Tok v. Kyes

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
EYLEM TOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL NESSIGNER, Warden,
Defendant.
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C.A. No. 25-cv-371-MRD-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Melissa R. DuBose, United States District Judge.
Petitioner Eylem Tok is fighting extradition to Türkiye after she and her son
fled the country just hours after he was involved in a fatal car accident in Istanbul on
March 1, 2024. 	Tok’s extradition was certified to the Secretary of State by Chief
Magistrate Judge Donald L. Cabell of the District of Massachusetts on February 11,
2025 when he issued an Order on Relator’s Extradition, Motion to Dismiss, and
Motion for Release from Custody. 	Aggrieved by the Magistrate Judge’s Order, Tok
filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus which requires this Court to examine many
of the same arguments that the Magistrate Judge rejected. 	After reviewing the
February 11, 2025 Order, the relevant Treaty and case law, as well as the parties’
arguments, the Court DENIES Petitioner Tok’s writ of habeas corpus for the reasons
below.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Factual Background
Unless otherwise noted, the following information comes from the factual
findings in the Magistrate Judge’s February 11, 2025 Order in
Matter of Extradition
of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d 46, 54–57 (D. Mass. 2025).
See In re Extradition of Howard,
996 F.2d 1320, 1329 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that the Court must accept the
Magistrate Judge’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous).
This case stems from a tragic car crash in Istanbul, Türkiye on March 1, 2024
involving Tok’s son, T.C., who drove of one of the vehicles involved in the crash.
Matter of Extradition of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 54–55. T.C. had three passengers in
his car and was being followed by a friend who was carrying five passengers, when
he accelerated at a high rate of speed around a curve and crashed into five individuals
who were stopped on the side of the road after one of their ATV vehicles broke down.
Id. at 54. 	All five ATV riders were brought to the hospital, and one later died from
their injuries.
	Id. 	While still on scene, one of the injured passengers in T.C.’s car
gave his cell phone to another passenger to utilize the flashlight feature in order to
illuminate the injured party’s head.
	Id. at 55. 	After doing so, the passenger
absentmindedly pocketed the injured party’s phone, took the keys from one of the
vehicles, and drove from the crash site to a nearby housing complex.
Id.
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Immediately after the crash, T.C. called his mother—Eylem Tok—and his
driver.1
Id. His mom responded to the crash scene and transported her son and two
occupants of the crashed cars away from the scene to their homes at the same housing
complex.
Id. Congregating at the complex was Tok, her son, the passenger who had
the cell phone, others from the crash scene, security officers, and T.C.’s driver.
	Id.
While there are conflicting accounts about what exactly happened to the cell phone
that night, it is undisputed that T.C.’s driver found the cell phone in his vehicle a few
days later and turned it into police after consulting with T.C.’s father’s attorney.
Id.
at 56–57. 	Meanwhile, approximately 3 hours after the crash, Tok and her son
boarded a one-way flight to Cairo and then to the United States.
Id. at 57.
Turkish officials obtained “arrest warrants” for Tok for allegedly violating
Turkish Criminal Code Article 281, “destroying, concealing, or altering evidence,” and
Article 283 for “protecting the offender.”2	
Id. at 53. The two were arrested on June
14, 2024 in Boston, Massachusetts on warrants that sought their extradition to
Türkiye.
Id. Petitioner has been detained since that date.
1 The Court accepts that it was T.C.’s driver, but notes for the reader that “the
extradition file as a whole presents [the driver’s] agency as a disputed matter.”
	Id.
at 60. As a spoiler, the Court agrees that “the agency status of [the driver] is a matter
for trial in Türkiye.”
Id.
2 The Court will later address Petitioner’s argument that these documents are
not “arrest warrants” as understood in the American criminal legal system and are
documents that merely state Petitioner is wanted for questioning, not prosecution,
for the Article 281 and 283 offenses.
