exclusively a state function, and under established precedent,

receipt of federal funds does not transform a hospital into a state actor.2, Rockwell,

2 This principal was upheld in another district as recently as last month in the
context of COVID-19 vaccination exemptions. McEntee v. Beth Israel Lahey Health,
Inc., No. 22-cv-11952-DLC, 2023 WL 4907617, at *4 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2023).

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26 F.3d at 258 (citation omitted). Thus, Mr. Sanchez has no cause of action against
Lifespan under the First Amendment.
The Court GRANTS Defendant Lifespan Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss.

ECF No. 6.

ITIS SO ORD ED. |

John J. McConnell, 4
Chief Judge
United States District Court

October 4, 2023

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