Angus v. Burman et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
CARL ANGUS, individually and on
behalf of the E.W. Burman, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDWARD BURMAN, PAUL
BURMAN, and E.W. BURMAN, INC.,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 24-cv-328-MRD-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Melissa R. DuBose, United States District Judge.
After 38 years of working with, and for, Edward and Paul Burman at E.W.
Burman, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”), Carl Angus decided to call it a career and
started making plans to move to Portugal in September 2023. In January 2023, he
told the Burmans this plan and mentioned that he wanted to cash-out his funds from
the E.W. Burman Inc. Profit Sharing Plan and Trust (“Plan”), an employer sponsored
defined-contribution Plan, as soon as possible. On July 21, 2023, Defendants
distributed $1,356,369.31 to Mr. Angus. The problem, he contends, is that this
amount was based on the account value as of December 31, 2022 when it should have
been valued as of December 31, 2023. Had the Defendants waited until December
31, 2023 to value the account, Mr. Angus claims he would have received over $170,000
in additional funds based on the stock market’s 2023 performance. After
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communicating with Plan Administrator and exhausting the administrative appeal
process, Mr. Angus initiated this lawsuit to collect the additional funds.
Now before the Court for resolution are the parties’ cross Motions for Summary
Judgment. ECF Nos. 34, 37. The Court heard argument from the parties on January
28, 2026. For the following reasons, Mr. Angus’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
I. BACKGROUND1
E.W. Burman, Inc. is a general contracting and construction management
services firm in Warwick, Rhode Island. Defs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts in
Support of Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 1 (“DSUF”); ECF No. 34-2. In 1984, E.W. Burman started
the Plan which provides retirement benefits to participants.
Id. ¶¶ 2–3. Carl Angus
worked at E.W. Burman, Inc. from September 1984 until August 2023, and
participated in the Plan from September 1984 to July 2023.	
Id. ¶ 5; Pl.’s Statement
of Undisputed Facts in Support of Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 31 (“PSUF”); ECF No. 35-3.2
In January 2023, Angus informed the Burmans that he intended to retire and
move to Portugal at some point in 2023. ECF No. 34-2 ¶ 6; ECF No. 35-3 ¶ 33. During
that January 2023 interaction, Angus told the Burmans that he wished to cash-out
from the Plan and have the funds distributed to him as soon as possible. ECF No.
1 On a motion for summary judgment in an ERISA benefit-denial case, “the
non-moving party is not entitled to the usual inferences in its favor.”
Orndorf v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 510, 517 (1st Cir. 2005).
2 The Court will cite to the unredacted and unsealed PSUF which is located at
ECF No. 35-3. Plaintiff complied with LR CV 56(a)(2) by filing ECF No. 38, which is
a sealed version of PSUF.
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34-2 ¶ 11; ECF No. 35-3 ¶ 34. The Burmans explained to Angus that if he retired
before year-end 2023, he would receive the funds in his Plan account as valued on
December 31, 2022. ECF No. 34-2 ¶ 8. Angus does not recall being told that
information and instead claims that Edward Burman told him that a mid-2023
retirement meant Angus could not receive his distribution until 2024. ECF No. 35-3
¶ 35. According to Angus, Edward Burman eventually took the position that Angus
could receive the distribution in 2023 but that he would lose out on the Plan profit-
sharing contribution for that year.	
Id. ¶ 36. Angus had no issue with forgoing his
2023 profit-sharing contributions but suggests that parties never agreed that Angus’
distribution would reflect the year-end 2022 valuation, or that a mid-2023
distribution meant he would not be entitled to any 2023 investment earnings.	
Id.
¶ 38.
Fast forward to May 2023. Angus received his annual account statement and
requested a withdrawal of the account balance. ECF No. 34-2 ¶ 16. On May 18, 2023,
Paul Burman—the Plan Administrator—contacted Pat Ambrosio from Sentinel
Benefits and Financial Group—the Plan recordkeeper—and requested a transfer
form because an employee was retiring. ECF No. 35-3 ¶ 41. The recordkeeper
responded to the Plan Administrator that “the plan document states the distributions
may be made after the last day of the plan year coincident or next following date of
severance. So if [that] person retires in 2023 he/she cannot take money out until after
12-31-2023.”	
