Hall v. Nessinger et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
MALCOLM ELDRIDGE HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL NESSINGER, Warden of
Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility;
PATRICIA HYDE, Director ICE
Boston Field Office; TODD M. LYONS,
Acting Director of ICE; KRISTI
NOEM, United States Secretary of
Homeland Security,
in their official
capacities.
Respondents.
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C.A. No. 25-cv-667-JJM-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.
Malcolm 	Eldridge 	Hall, 	who 	is 	currently 	being 	held 	in 	the 	custody 	of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), brings this habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Mr. Hall contends that the Government violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) when it revoked his order of supervision and re-detained him.
Id. at 9-11. He
now seeks relief in this Court, requesting an order that he be immediately released
from ICE custody.
	Id. at 11. 	The Government objects to Mr. Hall’s petition and
argues that it should be dismissed. ECF No. 8.
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For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Mr. Hall’s petition and
ORDERS his immediate release.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Section 1231(a) of the INA authorizes the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) to detain noncitizens who have been “ordered removed.”
Johnson v. Arteaga-
Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 575 (2022) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)). “After the entry of a
final order of removal against a noncitizen, the Government generally must secure
the noncitizen’s removal during a 90-day ‘removal period.’”1	
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A)). 	“During the removal period, detention is mandatory.”
	Johnson v.
Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 528 (2021) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)).
If the noncitizen is not deported within the 90-day removal period, then they
are only subject to discretionary detention, meaning they “‘may be detained’2 or may
be released under terms of supervision.”
	Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 575 (2022)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)). 	Unlike other provisions of the INA, Section 1231(a)
does not require the Government to provide a noncitizen with a bond hearing before
1 The “removal period” begins on the latest of three dates: “(1) the date the
order of removal becomes ‘administratively final,’ (2) the date of the final order of any
court that entered a stay of removal, or (3) the date on which the [noncitizen] is
released from non-immigration detention or confinement.”
Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S.
at 528 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)).
2 After the 90-day removal period, the Government “may” detain only four
categories of noncitizens: “(1) those who are ‘inadmissible’ on certain specified
grounds; (2) those who are ‘removable’ on certain specified grounds; (3) those it
determines ‘to be a risk to the community’; and (4) those it determines to be ‘unlikely
to comply with the order of removal.’”
Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 578-79 (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)).
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an IJ where the Government bears the burden of justifying the noncitizen's continued
detention.
	Id. at 581 (distinguishing between Section 1226(a), which provides for
bond hearings at the outset of detention, and Section 1231(a)(6), which does not);
see
also Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 39 (1st Cir. 2021) (discussing the
Government's burden of proof in Section 1226(a) cases). 	Instead, ICE officials
themselves are responsible for making decisions regarding continued detention and
supervised release. Two regulations primarily govern their decision-making: 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4 and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.
	See Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387 (D.
Mass. 2017);
Santamaria Orellana v. Baker, No. 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL 2444087, at
*4 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025). 	The regulations differ in a few slight but important
respects.
1. 	The Post-Removal-Period Procedures: Detention and Supervised
Release Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4
8 C.F.R. § 241.4 specifically applies to noncitizens who are detained beyond the
90-day removal period (also known as the “post-removal-period”).
	Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. at 529 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4). 	Under this provision, if ICE wishes to
continue detaining a noncitizen beyond the post-removal-period, then ICE must
conduct an individualized “custody review.”
Cruz v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-262-JJM-PAS,
2025 WL 3295485, at *2 (D.R.I. Nov. 26, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4). 	ICE must
follow several key procedures, such as: (1) conducting the initial custody review “prior
to the expiration of the removal period” or “as soon as possible thereafter,”
id. (citing
8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(h)(1), (k)(1)(i), (k)(2)(iv)); (2) “provid[ing] written notice to the
detainee about 30 days in advance of the pending records review” so that they may
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submit information in support of their release,
id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(h)(2)); and
(3) “forward[ing] by regular mail a copy of any notice or decision that is being served”
on the noncitizen to the noncitizen’s attorney, if they are represented,
id. (citing 8
C.F.R. § 241.4(d)(3)).
To be released on an order of supervision (“OSUP”), “the noncitizen must show
that: their immediate removal is not practical or proper; they are not likely to be
violent or ‘pose a threat to the community following release’; and they do not ‘pose a
significant risk of flight’ or of ‘violat[ing] the conditions of release.’”
