Landry v. Pawtucket Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
NORMAN J. LANDRY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
PAWTUCKET POLICE
DEPARTMENT, CHIEF TINA
GONCALVES, in her official and
individual capacities, LIEUTENANT
CARRIE HORMANSKI, in her official
and individual capacities, GATEWAY
HEALTHCARE, INC., LIFESPAN
CORPORATION d/b/a BROWN
UNIVERSITY HEALTH, and BROWN
UNIVERSITY,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 25-cv-131-MRD-AEM
ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Norman Landry Jr. brings this action against Defendants
Pawtucket Police Department (“PPD”), Chief Tina Goncalves, Lieutenant Carrie
Hormanski, (“Pawtucket Defendants”), Gateway Healthcare Inc., Lifespan
Corporation d/b/a Brown University Health, and Brown University. Before the Court
are three motions: Mr. Landry moves to consolidate this case with another civil action
he argues is related (ECF No. 23) and Pawtucket Defendants and Gateway
Healthcare Inc., (collectively, “Defendants”), separately move to dismiss Mr. Landry’s
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Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and (d)(1).
(ECF Nos. 14, 21.)1
For the reasons stated below, the Court grants both motions to dismiss and
denies Mr. Landry’s motion to consolidate.
In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s liberal pleading
standard Rule 8(a)(2), and because Mr. Landry is proceeding pro se, his pleadings
will “be liberally construed.”	
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Briefly
stated, a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The
“fundamental purpose” of this pleading rule “is to protect a defendant’s inalienable
right to know in advance the nature of the cause of action being asserted against
him.”	
Martinez v. Petrenko, 792 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting
Ruiz Rivera
v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2008)). This “short and plain
statement” must “give the defendant fair notice of the claim and its factual basis,”
and “possess enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief.”	
SEC v.
Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 118 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotations, citations, and
original textual alteration omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(1) imposes the additional pleading
requirement that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise and direct.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(d)(1). Dismissal for failing to comply with Rule 8 is an appropriate remedy if the
1 The Court accepts the pending motion (ECF No. 25) as Gateway Healthcare
Inc.’s reply to Landry’s response in opposition to its motion to dismiss.
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complaint “is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true
substance, if any, is well disguised.”	
Sayied v. White, 89 Fed. App’x 284 (1st Cir.
2004) (unpublished table decision) (quoting
Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d
Cir. 1988)).
As best this Court can understand, Mr. Landry alleges that Defendants
conspired to unlawfully subject him to repeated 72-hour psychiatric detentions in
retaliation for his accusations against the PPD as a part of a broader pattern of
misconduct to silence and discredit him. ECF No. 5.
Without question, Mr. Landry’s Amended Complaint violates Rule 8. The
complaint, although short, is very far from a “plain statement” of the claims. It is
extraordinarily confusing, verbose, and needlessly complicates the claims to the point
“it would [be] unreasonable to expect defendants to frame a response to it.”	
Sayied,
89 Fed. App’x 284. For example, Mr. Landry writes:
Ere long, in 2023, PPD under Chief Tina Goncalves’ aegis and with Lt
Hormanski’s complicity, confederated with Gateway and Lifespan/BUH
to sequester Plaintiff within a 72-hour psychiatric conferment- an
incarceration proximate to his May 2023 denunciation to Hormanski,
heralding a palpable intensification of Defendants campaign to
subjugate him, a motif the records shall starkly delineate.
ECF No. 5, Exhibit 2 ¶ 17. As another example:
Gateway and Lifespan/BUH, buttressed by Brown University’s
institutional gravitas, failed or aggrandized rationales for these
detentions, illicitly billing Plaintiff’s insurer to reap pecuniary gain
whilst amplifying PPD’s prejudiced crusade to discredit Plaintiff post
his May 2023 report, further entrenching this archetype of government
profligacy. All defendants acted in symphony.
Id. ¶ 26.
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Both Pawtucket Defendants and Gateway Health Inc. correctly point out that
the complaint does not clearly link specific factual allegations of wrongdoing against
each Defendant.	
See ECF No. 14-1 at 5; ECF No. 21 at 4–5. While the complaint
organizes its claims into five causes of action, the connection between the factual
allegations and the legal claims they are intended to support are unclear. To
understand the claims against them, Defendants would have to unravel and comb
through detailed yet irrelevant factual allegations. While Mr. Landry is proceeding
pro se, he is not exempt from complying with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). Defendants’ motions to
dismiss is therefore granted and Mr. Landry will not be permitted to amend further.2
For the reasons set forth above, the Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 14, 21) are
GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate is DENIED (without prejudice) as
moot. (ECF No. 23).3
The Court notes that Mr. Landry has a history of filing motions and complaints
in this Court that are frivolous and devoid of any arguable basis in law or fact.
See Landry v. Lt. Evans et al., C.A. 24-cv-00533;
Landry v. Gagnon, C.A. No. 25-cv-
00132. Such conduct constitutes an abuse of the judicial process and imposes
unnecessary burdens on the Court and opposing parties. Accordingly, Mr. Landry is
2 Although the Court initially found the complaint sufficient to satisfy the in
forma pauperis (IFP) screening standard, upon consideration of Defendants Rule 8(a)
and (d)(1) arguments, the Court concluded that the complaint fails to meet the
minimum pleading requirements.
3 The action with which consolidation is sought has been dismissed, leaving no
pending case to consolidate.
See Landry v. Gagnon, C.A. No. 25-cv-00132.
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warned that further frivolous, harassing, or wasteful filings may result in monetary
sanctions and/or other appropriate relief. If Mr. Landry seeks to file any future
complaints, petitions or additional pleading in this or any related matter, he must
first file a written motion for leave of Court.4 That petition must be accompanied by
the documents sought to be filed but shall not include an accompanying filing fee.
Upon filing, the Clerk of Court shall accept the documents, mark them received, and
forward them to a judicial officer for action on the petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Melissa R. DuBose
United States District Judge
January 23, 2026
4 Mr. Landry’s action,
Landry v. Goncalves et al., C.A. No. 25-cv-00353,
remains pending and will proceed before the Court.
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