Id. ¶ 42. Regardless, Burman told the recordkeeper to process Angus’
valuation date “as of 12/31/2022.”
Id. ¶ 43. Once again, the recordkeeper stated that
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Angus did not qualify for retirement under the Plan and the Adoption Agreement3
and that he should be considered a “terminated employee.”	
Id. ¶ 46. The Plan
Administrator, however, again instructed the recordkeeper to process Angus’
separation from service as of December 31, 2022, which she did.
Id. ¶ 47.
On July 5, 2023, Paul Burman “requested a transfer of [Angus’] [12-31-2022]
Plan balance to his IRA account” which was distributed to Angus on July 21, 2023.
ECF No. 34-2 ¶ 12; ECF No. 35-3 ¶ 48. Approximately two weeks later, at the
beginning of August 2023, Angus officially left E.W. Burman and began his
retirement. ECF No. 35-3 ¶ 31.
The following month, September 2023, Angus inquired about, and then
demanded, compensation for any gains in the Plan’s 2023 valuation. ECF No. 34-2
¶ 17. After consulting with the Plan recordkeeper, Edward Burman responded to
Angus and justified the rationale for the December 31, 2022 valuation by explaining
the following:
Our [Plan] is set to be valued once a year on December 31, as dictated
by the IRS approved plan.
In your case, you asked that this money be released as soon as possible
and you needed it to facilitate your move to Portugal. Therefore, your
distribution was based on the valuation of December 31, 2022, as per
the IRS regulations.
If you had waited to include the time worked in 2023, your distribution
would have been in 2024.
These same rules applied to [person 1] and [person 2] upon their
retirements.
3 Together, the Plan and Adoption Agreement constitute the full E.W. Burman
Inc. Profit Sharing Plan and Trust (“Plan”).
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This was not a personal IRA account, it is a Profit Sharing Trust under
strict rules and regulations of the IRS.
Id. ¶ 18.
In February 2024, Angus made a claim to the Plan Administrator for
additional Plan benefits—the difference between the December 31, 2023 account
valuation and the December 31, 2022 valuation. ECF No. 34-2 ¶¶ 19, 21; ECF No.
35-3 ¶ 49. After both sides again explained their positions to each other over a series
of emails, Angus filed an administrative appeal with the Plan Administrator on April
30, 2024. ECF No. 34-2 ¶¶ 20–25; ECF No. 35-3 ¶¶ 49–55. On June 3, 2024, the Plan
Administrator, once again, denied Angus’ request for the additional funds and denied
his administrative appeal. ECF No. 34-2 ¶ 28; ECF No. 35-3 ¶ 59. Angus was notified
of the denial when he received the Plan Administrator’s Uphold Letter. The Uphold
Letter relied on the Burmans’ declarations recapping the factual background and
benefit determination and further explained that specific Plan language supported
the decision to deny additional benefits.
Id. ¶¶ 29–30.
After receiving the Uphold Letter, Angus attempted to supplement his appeal,
but the Plan Administrator rejected the supplemental appeal since the Plan allows
only one administrative appeal.	
Id. ¶ 31. On August 14, 2024, Angus filed this
lawsuit, alleging a few violations of ERISA, including: Count (I) Benefits owed
pursuant to a plan, under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B),4 Count (II) Breach of fiduciary
4 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B): A civil action may be brought (1) by a participant
or beneficiary … (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
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duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)–(a)(3),5 and Count (III) Violation of the anti-
inurement clause, under 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1).6
II. LEGAL STANDARD
On a motion for summary judgment in an ERISA benefit-denial case, “the non-
moving party is not entitled to the usual inferences in its favor.”
Orndorf v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 510, 517 (1st Cir. 2005). Instead, “summary judgment
is simply a vehicle for deciding the issue.”
Id. The role of the district court in such a
case is to “sit [] more as an appellate tribunal than as a trial court. It does not take
evidence, but, rather, evaluates the reasonableness of an administrative
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan.
5 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), (3): A civil action may be brought; (2) by the Secretary,
or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109
of this title; (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1109: Liability for breach of fiduciary duty: (a) Any person who is
a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations,
or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to
make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and
to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable
or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such
fiduciary. A fiduciary may also be removed for a violation of section 1111 of this title.
