Espinoza v. Honeywell International, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
MARY ESPINOZA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL
INC., UOP LLC, and GULF
COAST ALLOY WELDING, INC.
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 1:24-CV-00259-MSM-LDA
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
Before the Court is defendant Gulf Coast Alloy Welding’s (“GCAW”) Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 44) plaintiff Mary Espinoza’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No.
18). 	Because GCAW has also moved to dismiss the Third-Party Complaint of
Honeywell International Inc. (“Honeywell”) and UOP, LLC. (“UOP”) (ECF No. 26) on
substantively identical grounds, the Court addresses that Motion (ECF No. 45) here
as well. 	Both of GCAW’s Motions are made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2), arguing that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it.
	See
ECF Nos. 44 at 1; 45 at 1. 	For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS both of
GCAW’s Motions.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are relatively simple. 	Ms. Espinoza alleges injuries
sustained after slipping on a ladder that is a part of an industrial chemical processing
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unit designed, manufactured, and sold by UOP, a subsidiary of Honeywell.
See ECF
Nos. 18 ¶ 7–19; 22 ¶¶ 3, 7, 22, 30. Honeywell is incorporated in Delaware and has its
principal place of business in North Carolina. 	(ECF No. 32.) 	UOP is a Delaware
limited liability company and has its principal place of business in Illinois. (ECF No.
26 ¶ 2.) 	Ms. Espinoza claims she sustained her injuries while working for Kiewit
Power Constructors (“Kiewit”) in Rhode Island and while she was a Rhode Island
resident. 	(ECF Nos. 18 ¶ 9; 53 at 1.) 	Ms. Espinoza, currently a resident of New
Jersey, sued in this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 1, 5.)
GCAW is a Texas company that manufactured the ladder, as well other
components, used in the unit according to specifications provided to it by UOP.
	See
ECF Nos. 26-1; 26-2; ECF No. 46 at 3–8. GCAW does not dispute knowledge, based
on UOP’s specifications, that the ladder’s final destination was Rhode Island. (ECF
No. 55 at 2 n.1.) Apart from communications with Kiewit related to the unit, GCAW
denies any other contacts with Rhode Island. (ECF Nos. 44-1 at 5–7; 55 at 7.) Neither
Ms. Espinoza nor Honeywell or UOP have presented any evidence or made any
credible allegations suggesting any other ties between GCAW and Rhode Island.
Ms. Espinoza’s Amended Complaint asserts negligence, products liability, and
breach of warranty claims against GCAW, Honeywell, and UOP. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 20–
43.) Honeywell and UOP filed a third-party complaint against GCAW, alleging strict
liability, negligence, and contract claims. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 16–36.)
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction 	imposes 	the 	burden 	on 	the 	plaintiff 	to 	establish 	the 	existence 	of
jurisdiction.
Astro–Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009).
A district court may choose from three methods for determining whether a plaintiff
has met its burden: prima facie, preponderance of the evidence, or an intermediate
standard.
Id.
Here, the Court applies the prima facie method. Known as the most plaintiff
friendly, the prima facie method requires a court to consider only whether the
plaintiff has submitted enough evidence to support personal jurisdiction.
See Astro-
Med, Inc., 591 F.3d at 8. Properly documented evidence is accepted as true regardless
of whether the defendant disputes it.
Id. But the Court does not consider conclusory
allegations or farfetched inferences.
	Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar
Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998). The court can “add to the mix facts put forward
by the defendants, to the extent that they are uncontradicted.”
Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s
authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.”
	Walden v.
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014). “To exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, the defendant must ‘have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance 	of 	the 	suit 	does 	not 	offend 	‘traditional 	notions 	of 	fair 	play 	and
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substantial justice.’”
	Vapotherm, Inc. v. Santiago, 38 F.4th 252, 258 (1st Cir.
2022) (quoting
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1940)).
When considering personal jurisdiction in a diversity suit, such as here, a
federal court acts as “the functional equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum
state.”
See Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009).
Because Rhode Island's “long-arm statute,” R.I.G.L. § 9-5-33, authorizes Rhode Island
courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent
permitted by the United States Constitution, this Court need only decided whether
the assertion of personal jurisdiction accords with due process principles.
	See
Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 461 (1st Cir. 1990).
The Supreme Court recognizes “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general
(sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-
linked) jurisdiction.”
	Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct.
1017, 1024 (2021) (citing
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)). The parties agree that Rhode Island courts cannot exercise general
jurisdiction over GWAC. 	(ECF Nos. 46 at 11; 53 at 2.) 	The analysis then turns to
specific jurisdiction.
