Nguyen v. Lyons et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
HUNG THIEN NGUYEN,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD LYONS, ACTING DIRECTOR,
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; PATRICIA HYDE,
ACTING BOSTON FIELD OFFICE
DIRECTOR, MICHAEL NESSINGER,
WARDEN, DONALD W. WYATT
DETENTION FACILITY,
Respondents.
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C.A. No. 25-cv-631-MSM-PAS
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Hung Thien Nguyen’s Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus. 	(ECF No. 1). 	Mr. Nguyen has been held for approximately three
months at the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility.
See ECF No. 1 at 5. Mr. Nguyen
argues 	that 	he 	is 	being 	unlawfully 	detained 	under 	“Section 	241(a)(6) 	of 	the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), its implementing
regulations 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13-14, and the Fifth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 35–41.)
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Mr. Nguyen’s Petition and orders his
immediate release.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
In 1989, Mr. Nguyen immigrated to the United States from Vietnam. 	(ECF
No. 6 at 3.) 	During his first decade in the U.S., he struggled with substance abuse
and had several interactions with law enforcement that resulted in his incarceration.
Id. 	During that time the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) began
removal proceedings in October 2000 and detained Mr. Nguyen in April 2001 as part
of those proceedings. 1
	Id. 	Although diplomatic relations had been re-established
between the United States and Vietnam in 1995, there was no repatriation agreement
in effect in 2000. 	(ECF No. 5 at 2.) 	The INS attempted to repatriate Nguyen to
Vietnam, but the Socialist Republic of Vietnam declined to accept him.
	Id. 	In
January 	2002, 	Mr. 	Nguyen 	was 	released 	under 	an 	administrative 	order 	of
supervision. (ECF No. 6 at 4.)
In 	2008, 	the 	United 	States 	and 	Vietnam 	signed 	a 	Memorandum 	of
Understanding 	regarding 	repatriation 	(“2008 	MOU”), 	but 	Vietnam 	agreed 	to
repatriate 	only 	nationals 	who 	arrived 	in 	the 	United 	States 	after 	diplomatic
recognition was established in 1995. 	(ECF No. 5 at 2.) 	Mr. Nguyen could not be
removed under the 2008 MOU. 	In November 2020, the United States and Vietnam
executed a repatriation agreement through a new Memorandum of Understanding
1 The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) was a United
States federal government agency disbanded on March 1, 2003, by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and whose functions were largely distributed to U.S. Citizenship
and 	Immigration 	Services 	(“USCIS”), 	Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement
(“ICE”), and Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”).
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which created a process of removal for pre-1995 arrivals (“2020 MOU”). (ECF No. 5
at 2.)
Mr. Nguyen has complied with his order of supervision for nearly two decades.
(ECF No. 6 at 4 n.3.) 	ICE notified Mr. Nguyen that he had to report in-person on
October 16, 2025, for a regular supervisory check-in with the agency. (ECF No. 6 at
5.) 	When he appeared, ICE revoked his order of supervision and took him into
custody. 	ICE produced a Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice”), which notified
Mr. Nguyen that the “decision has been made based on a review of your official alien
file and a determination that there are changed circumstances in your case.” 	(ECF
No. 	6-1 	at 	28.) 	According 	to 	the 	Notice, 	the 	“determination” 	of 	“changed
circumstances” was based on two precursor determinations: that (1) “ICE [had]
determined that [Mr. Nguyen] can be removed from the United States pursuant to
the outstanding order of removal” and (2) “that the purposes of [Mr. Nguyen’s] release
[had] been [served] and it is appropriate to enforce the removal order.”
Id.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to
every individual detained within the United States.”
	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is
an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
	Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 	A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a
petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
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federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Section 2241 habeas corpus proceedings provide
a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal detention.
Jimenez v. Cronen, 317 F. Supp. 3d 626, 636 (D. Mass. 2018) (citing
Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)). Mr. Nguyen submitted this petition for habeas relief
on November 26, 2025. (ECF No. 1.)
III. 	DISCUSSION
As 	Respondents 	note, 	“ICE 	has 	issued 	Post-Order 	Custody 	Regulations
(“POCR”) contained at 8 C.F.R. §241.4 and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 to set forth procedures
concerning custody reviews, release from ICE custody, and revocation of release for
individuals with final orders of removal.” (ECF No. 5 at 4.) These regulations were
promulgated shortly after
Zadvydas, aligning INS’s policies with the decision’s
limitations on noncitizen detentions. 	533 U.S. at 699–700; Continued Detention of
Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 56967, 56967-70 (Interim
Rule Nov. 14, 2001) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Zadvydas, this rule
revises the Department’s regulations by adding a new 8 CFR 241.13, governing
certain aspects of the custody determination of a detained alien after the expiration
of the removal period.”) “ICE, like any agency, ‘has the duty to follow its own federal
regulations.’”
	Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (D. Mass. 2017) (quoting
Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 205 (1st Cir. 2003));
Fed. Defs. of New York, Inc. v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 954 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[U]nder deeply rooted
principles of administrative law, not to mention common sense, government agencies
are generally required to follow their own regulations.”).
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Once a noncitizen is released, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) provides the circumstances
and procedures for revocation of release. As referenced in the Notice and as required
by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3), ICE must “conduct an initial informal interview promptly
after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the [non-citizen] an opportunity to
respond to the reasons for revocation” stated in the notification.2
	See Nguyen v.
Charles, No. 1:25-CV-01592-TLN-CSK, 2025 WL 3492117, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4,
2025). All parties recognize that § 241.13(i)(2) applies to Mr. Nguyen. (ECF No. 5 at
4.)
Respondents’ argument that Mr. Nguyen’s claim “is raised prematurely under
the
Zadvydas-framework,” (ECF No. 5 at 8–14), “misses the mark.”
Nguyen v. Hyde,
788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D. Mass. 2025).3 This case is not about the ability to detain
in the first instance, as was the case in
Zadvydas, but the ability to “
re-detain Mr.
Nguyen after he was issued a final order of removal, detained, and subsequently
released.”
	See id. (emphasis original);
Hall v. Nessinger, No. 25-CV-667-JJM-PAS,
2026 WL 18583, at *6 (D.R.I. Jan. 2, 2026).
The First Circuit has set forth the circumstances under which ICE may re-
detain a person like Mr. Nguyen.
	Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 619–20 (1st
Cir. 2023) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)). A noncitizen granted supervised release is
2 It is unclear from the record whether this initial interview or any other interview
has occurred as of this writing.
3 Further, Mr. Nguyen’s detention would not be presumptively reasonable under
Zadvydas as he has been held cumulatively for more than six months.
Hall, 2026 WL
18583 at *6 (finding detention periods to be cumulative);
Siguenza v. Moniz, No. 25-
CV-11914-ADB, 2025 WL 2734704, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2025) (collecting cases).
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“governed by ICE’s own regulation requiring (1) an individualized determination (2)
by 	ICE 	that, 	(3) 	based 	on 	changed 	circumstances, 	(4) 	removal 	has 	become
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
	Id. 	ICE is tasked with
making “the required individualized finding” of the reasonably foreseeable removal.
See id. at 620.
Here, ICE’s stated change of circumstances for re-detaining Mr. Nguyen is
that (1) “ICE [had] determined that [Mr. Nguyen] can be removed from the United
States pursuant to the outstanding order of removal” and (2) “that the purposes of
[Mr. Nguyen’s] release [had] been [served] and it is appropriate to enforce the removal
order.” (ECF No. 6-1 at 28.) This circular reasoning that the change of circumstances
is that ICE has determined there is a change of circumstances, without noting what
those circumstances are, cannot meet the basic burden imposed by ICE’s own
regulations.
The changes in circumstances that Respondents raise here: the 2020 MOU and
that other pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants have been removed are not provided for
in the Notice. 	Respondents concede that in
Nguyen v. Hyde, the Massachusetts
district court concluded that “the 2020 MOU alone is not enough to show ICE has met
their burden under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2).” 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 150 (D. Mass. 2025).
Still, the government has detained a noncitizen under exactly the same reasoning as
that which was disallowed in
Nguyen and have disregarded
Kong. Instead, they cite
to U.S. District Courts in other circuits. (ECF No. 5 at 6–7) (citing
Nguyen v. Noem,
797 F. Supp. 3d 651, 665 (N.D. Tex. 2025);
Tran v. Baker,
No. 1:25-CV-01598-JRR,
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2025 WL 2085020, at *4 (D. Md. July 24, 2025),
corrected, No. 1:25-CV-01598-JRR,
2025 WL 2087124 (D. Md. July 24, 2025)).
In
Nguyen v. Noem, the Texas district court expressly considered
Kong and its
“persuasive authority” but stated that it was “not binding upon [that] court” before
reaching a different conclusion. 797 F. Supp. 3d 651, 665 (N.D. Tex. 2025). But this
Court “is bound by the precedent established by the Court of Appeals of its Circuit
and not the opinions of sister district courts in other Circuits.”
Anthony v. JetDirect
Aviation, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 n.10 (D. Mass. 2010).)
Therefore, following
Kong and reviewing ICE’s stated change of circumstances,
this Court, like district courts across the country, finds Respondents’ arguments that
ICE has made an “individualized” determination,” “based on changed circumstances”
that “removal has become significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future”
unconvincing.
