State of New York et al v. Kennedy et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF
WASHINGTON; STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND; STATE OF ARIZONA;
STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF
COLORADO; STATE OF
CONNECTICUT; STATE OF
DELAWARE; THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA; STATE OF HAWAI’I;
STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF
MAINE; STATE OF MARYLAND;
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN; STATE OF
MINNESOTA; STATE OF NEW
JERSEY; STATE OF NEW MEXICO;
STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF
VERMONT; STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., in his
official capacity as SECRETARY OF
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 25-cv-196-MRD-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Melissa R. DuBose, United States District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendants United States Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS” or “the Agency”) and HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy’s
(“RFK, Jr.”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended
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Complaint, ECF No. 98.1 	For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the background underlying
this dispute and the factual backdrop that the Court provided in its July 1, 2025
Memorandum and Order.
	See ECF No. 73 at 2-11. As a brief reminder, this action
involves a challenge brought by nineteen states and the District of Columbia seeking
to invalidate Defendants’ decision to overhaul HHS’s structure and operations as an
administrative agency. 	Specifically, Plaintiffs contest Defendants’ March 27, 2025
directive (the “March 27 Communiqué”) announcing the Agency’s goal of drastically
reducing the number of employees within it and purporting to eliminate the existence
of several sub-agencies within HHS itself.2 ECF No. 94 ¶ 2.
Subsequent 	to 	the 	March 	27 	Communiqué 	and 	Defendants’ 	attempt 	to
overhaul HHS, Plaintiffs brought the instant action and moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent HHS from razing itself. 	ECF No. 43. 	Following the Court’s
decision granting Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction in part and denying
the Defendants’ preemptive request for a stay of any injunction ordered, as well as
its subsequent order clarifying the scope of its preliminary injunction, Defendants
filed a notice of appeal and sought an emergency stay of this Court’s preliminary
1 Plaintiffs include nineteen states and the District of Columbia. 	This
Memorandum and Order refers to them collectively as “Plaintiffs.”
2 The parties refer to the Agency’s employee termination notices as reductions
in force or “RIFs.”
See ECF No. 94 ¶ 2.
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injunction from the First Circuit. 	The Court of Appeals denied the request on
September 17, 2025.3
New York v. Kennedy, 155 F.4th 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2025). Slightly
over 	six 	weeks 	later, 	Defendants 	voluntarily 	dismissed 	their 	appeal 	of 	the
preliminary injunction. 	Defendants now seek resolution of their motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.
As Plaintiffs themselves describe, much of their Amended Complaint remains
the same as the initial Complaint they filed. 	ECF No. 101 at 27. 	Specifically,
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint adds that, among other things, Defendants’ post-
March 	27 	Communiqué 	actions 	have 	resulted 	in: 	(1) 	the 	Food 	and 	Drug
Administration missing a vaccine application deadline and cancelling a test for the
virus that causes bird flu; (2) office closures and layoffs which have required Head
Start and Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program grantees to fend for
themselves; and (3) a lack doctors available to certify new illnesses for coverage as
required to care for the responders and survivors of the attacks that took place on
September 11, 2001. ECF No. 94 ¶ 3.
Notwithstanding these similarities, the Amended Complaint now only seeks
relief against RFK, Jr. and HHS itself and omits HHS’s constituent subagencies as
defendants.
	See ECF No. 94 ¶¶ 32-33. 	With respect to the Amended Complaint’s
allegations, Plaintiffs have provided updated information regarding HHS’s attempt
to restructure itself and the alleged harm that has resulted from it. Notwithstanding
3 Plaintiffs amended their Complaint and Defendants moved to dismiss it
during the pendency of their appeal.
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these updates, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint retains its prior claims including the
allegations 	that 	Defendants’ 	decision 	to 	restructure 	HHS: 	(1) 	violates 	the
Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine; (2) runs afoul of the Constitution’s
Appropriations Clause; (3) constitutes an unlawful exercise of the Executive’s power
and is therefore
ultra vires; (4) violates the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) as
contrary to law; and (5) violates the APA as arbitrary and capricious.
