Metz et al v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
MARGARITA METZ and MANUEL METZ, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 23-510 WES
)
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY )
COMPANY, )
)
Defendant. )
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Senior District Judge.
Before the Court are Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s Motion”), Dkt.
No. 26, and Plaintiffs’, Margarita Metz’ and Manuel Metz’s, Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs’ Motion”), Dkt. No. 28.
These motions seek to resolve the parties’ ongoing dispute
regarding the applicability of Plaintiffs’ homeowner’s insurance
policy to remediate water damage to their former residence (the
“Property”).1 For the reasons below, the Court grants Defendant’s
Motion and denies Plaintiffs’ Motion.
1 Previously, the Court granted in part Defendant’s Motion to
Bifurcate this action pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and stayed Plaintiffs’ claims for bad faith
pending the Court’s resolution of their contractual claims. Text
Order (June 24, 2024). Although Plaintiffs have not moved for
summary judgment on their bad faith claims, Defendant requests
that the Court resolve this case in its entirety. See Wolf v.
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I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from Defendant’s denial of insurance
coverage to redress severe water damage in Plaintiffs’ former
residence in Bristol, Rhode Island. See Pl.s’ Statement Undisputed
Facts (“PSUF”) ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 29. In “September of 2022” Plaintiffs
moved out of the Property, which prompted their daughter, Tamara
Metz, to begin checking in on it periodically. Id. ¶ 3-4.
Plaintiffs concede that this home lacked a full-time occupant once
they moved out of the Property. Id. Approximately seven months
later, “[o]n or around April 24, 2023,” a landscaping company
contacted Tamara Metz and informed her of severe water damage at
the Property. Id. ¶ 6. In response, Ms. Metz arranged for her
husband to visit the Property leading him to discover a water leak
that he described as “pretty catastrophic looking.” Id. ¶¶ 7-9.
Following a report to Defendant that same day, Plaintiffs sought
coverage for damage to both the dwelling itself and the personal
property within it.2 Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 27.
After Plaintiffs requested coverage, Defendant undertook an
investigation using an independent adjusting company named
Geico Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 2d 197, 198 (D.R.I. 2010) (noting
that an action for bad faith does not exist until a plaintiff first
establishes a breach of contract).
2 The policy at issue contains separate provisions for damage
to the dwelling itself “Coverage A” and damage to the property
within the dwelling “Coverage B.” Pl.’s Statement Undisputed Facts
(“PSUF”) ¶ 17, Dkt. No. 29.
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Sedgwick. Id. ¶ 30. Pursuant to the investigation, Sedgwick
employee Cameo Clark requested a variety of information associated
with this accident and assigned another company, American Leak
Detection, to inspect the premises. Id. ¶¶ 31-33. Along with
other documentation, Clark obtained a water record from
Plaintiffs’ public adjuster Gentili & Rossini. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34-35.
Specifically, these records displayed the amount of water used
over the four years preceding the accident in three-month
increments. Id. ¶ 35. Importantly, the records indicate that the
household typically used between 6,000 and 12,000 gallons during
each three-month period when Plaintiffs lived at the Property.
Id. From January 22 to April 23,2023, the records indicate that
the Property used 870,732.53 gallons of water.3 See id. Ex. 13,
at 11, Dkt. No. 29-13. During the prior three-month period, the
first full period after Plaintiffs vacated the residence, the
Property used zero gallons of water. Id.
With respect to the inspection conducted by American Leak
Detection, technician Aaron Mann’s report contained the following
notes:
I arrived at the residence and was allowed entry by the
public adjustor. There is very severe damage to most of
3 For reference, an Olympic-sized swimming pool holds about
660,000 gallons of water. Grace Jidoun, How Big Is an Olympic
Swimming Pool? Your Questions Answered Ahead of the Summer Games,
NBC (Apr. 24, 2024, 2:51 PM), https://www.nbc.com/nbc-
insider/olympic-swimming-pool-size-gallons-meters-depth.
