Akinde v. Bryant University

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
ADEOLA AKINDE,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRYANT UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
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C.A. No. 1:23-cv-00551-MSM-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
The 	plaintiff, 	Adeola 	Akinde, 	was 	employed 	by 	the 	defendant, 	Bryant
University (“the University”), from January 2018 until his termination in December
2022. 	He brings claims alleging race and disability discrimination and retaliation
under state and federal law. 	The University now moves for summary judgment,
(ECF No. 28), which, for the reasons below, the Court GRANTS.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Akinde’s claims against the University arise from his employment as a
Public Safety Officer (“PSO”) from January 2, 2018, until December 6, 2022. 	(ECF
No. 29 ¶¶ 1, 79–83.) PSOs are part of the University’s Department of Public Safety
(“DPS”) which is headed by the Executive Director of Public Safety, Chief Stephen
Bannon. (ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 1–3.)
From the beginning of 2018 to 2020, Mr. Akinde began accumulating written
performance issue write-ups and verbal admonishments for failing to show up to work
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during assigned periods, for the use of his personal cell phone during work hours, and
for failing to respond to dispatch calls.1 (ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 8–9, 76.)
On March 22, 2021, Mr. Akinde received a one-day suspension for losing his
duty keys. 	(ECF No. 29-1 at 281–82.) 	The loss of duty keys “creates a crisis-level
security risk” for the University because duty keys provide access to “nearly every
building, office, residence hall, townhouse, and bedroom on campus.”2 (ECF No. 29 ¶
13.) In response to this loss of duty keys, Chief Bannon instituted a new DPS protocol
requiring every officer to attach their keys to a lanyard on their duty belt. (ECF No.
29 ¶¶ 14–15.)
On December 13, 2021, Mr. Akinde submitted a completed Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”) certification form to the University indicating that he would need
approximately six weeks of FMLA leave for lower back pain he was experiencing from
a bad mattress. (ECF Nos. 36-2 ¶ 115; 34-38.) His chiropractor noted that his lower
back pain prevented him from sitting or standing for prolonged periods.3 (ECF No.
1 Mr. Akinde received a verbal warning for failing to respond to dispatch calls. The
parties agree that this incident falls outside the statute of limitations for the purposes
of Title VII and FEPA. (ECF No. 36-1 at 16 n.3.) This incident also falls outside the
three-year statute of limitations for RICRA. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-2. Even so, Mr.
Akinde refers to this incident as background evidence of the alleged pattern and
practice of discriminatory treatment for timely claims.
	See Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002).
2 The duty keys were found months later in a fraternity townhouse. 	(ECF No. 29-1
at 208.)
3 During his leave, Mr. Akinde flew to Nigeria, where he did not receive treatment,
returning to the United States on January 14 and receiving a note of clearance on
January 18. (ECF No. 29-1 at 80–87, 292–96.)
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36-2 ¶ 116.) The University granted the leave, and Mr. Akinde was cleared for work
upon his return in January 2022. (ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 23–27.)
On June 15, 2022, Mr. Akinde received a second one-day suspension, this time
for abandoning his shift to recline in the driver’s seat of his car to take a nap for
approximately two hours.4 	(ECF No. 29-1 at 22–23, 94, 298–99.) 	After reviewing
security camera footage and interviewing Mr. Akinde, the University suspended him
for one day. Two weeks after Mr. Akinde’s suspension for falling asleep in his vehicle,
he submitted to the University, on June 29, 2022, a doctor’s note stating he had
allergy symptoms and that he “should remain out of work this week, could return
7/5/22.” (ECF No. 34-33.)
Mr. Akinde received an annual evaluation from Sgt. Haley on or around June
10, 2022, reviewing his performance since the beginning of the fiscal year, June 30,
2021. After that evaluation was completed by Sgt. Haley, the University amended it
to include the June 15, 2022, napping incident before it was signed by Chief Bannon
on July 6, 2022. 	(ECF Nos. 36-1 at 27; 34-10.) 	Mr. Akinde maintained an overall
rating of “effective” but received lower ratings in several individual categories.
On June 30, 2022, Mr. Akinde filed the first of his complaints against the
University through a Union grievance regarding the procedures and the extent of the
corrective action issued in response to the sleeping incident. 	(ECF No. 29-1 at 301,
4 The Union filed a grievance on Mr. Akinde’s behalf alleging that his suspension
violated the collective bargaining agreement and DPS policies. (ECF No. 29-1 at 301–
05.) 	The University denied the grievance and the Union declined to take the
grievance to arbitration.