6 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1): Assets of plan not to inure to benefit of employer;
allowable purposes of holding plan assets: (1) Except as provided … the assets of a
plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the
exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their
beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.
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determination in light of the record compiled before the plan fiduciary.”	
Leahy v.
Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2002). “The Court’s review is generally
limited to the administrative record and focuses on the plan administrator’s final,
post-appeal decision.”	
Rogers v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 799 F. Supp. 3d 40, 43
(D. Mass. 2025) (citing
Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1998)). “Where
the record is fully developed, contains no significant factual disputes, and establishes
the claimant is entitled to benefits, the appropriate remedy is an award of benefits.”
Id. (citing
Cook v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 320 F.3d 11, 24 (1st Cir. 2003)).
III. DISCUSSION
Sitting as an appellate tribunal in this case, the Court must first determine
whether to apply an abuse of discretion or de novo standard of review. Once that is
decided, the Court will move on to evaluate the claims.
A. Standard of Review
The parties disagree on which standard applies, with the Defendants asking
this Court to review the Plan Administrator’s decision under the abuse of discretion
standard and the Plaintiff advocating for a de novo standard to apply. “[A] denial of
benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a
de novo standard
unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority
to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”	
Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). The First Circuit has
explained that “[w]hen a Plan Administrator has discretion to determine an
applicant’s eligibility for benefits … the administrator’s decision must be upheld
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unless ‘arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.’”	
Vlass v. Raytheon Emp.’s
Disability Tr., 244 F.3d 27, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting
Doyle v. Paul Revere Life
Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 183 (1st Cir. 1998)). The administrator’s decision must be
upheld “if it is reasoned and ‘supported by substantial evidence in the record.’”
Id. at
30 (quoting
Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184). Under this standard, “[s]ubstantial evidence []
means evidence reasonably sufficient to support a conclusion.”	
Doyle, 144 F.3d at
184.
Here, Section 10.4(b) of the Plan provides complete discretionary authority to
the Plan Administrator in interpreting the Plan and rendering claims
determinations. Section 10.4(b) provides the following:
Administrator’s discretion/nondiscriminatory administration: The
Administrator has	
total and complete discretion to interpret and
construe the Plan and to determine all questions arising in the
administration, interpretation and application of the Plan. Any
determination the Administrator makes under the Plan is final and
binding upon any affected persons. The Administrator must exercise all
of its Plan powers and discretion, and perform all of its duties, in a
uniform and nondiscriminatory manner.
ECF No. 34-3 at 162 (emphasis added). Defendants suggest that because the “Plan
granted complete authority to the Plan Administrator,” therefore the arbitrary and
capricious standard applies. ECF No. 34-1 at 10. Angus urges the Court to apply a
de novo standard of review to the Plan Administrator’s decision because process was
“fraught by procedural irregularities.” ECF No. 37 at 11;
see Stephanie C. v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Mass. HMO Blue, Inc., 813 F.3d 420, 425 (1st Cir. 2016)
(explaining that a de novo standard of review applies when procedural irregularities
are present in the administrative process
and the claimant can show prejudice).
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To support Angus’ contention that the review process was fraught with
procedural irregularities, Angus points to emails between the Burmans and the plan
recordkeeper that were withheld from Angus during the review process but are filed
with this Court as part of the Administrative Record at Exhibit. ECF No. 37 at 11.
Those emails show that the recordkeeper informed the Plan Administrator that
Angus’ separation was not a retirement, but that he was to be considered a
“terminated participant.” ECF No. 35-3 ¶¶ 45–46. Even more, the recordkeeper
explained that the Plan only allowed distributions “after the last day of the plan year
coincident or next following date of severance.”	
Id. ¶ 42. Angus further argues that
since the decision provided a “false” reason for the denial of benefits—a backdated
retirement—the Court should not afford that decision any deference.
Id. ¶ 47.
The Court agrees that the withheld emails should have been produced and
considered by the Plan Administrator during the administrative review process.
These emails were directly on point with Angus’ argument that he was entitled to
additional benefits and provided context on how to apply the provisions of the Plan.
