Bisbano Jr. et al v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
RALPH BISBANO JR., Individually
and as Administrator of THE ESTATE
OF RALPH BISBANO SR.; BRIAN
BISBANO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
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C.A. No. 1:25-cv-00604-MSM-PAS
ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
Before the Court is the Government’s Partial Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 6.)
The plaintiffs are Ralph Bisbano, Jr., who is suing in both his individual capacity and
in his capacity as administrator of the estate of his deceased father Ralph Bisbano,
Sr. (“Mr. Bisbano”), and Brian Bisbano, also a son of the late Mr. Bisbano (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”). (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1–2.) The Government seeks dismissal of Ralph Bisbano,
Jr. and Brian Bisbano and their corresponding claims, arguing that the Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) because they failed to administratively exhaust their claims before filing suit.
(ECF No. 6 at 1.) 	For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Government’s
Partial Motion to Dismiss.
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Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Mr. Bisbano’s death was the result of
deficient medical care received from the Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”), as
operated through the Providence Veterans Affairs Medical Center. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7–
23.) 	Following Mr. Bisbano death, the VA received a written administrative claim
for damages from an attorney representing his estate. 	(ECF No. 6-1.)1 	That claim
identified only one claimant, Mr. Bisbano, and only alleged injuries related to him.
See id. The claim’s only mention of either of Mr. Bisbano’s sons was its identification
of Ralph Bisbano, Jr.’s capacity as administrator of Mr. Bisbano’s estate.
See id. The
VA denied the administrative claim after its investigation determined that “there
was no negligent or wrongful act on the part of a VA employee acting within the scope
of employment that caused compensable harm.” (ECF No. 6-1 at 9.) The VA’s denial
letter, dated June 30, 2025, included information on how to file an FTCA claim
challenging its determination.
Id.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on November 17, 2025. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	Plaintiffs
assert wrongful death, loss of society and companionship, and related claims against
the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)
and 2671–2680, based on the allegedly deficient medical care received by Mr.
Bisbano.
Id. ¶¶ 24–58. Counts One, Four, and Seven of Plaintiffs’ Complaint assert
1 The Court may properly consider the administrative claim, which is attached as an
exhibit to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss.
	See Gonzalez v. United States, 284
F.3d 281, 288 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The attachment of exhibits to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
does not convert it to a Rule 56 motion. While the court generally may not consider
materials outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider such
materials on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion . . . .”).
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claims by Mr. Bisbano’s sons based on their loss of their father’s society and
companionship.
Id. ¶¶ 24–30; 35–43; 48–54.
The Government argues that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
Mr. Bisbano’s sons’ claims because neither the sons nor their present claims were
identified in the administrative claim. 	(ECF No. 6.) 	Generally, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity prohibits individual lawsuits against the federal government for
damages.
	F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). 	Absent a waiver of that
immunity, 	federal 	courts 	lack 	subject-matter jurisdiction 	over damages 	claims
against the Government.
Davallou v. United States, 998 F.3d 502, 504 (1st Cir. 2021).
The FTCA acts as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity but requires that an
individual who seeks to sue the Government first present an administrative claim to
the relevant federal agency.
	Holloway v. United States, 845 F.3d 487, 489 (1st Cir.
2017);
see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a). 	To present a claim to an agency, an
individual must send a completed claim form “or other written notification of an
incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain.” 28 C.F.R. §
14.2(a).
Claimants who fail to satisfy this notice requirement are barred from suing the
Government under the FTCA.
	McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
The purpose of this requirement is to facilitate settlement and reduce the burden of
FTCA litigation.
Id. at 112 n.7. The First Circuit “approaches the notice requirement
leniently, ‘recognizing that individuals wishing to sue the government must comply
with the details of the law, but also keeping in mind that the law was not intended to
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put up a barrier of technicalities to defeat their claims.’”
Santiago-Ramirez v. Sec. of
Dept. of Def., 984 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting
López v. United States, 758 F.2d
806, 809 (1st Cir. 1985)). 	A plaintiff satisfies the notice requirement “if he or she
provides a claim form or ‘other written notification’ which includes (1) sufficient
information for the agency to investigate the claims, and (2) the amount of damages
sought.”
