Merritt et al v. Tiernan et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
KAREN R. MERRITT,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES P. TIERNAN; and PENSCO
TRUST COMPANY
now known as
Pacific Premier Trust Custodian FBO
James P. Tiernan IRA, Account
Number 200075,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 23-cv-509-JJM-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.
Defendant James P. Tiernan moves for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 70) and
Plaintiff Karen R. Merritt moves for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 68) in this
case about a promissory Note, a mortgage, a foreclosure, and a title and eviction in
Massachusetts state court. 	Because there are no factual disputes that are relevant
to deciding the legal question here, the Court will first set forth the undisputed facts
then proceed to analyze how those facts interact with the law and then conclude.
I. 	FACTS
Karen R. Merritt was in danger of losing her home (“Property”) to foreclosure
because she had fallen behind in her mortgage payments. Mr. Merritt’s ex-husband
had a professional relationship with an accountant who was also the accountant for
Defendant James P. Tiernan. 	Mr. Tiernan agreed to loan ($146,500) as a “bridge
loan” from his personal IRA to Ms. Merritt until Ms. Merritt and her ex-husband
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either refinanced or sold the Property.1 Ms. Merritt signed a promissory Note for the
loan amount payable upon demand. 	ECF No. 70-2 at 11-13. 	The Note also stated
that “THE ENTIRE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT HEREUNDER SHALL IN ALL EVENTS
BE DUE AND PAYABLE ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THE EXECUTION
OF THIS NOTE.”
Id. at 11.
The one-year deadline came and went – as did the next six years – without Ms.
Merritt or her ex-husband making any payment on the Note. By letter in 2017, Mr.
Tiernan declared that Ms. Merritt had been in default on the loans since 2011 and
notified her of his intention to foreclose on the Property. 	He claimed that, as of
June 30, 2017 the outstanding balance was $851,983.14.
The next year, Mr. Tiernan again sent a letter declaring Ms. Merritt in default
and again stating his intent to foreclose the Property as a result. 	Attached to the
letter was an accounting of principal and interest amounts, which indicated that,
contrary to the language of the promissory notes, she was assessed compound rather
than simple interest. 	The following year Mr. Tiernan sent a third letter again
declaring that Ms. Tiernan was in default and his intent was to foreclose on the
Property. This time, the letter stated that a foreclosure auction had been scheduled
to take place.
The auction took place on December 3, 2019 with the winning bid of $550,000.
However, the foreclosure sale did not close until May 2020 when the foreclosure deed
1 Another of the accountant’s clients lent Ms. Merritt the remaining portion of
the money needed to avoid foreclosure.
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for the Property was recorded. 	The Property’s new owner brought actions in the
Massachusetts Housing Court seeking to establish superior title right to the Property
and to evict Ms. Merritt. She had lived without any payment on the Note or rent for
a decade – nor has she paid any insurance or taxes on the Property. 	The final
judgment in those cases was delivered for the new owner.
Ms. Merritt filed this Complaint, asserting a claim under G.L. c 93A §§ 2 and
9. ECF 1.
II. 	HISTORY OF LITIGATION
Because so much of Mr. Tiernan’s motion involves the effects of other litigation
on this case, a review of the relevant prior litigation helps our current analysis.
Litigation involving the loan and mortgage given by Mr. Tiernan to Ms. Merritt
and her ex-husband began in August 20202 when the purchaser of the Property at
the foreclosure sale, L&S Realty, LLC sued3 Ms. Merritt, her ex-husband, and their
children.4 (“L&S Litigation”). In response to the lawsuit, Ms. Merritt filed a 46-page
answer with many affirmative defenses and extensive Counterclaims, including
fifteen Affirmative Defenses based on Massachusetts G.L. c. 244 statutory law and
foreclosure procedures, which are the same claims that Ms. Merritt asserts in support
of her Chapter 93A claim here. 	Also, Ms. Merritt brought Counterclaims for
declaratory, equitable, and injunctive belief, based on alleged violations of G.L. c. 244
2 Before that Ms. Merritt filed bankruptcy.
3
L&S Realty, LLC v. James M. Cronan, Molly Cronan, Charles Cronan, Joseph
Cronan, and Karen R. Merritt in Southeast Housing Court, Taunton Session, Civil
Action No. 20H83CV00167TA.