That said, the Court does not find that excluding these emails deprived Angus of the
“full and fair review” contemplated by 29 U.S.C. § 1133 or 29 CFR § 2560.503-1(h)(2)
because the Plan Administrator had all this information when making the appeal
determination because he was the one who communicated with the recordkeeper.
Even if Angus was deprived of the “full and fair review,” simply receiving an adverse
decision does not amount to prejudice to the claimant. Based on the clear language
of Section 10.4(b) quoted above, which grants complete discretionary authority to the
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Plan Administrator, the Court will apply an arbitrary and capricious standard of
review.7
B. Benefits owed pursuant to a plan (Count I)
Much of Defendants’ argument urging this Court to uphold the Plan
Administrator’s decision hinges on Angus stating that he was moving to Portugal and
wanted his money “as soon as possible.”	
See ECF No. 34-1 at 6–8 (explaining the
Plan Administrator’s decision to deny additional benefits). In deciding that the mid-
year distribution was in fact allowed under the Plan, the Plan Administrator relied
on Section 6.7:
TIME OF DISTRIBUTION
Except as limited by Section 6.8, whenever a distribution is to be made,
or a series of payments are to commence, the distribution or series of
payments may be made or begun as soon as practicable.
Notwithstanding anything in the Plan to the contrary,	
unless a
Participant otherwise elects, payments of benefits under the Plan will
begin not later than the sixtieth (60th) day after the close of the Plan
Year in which the latest of the following events occurs: (a) the date on
which the Participant attains the earlier of age 65 or the Normal
Retirement Age specified herein: (b) the tenth (10th) anniversary of the
year in which the Participant commenced participation in the Plan; or
(c) the date the Participant terminates service with the Employer.
ECF No. 34-3 at 146 (emphasis added). Defendants argue that Angus exercised his
right to “otherwise elect,” which the Plan Administrator explained to him in the
7 Before moving on, the Court acknowledges Angus’ argument that there was
a conflict of interest with Burman adjudicating claims and paying awarded benefits.
ECF No. 41 at 10;
see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008) (holding
a reviewing court should consider the conflict of interest arising from the dual role of
an entity as an ERISA plan administrator and payer of plan benefits as a factor in
determining whether the plan administrator has abused its discretion in denying
benefits). The Court notes the inherent potential conflict of interest created by the
administrative review structure and considered it while deciding these motions.
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Uphold Letter.	
Id. at 248–51. In response, Angus argues that Defendants are
misinterpreting the provision and instead suggests the “unless a Participant
otherwise elects” language means the Participant may elect to
delay that withdrawal,
not that they can elect to withdraw the money before the end of the Plan Year.
According to Angus, following Defendants’ interpretation of Section 6.7 would render
the rest of the section superfluous and conflict with other provisions in the Plan.
Angus also contends that he is a Terminated Participant, that Section 6.4(a)
governs his determination of benefits, and that the benefits should have been
distributed consistent with Section 6.5. ECF No. 37 at 12–16. Section 1.79 of the
Plan defines a Terminated Participant as “a person who has been a Participant, but
whose employment has been terminated with the Employer…other than by death,
Total and Permanent Disability or retirement.” ECF No. 34-3 at 115. While
“retirement” is not defined in the Plan, Section 1.72 defines Retirement Date as “the
date as of which a Participant retires for reasons other than Total and Permanent
Disability, regardless of whether such retirement occurs on a Participant’s Normal
Retirement Date,8 Early Retirement Date,9 or Late Retirement Date.
Id. at 114.
The Administrative Record before the Court and unambiguous Plan language
lead this Court to conclude that the Plan Administrator’s decision to deny Angus’
request for additional benefits was unsupported and unreasonable. First, during the
8 The Plan’s Adoption Agreement sets the “Normal Retirement Age” at 65.
ECF 34-3 at 25.
9 The Adoption Agreement also indicates that “no early retirement provision
[is] provided.” ECF No. 34-3 at 25.