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304–05.) 	On August 12, 2022, while Mr. Akinde’s grievance was pending, he
submitted a second complaint, this time to the Human Resources Department. (ECF
No. 29-1 at 143.) There, Mr. Akinde claimed, as he does in this case, that Lt. Hayden
treated him differently than other PSOs in terms of the tone of his communications,
the distribution of assignments, and his willingness to criticize and issue corrective
action. (ECF No. 36-2 ¶¶ 89–94.)
Mr. Akinde again lost his duty keys on August 29, 2022. (ECF No. 29-1 at 29,
341.) 	Upon realizing he did not know where his keys were, he did not inform his
superiors immediately as he had been instructed and failed to do so for approximately
two hours. 	(ECF No. 29-1 at 33–39.) 	The University investigated the loss and
subsequently suspended Mr. Akinde for one week, issuing him a final warning. (ECF
No. 29-1 at 341–42.) The day after the loss occurred and after Chief Bannon had
placed him on interim suspension with pay, Mr. Akinde filed a complaint with the
Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (“RICHR”) and the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”). (ECF No. 36-2 ¶ 63.) The Union
did not file a grievance. There is no record of any subsequent legal actions taken by
the NAACP or the RICHR in response to this complaint.
On November 22, 2022, when Mr. Akinde was dispatched to conduct a wellness
check in a student’s dorm room, he failed to notice the student “laying on the floor of
the room, unresponsive, approximately four feet from the door.” (ECF Nos. 29 ¶¶ 63–
70; 36-2 ¶¶ 170–72.) The student was later determined to have been deceased. (ECF
No. 29 ¶ 69.) 	The University placed Mr. Akinde on paid suspension pending
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investigation. 	(ECF No. 29-1 at 49.) 	Finding gross dereliction duty while on final
warning status, the University terminated Mr. Akinde’s employment on December 6,
2022. (ECF No. 29-1 at 386, 400.)
After he received a telephone call and voicemail from Chief Bannon on
December 6, 2022, at 11:30 a.m. seeking to notify him of his termination, the
University’s Human Resources Department received a fax at 12:25 p.m. from a doctor
of Mr. Akinde’s stating: “[i]n order to avoid aggravation of [his] condition, I am
excusing [him] from work until December 20th, 2022.” (ECF No. 29-1 at 398.)5 The
note failed to specify the particular ailment afflicting Mr. Akinde. 	Chief Bannon
called a second time at 1:09 p.m. This time Mr. Akinde picked up and Chief Bannon
informed him that the University had terminated his employment. 	(ECF No. 29 ¶
83.) The termination was also communicated by email and formal letter.
Mr. Akinde filed a Charge of Discrimination with the RICHR and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May 4, 2023. (ECF No. 11 ¶ 45.)
He obtained Right to Sue letters from the RICHR and EEOC on October 3, 2023, and
November 2, 2023, respectively. 	(ECF No. 11 ¶ 47.) 	Mr. Akinde timely filed the
instant suit.
In his complaint Mr. Akinde alleges violations of (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) for discrimination and retaliation on the basis of race; (2) the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) for discrimination and retaliation
5 Mr. Akinde recognized Chief Bannon’s phone call, listened to his voicemail, and sent
text messages to another PSO about the possibility that he would be terminated.
(ECF No. 29-1 at 186–89.)
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for taking medical leave in December 2021 and attempting to on the day of his
termination in December 2022; (3) the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act
(“FEPA”) for discrimination on account of race and disability; (4) the Rhode Island
Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”) for discrimination on account of race and disability; (5)
the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) for alleged retaliation for attempting to
take FMLA leave on the day of his termination in December 2022; and (6) the Rhode
Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (“RIWPA”) for retaliation for Mr. Akinde’s
reporting of the alleged racial discrimination. (ECF No. 11 at 11–13.)
The University now moves for summary judgment. (ECF No. 28.)
II. 	SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	A dispute is genuine “if the evidence about the fact is such that a
reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party,” and a
fact is material “if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit
under the applicable law.”
	Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217
F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000). 	“[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment “‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’”
	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quoting
National
Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)) (cleaned up). 	“The
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evidence of the non-movant”— here Mr. Akinde — “is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in [their] favor.”
Id. at 255.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Mr. Akinde alleges discrimination on the basis of his race and disabilities, as
well as unlawful retaliation against him for engaging in protected activities. 	The
adverse actions that Mr. Akinde alleges include suspensions for sleeping on duty
(June 15, 2022) and for losses of his duty keys (March 2021 and September 2022),
adjustment of his performance evaluation in June 2022, and his termination on
December 6, 2022.