	See Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771,
at 	*4–5 	(E.D. 	Cal. 	July 	16, 	2025) 	(rejecting 	the 	assertion 	that 	a 	change 	in
circumstances exists because there is a pending updated travel document request,
the 2020 treaty MOU with Vietnam, or the fact that there are removals to Vietnam
of pre-1995 immigrants);
Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 149–52 (same);
Roble
v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3196 (LMP/LIB), 2025 WL 2443453, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Aug. 25,
2025) (finding ICE’s argument that its efforts to remove a noncitizen constituted
changed circumstances, falling “woefully short”);
Hernandez Escalante v. Noem, No.
9:25-cv-00182-MJT, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3–4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025) (finding
“conclusory 	statements 	that 	[ICE] 	are 	taking 	steps 	to 	remove 	Petitioner” 	as
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insufficient to show a significant likelihood that removal will occur in the reasonably
foreseeable future);
Sun v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02433-CAB-MMP, 2025 WL 2800037,
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025) (same).
Respondents argue that this case is distinguishable from
Nguyen v. Hyde
because ICE is in fact removing pre-1995 Vietnamese citizens and because they are
in the process of preparing travel documents for Mr. Nguyen. 	(ECF No. 5 at 7–8).
The Massachusetts district court in
Nguyen v. Hyde rejected both arguments that
Respondents raise to distinguish this case. 	The only difference is that here, ICE
identified how many of the removals are pre-1995 refugees. The citation of the travel
documents obtained for pre-1995 immigrants or of the number of removals of such
immigrants still does not provide the Court with meaningful statistics without any
reference to their relevance to Mr. Nguyen’s individual case or even to the number of
travel document requests submitted and the number of attempted removals. Simply
stated, the successful removal of other noncitizens does not eliminate the need for
ICE to consider the individual circumstances of each noncitizen and of the individual
characteristics of their removal process.
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
Preparing to change circumstances is different from “changed circumstances.”
“[T]hese kind of vague assertions—akin to promising the check is in the mail—
insufficient to meet ICE's own requirement to show ‘changed circumstances’ or ‘a
significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future.’”
	Sun, 2025 WL 2800037 at *2. 	Respondents again do not claim any
individualized 	findings 	as 	to 	how 	or 	why 	Petitioner 	may 	be 	removed 	in 	the
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“reasonably foreseeable future.”
See Nguyen v. Scott, 796 F. Supp. 3d 703, 726 (W.D.
Wash. 2025). 	The fact that Respondents are making efforts to process documents
does not shed light on any eligibility details specific to Mr. Nguyen. The Respondents
have presented nothing from which this Court can even begin to estimate the length
of time the document processing may take.
See, e.g.,
Hoac, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4;
Nguyen v. Scott, 796 F. Supp. at 726;
Vu v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-01366-KES-SKO (HC),
2025 WL 3114341, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025). Nor is there any certainty that Mr.
Nguyen’s documents will be successfully processed or that any process will occur
within 30 days or in the coming months. Vietnam retains full discretion of whether
to accept Mr. Nguyen removal.
	See Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. at 151;
Phan v.
Beccerra, No. 2:25-CV-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. July 16,
2025); ECF No. 6-3 ¶¶ 7–13 (noting immigration attorney’s experience with the
substantial vetting of pre-1995 immigrants, informal silent denials, and processing
of four to seven months for successful pre-1995 applicants.)
Respondents are of course free to request Mr. Nguyen’s cooperation with ICE’s
investigatory or documentation efforts or to re-detain him for violating the conditions
of his supervised release. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1). Should changed circumstances arise
such that Mr. Nguyen’s travel documents are successfully processed, and his removal
has 	become 	significantly 	likely 	in 	the 	reasonably 	foreseeable 	future, 	then
Respondents may re-detain Mr. Nguyen. 	However, the government is not free to
ignore their own regulations or the Fifth Amendment due process protections in order
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to re-detain Mr. Nguyen while they are simply waiting for “ICE to determine whether
a travel document is approved.” (ECF No. 5 at 14.)
This Court finds that Respondents have re-detained Mr. Nguyen in violation
of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) by failing to make an individualized determination that
legitimate “changed circumstances” have occurred and that there is a “significant
likelihood that [Mr. Nguyen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
ICE’s own immigration regulation was promulgated to protect a fundamental right
derived from the Constitution.
	Rombot, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 388. 	“Freedom from
imprisonment lies at the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Noncitizens, even those subject to a final removal order,
have constitutional rights just like everyone else in the United States.”
	Ceesay v.
Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 144 (W.D.N.Y. 2025).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Mr. Nguyen’s habeas petition. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	The Court
ORDERS Petitioner to be released from detention immediately, subject to the
conditions in his preexisting Order of Supervision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
January 16, 2026
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