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Procedural Background
After their arrests on June 14, 2024, Petitioner Tok and her son appeared
before Chief Magistrate Judge Donald L. Cabell of the District of Massachusetts who
ordered both be detained while their extradition requests were pending.
	Id. 	The
Court heard argument on October 16, 2024, and issued an Order on February 11,
2025 certifying Tok’s extradition to the Secretary of State. That Order was stayed to
allow Petitioner Tok to pursue habeas relief. On March 19, 2025, Tok filed a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District of Massachusetts. 	In an Order issued on
August 1, 2025, District Judge Allison D. Burroughs transferred Petitioner Tok’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court because Petitioner is currently
detained at the Wyatt Detention Facility in Central Falls, Rhode Island.
Tok v. Kyes,
C.A. No. 25-cv-10649, 24-cv-12458, 2025 WL 2200412, at *4 (D. Mass Aug. 1, 2025).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“[A] district judge may review a magistrate judge’s extradition decision only
on a petition for writ of habeas corpus.”
Tok v. Kyes, 2025 WL 2200412, at *3 (citing
Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369–70 (1920)). 	“Ordinarily, ‘habeas corpus is
available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense
charged is within the treaty, and . . . whether there was any evidence warranting the
finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.’”
	Hilton v.
Kerry, 754 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting
Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 171
(1st Cir. 1991)). 	This review “is not a means for rehearing what the magistrate
already decided.”
	Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). 	As the First
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Circuit has observed, “serious due process concerns may merit review beyond the
narrow scope of inquiry in extradition proceedings.”
In re Extradition of Manzi, 888
F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1989).
III. 	DISCUSSION3
A. 	Whether the Offense(s) Charged Are Within the Treaty
The Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus raises several issues for this Court to
consider, many of which were already addressed and rejected by Magistrate Judge
Cabell. 	The arguments, in sum, are that the requirements of the Treaty on
Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the United States
of America and the Republic of Türkiye, U.S.-Turk., June 7, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 3111 (the
“Treaty”)4 have not been met for the reasons below: 1) “[Petitioner] has not been
charged with an offense under the meaning of the Treaty,” 2) Türkiye has not
provided valid arrest warrants, 3) Petitioner cannot be jailed for more than 1 year on
either the Article 281 or 283 charge, 4) dual criminality is not met, 5) the allegations
relied on by the Government would not violate Turkish law, and 6) Petitioner’s arrest
and continued detention violates her rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. 	ECF No. 29-1 at 1–2. 	The Government argues that the
3 The Court can quickly dispense with the question of whether the Magistrate
Judge had jurisdiction to hear the extradition case because “[t]he parties agree[d],
and the court so [found], that the court ha[d] authority over th[e] extradition dispute.”
Matter of Extradition of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 58. Further, neither Petitioner Tok’s
nor the Government’s papers raise any objection about the Magistrate Judge’s
jurisdiction to hear the extradition case. Thus, the Court finds that Chief Magistrate
Judge Cabell properly exercised jurisdiction over Petitioner’s extradition case and
will move on to address Petitioner’s arguments.
4 https://perma.cc/LJ5R-HKCS
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Magistrate Judge was correct in finding the following: 1) the Court had authority to
conduct the extradition proceeding, 2) the Court had jurisdiction over Tok because
she was arrested in Massachusetts, 3) the Treaty was in full force and effect, 4) the
Article 281 and 283 charges — “destroying, concealing, or altering evidence” and
“protecting an offender,” respectively—were covered by the Treaty, and that there
was probable cause to believe Petitioner committed the offenses. ECF No. 30 at 7. In
reaching these findings, the Magistrate Judge rejected Petitioner’s arguments on
both the length of punishment allowed under Articles 281 and 283 and her not being
formally charged with an offense that would render her extraditable. This Court will
now consider the parties’ arguments, and the Magistrate Judge’s analysis and
conclusions set forth in
Matter of Extradition of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 46.