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discovery process in this Court, Defendants withheld highly relevant and material
emails between the Plan Administrator and the recordkeeper from Sentinel Benefits
Group.10 There are various emails from January 2023–June 2023 where the
recordkeeper: (a) explains to the Plan Administrator that Plaintiff is to be considered
a Terminated Participant, (b) asks for Angus’s Retirement Date and is told it was
12/31/2022 (which is false11), and (c) explains “the plan document states that the
distributions may be made after the last day of the Plan Year coincident or next
following date of severance. So if a person retires in 2023 he/she cannot take money
out until after 12-31-2023.” ECF No. 34-3 at 268, 309–11, 320, 322–23. While the
Administrator chose to ignore the recordkeeper’s emails, they both support Angus’
interpretation of the Plan and provide a useful roadmap for this Court.
The unambiguous language in the Plan supports that Angus was a Terminated
Participant, not a retiree, and that the account valuation and payout should have
occurred on/after December 31, 2023, not 2022. First, Angus fits the Plan’s definition
of a Terminated Participant (Section 1.79). Next, Angus never attained the Normal
Retirement Date12 which the Adoption Agreement sets at 65 years old. ECF No. 34-
3 at 25. Third, the Adoption Agreement clearly states that there is no early
10 While these records were not revealed during the administrative appeal
process, they are part of the Administrative Record before this Court. The records
were disclosed to Plaintiffs during the discovery process and Defendants submitted
those documents as part of the Administrative Record.
11 Angus separated from service the first week of August 2023. This date is not
in dispute.
12 Normal Retirement Age as defined in Section 1.55 of the Plan: “the age
elected in the Adoption Agreement …”
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retirement provision provided under the Plan.	
Id. And finally, in the Adoption
Agreement under the heading “DISTRIBUTIONS,” it clearly states that for accounts
in excess of $5,000 “[d]istributions may be made as soon as administratively feasible
after the last day of the Plan Year coincident with or next following severance of
employment.”
Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
The Court also relies on section 6.4, which explains how benefits are
determined upon termination.
Id. at 140. That Section provides the following:
(a) Payment on severance of employment. If a Participant’s employment
with the Employer … is severed for any reason other than death,
Total and Permanent Disability, or attainment of the Participant’s
Retirement Date, then such Participant shall be entitled to such
benefits as are provided herein.
…
Distribution of the funds due to a Terminated Participant shall be made
on the occurrence of any event which would result in the distribution
had the Terminated Participant remained in the employ of the
Employer … However, at the election of the Participant, the
Administrator shall direct that the entire Vested portion of the
Terminated Participants Combined Accounts be payable to such
Terminated Participant
provided the conditions, if any, set forth in the
Adoption Agreement have been satisfied.
Id. (emphasis added). Here, the only applicable condition set forth in the Adoption
Agreement is that “[d]istributions may be made as soon as administratively feasible
after the last day of the Plan Year coincident with or next following severance of
employment.”	
Id. at 42. Defendants ask this Court to ignore these provisions and to
instead focus solely on Section 6.7 because Angus wanted his money “as soon as
possible.” But doing so would lead to conflict between various provisions in the Plan
and Adoption Agreement.
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As the First Circuit has explained, “courts are to construe ERISA plans by
employing accepted principles of contract and trust law.”	
Bellino v. Schlumberger
Technologies, Inc., 944 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1991). The Circuit then clarified that
courts “give preeminence to the natural meaning of ERISA plan terms, and [courts]
may not supplant such meaning with rigid definitions or contrary interpretations
offered by the parties.”	
Id. at 31–32 (citing
Firestone Tire and Rubber, 489 U.S. at
112). Under Rhode Island law,13 “[t]he Court considers the policy in its entirety and
does not ‘establish ambiguity by viewing a word in isolation or taking a phrase out of
context.’”	
Bliss Mine Rd. Condo. Ass’n v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 11 A.3d
1078, 1083 (R.I. 2010) (quoting
Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Streicker, 583 A.2d 550, 552
(R.I. 1990));
see also Johnson v. Amer. United Life Ins. Co., 716 F.3d 813, 820 (4th
Cir. 2013) (“[c]ourts must look at the ERISA plan as a whole and determine the
provision’s meaning in the context of the entire agreement. And, because, contracts
are construed as a whole, courts should seek to give effect to every provision in an
ERISA plan, avoiding any interpretation that renders a particular provision
superfluous or meaningless.”) (cleaned up).