See id. ¶¶ 328-
77. 	Although the Court partially granted Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary
injunction, 	Defendants 	now 	seek 	dismissal 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	Amended 	Complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).4
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Although courts typically apply the rule outlined in
Bell Atlantic Corp v.
Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal when assessing a defendant’s motion to dismiss,
Plaintiffs have acknowledged the existence of an alternative standard of review that
the First Circuit has used when evaluating a motion to dismiss in the context of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). ECF No. 101 at 28-29. Specifically, Plaintiffs
rely on
Atieh v. Riordan, where the First Circuit vacated and remanded a district
court’s decision after determining that it improperly applied the
Twombly/Iqbal
standard on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 727 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir.
2013). In doing so, the First Circuit determined that “[t]he relevant inquiry is—and
must remain—not whether the facts set forth in a complaint state a plausible claim
4 The Court thanks the amici and their counsel for their participation in both
this proceeding and in the Court’s general consideration of the issues involved in this
dispute.
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but, rather, whether the administrative record sufficiently supports the agency’s
decision.”
Id. at 76. Notwithstanding the existence of this alternative standard, the
Court concludes that it does not govern its review of Defendants’ motion here for two
primary reasons.
First, the Court determines that this case meets the criteria for the exception
created by
Atieh itself. 	Although
Atieh held that the plausibility standard does not
apply to a complaint seeking judicial review of a final agency action, it further
concluded that courts may nevertheless apply
Twombly/Iqbal when “the agency
claims that the underlying premise of the complaint is legally flawed (rather than
factually unsupported).”
	Id. at 76 n.4. 	Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint is legally flawed. 	For example, Defendants contend that
Plaintiffs cannot succeed in demonstrating that HHS’s actions have violated either
the Constitution or the APA because HHS possesses the relevant statutory and
Constitutional power to restructure itself and fire its employees. ECF No. 98 at 56-
59. 	As a result of Defendants’ decision to attack Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint as
legally flawed, the Court determines that this case fits within
Atieh’s exception.
Second, the Court notes that the First Circuit has declined to explicitly apply
Atieh when given the opportunity to do so as in the case of
Union of Concerned
Scientists v. Wheeler, 954 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2020). 	In
Wheeler, the First Circuit
reviewed a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss an APA claim but (1) did not
mention the standard established in
Atieh and (2) used plausibility language instead.
Id. at 20 (“These allegations
plausibly state claims for judicial review under the
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APA.”) (emphasis added). 	The Court’s use of this language appears to suggest that
the First Circuit may no longer follow
Atieh in all instances. As a result, this Court
will 	follow the First Circuit’s 	more 	recent 	lead and apply the
	Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard to the portions of Defendants’ motion that they have brought
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).5
When evaluating Defendants’ argument that, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), it
must dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or based
on another justiciability doctrine, courts must accept a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.
	See Valentin v.
Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that “[Rule 12(b)(1)]
is a large umbrella, overspreading a variety of different types of challenges to subject
matter jurisdiction” including “ripeness, mootness, sovereign immunity, and the
existence of federal question jurisdiction”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Defendants’ Jurisdictional Challenge
Similar to their opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,
Defendants assert that this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide this dispute. ECF No.
5 For additional context, the Court notes that other Circuits appear to apply
the plausibility standard in this context as well. 	For example, in
Concord Hospital
Inc. v. NH Dep’t Health and Hum. Servs., the District of New Hampshire noted that
“[
Atieh] is in contrast with courts elsewhere. In the D.C. Circuit, for example, courts
‘regularly review motions to dismiss APA actions under the plausibility standard.’”