1. 	Petitioner Has Not Been “Charged”
The Treaty authorizes, in relevant part, extradition of persons “who are being
prosecuted for or have been charged with an offense.” Treaty Art. 1(1). The Petitioner
asserts that the documents submitted in support of the extradition request establish
that no prosecution has been initiated and that she has not been indicted or formally
charged, as those terms are understood in the American criminal legal system. ECF
No. 29-1 at 7–8. 	The Government responds that “[t]here is no reference to formal
charges or indictment” in the Treaty, and that if formal charges were required, “there
would be no need for Article 1 to expressly cover both individuals ‘who are being
prosecuted’
and ‘who have been charged.’” ECF No. 30 at 10 (emphasis in original).
These are largely the same arguments the Magistrate Judge considered and rejected
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in his February 11, 2025 Order certifying extradition to Türkiye.
	See Matter of
Extradition of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 64–67 (explaining “the court finds that Tok has
‘been charged with an offense’ anent articles 281 and 283”).
Petitioner’s assertion that she cannot be extradited since she has not been
formally charged/indicted or that no prosecution has been initiated is based, in part,
on the “arrest warrant” indicating she is a “suspect” who is wanted for interrogation.
ECF No. 30-3 at 53–54. 	In rejecting this argument and concluding that Petitioner
“has been charged with and/or is being prosecuted for a criminal offense within the
meaning of the Treaty,” the Magistrate Judge examined the plain language of the
Treaty and found that “no language qualifies or restricts the Article 1 phrase ‘have
been charged with an offense’ to ‘
formally charged with an offense,’ such as indicted,
charged in a criminal complaint, or the like.”
	Matter of Extradition of Tok, 765 F.
Supp. 3d at 65, 67. This Court agrees, and finds it persuasive that the United States
and Türkiye did not require that the fugitive be “formally charged.” Further, Article
7 of the Treaty, which lists the documents that must accompany extradition requests,
omits the requirement of a formal charging document.
	Id. at 65. 	This approach is
supported by caselaw from other circuits as well.
	See Emami v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 834
F.2d 1444, 1449 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting Petitioner’s argument that Germany had
not committed to prosecuting him, but simply requested his extradition for “detention
for investigation”);
Matter of Assarson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied
451 U.S. 938 (1981) (finding the U.S.-Sweden Extradition Treaty did not require
formal charges or a formal charging document in support of the extradition request);
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cf. Vitkus v. Blinken, 79 F.4th 352, 363, 366 (4th Cir. 2023) (analyzing a treaty that
required “
the charging document” instead of “
a charging document”) (emphasis in
original);
Aguasvivas v. Pompeo, 984 F.3d 1047, 1060 (1st Cir. 2021) (explaining that
the First Circuit “readily agrees with the holdings and the rationale in both
Emami
and Assarsson” and finding that a treaty required a specific charging document).
Rather than being extradited to face charges, Tok contends that the paperwork
submitted in support of her extradition establishes that she is wanted so her
statement can be taken, thereby triggering Chapter II of the Treaty entitled “Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters.” 	ECF No. 29-1 at 12. 	The Mutual Assistance
provision 	of 	the 	Treaty 	states 	that 	“(3) 	[m]utual 	assistance 	shall 	include: 	(a)
[e]xecution of requests related to criminal matters; (b) [e]ffecting the taking of
testimony or statements of persons.” Treaty, Ch. 2, Sec. 1, Art. 21. In arguing that
Türkiye’s request should have been made under the Mutual Assistance provision of
the Treaty, Petitioner Tok suggests that “[t]o conclude that any accused person whose
statement is ‘charged with an offense’ under Chapter I would be to render the portions
of Chapter II dedicated to Mutual Assistance for effecting the taking of statements
surplusage and redundant.” ECF No. 29-1 at 12. The Government responds that it
is inapposite that the Treaty combines sections on Extradition and Mutual Assistance
and argues that “Türkiye is not seeking Tok’s extradition solely to take her testimony;
it is seeking to prosecute her for the Articles 281 and 283 offenses.” 	ECF No. 30 at
15–16.