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the property. The hot water shutoff to the second-floor
bathroom vanity failed and water ran through the house
for an extended amount of time. The line was cut and
capped before my arrival. I turned the water on and
filled the system. There are no other leaks at this
time. I shut the main supply off before my departure.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. D, Dkt. No. 26-2.4
Moreover, a claim note from Clark indicates that she spoke to
a Bristol County Water Authority employee named Donna and sought
further clarification regarding the size of the leak. PSUF Ex.
10, at 6, Dkt. No. 29-10. Clark’s notes indicate that Donna
advised her that the leak began on or about February 6, 2023, and
ended around April 24, 2023, which resulted in a water bill of
$7,280.08.5 Id. Following its investigation, Defendant denied
the claim and noted that Plaintiffs’ policy excludes coverage for
damage caused by the seepage or leakage of water that develops
over a period of time. PSUF ¶¶ 46-47. After this Court denied
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, both parties
moved for summary judgment. See Mem. & Order (Feb. 14, 2025),
Dkt. No. 21.
4 In their opposition to Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiffs take
issue with this statement: (1) to the extent that it imprecisely
describes the duration of the leak; and (2) because it constitutes
hearsay and is therefore allegedly improper evidence for
consideration on summary judgment. Pls.’ Statement of Disputed
Facts(“PSDF”) 3, Dkt. No. 35.
5 Plaintiffs also object to this evidence, arguing that it
constitutes hearsay and questioning Defendants’ failure to obtain
the underlying data from the Bristol County Water Authority to
support this claim. See Pls.’ Mem. 16 & n.6, Dkt. No. 29-1.
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II. Legal Standard
To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, litigants must
demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact does not exist
and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Boykin v. Genzyme Therapeutic Prods., LP, 93 F.4th 56, 60 (1st
Cir. 2024) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “The summary judgment
ritual is standard fare: once the movant adumbrates an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the burden shifts
to the nonmovant to establish the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Id. (citation modified). Importantly, “to carry
this burden, the nonmovant cannot simply rely on evidence that is
conjectural or problematic but, rather, must present definite,
competent evidence.” Id. (citation modified). Relatedly, the
interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law and
courts will assess the policies using the same rules that govern
the construction of contracts. See Atmed Treatment Ctr., Inc. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 285 A.3d 352, 359-60 (R.I. 2022).
Here, both parties agree that the Court’s interpretation of
the “seepage or leakage” exclusions, contained in both the sections
of the policy providing coverage for damage to the dwelling and
for personal property, dictates the outcome of their dispute.6
These exclusions provide the following in relevant part:
6 Defendant also notes that the policy contains a similar
coverage exemption under its “limited coverage endorsement” for
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Section 1 – Losses Not Insured [By Coverage A]
1. We will not pay for any loss to the property described
in Coverage A that consists of, or is directly and
immediately caused by, one or more of the perils listed
in items a. through m. below, regardless of whether the
loss occurs abruptly or gradually, involves isolated or
widespread damage, arises from natural or external
forces, or occurs as a result of any combination of
these:
. . . .
f. seepage or leakage of water, steam, or sewage that
occurs or develops over a period of time:
(1) and is:
(a) continuous;
(b) repeating;
(c) gradual;
(d) intermittent;
(e) slow; or
(f) trickling; and
(2) from a:
. . . .
(c) plumbing system, including from, within or
around any shower stall, shower bath, tub
installation, or other plumbing fixture, including
their walls, ceilings or floors.
We also will not pay for losses arising from condensation
or the presence of humidity, moisture, or vapor that
occurs or develops over a period of time.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. A, at 0033-34, Dkt. No. 26-2.7
the remediation of fungus. See Def.’s Mem. L. Supp. Opp’n Pl.’s
Mot. Summ. J. 5-6, Dkt. No. 31. Plaintiffs do not appear to assert
that a separate interpretation of this section or its exemptions
would alter its ability to obtain coverage for their losses. See
generally Pls.’ Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J., Dkt. No. 28.