770 F. Supp. 3d 400, 404 n.3 (D.N.H. 2025) (citing
Asante v. Azar, 436 F. Supp. 3d
215, 222 n.2 (D.D.C. 2020)). Notably, the Court in
Concord Hospital declined to apply
Atieh 	and 	opted 	to 	review 	that 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	pursuant
	Twombly/Iqbal’s
plausibility standard instead.
Id. at 404.
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98 at 22. 	Specifically, Defendants contend that: (1) the Civil Service Reform Act
(“CSRA”) divests this Court of jurisdiction; (2) Plaintiffs lack standing pursuant to
Article III of the Constitution; (3) the Tucker Act requires Plaintiffs to file part of this
action in the Court of Federal Claims; and (4) Plaintiff may not challenge the legality
of the March 27 Communiqué because it does not constitute a “final agency action”
pursuant to the APA.
	Id. at 22-49. 	The Court finds that each of these bases for
dismissal are meritless and will address them in turn.6
1. 	Claim Channeling
As they did before, Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide
Plaintiffs’ claims because they allegedly seek review of employment decisions made
by federal agencies and the CSRA therefore requires Plaintiffs to challenge these
decisions before either the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) or the Federal
Labor Relations Authority (“FLSA”). ECF No. 98 at 22-26. 	In essence, Defendants
argue that HHS’s initiative to eliminate its employees and the employees within its
subagencies constitutes routine employment decisions that fall within the purview of
6 Although Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint, their motion
effectively asks the Court to reconsider several conclusions that it reached when
deciding Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and which the First Circuit
indicated it would affirm when it denied Defendants’ motion for stay pending appeal.
See New York v. Kennedy, 155 F.4th 67 (1st Cir. 2025) (considering whether
Defendants had made a strong preliminary showing that they were likely to succeed
on the merits of their appeal). What’s more, the Court must now review the Amended
Complaint pursuant to a
less demanding standard of review (plausibility, as opposed
to strong likelihood of success on the merits). To be sure, the Court must now assess
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint — as opposed to their original Complaint — but it
nevertheless wishes to note the substantial overlap between the issues that it already
evaluated, the tip of the First Circuit’s hat to the Court’s prior analysis, and the issues
that Defendants present at this stage of the case.
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the MSPB and the FLSA. 	The Court’s review of the Amended Complaint and the
arguments presented by Defendants reveal that neither the MSPB nor the FLSA
prevent this Court from presiding over this action.
Specifically, the Court emphasizes Defendants’ explicit concession that they
are making the same arguments rejected by this Court and the First Circuit in
support of their claim channeling theory.
	Id. at 26 n.5. Moreover, Defendants have
neither presented any new, previously unrejected authority in support of their motion
to dismiss nor have they explained how Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint would
somehow alter the Court’s prior rejection of the CSRA claim channeling argument.
As a result, the Court determines that the Court possesses jurisdiction over this
dispute and that Plaintiffs are not required to engage in CSRA claim channeling.
2. 	Standing
Defendants next seek to dismiss this action based on Plaintiffs’ alleged lack of
standing.
	Id. at 26. 	Here, Defendants remind the Court that it must review their
standing arguments “afresh” because Plaintiffs amended their complaint.
	Id. 	As a
quick reminder:
To clear the Article III hurdle [and establish standing], the party who
invokes a federal court’s authority must show that (1) [s]he or []he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
challenged conduct; (2) the injury can fairly be traced to that conduct;
and (3) the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable decision from
the court.
N.H. Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1996).
Notwithstanding their request to review their argument “afresh,” the Court’s review
of 	Defendants’ 	arguments 	reveal 	that 	they 	have 	clearly 	repeated 	their 	prior
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arguments that both this Court and the First Circuit reviewed and rejected. Overall,
Defendants again argue that Plaintiffs lack standing because: (1) they have not
suffered a valid informational injury; (2) HHS’s failure to provide services does not
constitute an injury suffered by Plaintiffs; and (3) for some lapses in services,
Plaintiffs fail to allege their “personal stake” in the actions they seek to challenge.