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The problem for Petitioner is that the record is replete with indications that
“Türkiye has unequivocally confirmed its intent to prosecute Tok.” ECF No. 30 at 15.
On this point, the Magistrate Judge stated:
Tok also maintains that she is simply being investigated and that the
Turkish documents in the extradition file only refer to an intent to
investigate. 	The 	record 	belies 	this 	assertion 	and 	establishes
unambiguously that Turkish officials view Tok as a suspect. The arrest
warrant for the article 281 offense identifies Tok as a “
suspect” who “has
been ordered” to be “apprehended.” Further, the accompanying decision
states 	that, 	“An 	arrest 	warrant
	shall 	be 	issued 	against 	the
suspected . . . More, Türkiye’s official statement leaves no doubt where
it states that, “[i]t is certain that she committed the offence[] of
concealing, altering and destroying the evidence . . . In sum, the record
establishes that Tok has been charged with and/or is being prosecuted
for a criminal offense within the meaning of the treaty.
Matter of Extradition of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 67 (internal citations omitted). While
the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	was 	not 	specifically 	addressing 	the 	Petitioner’s 	Mutual
Assistance argument, the quoted language makes clear, as the Government argues,
that “Türkiye is not seeking Tok’s extradition solely to take her testimony; it is
seeking to prosecute her for the Articles 281 and 283 offenses.” ECF No. 30 at 16.
This Court concludes that the Petitioner has been “charged” under the Treaty,
and further that Türkiye is not required to pursue Tok’s statement via the Mutual
Assistance provision of the Treaty.
2. 	No “Arrest Warrant”
Now that the Court has concluded that the Petitioner has been “charged” or “is
being prosecuted,” it moves on to address her next argument that Türkiye has not
submitted arrest warrants that meet the Treaty’s requirements for extradition. ECF
No. 29-1 at 15. Article 7 states that “[a] request relating to a person being prosecuted
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or who is charged with an offense . . . shall be accompanied by . . . [a] warrant of
arrest issued by a judge or other competent judicial officer.” 	Treaty Art. 7(1)(a).
While Petitioner is right that “[t]he Magistrate Judge did not substantively address
Ms. Tok’s arguments that the documents submitted are not, in fact, arrest warrants,”
ECF No. 29-1 at 15–16 n.11, this Court concludes that Petitioner’s argument lacks
merit.
First, both warrants were issued by judges—one from the 7th Criminal
Judgeship of Peace and one from the 10th Criminal Judgeship of the Peace—and
signed by clerks of each court. 	ECF No. 30-3 at 51–56. 	Next, both arrest warrants
identify Tok as a “suspect” and allege that she has committed the Articles 281 and
283 offenses.
Id. Further, the Government argues that “[t]he very nature of an arrest
warrant is to provide authorization for law enforcement to arrest and detain a person,
and there is no reason to believe Türkiye would not seek to bring Tok into custody
based on the outstanding warrants.” ECF No. 30 at 17–18. The content of the arrest
warrants seeks exactly that, to arrest and detain Tok.
While the Court acknowledges that the two arrest warrants differ in some
respects, the differences do not materially alter the purpose of each document, which
is clearly to arrest and detain Tok for suspicion of violating Articles 281 and 283. For
example, the Petitioner argues that “[u]nlike the Article 283 document, the Article
281 document does not instruct apprehending authorities to immediately
bring the
suspect to the prosecutor’s office, but instead instructs authorities merely to
contact
the prosecutor’s office.” 	ECF No. 29-1 at 17. This minor difference in wording does
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not negate that the document is called an arrest warrant, refers to the suspect being
captured, and lists the “imputed offence” and “statutory basis” for the arrest warrant.
Most 	importantly, 	however, 	both 	documents 	contain 	an 	indication 	that 	the
investigation file was reviewed by each judge before each determined that the
Petitioner should be arrested and detained.5 ECF No. 30-3 at 51, 54.