“For 	specific 	personal 	jurisdiction, 	the 	constitutional 	analysis 	has 	three
distinct prongs: (1) relatedness; (2) purposeful availment; and (3) reasonableness.”
Id. 	The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that all three prongs are
satisfied.
Id. (citing
A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2016)).
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Because the second prong of that test is dispositive here, the Court begins its analysis
there.
The 	purposeful-availment 	prong’s 	purpose 	“is 	to 	assure 	that 	personal
jurisdiction is not premised solely upon a defendant's ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous’
contacts with the forum state.”
Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1391 (1st Cir. 1995)
(quoting
	Keeton 	v. 	Hustler 	Mag., 	Inc., 	465 	U.S. 	770, 	774 	(1984)). 	The 	two
“cornerstones” of this prong are “voluntariness and foreseeability.”
	Rodriguez, 43
F.4th at 163. 	“Voluntariness asks whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state are of its own making and ‘not based on the unilateral actions of another party
or a third person.’”
Id. (quoting
Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 716 (1st
Cir. 1996)). “And foreseeability asks whether the defendant’s voluntary conduct and
connection with the forum state are ‘such that [the defendant] should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.’”
Id.
This case presents the following question: does the mere knowledge that a
piece of equipment is destined for a particular forum constitute purposeful availment
of that forum by a manufacturer of a component to that equipment? Had GCAW not
known the ultimate destination of its ladder, an assertion of personal jurisdiction
over it in Rhode Island would be tenuous.
Rodriguez-Rivera v. Allscripts Healthcare
Sols., Inc., 43 F.4th 150, 163 (1st Cir. 2022) (“[M]ere placement of a product into the
stream of commerce with the awareness that it
could end up in a forum state, without
more, is not enough to show purposeful availment.”) (emphasis added).
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Particularly relevant to this case is Justice Breyer’s concurrence in
J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011), which the First Circuit has held to be
binding as the narrowest opinion from that case.
	Knox v. MetalForming, Inc., 914
F.3d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing
Plixer Intl., Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d
1, 10 (1st Cir. 2018)). Based on that concurrence, the First Circuit has found “‘a single
isolated sale” into the forum . . . is insufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction.”
Rodriguez, 	43 	F.4th 	at 	164 	(quoting
Nicastro, 	564 	U.S. 	at 	888 (Breyer, 	J.,
concurring)). 	Instead, there must be “something more,” such as “designing the
product 	for 	the 	market 	in 	the 	forum 	State, 	advertising 	in 	the 	forum 	State,
establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State,
or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales
agent in the forum State.”
	Knox, 914 F.3d at 692 (quoting
Asahi Metal Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (opinion of
O’Connor, J.)).
Here, none of the examples cited in
Knox are present. 	To the extent that
GCAW “designed” the ladder at issue, it did so in conformity with specifications
provided to it by Honeywell and UOC, and not on its own initiative. And it engaged
in no advertising, marketing, or other contacts with anyone in Rhode Island outside
of its communications with Kiewit, which took place in connection to the manufacture
of the ladder and other related components. This was, in essence, “a single isolated
sale.”
	See Rodriguez, 43 F.4th at 164. It was, as such, insufficient to constitute the
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kind of purposeful availment necessary for this Court to assert personal jurisdiction
over GCAW.
In support of this conclusion, the Court looks to
Dalmau Rodriguez v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 781 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1986). 	There, a helicopter manufacturer sold two
helicopters to a helicopter dealer, who then sold the helicopters to the Puerto Rico
Police Department.
	Id. at 11–12. 	The extent of the manufacturer’s direct contacts
with 	Puerto 	Rico 	were 	insufficient 	to 	alone 	support 	an 	assertion 	of 	personal
jurisdiction over it there in a suit related to those helicopters, but the manufacturer
was aware at the time it sold the helicopters to the dealer that the helicopters were
bound for Puerto Rico.
Id. at 14–15. The Court determined, however, that “whether
[the manufacturer] knew that the helicopters were being sold to the Puerto Rico
Police department has [no] jurisdictional significance.”
	Id. at 15. Indeed, “[t]he test
is not knowledge of the ultimate destination of the product, but whether the
manufacturer has purposefully engaged in forum activities so it can reasonably
expect to be haled into court there.”
	Id. 	Thus, the single sale at issue “was not a
stream [of commerce] or the beginning of one; it was an isolated splash.”