Mr. Akinde concedes that several of these claims are time-barred, but he still
offers them as background evidence. 	The parties agree that claims related to his
sleeping on duty, his second loss of his duty keys, the amendment of his annual
performance review, and his termination are not time-barred.
A. 	Discrimination and Retaliation Claims Subject to
McDonnell Douglas
Mr. Akinde’s discrimination and retaliation claims (Claims I–V) are subject to
the burden shifting framework set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 	It is “routine practice” for
courts to analyze claims under Title VII, RICRA, and FEPA together.
	Ferro v. R.I.
Dept. of Transp. ex rel. Lewis, 2 F. Supp. 3d 150, 157 (D.R.I. 2014). 	“Because both
the federal and state claims protect against disability discrimination, the Court will
treat them collectively.”
	Barnes v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 618, 624 F.
Supp. 3d 93, 97 (D.R.I. 2022).
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Under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff “must carry the initial
burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case” of discrimination. 	411
U.S. at 802. 	To present a prima facie case the plaintiff must present evidence that
he or she is : (1) a member of a protected class; (2) qualified for their job; (3) suffered
an adverse employment action at the hands of their employer; and (4) there must be
some evidence of a causal connection between their membership in a protected class
and the adverse employment action.
	Bhatti v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 70
(1st Cir. 2011).
If the plaintiff meets his or her burden, the defendant must then come forward
with a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action.
	Id. 	This task
is not “onerous,” and a defendant need only articulate a reason “which, on its face,
would justify a conclusion” that the adverse employment action was taken for a
nondiscriminatory motive.
	O’Horo v. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 131 F.4th 1, 14 (1st Cir.
2025) (quoting
Taite v. Bridgewater State Univ., Bd. of Trs., 999 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir.
2021)).
If the defendant provides a legitimate reason for the action, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate
reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.”
	Velez v. Thermo King de Puerto Rico, Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 447–48
(1st Cir. 2009) (quoting
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143
(2000)).
In evaluating a plaintiff’s claims of discrimination, a court “must determine if
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‘there is a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to
infer intentional discrimination.’”
Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490, 497–98 (1st Cir.
2014) (quoting
Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1056 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). 	To do so, this Court will not view each of Mr. Akinde’s
alleged instances of discrimination in “splendid isolation” but will examine each
instance to see if the pieces form some semblance of a mosaic that could be recognized
by a jury.
See Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 824 (1st Cir. 1991).
1. 	Race-Related Discrimination Claims
Mr. 	Akinde 	alleges 	that 	multiple 	disciplinary 	actions 	taken 	during 	his
employment, including suspension for sleeping on duty, suspensions for loss of his
keys, revisions to his annual performance evaluation, and his ultimate termination
were motivated by race discrimination. 	These claims are analyzed collectively
because they rest on the same evidentiary theory: that the University disciplined Mr.
Akinde more harshly than similarly situated non-minority employees. 	But even
assuming Mr. Akinde can satisfy this initial burden to establish a prima facie case of
race discrimination, the University has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons 	for 	each 	challenged 	action, 	based 	on 	his 	documented 	performance
deficiencies.
The undisputed record shows that Mr. Akinde was disciplined for specific
instances of misconduct or neglect, including abandoning his post to sleep in his car,
repeatedly losing duty keys that provided access to secure campus facilities, failing
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to promptly report a key loss, and failing to conduct a wellness check in a manner
that would have found a student unresponsive on the floor of a dorm room.
Mr. Akinde’s attempt to show pretext relies primarily on comparator evidence.
To be probative, such evidence must identify similarly situated employees outside the
protected class who engaged in comparable misconduct and were treated more
favorably.
	See Lauriston v. Hallsmith-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., No. CIVA 08-CV-
11956PBS, 2010 WL 2483327, at *5–7 (D. Mass. June 15, 2010). The record does not
support such a finding. 	The University identified other employees who were
suspended 	for 	sleeping 	on 	duty 	and 	whose 	discipline 	varied 	based 	on 	the
circumstances and their disciplinary histories. (ECF No. 29-1 at 309, 320–21.) The
only identified comparator for the lost duty keys incidents involved materially
different circumstances, including immediate reporting and recovery of the keys.
(ECF Nos. 29-1 at 207; 36-2 ¶ 71.) Mr. Akinde’s general and unspecified recollections
of other loss-of-keys incidents lack sufficient detail to establish comparability. (ECF
No. 29-1 at 98–100.)
Mr. 	Akinde 	also 	challenges 	revisions 	made 	to 	his 	annual 	performance
evaluation following his June 2022 suspension. The undisputed evidence shows that
the evaluation was not final at the time of the revision and that inclusion of the
sleeping-on-duty incident reflected performance during the relevant review period.