This Court is not willing to “second-guess” Türkiye’s determination of what
constitutes a valid arrest warrant.
	See Basic v. Steck, 819 F.3d 897, 901 (6th Cir.
2016). Indeed, if the two documents were plainly lacking the necessary requirements
of a typical arrest warrant this Court could intervene, but this situation is far from
that. 	The purpose of these two documents is clear: to arrest and detain Petitioner
Tok, the exact purpose of an arrest warrant. 	The two arrest warrants Türkiye
obtained 	and 	submitted 	as 	part 	of 	its 	extradition 	packet 	contain 	sufficient
information 	to 	lead this 	Court 	to 	conclude 	that 	the 	Article 7 	arrest 	warrant
requirement has been satisfied.
3. 	Charges Carry Punishment Greater Than 1 Year
One requirement for extradition under the Treaty is that the extraditable
offense be punished “by deprivation of liberty at least for a period exceeding one year
or by a more severe penalty.” 	Treaty Art. 2(1). 	Petitioner argues that this
requirement is not met because neither the Article 281 charge nor the Article 283
charge carry a deprivation of liberty for one year or more. 	ECF No. 29-1 at 21–24.
5 The Court also notes that the first warrant was obtained on March 6, 2024
and the second on March 13, 2024 which could also lead to the minor discrepancies
highlighted by the Petitioner. ECF No. 30-3 at 52, 56.
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As it relates to the Article 283 charge, Petitioner suggests that she cannot be
prosecuted at all under that statute since she is exempted as the “direct ancestor or
descendant of an alleged offender.”
	Id. at 21. 	The argument that the Petitioner is
not facing more than one year on the Article 283 charge stems from a provision in the
Turkish Criminal Code that states “[w]here a person submits evidence of an offence,
which had been concealed by him, before judgment is passed regarding such offence,
the penalty to be imposed according to this Article
shall be reduced by four-fifths.”
Id. at 23 (quoting Article 281(3)) (emphasis in original). According to Petitioner, the
fact that T.C.’s driver turned the phone into local authorities triggers this provision
and reduces the maximum punishment range from 6 months–5 years to 1.8 months–
1 year.6
Id. at 23–24.
While the Court did not analyze whether the Article 283 offense satisfies the
Treaty requirement, it thoughtfully considered and rejected Petitioner’s argument on
the Article 281 charge.
	Matter of Extradition of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 58–60. 	In
rejecting Petitioner’s argument, the Magistrate Judge focused on the “competing
version of the facts” which fail to conclusively establish that the reduction applies.
Id. at 59–60. 	The fact dispute centers on whether T.C.’s driver was acting as Tok’s
agent when returning the phone to police, or whether he was acting on the legal
advice from T.C.’s father’s attorney.
Id. at 60. This Court agrees with the Magistrate
6 The Court notes that Petitioner’s Counsel and the Magistrate Judge assert
the punishment would be “4.8 months to one year” if this Article 281(3) reduction
applies, but this Court believes the correct downward adjustment would lead to a
range of 1.2 months–1 year.
Matter of Extradition of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 59; ECF
No. 29-1 at 24.
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Judge that “the agency status of [the driver] is a matter for trial in Türkiye” and
because of that “Tok would be punishable under Article 281(1) for a period exceeding
one year, namely, up to five years if it is determined at trial that [the driver] was not
acting as [Tok’s] agent when he turned the phone into police.”
Id.
The Magistrate Judge did not analyze whether Article 283 met this Treaty
requirement because the Court found that “[the Treaty] provides that if one offense
is extraditable, the other offense is extraditable even if it does not satisfy the above-
quoted deprivation of liberty requirements.”