7 Although organized differently, the policy’s explanation
of coverage for damage to personal property contains effectively
the same exclusionary language. See Def.’s Mot. Ex. A, at 0033-
34, Dkt. No. 26-2. Moreover, with the exception of one argument
addressed below, neither party has asserted that the Court’s
interpretation should diverge based on the aforementioned
differences. As a result, the Court will not provide duplicative
analyses of these near-identical provisions.
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The Court’s review of the record and the language contained
in the policy suggests that Defendant properly declined to provide
Plaintiffs coverage for the damage to the Property. Specifically,
the record reveals that Defendant investigated the cause of the
water damage and determined that it originated from a failed hot
water shutoff located in Plaintiffs’ second floor vanity. Def.’s
Mot. Ex. D, at SF00138, Dkt. No. 26-2. This water shutoff’s
failure caused 870,732.53 gallons of water to leak out of this
source between January 22, 2023, and April 23, 2023, which,
coincidentally, is the day before the water damage was discovered.
PSUF ¶ 35, id. Ex. 13, at 11.
Although Plaintiffs contest the admissibility of the more
granular details underlying this event, they do not dispute the
underlying cause of the water damage, or the amount of water
released over this period of time. Therefore, even when viewing
the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the
uncontroverted factual record in this matter demonstrates that
this 870,732.53-gallon release that resulted from the failed
shutoff constitutes a “continuous” or a “repeating” “seepage or
leakage of water” “from a plumbing system” that “occur[ed] or
develop[ed] over a period of time” and therefore falls outside the
coverage provided by their insurance policy. See Def.’s Mot. Ex.
A, at 0034. What’s more, Plaintiffs have failed to present
“definite, competent evidence” that would contradict the core
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narrative of what Defendant’s investigation reveals: the cause of
this water damage originated from a leak that took place at a
minimum over the course of several weeks, and probably multiple
months. Plaintiffs have failed to direct the Court to record
evidence that would provide a plausible, alternative explanation
for the series of events that could have resulted in the damage to
the Property. As a result, this Court grants summary judgment in
Defendant’s favor.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue the Court may not grant
summary judgment in Defendant’s favor based on what they identify
as supposed evidentiary issues rooted in the rule against hearsay.
Similarly, Plaintiffs assert that their interpretation of the
evidentiary record and the policy permits the Court to grant
summary judgment in their favor. The Court finds neither argument
convincing.
With respect to their opposition to Defendant’s Motion,
Plaintiffs object to Defendant’s reliance on the report prepared
by Defendant’s agent and its summary of a conversation with the
employee from the Bristol County Water Authority. Specifically,
Plaintiffs take issue with the note stating that the water ran
through Plaintiffs’ property over the course of seventy-seven
days. Pls.’ Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Mem.”)
15-16, Dkt. No. 28-1. According to Plaintiffs, both the report
itself and the statements contained within it constitute hearsay
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and therefore the Court must refrain from relying upon them at
summary judgment. Id. at 16. The Court finds this argument
unavailing.
Although Defendant relies on the information contained in the
report on summary judgment, Defendant would undoubtedly call both
the author of the report itself and a knowledgeable representative
from the Bristol County Water Authority to provide direct testimony
surrounding the investigation that took place and the data obtained
to determine the source of this damage at trial. As a result,
Plaintiffs’ evidentiary concerns fail to present a valid obstacle
at this stage of the dispute. See Estate of Rahim v. Doe, 51 F.4th
402, 412 (1st Cir. 2022) (“The standard is not whether the evidence
at the summary judgment stage would be admissible at trial — it is
whether it could be presented at trial in an admissible form.”)
(citation modified). Therefore, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’
attempt to prevent its reliance on this evidence.