Id.1
Based on
Knox and
Hughes, the Court finds that it does not have personal
jurisdiction over GCAW.2 This leaves the question as to what to do with the present
1 While
Hughes was decided before the Supreme Court more directly addressed
“stream of commerce” theories in
Asahi, the First Circuit “[is] not persuaded that the
opinions in
Asahi have undermined
Hughes.”
Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d
671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992).
2 Ms. Espinoza, Honeywell, and UOC request in their Responses to GCAW’s Motion
to Dismiss that the Court should, as an alternative to dismissal, permit limited
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case. Honeywell and UOC argue that, if personal jurisdiction is lacking over GCAW,
the Court should transfer the case to the Southern District of Texas, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631. 	(ECF No. 46 at 18–19.) 	Ms. Espinoza, by contrast, argues that transfer of
her case against Honeywell and UOP to Texas is inappropriate because this Court
retains personal jurisdiction over Honeywell and UOP and because her claims may
be barred in Texas by the applicable statute of limitations. 	(ECF No. 53 at 8.) 	Ms.
Espinoza presents no alternative venue for her claims against GCAW.
Id. at 7.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, when a federal court “finds there is a want of
jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or
appeal to any other such court . . . in which the action or appeal could have been
brought at the time when it was filed or noticed.” “Congress’s use of the phrase ‘shall
. . . transfer’ in section 1631 persuasively indicates that transfer, rather than
dismissal, is the option of choice.”
	Britell v. United States, 318 F.3d 70, 73 (1st Cir.
2003). Thus, the First Circuit applies a presumption in favor of transfer rather than
dismissal when personal jurisdiction is lacking.
	Fed. Home Loan Bank of Boston v.
Moody’s Corp., 821 F.3d 102, 114–17 (1st Cir. 2016),
abrogated on other grounds by,
Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82 (2017).
jurisdictional discovery. 	(ECF Nos. 46 at 19–20; 53 at 6–7.) 	Laying aside GCAW’s
procedural objections to those requests,
see ECF Nos. 49 at 14–15; 55 at 6–7), the
Court is satisfied that there is no “non-frivolous dispute about facts that may yield a
sufficient predicate for in personam jurisdiction” such that jurisdictional discovery is
merited.
	See Motus, LLC v. CarData Consultants, Inc., 23 F.4th 115, 128 (1st Cir.
2022).
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Honeywell and UOC argue that transfer would be in the interests of justice in
this case. (ECF No. 46 at 18.) The Court disagrees. Were it to transfer this case to
Texas, it would only do so with respect to Honeywell and UOC’s third-party complaint
against GCAW, as the Court retains jurisdiction over Ms. Espinoza’s claims against
Honeywell and UOC and it would clearly not be in the interests of justice to force her
to litigate those claims in Texas.
Cf. Curtis v. Galakatos, 19 F.4th 41, 46–47 (1st Cir.
2021) (noting that a plaintiff “ordinarily holds a ‘heavy presumption weigh[ing] in
favor of [her] initial forum choice.’” (quoting
Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 53 (1st
Cir. 2007));
Britell, 318 F.3d at 74 (“Given the language of the statute, we are
confident that Congress wanted courts to exempt from the transfer mandate those
cases in which transfer would [
inter alia] impose an unwarranted hardship on an
objector.”).
And were the Court to transfer Honeywell and UOC’s third-party complaint to
Texas, that case would not be resolvable until Ms. Espinoza’s case against Honeywell
and 	UOC 	is 	concluded 	because 	Honeywell 	and 	UOC’s 	claims 	against 	GCAW
necessarily depend on the outcome of Ms. Espinoza’s case against Honeywell and
UOC.
See ECF No. 26 ¶ 16–36. As dismissal of Honeywell and UOC’s claims for lack
of 	personal 	jurisdiction 	would 	be 	without 	prejudice, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the
circumstances of this case, including the need to not “unduly burden the judicial
system” with claims that might not be ripe for resolution, suggest that it would not
be in the interests of justice to transfer, rather than dismiss, Honeywell and UOC’s
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claims.
See id. So the Court finds that dismissal of all claims against GCAW without
prejudice is appropriate.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS GCAW’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
44) Ms. Espinoza’s Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 	This
dismissal is only of Ms. Espinoza’s claims against GCAW, and not her remaining
claims against Honeywell and UOP. 	The Court also grants GCAW’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 45) the Third-Party Complaints of Honeywell and UOP for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Both dismissals are without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
November 3, 2025
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