Regardless, Mr. Akinde identifies no tangible adverse consequence resulting from
this revision.
See, e.g.,
Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 73;
Bronson v. Town of S. Kingstown, 766
F. Supp. 3d 336, 349 (D.R.I. 2025).
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Finally, Mr. Akinde also relies on workplace interactions and perceived slights
as circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus. (ECF No. 36-1 at 11 n.1.) But
he does not bring a “standalone hostile work environment claim.”
	Id. To the extent
this evidence is offered to establish pretext, it is insufficient. Such evidence must be
tied to the specific adverse employment actions at issue and to the motivations of the
relevant decisionmakers, not to isolated or conclusory assertions untethered from the
disciplinary decisions challenged here.
	See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 826–28;
Ray v.
Ropes & Gray LLP, 799 F.3d 99, 116 (1st Cir. 2015).
Viewing the record as a whole, Mr. Akinde has failed to present evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that the University’s stated reasons for its
disciplinary 	action 	or 	termination 	were 	a 	pretext 	for 	race 	discrimination.
Accordingly, 	the 	University 	is 	entitled 	to 	summary 	judgment 	on 	the 	race
discrimination claims.
2. 	Retaliation and RIWPA Claims
Mr. Akinde also claims he was retaliated against for engaging in protected
activity, including submitting complaints about his treatment after receiving notices
of corrective action and calling the RICHR and NAACP to report race discrimination
and submitting internal grievances and complaints. He contends that this protected
activity prompted disciplinary actions in 2022 and ultimately led to his termination.
Retaliation claims are also analyzed under the
McDonnell Douglas framework.
To successfully overcome a motion for summary judgement, the plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct, (2)
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the employer took an adverse employment action, which was (3) in response to the
employee’s protected activity.
	See Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 139
(1st Cir. 2013);
Kinzer v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 99 F.4th 105, 115 (1st Cir. 2024). A
reasonable jury must be able to conclude that retaliatory animus was the but-for
cause of the adverse action.
See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338,
360 (2013). 	Thus, a plaintiff must show that their employer would not have taken
the adverse action but for a desire to retaliate.
Id. at 352, 360.
Mr. 	Akinde’s 	claims 	that 	he 	suffered 	retaliation 	(1) 	after 	submitting 	a
grievance in relation to his napping incident on June 15, 2022; (2) while his grievance
was pending, submitting a complaint against Lt. Hayden on August 25, 2022; and (3)
after submitting a complaint to the NAACP and the RICHR. 	The related adverse
employment actions he alleges include his suspensions following the napping incident
on June 15, 2022, and the loss-of-keys incident on August 29, 2022, and his
termination on December 6, 2022. (ECF No. 36-1 at 37.) Mr. Akinde argues that the
“temporal proximity between protected conduct and adverse actions establishes the
causal link” necessary.
Id. Temporal proximity, however, is not sufficient on its own
to establish retaliation where the record reflects legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons
for the employer’s actions.
	Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir.
2003) (citing
Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997))
(holding 	that 	“chronological 	proximity 	does 	not 	by 	itself 	establish 	causality,
particularly 	if 	‘[t]he 	larger 	picture 	undercuts 	any 	claim 	of 	causation’”). 	The
undisputed record shows that the challenged disciplinary actions corresponded
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directly to specific and acknowledged instances of misconduct or neglect, including
sleeping on duty, losing duty keys, and failing to promptly report a key loss, all of
which occurred contemporaneously with or independently of Mr. Akinde’s protected
activity.
The record also does not support an inference of a causal relationship between
Mr. Akinde’s protected activity and his termination. He was on final warning status
at the time of his failure to observe an unresponsive student on the floor of a dorm
room during a wellness check. 	The termination decision followed an investigation
into that incident and was consistent with prior warnings Mr. Akinde had received
about his performance. He presents no evidence that his protected activity factored
into the decision-making process, nor does he identify statements or conduct by
decisionmakers suggesting any retaliatory motive.
Mr. Akinde also alleges retaliation based on his contacts with the RICHR and
the NAACP. 	The record does not establish that the University was aware of these
contacts at the time it imposed discipline or decided to terminate Mr. Akinde’s
employment. Even assuming the University knew of his contacts, “knowledge on an
employer’s part, without more, cannot itself be sufficient to take a retaliation case to
the jury.”
Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 828.
Viewing the record as a whole, no reasonable jury could conclude that Mr.
Akinde’s protected activities were the but-for cause of the disciplinary actions or his
termination. 	For the same reasons, his retaliation claim under the Rhode Island
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act fails.