Id. at 58 (citing Treaty, Art. 2(4)).7 The
Petitioner’s argument that she cannot be punished for the Article 283 offense—
protecting an offender—appears convincing, but this Court adopts the approach of
the Magistrate Judge and declines to fully analyze this point because the punishment
requirement is satisfied as it relates to the Article 281 charge. 	Since the Treaty
allows for extradition on both offenses so long as one satisfies the punishment
requirement, this Court concludes that Article 2 of the Treaty has been satisfied.
4. 	Dual Criminality
Dual criminality exists if the particular act charged is criminal in both
jurisdictions—here, the United States and Türkiye.
	Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309,
312 (1922). Tok contends that the facts leading to the Article 281 charge do not satisfy
7 Treaty, Sec. I., Art. 2(4) states in full: “When a request for extradition
comprises several separate offenses and extradition has been granted for one of the
extraditable offenses, it shall also be granted for other extraditable offenses which
could not otherwise fulfill the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) above as related
to the deprivation of liberty to be served or duration of the penalty to be enforced in
the Requesting Party.”
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the dual criminality requirements. 	ECF No. 29-1 at 24–25. 	In finding dual
criminality for the Article 281 charge, the Magistrate Judge explained the following:
[I]n taking the cellphone, she prevent[ed] the law enforcement officers
and the judicial officers from intervening effectively and quickly in the
incident. Türkiye’s official response adds that this is sufficient for the
trial of TOK under the Article 281 offense… As set out in the preceding
paragraph 	and 	the 	more 	fulsome 	factual 	background, 	her 	actions
concealed 	evidence 	of 	[T.C.’s] 	offense 	to 	prevent 	the 	truth 	from
emerging. 	The 	Turkish 	prosecutor’s 	report 	and 	Türkiye’s 	official
response reflect that Tok lied to and misled the security guards that she
knew the owner of the cellphone. She then took the cellphone, which
Türkiye considered evidence, and concealed it.
Matter of Extradition of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 62. (cleaned up). The Court explained
that the same conduct could violate 18 U.S.C. § 1512 which deals with tampering
with a witness, victim, or informant. 	The purpose of that statute is “to facilitate
federal 	law 	enforcement’s 	ability 	to 	gather 	information 	about 	possible 	federal
crimes—including federal crimes that are not yet under investigation at the time of
the offense.”
United States v. Bailey, 405 F.3d 102, 108 (1st Cir. 2005). Simply put,
Tok prevented investigators from accessing certain information to facilitate the
investigation into the crash. This conduct satisfies the dual criminality requirement
of the Treaty.
Tok’s Amended Habeas Petition does not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s
finding that dual criminality exists for the Article 283 charge. 	Because this review
“is not a means for rehearing what the magistrate already decided,”
Fernandez, 268
U.S. at 312, the Court will not take up this analysis on its own accord. Instead, the
Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that dual criminality
exists.
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5. 	Fourth and Fifth Amendment8
Next, Petitioner argues that her arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and
18 U.S.C. § 3184, and that her continued detention violates her Fifth Amendment
due process rights. ECF No. 29-1 at 19. She argues that she was “arrested based on
a representation that she was extraditable for a violation of Turkish Criminal Code
Article 283, and an arrest warrant was issued based on that complaint.”
	Id. 	The
problem, she asserts, is that critical information was omitted from the extradition
packet. 	Specifically, Tok argues that the judicial officer who signed the arrest
warrant was not provided with the entire text of Article 283 which includes a
provision stating that the direct ancestor or descendant of an alleged offender cannot
be punished under Turkish law for protecting an offender.
Id. at 19–21.
On 	this 	issue, 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	simply 	stated 	that
“Tok’s [] argument fails summarily” because Türkiye supplemented the original
Complaint with the entire law.
	Matter of Extradition of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 54
n.7. 	But this Court is not constrained to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis since the
existence of probable cause is a question of law, requiring the Court to apply a de
novo standard of review.
	See In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1329 (1st
Cir. 1993) (explaining “[t]reaty interpretation is a purely legal exercise as to
which … no deference is due to the trier”).