ECF No. 98 at 26-42.
With respect to the lack of an informational injury, Defendants appear to argue
that they are not required to provide certain information that Plaintiffs allege they
lost access to and that, even if Plaintiffs can demonstrate harm stemming from the
deprivation of information that they allege an entitlement to receive, Defendants
nevertheless maintain their ability to manage HHS from an operational perspective.
Id. at 28-32. 	Here, the First Circuit has already determined that the Court “found
that 	plaintiffs 	alleged 	clear 	‘downstream 	consequences 	from 	failing 	to 	receive
information,’”
Kennedy, 155 F.4th at 74 (quoting
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594
U.S. 413, 441-42 (2021)), and Defendants’ more granular attempt to argue that
various allegations, when viewed in isolation, defeat Plaintiffs’ ability to assert
Article III standing ignores both the Court’s prior findings and the First Circuit’s
decision affirming them. 	Moreover, Defendants completely fail to argue how the
Court could reach a contrary determination on standing without running afoul of its
prior decision or the First Circuit’s opinion in this case.
Similarly, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs have not suffered any injury
based on HHS’s failure to provide services lacks merit. As this Court has previously
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found and the First Circuit noted, “the plaintiffs alleged myriad injuries to the states
themselves, including the cessation of services on which state agencies -- not just
residents of the states -- rely.”
Id. at 73. The Court determines that Defendants have
again failed to articulate a cognizable reason why the Court should change its earlier
position on this issue or how it could do so given the First Circuit’s indication of
agreement with it.
Finally, Defendants recycle their prior argument asserting that Plaintiffs have
not stated a particularized injury and they therefore lack a personal stake in their
challenge to the March 27 Communiqué. 	ECF No. 98 at 40-42. 	Once again, this
argument lacks force based on the Court’s earlier finding of the direct harm faced by
the states themselves, the First Circuit’s indication of likely approval of that finding,
as well as the lack of a material change that would alter this Court’s assessment of
these circumstances at this juncture. 	The Court therefore rejects Defendants’
attempt to dismiss this case based on a lack of standing.
3. 	The Tucker Act
The Tucker Act, which requires plaintiffs bringing contractual claims against
the government to proceed in the Court of Federal Claims, sometimes divests this
Court of jurisdiction. Without acknowledging this Court’s or the First Circuit’s prior
rejection of this argument, Defendants return to this refrain in their motion to
dismiss but without explaining how the Court could reach the opposite outcome here.
See Kennedy, 155 F.4th at 75 n.4 (rejecting Defendants’ Tucker Act argument and
noting that the inclusion of an allegation regarding HHS’s failure to process grants
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“does not transform their suit into a demand for money damages or an order ‘to
enforce a contractual obligation to pay money’”) (quoting
Department of Educ. v.
California, 604 U.S. 650, 651 (2025)). 	The Court therefore rejects this argument
again here; the Tucker Act does not present an obstacle to the Court exercising its
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, as amended.
4. 	Finality of Agency Action
Finally, Defendants repeat their arguments asserting that the Court may not
review HHS’ March 27 Communiqué because it does not constitute a final agency
action under the APA. Rather than explaining how the Amended Complaint changes
the Court’s prior rejection of this theory, Defendants instead reuse their prior
arguments 	while 	noting 	that 	“this 	Court 	remains 	free 	to 	revisit 	its 	earlier
determination” given the fact that Plaintiffs have amended their complaint. ECF No.
98 at 45. Based on Defendants’ failure to present a materially different argument in
support of this position and that nothing in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint would
suggest that the Court should deviate from its prior conclusion, the Court relies on
its prior analysis,
see ECF No. 73 at 32-35, to once again determine that the March
27 Communiqué constitutes a final agency action.
Therefore, the Court determines that it possesses jurisdiction over this matter
and can properly hear Plaintiffs’ claims.