These legal principles indicate that the Plan Administrator’s interpretation
was unreasonable because it created conflict between the Plan terms and the
Adoption Agreement. For example, the Plan Administrator claims it was proper to
13 Section 10.4 of the Plan explains that it “shall be construed and enforced
according to … the laws of the state … in which the Employer’s principal office is
located.” E.W. Burman is in Warwick, Rhode Island. ECF No. 34-2 ¶ 1. The Adoption
Agreement confirms this. ECF 34-2 at 60 (subsection “o”).
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issue Angus a mid-year distribution because Section 6.7 allowed Angus to elect to
receive an early distribution.	
See ECF No. 34-1 at 8, 13–14. Yet, Section 38 of the
Adoption Agreement clearly states that “[i]n-service distributions are NOT
permitted.” ECF No. 44 (emphasis in original). Here, Angus’ funds were distributed
to him on July 21, 2023—while he was still an employee—and he officially ended his
employment approximately two weeks later. ECF No. 34-2 ¶ 12; ECF No. 35-3 ¶¶ 31,
48. Further, the Plan Administrator’s argument that the language “unless a
participant otherwise elects” permitted Angus to cash-out early is unreasonable and
unsupported. Accepting this argument would be to defeat the purpose of a retirement
plan since a plan participant could demand money at any time, which is not the
purpose of the Plan.	
See ECF No. 34-3 at 63 (“A pension benefit plan … has been
adopted by the company for the purpose or rewarding long and loyal service to the
company by providing to employees additional financial security at
retirement … [s]ince the principal purpose of the plan is to provide benefits at normal
retirement age”). The more reasonable interpretation, taking into consideration the
other Plan provisions and the purpose of retirement plans generally, is that the
participant may elect to defer the time of distribution
beyond the “the sixtieth (60th)
day after the close of the Plan Year.”
Defendants also suggest that the Plan’s explicit definitions of Early Retirement
Date and Normal Retirement date should be interpreted as “inclusive of those dates
as well as any other date upon which the participant retires for reasons other than
disability.” ECF No. 34-1 at 14–15. However, neither the Adoption Agreement nor
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the Plan permit such an expansive view because it is clear that “early retirement” is
not an option, and the “normal retirement” is age 65.14
Defendants’ other argument—that there was an agreement with Angus to
distribute the funds early—is also unsupported by law or fact. While Angus admits
he wanted his money as soon as possible, nothing in the record supports that he and
the Defendants agreed to change the terms of the Plan to enable his distribution to
take place mid-year. Even so, “ERISA plans must be in writing and cannot be
modified orally.”
Livick v. The Gillette Co., 524 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2008). Further,
“if the provision is clear, however, an informal statement in conflict with it is in effect
purporting to	
modify the plan term, rendering any reliance on it inherently
unreasonable.”	
Id. (citing
Law v. Ernst & Young, 956 F.2d 364, 370 (1st Cir. 1992)).
This considered, the Court cannot rely on any informal or oral agreements because
they cause conflict with the clear and unambiguous Plan provisions.
In sum, the Plan required Angus’ account to be valued as of December 31, 2023,
not 2022, and he should have been paid out sometime in 2024. Based on a review of
the Administrative Record, which is comprised of the Plan, the Adoption Agreement,
and email communications between the parties, the Administrator’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence.	
Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.
14 When Defendants set up the Plan, they elected to not permit early
retirement and set the normal retirement age at 65. They now seek to alter the
meanings of their own selections which this Court will not entertain given that the
provisions are clear and unambiguous.
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17
2002). The Plan Administrator’s decision to deny the extra benefits is reversed, and
Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment on Count One is granted.15
IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on Count I of the Complaint, and denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Court may not enter final judgment until it determines the
appropriate remedy for Count I. The parties are ordered to submit a briefing schedule
on the remedy issue to this Court within twenty-one days of entry of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Melissa R. DuBose
United States District Judge
03/02/2026
15 Angus presented Counts II and II as alternative to Count I. ECF No. 41 at
15. Accordingly, the Court need not address Counts II or III, as this matter is
properly resolved on Count I.
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