Id. (citing
López, 758 F.2d at 809–10).
It is undisputed that neither Ralph Bisbano, Jr. nor Brian Bisbano submitted
administrative claims in their individual capacities to the VA before commencing this
lawsuit. Plaintiffs argue, however, that the administrative claim submitted on behalf
of Mr. Bisbano’s estate sufficiently notified the Government of their claims. (ECF No.
8 at 11–18.) For support, Plaintiffs rely chiefly on
Urizar-Mota v. United States, 556
F. Supp. 3d 64 (D.R.I. 2 021), where the court found that a woman’s administrative
claim sufficiently notified the Government of derivative claims later brought by her
husband and children, despite the administrative claim having not identified those
other individuals as claimants.
Generally, courts faced with similar derivative claims have determined that
each claimant must exhaust their claims administratively (i.e., by notifying the
Government) before suing. For example, in
López-De Robinson v. United States, the
First Circuit identified the purpose of the exhaustion requirement as encouraging
settlement 	and 	explained 	that 	“[a]llowing 	one 	claimant's 	exhaustion 	of 	her
administrative remedies to satisfy the exhaustion requirement for other possible
claimants would make it extremely difficult for the agency to know the value of the
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suit, thus making settlement less likely.” 	No. 96-1702, 1997 WL 259551, at *3 (1st
Cir. May 13, 1997) (unpublished);
see generally Wozniak v. United States, 701 F.
Supp. 259, 262 (D. Mass. 1988) (collecting cases to establish that it is “well settled by
an impressive number of cases that, where loss of consortium is a separate and
independent claim under the applicable state law, it must be expressly raised in an
administrative claim to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Act”).
Plaintiffs’ case is also meaningfully distinct from
Urizar-Mota. 	In that case,
the court found the notice requirement satisfied when the administrative claim, while
not specifying a woman’s husband and children as claimants, sufficiently notified the
Government of derivative claims by describing that the woman was married, suffered
“permanent, life-altering disabilities,” had “returned home with her family,” was “no
longer able to manage the household as she used to do,” and was debilitated in her
“ability to care for her younger children.”
Urizar-Mota, 556 F. Supp. 3d at 69. Here,
however, the administrative claim provided no information whatsoever regarding
how Mr. Bisbano’s death might give rise to claims by his sons.
See ECF No. 6-1 at 4.
Instead, the administrative claim merely describes the allegedly negligent medical
care for Mr. Bisbano and his subsequent death.
Id. This is not sufficient to constitute
adequate notice of Mr. Bisbano’s sons’ claims under
Urizar-Mota’s interpretation of
the notice requirement.
Plaintiffs’ other arguments against dismissal of Mr. Bisbano’s sons’ claims are
unavailing. First, Plaintiffs contend that the VA should be equitably estopped from
arguing 	that 	it 	lacked 	notice 	of 	Mr. 	Bisbano’s 	sons’ 	claims 	because 	the 	VA
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“intentionally and knowingly” reached out to them to inform them of the medical
circumstances of their father’s death and to advise them of their legal rights relating
to his death.
	See ECF No. 8 at 8–11. 	But Plaintiffs present no legal authority
supporting that theory, which appears to directly conflict with
Office of Personnel
Management v. Richmond, where the Supreme Court explained that it “has never
upheld an assertion of estoppel against the Government by a claimant seeking public
funds.” 	496 U.S. 414, 434 (1990). 	Second, Plaintiffs invoke Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1 to suggest that the Court should construe their administrative claim in
a way that secures “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of this case,
see
ECF No. 8 at 19, but that is precisely the purpose for which Congress imposed the
notice requirement for FTCA claims.
The Court finds that Ralph Bisbano, Jr. and Brian Bisbano failed to comply
with 	the 	FTCA’s 	notice 	requirements. 	The 	Court 	therefore 	GRANTS 	the
Government’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6). Ralph Bisbano, Jr. and Brian
Bisbano are DISMISSED as plaintiffs in their individual capacities. 	Counts One,
Four, and Seven of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF No. 1) are likewise DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
April 28, 2026
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