Brodeur v. State of Rhode Island

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
PETER BRODEUR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 25-235 WES
)
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, by and )
through the RHODE ISLAND )
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL )
MANAGEMENT, )
)
Defendant. )
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Senior District Judge.
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant
(“Motion to Dismiss”), Dkt. No. 8. For the following reasons, the
Motion to Dismiss is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Peter Brodeur alleges that, in May 2024, he suffered
extensive injuries to his right side and back while loading lobster
traps into his boat from a state-owned wharf in Narragansett, Rhode
Island. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 11, Dkt. No. 1. Brodeur’s alleged injuries
occurred when the wharf’s marine bulkhead shifted suddenly beneath
his feet, causing him to fall onto the deck of his boat, which sat
on the water about eight feet below. Id. ¶¶ 3, 39. Brodeur
attributes his injuries to Defendant State of Rhode Island’s
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failure to maintain the wharf in a safe condition for its intended
use. Id. ¶ 47. He thus invokes the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction
to bring a claim against the State for breach of duty as wharfinger
under the general maritime law. Id. ¶¶ 42-50. He also brings a
common-law negligence claim. Id. ¶¶ 51-64.
The State moves to dismiss Brodeur’s Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Mot. Dismiss 1. Specifically, the
State argues that Brodeur cannot satisfy the first requirement of
admiralty jurisdiction and that, because this case does not
otherwise trigger the Court’s diversity jurisdiction or federal
question jurisdiction, Brodeur must pursue his claims in state
court. Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 1 (“Def.’s Mem.”), Dkt. No.
8-1.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), it is
the plaintiff’s burden to establish the court’s jurisdiction. Woo
v. Spackman, 988 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2021). Where, as here, the
defendant challenges only the jurisdictional sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s allegations and not their factual accuracy, the court
must credit those allegations and draw all reasonable inferences
from them in the plaintiff’s favor. Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista,
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254 F.3d 358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that Brodeur’s allegations do not satisfy the
first requirement of admiralty jurisdiction. Federal district
courts have original jurisdiction, exclusive of state courts, of
“[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” 28
U.S.C. § 1333 & (1). To establish admiralty jurisdiction, Brodeur
must show that “the tort at issue (1) occurred on navigable waters
and (2) bore a significant relation to traditional maritime
activities.” Butler v. Am. Trawler Co., 887 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir.
1989) (citation modified); see also Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995). The State
does not dispute that Brodeur satisfies the second requirement of
admiralty jurisdiction; instead, it argues only that the tort did
not occur on navigable waters, and therefore Brodeur fails the
first requirement of admiralty jurisdiction, known as the locality
test. Def.’s Mem. 8.
Brodeur contends that the tort at issue occurred not on the
wharf — which, for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, constitutes
an extension of the land — but on his boat, “which was afloat in
navigable waters.” Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp.”)
1, Dkt. No. 9; see also Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396
U.S. 212, 214-15 (1969) (“[S]tructures such as wharves and piers,
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permanently affixed to land, are extensions of the land.”). As
support, he cites Butler’s statement that whether a tort occurs on
navigable waters depends on “where the negligence ‘takes effect,’
not where the negligent act occurred.” Butler, 887 F.2d at 21
(collecting cases). In Butler, the plaintiff severely injured her
finger when she tried to board a ship from a wharf by climbing
down the ship’s rigging instead of using a ladder descending from
the wharf that was poorly maintained by its owner. Id. at 20-21.
The First Circuit held that regardless of whether “the wharf itself
counts as part of the land, the injury occurred on the ship,” thus
satisfying the locality test. Id. at 21. Applying Butler, Brodeur
argues that his injuries occurred not when he fell from the wharf,
but when he hit the deck of his boat, and so regardless of where
the negligent act took place, it took effect on navigable waters.
Pl.’s Resp. 3, 5.
Brodeur’s application of Butler is plausible, but only if one
disregards longstanding Supreme Court precedent. In T. Smith &
Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928), the Court held there was no
admiralty jurisdiction where a sling full of cargo, which was being
lowered from a ship to a wharf “by means of a winch on the vessel,”
knocked a longshoreman from the wharf into the water, where he was
later found dead. 276 U.S. at 181. The claims were “solely for
the death that occurred in the river” and not for any injuries the
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longshoreman sustained on the wharf. Id. at 182. Nevertheless,
the Court reasoned that the “blow by the sling was what gave rise
to the cause of action. It was given and took effect while deceased
was upon the land. It was the sole, immediate and proximate cause
of his death.” Id. The Court addressed “the converse case” seven
years later, in Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647
(1935). There, it held that there was admiralty jurisdiction where
a sling full of cargo knocked a longshoreman from a vessel onto
the wharf. 295 U.S. at 647-49. “If, when the blow from a swinging
crane knocks a longshoreman from the dock into the water, the cause
of action arises on the land, it must follow,” the Court explained,
“that when he is struck upon the vessel and the blow throws him
upon the dock the cause of action arises on the vessel.” Id. at
649.
Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning here, Brodeur’s cause
of action arose on the wharf, when the marine bulkhead shifted
suddenly under his feet, causing him to fall several feet down to
the deck of his boat. Although Brodeur’s injuries technically did
not occur until he made impact, the “sole, immediate and proximate
cause” of those injuries was his fall from the wharf. T. Smith,
276 U.S. at 182. This result is compatible with Butler, where the
plaintiff’s injuries occurred entirely on the ship. 887 F.2d at
21. To be sure, but for the defective ladder (and hence the
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defendant’s negligence), Butler would not have injured herself in
the rigging. But the negligence took effect only once she was in
the rigging, i.e., on the ship, and not when she was on the wharf.
Applying T. Smith and Minnie, had Butler tried to climb down the
faulty ladder, slipped, and fallen into the water or to the ship’s
deck below, there would have been no admiralty jurisdiction.
It may seem unfair to pin the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction
on simple twists of fate. Indeed, citing T. Smith and Minnie, the
Supreme Court has lamented “the perverse and casuistic borderline
situations that have demonstrated some of the problems with the
locality test of maritime jurisdiction.” Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc.
v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249,255 (1972). But despite these
issues, the Supreme Court has not disavowed the locality test.
And it has warned that, “in determining whether to expand admiralty
jurisdiction,” courts “‘should proceed with caution.’” Id. at 272
(citation modified) (quoting Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404
U.S. 202, 212 (1971)).
Accordingly, this Court finds that the tort at issue occurred
on the wharf, when Brodeur fell from the marine bulkhead, and not
when he landed on his boat. Because the wharf does not constitute
navigable waters, the Court lacks admiralty jurisdiction over this
case.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant,
Dkt. No. 8, is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Senior District Judge
Date: January 14, 2026
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