B. Failure to State a Claim
The Court’s July 1 Memorandum and Order evaluated whether Plaintiffs
demonstrated a “strong likelihood of success” on the merits of their claims and,
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because the Amended Complaint alleges the same claims, now only needs to
determine 	whether 	Plaintiffs’ 	Amended 	Complaint 	has 	plausibly 	alleged 	an
entitlement to relief. 	For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an entitlement to relief on each of their five causes
of action.
1. 	Counts I, II, and III – Constitutional Claims (Separation of Powers and
Appropriations Clause Violations) and Ultra Vires Claim
Defendants appear to simultaneously assert overlapping arguments in support
of dismissing count 1 (a violation of the separation of powers doctrine); count 2 (a
violation of the appropriations clause); and count 3 (a request for a determination
that the March 27 Communiqué was
ultra vires): they argue that litigants lack the
ability to bring freestanding constitutional claims when, according to Defendants,
Plaintiffs actually seek redress for statutory violations. 	ECF No. 98 at 57-58. 	The
Court reiterates that Article III courts undoubtedly possess the authority to enjoin
government actions that violate the Constitution.
	See Armstrong v. Exceptional
Child Center, 	Inc., 	575 U.S. 320, 	327 	(2015) 	(“The 	ability to 	sue 	and enjoin
unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of
equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing
back to England.”). Given the existence of this relief and the fact that the Court must
accept Plaintiffs’ well pleaded allegations as true, the Court determines that they
have plausibly alleged HHS and RFK, Jr.’s actions in reorganizing HHS have violated
the separation of powers doctrine, the appropriations clause, and that the March 27
Communiqué 	was
	ultra 	vires. 	Specifically, 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	HHS’s
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reorganization has violated explicit statutory mandates, which determine how HHS
and its subagencies must operate and these allegations plausibly allege violations of
the Constitution and
ultra vires action on behalf of Defendants.
	See ECF No. 94
¶ 327 (alleging that “Plaintiff states have not been given access to demographic data
required under 42 U.S.C. § 290bb-36c(e),” which has limited their ability to track
information related to high-risk populations in conjunction with the Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration).
Relatedly, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’
ultra vires claim based on
the idea that Plaintiffs have “failed to show” that HHS has violated the law. ECF No.
98 at 59. However, as the Court determined above, the Amended Complaint contains
several plausible allegations regarding HHS’s extralegal conduct and constitutional
violations, and these allegations are sufficient to withstand Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. 	For example, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges that, contrary to
federal law, HHS’s restructuring has functionally prevented it from operating labs
detecting viral Hepatitis, supporting tobacco control, and detecting lead poisoning.
ECF No 94 ¶ 347. 	To the extent that Defendants wish to contradict Plaintiffs’
plausible allegations and present evidence of the lawfulness of their actions for the
Court’s review, the opportunity to do so will come at subsequent stages of this case.
As a result, the Court rejects Defendants’ attempt to weigh in on how
they believe
HHS’s reorganization fulfills all existing statutory mandates and instead determines
that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ actions have violated the
Constitution and are otherwise
ultra vires.
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2. 	Counts IV and V – Violations of the APA (Contrary to Law; Arbitrary and
Capricious)
Along with their challenge to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, Defendants seek
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims asserting that the March 27 Communiqué violated the
APA. Specifically, Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
for a violation of the APA because they failed to meet the “mandamus-like standard”
ostensibly imposed by 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 	ECF No. 98 at 49-52. 	Be that as it may,
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint undoubtedly seeks relief pursuant to § 706(2)—as
opposed to § 706(1)—and the Court has already endorsed this theory of relief during
the preliminary injunction proceedings.
	See ECF No. 73 at 50 n.13. 	While
Defendants do in fact acknowledge that the Court has previously addressed this
issue, they nevertheless reargue it in their motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding their
decision to reassert this same argument a second time, Defendants have failed to
advance any legitimate basis that would permit the Court to revisit its prior decision
on this issue. As a result, the Court rejects it here as well and determines that it will
not assess Plaintiffs’ APA claims through the lens of § 706(1).