8 On November 19, 2025, this Court issued a Text Order providing the Parties
with 	an 	opportunity 	to 	submit 	additional 	briefing 	on 	the 	Fourth 	and 	Fifth
Amendment issues. 	The Court has received and considered the supplemental
briefings submitted in ECF Nos. 37, 38.
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The Treaty expressly outlines that a request to extradite “
shall be accompanied
by … (e) [t]he text of the applicable laws of [Türkiye], including the law defining the
offense, the law prescribing the punishment for the offense, and the law relating to
the limitation of legal proceedings or the enforcement of the penalty for the offense.”
Treaty, Sec. II., Art. 7(1)(e) (emphasis added);
see Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10
(2010) (quoting
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2009) (“[t]he interpretation of a
treaty, like the interpretation 	of 	a statute, 	begins 	with its text.”)). 	Read in
conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 3184, which permits extradition if evidence is deemed
“sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the Treaty,” the Complaint
submitted to the Magistrate Judge in Florida should have contained the full text of
the law, including the penalty and limitation.9 	Rather than submit the full text of
Article 283, the Government omitted highly relevant portions of the law, specifically
the exception limiting punishment for direct ancestors or descendants of an alleged
offender. 	This omission—intentional or not—is troubling because it is the exact
language that could have casted doubt on the existence of probable cause to issue an
arrest warrant.
The 	Government 	argues 	that 	this 	is 	a 	non-issue 	because 	an 	Amended
Complaint including the omitted language and the Article 281 charge was filed on
July 1, 2024, albeit after Petitioner’s arrest on June 14, 2024. ECF No. 30 at 27–28;
ECF No. 37 at 8–11. 	This contention misses the mark because Petitioner was
9 The Government presented the extradition packet and request for a warrant
to a magistrate judge in Florida, but the Petitioner and her son were arrested in
Massachusetts.
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arrested and deprived of her liberty on June 14, 2024, before the omissions were
corrected. The more precise concern is whether, given the omitted language, probable
cause existed to support the issuance of the May 7 Arrest Warrant (ECF No. 30-6).
See U.S. CONST . amend. IV (“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”);
see
also Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 81–82 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that
material errors or omissions from warrant applications may violate the Fourth
Amendment).10 	Meanwhile, Petitioner urges the Court to dismiss the extradition
complaint based on the reasoning of
In re Extradition of Ferriolo, 126 F. Supp. 3d
1297 (M.D. Fla. 2015) and
In re Extradition of Molnar, 202 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill.
2002). ECF No. 38 at 4.
In
Ferriolo, an extradition complaint was dismissed after the government
failed to include English translations of the law, in violation of the treaty. 	126 F.
Supp. 3d at 1304. In its discussion on why dismissal was proper, the court explained
that, “[w]ithout English translation copies of certain of the statutes Ferriolo allegedly
violated, the Court cannot determine whether there is probable cause to believe the
elements of those crimes has been shown … [and] a finding of no probable cause is
compelled.”
Id. In
Molnar, the Republic of Hungary failed to submit documentation
that sufficiently described the “elements of the offense.” 202 F. Supp. 2d at 787. The
10 The Government’s supplemental filing cites to cases that stand for the
proposition that the relevant inquiry is “the facts known to the officer at the time of
arrest.” 	ECF No. 37 at 5 (citing
Velez v. Euty, 152 F.4th 292 (1st Cir. 2025);
Karamangolu v. Town of Yarmouth, 15 F.4th 82 (1st Cir. 2021)). These cases are not
on point with these facts because they involve law enforcement making warrantless
arrests, not whether probable cause existed to support the issuance of an arrest
warrant.
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court explained that it found no probable cause on other grounds, “but had [it] not,
the 	deficiencies 	in 	the 	documentation 	would 	give 	[the 	court] 	pause 	to 	allow
extradition in any event.”
Id. at 788.