Even if the Court declined to consider the report on summary
judgment, the record contains sufficient evidence for it to rule
in Defendant’s favor. However, the Court notes that this report
provides an unquestionably stronger basis for its determination
that a seventy-seven-day long discharge of water constitutes a
“continuous” or “repeating” discharge of water that took place
“over a period of time.” See Def.’s Mot. Ex. A, at 0034. Once
again, the Court’s reliance on this evidence is significantly
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bolstered by the fact that Plaintiffs have failed to assert a
plausible alternative explanation for the events that took place
at the Property using record evidence.
With respect to Plaintiffs’ request for summary judgment in
their favor, the Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to read
either the record or the policy in a manner that would prevent the
exemption from applying. Specifically, Plaintiffs appear to ask
the Court to engage in a myopically literal reading of the phrase
“period of time” and conclude that this policy results in “illusory
coverage.” Pls.’ Mem. 8-9. However, because the record in this
matter reflects a virtually uncontroverted narrative that the leak
took place over the course of several weeks, the Court will refrain
from engaging in the mental gymnastics necessary to determine
whether the plain meaning of the phase “period of time” would allow
an insurer to decline coverage under this policy under every
conceivable factual scenario involving a leak. See Allstate Ins.
v. Ahlquist, 59 A.3d 95, 98 (R.I. 2013) (“We refrain from engaging
in mental gymnastics or from stretching the imagination to read
ambiguity into a policy where none is present. The test to be
applied is not what the insurer intended, but what the ordinary
reader and purchaser would have understood the language to mean.”)
(citation modified). While it is possible in a case with a
different set of facts the policy language might create an
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ambiguity, the only issue before the Court is whether the policy
is ambiguous as applied to these facts. It is not.
Similarly, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that the
policy’s use of the phrase “abrupt and accidental discharge or
overflow of water” impliedly suggests that it only prevents
coverage from leaks that involve a small volume of water or that
occur at a slow pace. See Pls.’ Mem. 8, 18. The plain language
of the policy does not permit this inference and the Court refuses
to depart from the policy’s text absent the existence of any
ambiguous language. The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ attempt to
assemble a collection of cases from other jurisdictions in an
effort to demonstrate that the high volume of water that leaked
into the Property prevents the Court from characterizing it as a
leak. See id. 18-19. To be sure, a leak of 870,732.53 gallons of
water over the period of seventy-seven days is an enormous volume
of water. However, as Plaintiffs indicate, a leak of this
magnitude would involve water leaking at a rate of 11,298 gallons
each day or roughly 470 gallons each hour. This rate slightly
exceeds the flow rate of a strong bathtub faucet. See Quality Bath,
A Guide to Water Flow Rates (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.qualitybath.com/discover/post/18226/guide-water-
flow-rates?srsltid=AfmBOoru-gNALY-
07MgrAfT3oNEYEqRC6hE6NUgRxGzCz6hNQWUiKpS6.
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This suggests that the leak here could reasonably be expected
to have taken place due to malfunctioning plumbing in an average
household and not only as a result of a cataclysmic accident.
Similarly, the volume of water by itself does not necessarily
suggest that the damage to the Property resulted from an
unpreventable or unforeseeable event. Instead, based on the record
before the Court, it appears that an inspection of the Property on
a more frequent basis would have drastically altered the volume of
water ultimately present in late April 2023. The Court therefore
rejects Plaintiffs’ attempt to argue that the volume of water found
at the Property should somehow prevent it from characterizing the
damage as a leak under the policy’s exclusions. Consequently, the
Court rejects the Plaintiffs’ request to reach a contrary ruling.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Defendant
has successfully demonstrated its entitlement to summary judgment.
As a result, the Court GRANTS Defendant State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 26, and
DENIES Plaintiffs’, Margarita Metz’ and Manuel Metz’s, Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 28.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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William E. Smith
Senior District Judge
Date: January 14, 2026
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