4 L&S Realty alleged that the family remained living in the Property.
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§ 35A (Count I), G.L. c. 244 § 35B (Count II), for alleged predatory lending in violation
of Chapter 93A (Count III), for alleged usury under § 271 and Chapter 93A (Count
IV) based on the same statutory provisions that she alleges support her 93A claim in
this lawsuit.
The L&S Litigation ended with a final judgment for L&S and against Ms.
Merritt and her co-defendants. The Court rejected all the Affirmative Defenses and
dismissed all of Ms. Merritt’s Counterclaims based on a statute of limitations
defense.5
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings and to assess the
proof to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.”
Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950
F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting
Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st
Cir. 1990)). 	Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	The moving party bears the
burden of “assert[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and then
support[ing] 	that 	assertion 	by 	affidavits, 	admissions, 	or 	other 	materials 	of
evidentiary quality.”
	Mulvihill v. Top-Flite Golf Co., 335 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2003).
“An issue is ‘genuine’ if it can be ‘resolved in favor of either party,’ and a fact is
5 In addition to the L&S Litigation, Ms. Merritt’s ex-husband filed suit in
Rhode Island Superior Court
James M. Cronan v. Ralph Grieco, James P. Tiernan,
the Classic Group, Inc., 88 Fountain Street, LLC, C.A. No. PC-2019-3655. 	Ms.
Merritt unsuccessfully tried to intervene, and the Court dismissed the lawsuit when
Mr. Cronan did not appear for a pretrial conference.
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‘material’ if it ‘has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case.’”
	Feliciano-
Muñoz v. Rebarber-Ocasio, 970 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting
Tang v. Citizens
Bank, N.A., 821 F.3d 206, 215 (1st Cir. 2016)).
Once the moving party has met its burden, “[t]he burden then shifts to the
nonmovant 	to 	establish 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact.”
Pleasantdale Condos., LLC v. Wakefield, 37 F.4th 728, 733 (1st Cir. 2022). To satisfy
this 	burden, 	the 	nonmovant 	“must 	present 	definite, 	competent 	evidence”
demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists.
	Id. (quoting
Mesnick, 950 F.2d
at 822). 	“[C]onclusory 	allegations, 	improbable 	inferences, 	and 	unsupported
speculation” are not enough.
Kinzer v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 99 F.4th 105, 108 (1st
Cir. 2024) (quoting
Ellis v. Fid. Mgmt. Tr. Co., 883 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2018)). 	The
Court must “view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
resolve all reasonable inferences in its favor, without weighing the evidence or
evaluating the credibility of the witnesses.”
Sheehan v. N. Am. Mktg. Corp., 610 F.3d
144, 149 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing
Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006)).
If there are no disputes about any relevant facts, then the Court must
determine whether the movants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
The Court will first analyze Mr. Tiernan’s assertions for summary judgment
because, if the Court agrees, that conclusion is dispositive of the case. 	Mr. Tiernan
asserts a barrage of reasons why he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law most
significantly: that the Court lacks jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
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collateral estoppel, and/or res judicata. Substantively, he argues that the case should
be dismissed because Ms. Merritt failed to prove that he was engaged in “trade or
commerce” as required by Chapter 93A, she lacks proof of damages, and the statute
of limitations bars her claims.
A. Rooker-Feldman
“The
	Rooker-Feldman 	doctrine 	preserves 	the 	Supreme 	Court’s 	exclusive
jurisdiction over ‘appeals from final state-court judgments,’ by divesting lower federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear certain cases brought by parties who have lost in state
court.”
	Klimowicz v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 907 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 2018)
(citations omitted). Specifically, the doctrine6 applies to “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [that were] rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and invit[e] district court review and
rejection of those judgments.”
	Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction “where the issues presented in
the case ‘are inextricably intertwined’ with questions previously decided by a state
court, such that the federal district court would be in the unseemly position of
reviewing a state court decision for error.”
Mills v. Harmon L. Offs.,
PC, 344 F.3d 42,
44 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting
Hill v. Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 29 (1st Cir. 1999)). Federal
claims are “inextricably intertwined” with state court claims if the “federal court
6 The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from two U.S. Supreme Court cases–
Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and
District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues
before it.”