What distinguishes Tok’s situation from what the courts in
Ferriolo and
Molnar confronted is that here the omission has been rectified. So now this Court is
confronted with a tug-of-war: on one side is a Complaint that likely fails to comply
with Article 7(1)(e) of the Treaty and on the other is an Amended Complaint that
satisfies that very omission. 	This is all complicated by the fact that Petitioner was
arrested on June 14, 2014 and the Amended Complaint was filed over two weeks
later.
While the Petitioner is correct that she may not be
punishable for violating
Article 283 based on the exception for direct ancestor or descendants of an alleged
offender, the Court cannot look past Türkiye’s assertion that “[a]ccording to Turkish
law, Eylem Tok’s status as a mother must be established and certified before the
court; and even if it is proven in the investigation that she is a mother, there is no
obstacle to the imposition of security measures.” ECF No. 30-4 at 22. Further, when
asked if a direct ancestor or descendant could be punished for violating Article 283,
Professor Türay—Associate Professor, Özyeğin University Faculty of Law, Criminal,
and Criminal Procedure Law, Faculty Member—stated that “a criminal case may be
filed against the person, but even if a lawsuit is filed, it is not possible for the person
to be convicted and therefore punished as a result of this trial.” 	ECF No. 21-5 at 8
(Türay Decl. at 4(e)). 	This Court will not speculate as to why the charge would be
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brought if the person cannot be convicted or punished, but, notably, the Türay
Declaration 	does 	not 	indicate 	that 	a 	person
	cannot 	be 	charged 	under 	these
circumstances.
Further, 	Article 	8 	of 	the 	Treaty 	permits 	a 	requesting 	party 	to 	request
additional information, even if the person is in custody. 	It states that, even if the
person is discharged from custody, “such discharge shall not prevent a subsequent
request for extradition for the same offense.” Treaty Sec. II, Art. 8(2). This, and the
fact that neither the Government of Türkiye (through their statement at ECF No. 30-
4 at 22) nor Professor Türay foreclose the possibility that a person in this situation
could still be charged, leads the Court to conclude that Türkiye’s original extradition
request, corrected by an Amended Complaint, complied with the Fourth Amendment.
Similarly, 	since 	her 	original 	detention 	was 	supported 	by 	probable 	cause, 	as
determined by a Magistrate Judge, her continued detention does not violate the Fifth
Amendment.
6. 	Did Actions Violate Turkish law
Petitioner argues that her actions do not violate Turkish Criminal Code Article
281, “destroying, concealing, or altering evidence,” because the cell phone is not
evidentiary. 	ECF No. 29-1 at 32. 	In support of this argument, Petitioner relies on
the declaration of Professor Türay who suggests Article 281 does not apply to items
that are not considered evidence. 	ECF No. 21-5 ¶ 4(d). 	The Government asks the
Court to reject this argument because it requires interpreting Turkish law which is
inappropriate. 	ECF No. 30 at 25–26. 	In agreeing with the Government, the
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Magistrate Judge relied on Türkiye’s official response that it does consider the cell
phone evidence.
	Matter of Extradition of Tok, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 60–61. 	Türkiye’s
official response explains, “it is clearly stated, within the scope of the investigation,
that Eylem Tok took evidence, which may contain many photographs and videos of
the accident scene.”
Id. at 56.
Because Professor Türay’s declaration conflicts with Türkiye’s position, the
Court will adopt the same approach as the Magistrate Judge and defer to Türkiye’s
interpretation of the law.
See id.;
Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 175 (1991) (stating
that “contradictory evidence properly may be excluded”);
Matter of Extradition of
Taylor, 484 F. Supp. 3d 13, 18 (D. Mass. 2020) (deferring to foreign government’s
reasonable interpretation of its own laws). The Petitioner’s argument is rejected.11
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Petitioner’s Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Melissa R. DuBose
United States District Judge
01/14/2026
11 While
Hilton permits the Court to examine “whether there was any evidence
warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused
guilty,” 754 F.3d at 86, neither party contests this portion of the Magistrate Judge’s
decision. Therefore, the Court will forgo this analysis.
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