Defendants next argue that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim that
HHS violated the APA by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in its issuance of the
March 27 Communiqué. ECF No. 98 at 52-54. In doing so, however, Defendants fail
to accept the factual allegations contained in the Amended Complaint as true and
instead offer alternative rationales for: (1) why HHS possesses the authority to
destroy itself; and (2) why the harms alleged in the Amended Complaint are not as
consequential as Plaintiffs allege.
	Id. 	Although these arguments could have some
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persuasive force at the summary judgment stage, the Court determines that they are
premature at this motion to dismiss stage and fail to demonstrate that Plaintiffs have
insufficiently 	alleged violations 	of 	the 	APA.
	See 	Schatz 	v. 	Republican 	State
Leadership Committee, 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that, on a motion to
dismiss, the court must “take the complaint’s well-pled (
i.e., non-conclusory, non-
speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor,
and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief”). Here, the Amended Complaint
contains sufficient, plausible allegations demonstrating how Defendants’ March 27
Communiqué 	constituted arbitrary 	and capricious 	agency 	action. 	Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to provide a reasonable basis in support of
dismantling HHS and that they also failed to consider the consequences of their
actions.
	See ECF No. 94 ¶¶ 370-74. 	As a result, the Court rejects Defendants’
arguments to the contrary based on their deviation from the applicable standard of
review.
Similarly, Defendants next argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ APA
claim seeking redress for HHS’s March 27 Communiqué on the basis that it exceeded
its statutory authority. 	ECF No. 98 at 54-56. 	Specifically, Defendants argue that
HHS should receive wide latitude to administer itself and that HHS has made it clear
that it will follow its statutory duties.
	Id. 	As with their opposition to Defendants’
arbitrary and capricious claim, these arguments directly contradict the plausible
allegations 	in 	the 	Amended Complaint explaining 	how 	HHS 	cannot 	fulfill its
statutory obligations as agency based on the sweeping overhaul that it undertook
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prior to the Court’s intervention.
	See Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. As a result, the Court
rejects this additional basis for dismissal and therefore denies Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.7
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on 	the 	foregoing, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Defendants 	have 	not
demonstrated their entitlement to dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. As a
result, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 98.
7 Curiously, the final section of Defendants’ memorandum in support of their
motion to dismiss provides the Court with a list of subagencies within HHS and an
“explanation” of why Plaintiffs have failed to allege claims with respect to the
subagencies themselves. 	ECF No. 98 at 60-67. 	However, the Court declines
Defendants’ invitation to make piecemeal rulings concerning the harm stemming
from the alleged mismanagement of these subagencies. Plaintiffs have only brought
this action against HHS itself and RFK, Jr., ECF No. 94 ¶¶ 32-33, and this action
challenges the March 27 Communiqué writ large. 	Plaintiffs do not seek to contest
the daily operations of each subagency and its statutorily mandated duties on an
individual basis. 	Instead, they seek the Court’s invalidation of the March 27
Communiqué in an effort to prevent the chaos allegedly taking place as described in
the Amended Complaint, throughout all levels of HHS.
	See ECF No. 98 at 104-05
(requesting that the Court “[i]ssue a judicial declaration that the March 27 Directive
(as defined above to include the RIF and reorganization) and any implementation is
unlawful because it violates the United States Constitution and the Administrative
Procedure Act.”). The Court therefore rejects Defendants’ attempt to seek dismissal
on this basis. Similarly, the Court has considered and rejects Defendants’ notices of
factual developments as an attempt to alter its outcome here based on HHS’s decision
to partially rescind the RIFs sent out after the immediate aftermath of the March 27
Communiqué.
See ECF Nos. 111 & 112.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Melissa R. DuBose
United States District Judge
April 7, 2026
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