Hill, 193 F.3d at 39 (quoting
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 23, 25
(1987) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
Mr. Tiernan asserts that Ms. Merritt’s “93A claims rely exclusively on alleged
deficiencies in the foreclosure proceeding and her claims that [he] applied usurious
interest in the foreclosure proceeding.” 	ECF No. 70 at 17. 	Because a state court
issued a final judgment in the L&S Litigation, he asserts that this action is a case
“brought by a state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before [these] proceedings commenced and inviting [this court
review and rejection of those judgment.”
	Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
The Counterclaims and the Affirmative Defenses that Ms. Merritt raised in
response to the Complaint in the L&S Litigation are remarkably like and perhaps
“almost identical” to the legal and factual claims she asserts in this federal lawsuit
She 	asserted 	violations 	of 	G.L. 	c. 	244, 	and 	Chapter 	93A. 	In 	that 	case, 	the
Massachusetts court dismissed her case on statute of limitations grounds and entered
final judgment against her, stating that from “a review of the record even under a
theory asserting equity, this case was before the Land Court . . . and [Ms.] Merritt . .
. could have and should have asserted [her] respective claims concerning predatory
lending in violation of G.L. c. 188C and G.L. 93A in that venue. [Her] failure to pursue
those claims at that time does not allow for a waiver of the applicable statute of
limitations here. 	In the opinion of the Court there was ample opportunity for [Ms.
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Merritt] to pursue those claims in that respective forum and against the parties most
culpable for any alleged lending violations.” ECF No. 80, Ex. A at 3. In this case, Ms.
Merritt brings nearly identical claims under Chapter 93A challenging deficiencies in
the foreclosure procedure and unfair interest charges. These “matters fall[] squarely
within the compass of the state-court judgments,”
Klimowicz v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l
Tr. Co., 907 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2018), and so squarely within
Rooker-Feldman’s
coordinates.
Ms. Merritt contends that she does not ask this Court to vacate, revise, or
disturb the Massachusetts Housing Court possession judgment because she does not
seek possession, title, or any form of relief that would alter the state court’s judgment
or its operative effect. She argues that
Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional bar does not
apply because she seeks damages and statutory relief for Defendant’s independent
creditor conduct—including the generation and enforcement of cure, default, and
payoff figures, and the leveraging of recorded instruments and enforcement process
in trade or commerce. 	ECF No. 76 at 5. 	Because she did not present these legal
theories to the state court, she argues that she should be allowed to continue her case
before this Court.
But “a plaintiff cannot escape the
Rooker-Feldman bar through the simple
expedient of introducing a new legal theory in the federal forum that was not
broached in the state courts.”
Klimowicz v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 907 F.3d 61,
65 (1st Cir. 2018);
Leavitt v. United States Auto. Ass’n, 2024 WL 218504 (D. Mass.
January 19, 2024). 	The Court can still apply
Rooker-Feldman where a different
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theory is put forth – the “doctrine is not contingent upon an identity between the
issues actually litigated in the prior state-court proceedings and the issues proffered
in the subsequent federal suit. Instead, the critical datum is whether the plaintiff’s
federal suit is, in effect, an end-run around a final state-court judgment.”
	Id.;
see
Federación de Maestros de P.R., 410 F.3d at 24 (stating that “a federal suit seeking
an opposite result [from a final state court judgment] is an impermissible attempt to
appeal the state judgment to the lower federal courts”).
As to her predatory lending claims, the Housing Court “also note[d] that his
matter has been litigated in several forums and Respondent also failed to assert any
of the claims under the promissory notes when said claims were within both of the
aforementioned applicable statutes of limitations.” 	ECF No. 80, Ex. A at 3. 	If the
Court was to allow Ms. Merritt claim to proceed, it would have to undo – or at least
undercut – the Massachusetts state court’s judgment in the L&S Litigation, which
ruled against Ms. Merritt on the same or essentially similar claims that are presented
here.7 	Because 	Ms. 	Tiernan 	litigated 	her 	foreclosure-related 	claims 	in 	the
Massachusetts courts and the Housing Court entered final judgment against her on
her claims, for important reasons of public policy, the “inextricably intertwined”
claims that she has brought in this case are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine
and Mr. Tiernan is thus entitled to summary judgment.