See Malone v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. C.A.
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07-065ML, 2009 WL 2151706, at *13–15 (D.R.I. July 16, 2009),
aff'd, 610 F.3d 16 (1st
Cir. 2010).
3. 	Disability Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
Mr. 	Akinde’s 	claims 	of 	disability-related 	discrimination, 	retaliation, 	and
failure to accommodate are based on (1) his approved FMLA leave for a lower-back
condition in December 2021; (2) his post hoc reliance on allergy symptoms following
his June 2022 suspension for sleeping on duty; and (3) his submission of a medical
note on the day of his termination on December 6, 2022.6 (ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 51–54.) He
claims his June 2022 suspension and his December 6 termination constituted adverse
action. 	(ECF No. 36-1 at 42–44.) 	The University assumes for the purposes of its
argument that Mr. Akinde’s lower back pain constitutes a disability but contends that
Mr. Akinde’s claims are either time-barred or otherwise fail to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination. (ECF No. 28 at 37.)
A claim of disability discrimination requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie
showing that (1) that they are disabled; (2) that they were able to perform the
essential functions of their job with or without accommodation; and (3) that they were
discharged or adversely affected, in whole or in part, because of their disability or
related protected conduct.
	Lopez-Lopez v. Robinson Sch., 958 F.3d 96, 104 (1st Cir.
2020) (quoting
Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharms., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2008));
DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13, 25 (R.I. 2005). 	To establish
6 	Plaintiff’s 	Count 	IV 	alleges 	only 	discrimination 	in 	violation 	of 	RICRA, 	not
retaliation. (ECF No. 11 ¶ 53.)
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retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between protected
activity and adverse action.
	See Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151,
161 (1st Cir. 1998);
Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 106 (1st
Cir. 2007);
Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 427 (R.I. 2007).
The undisputed record shows that the University granted his request for
FMLA leave for his back condition in December 2021 and permitted him to return to
work in January 2022 with no restrictions. 	Mr. Akinde identifies no adverse
employment action taken at or near the time of his leave, nor does he present evidence
linking his June 2022 discipline for sleeping on the job to that earlier, fully
accommodated medical leave. 	Temporal distance of approximately six months
between protected leave and discipline is insufficient, standing alone, to establish
causation, 	particularly 	where 	the 	record 	reflects 	intervening 	and 	independent
performance deficiencies.
	Stratton v. Bentley Univ., 113 F.4th 25, 49–50 (1st Cir.
2024) (explaining that alleged adverse action taken three and a half months after
FMLA leave was insufficient to establish causation where employee had a long record
of performance issues).
Mr. Akinde’s reliance on allergy symptoms, as the cause of his sleeping on the
job, following his June 2022 suspension likewise does not establish discrimination or
retaliation. The record demonstrates that he was disciplined for abandoning his post
and sleeping in his car. 	His later suggestion that allergy medication explained this
conduct was not supported by contemporaneous medical documentation and was not
communicated 	to 	the 	University 	as 	a 	request 	for 	accommodation 	before 	the
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disciplinary action. (ECF No. 36-1 at 44, 49.) An employer cannot be liable for failing
to accommodate or for discriminating based on a disability that was neither known
nor medically substantiated at the time of the adverse action.
	See Jones v.
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 90 (1st Cir. 2012).
Finally, Mr. Akinde contends that his termination was discriminatory or
retaliatory because he submitted a medical note excusing him from work shortly after
receiving a voicemail from his supervisor notifying him of his termination. 	The
undisputed timeline shows otherwise. (ECF Nos. 29 ¶¶ 79–86; 36-2 ¶¶ 118–19.) The
record demonstrates that the decision to terminate Mr. Akinde’s employment was
made earlier on the morning of December 6, 2022, before the medical note was faxed
to Human Resources. His termination cannot have been the result of a disability or
a request for leave that occurred after the decision was made.
See O’Rourke v. Tiffany
& Co., 988 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 2021) (finding lack of knowledge of FMLA protected
activity barred retaliation claim).
Mr. 	Akinde 	has 	failed 	to 	establish 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	of 	disability
discrimination, retaliation, or failure to accommodate under the ADA, FEPA, RICRA,
or the FMLA. 	Even assuming such a showing, the University has articulated
legitimate reasons for its actions, and Mr. Akinde has not presented evidence from
which a factfinder could conclude that the University’s reason was pretextual.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Viewing the record as a whole, Mr. Akinde has failed to establish a genuine
dispute of material fact as to any claim. 	The Court therefore GRANTS the
University’s Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. (ECF No. 28.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy,
United States District Judge
April 22, 2026
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