7 The state cases and this federal case did not overlap. 	Ms. Merritt filed this
federal court case after she lost her state court cases.
	See Exxon Mobile Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus.,
Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (
Rooker-Feldman does not apply more
broadly to any federal case that overlaps with parallel state-court litigation).
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B.
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
While the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Merritt’s claim
under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, to the extent that she identifies any other
arguments for this Court’s jurisdiction based on new information, the Court will
consider two legal axioms that Mr. Tiernan raises in support of his Motion for
Summary Judgment – res judicata and collateral estoppel. Because the Court finds
that Ms. Merritt’s claim has been previously litigated in prior proceedings, it is barred
from this Court’s hearing under both res judicata and collateral estoppel.
“Res judicata bars a party from re-litigating claims that were or could have
been raised in prior litigation where there is: ‘(1) a final judgment on the merits in an
earlier proceeding, (2) sufficient identicality between the causes of action asserted in
the earlier and later suits, and (3) sufficient identicality between the parties in the
two actions.’”
	Bishay v. Ricciuti, 575 F. Supp. 3d 262, 268 (D. Mass. 2021),
aff'd,
No. 22-1033, 2023 WL 9111255 (1st Cir. Apr. 26, 2023) (quoting
In re Colonial Mortg.
Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003)). The doctrine of res judicata requires
a plaintiff to present every ground for relief in the first action he files or forever be
barred from asserting it.
In re Colonial Mortgage Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st
Cir. 2003). 	The purpose of this doctrine is to promote the finality of judgments and
thereby increase certainty, discourage multiple litigation, and conserve judicial
resources.
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, (1980).
Collateral estoppel bars the re-litigation of issues or facts where: “(1) [T]he
issue sought to be precluded in the later action is the same as that involved in the
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earlier action; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was determined by a
valid and binding final judgment; and (4) the determination of the issue was essential
to the judgment.”
	Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc. v. El Dia, Inc., 490 F.3d 86, 90 (1st
Cir. 2007). “A judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the
same parties or their privies based upon the same cause of action.”
Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, n. 5 (1979). Because these doctrinal elements are in
lockstep, the Court will consider them together.
Here, as to the identity of the parties element, parties in the state and federal
actions are the same. As for determining privity, the Court looks for “‘a community
of interest between the two entities’ and when they ‘sufficiently represent’ each
other’s interests.”
IDC Prop., Inc. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 3d 236, 249
(D.R.I 2024) (quoting
Duffy v. Milder, 896 A.2d 27, 36 (R.I. 2006)). 	Here, as the
purchaser of the Property, L&S was in privity with Mr. Tiernan as sellers of the
Property. 	Ms. Merritt was a party to all the foreclosure and Housing Court
proceedings. 	And 	the 	Housing 	Court 	allowing 	Ms. 	Merritt 	to 	assert 	all 	her
foreclosure-related claims against L&S in the Housing Court Action. 	As to the
finality of judgment, the Housing Court’s judgment was final when Ms. Merritt
brought this action. 	As to identity of issues, as the Court has detailed above, the
issues presented here are identical (although now solely recast as 93A claims) to those
presented and were essential to the judgment entered against her in state court.
Here, all the claims that Ms. Merritt is asserting in this case either were
asserted unsuccessfully in state court or could have been asserted in the L&S
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Litigation and Ms. Merritt failed to do so. Ms. Merritt had more than a full and fair
opportunity to litigate these issues. Accordingly, collateral estoppel and res judicata
also bars this Court’s jurisdiction over Ms. Merritt’s 93A claim.
V. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendant James P. Tiernan’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. ECF No. 70. The Court DENIES Plaintiff Karen R. Merritt’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. ECF No. 68.8
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
John J. McConnell, Jr.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
March 20, 2026
8 The Court also DENIES AS MOOT: Defendant’s Motion to Strike Statement
of Undisputed Facts (ECF No. 74); Plaintiff’s Motion for Prejudgment and Limited
Discovery (ECF No. 87); and Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Consideration of
Summary Judgment Motion Due to Medical Hardship (ECF No. 88).
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