	Id. (quoting 8
C.F.R. § 241.4(e)). 	ICE must also consider whether the noncitizen is “‘a significant
flight risk or may abscond to avoid removal,’ ‘favorable factors, including ties to the
United States such as the number of close relatives residing here lawfully,’ and
factors 	bearing 	on 	the 	[noncitizen’s] 	dangerousness, 	such 	as 	criminal 	history,
disciplinary infractions, and past immigration violations, among others.”
Id. (quoting
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(f)). Finally, ICE must issue a written decision, briefly explaining its
reasoning behind continuing detention or ordering supervised release.
	Id. (citing 8
C.F.R. § 241.4(d)).
ICE 	may, 	in 	its 	discretion, 	revoke 	supervised 	release 	under 	certain
circumstances.
	Rombot, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 387. 	For instance, supervised release
may be revoked, and the noncitizen may be re-detained, if: (1) “[t]he purposes of
release have been served”; (2) “[t]he [noncitizen] violates any condition of release; (3)
[i]t is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal proceedings
against [the noncitizen]”; or (4) “[t]he conduct of the [noncitizen], or any other
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circumstance, indicates that release would no longer be appropriate.”
Perez-Escobar
v. Moniz, 792 F. Supp. 3d 224, 225 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting 8 C.F.R § 241.4(
l)(2)).3
However, in revoking supervised release, ICE must follow another set of
procedures.
Jimenez v. Cronen, 317 F. Supp. 3d 626, 652 (D. Mass. 2018). First, ICE
must notify the noncitizen of the reasons for revocation and their return to ICE
custody.
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R § 241.4(
l)(1)). Second, ICE must afford the noncitizen “an
initial informal interview promptly” after their return to ICE custody and afford them
“an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.”
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R § 241.4(
l)(1)). Third, the revocation decision must be made either
by the Executive Associate Director of ICE,4 a district director of ICE, or any other
official “delegated the function or authority … for a particular geographic district,
region, or area.”
Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 160-61 (W.D.N.Y. 2025)
(citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 241.4 (
l)(2));
see also Santamaria Orellana, 2025 WL 2444087,
at *4.
2. 	The
Zadvydas Procedures: Detention and Supervised Release
Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13
ICE promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In
Zadvydas, the Court identified “a serious
3 As other courts have done, to avoid confusion between the letter “l” and the
number “1,” the Court has italicized “
l” throughout the opinion when referring to this
particular provision of 8 C.F.R § 241.4.
	See, e.g.,
Perez-Escobar, 792 F. Supp. 3d
at 225;
Zhu v. Genalo, No. 1:25-cv-06523 (JLR), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2452352,
at *4 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025);
Santamaria Orellana, 2025 WL 2444087, at *4.
4 Although the regulation specifically refers to this person as the “Executive
Associate Commissioner,” that provision now refers to the “Executive Associate
Director of ICE.”
Ceesay, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 160 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1.2).
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constitutional problem” raised by Section 1231(a)(6). 	533 U.S. at 690. 	The statute
permitted immigration officials to detain certain noncitizens beyond the 90-day
removal period, but it did not expressly provide an end date for the period of
detention.
	Id. at 688-89. 	The Government therefore argued that it was authorized
to detain certain noncitizens
indefinitely.
Id. at 689-90.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and made clear that detention
under Section 1231(a) is authorized only so long as it is “reasonably necessary to
secure [the noncitizen’s] removal.”
Id. at 699. The Court held that such detention is
“presumptively reasonable” for up to six months.
Id. at 701. After the six months are
up, if the noncitizen “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the Government must
either rebut that showing or release the noncitizen.
Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 529
(quoting
Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 699-700). ICE codified these regulations at 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13, which are referred to as “the
Zadvydas procedures.”
Id.;
see also Fajardo v.
Decker, No. 22-CV-3014 (PAE), 2022 WL 17414471, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2022).
Consistent with its purpose, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 establishes “special review
procedures” for a noncitizen detained under Section 1231(a) after the removal period
lapses and who “has provided good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood
of removal … in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a). 	The
procedures begin once the noncitizen “submits a written request providing reasons
why there is no significant likelihood the Government will remove him or her.”
E.M.M. v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-08212 (MMG), 2025 WL 3077995, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
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Nov. 4, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(d)(1)). “The written request triggers a formal
review by the Headquarters Post-Order Detention Unit (‘HQPDU’).”
	Id. (citing 8
C.F.R. §§ 241.13(e), (f)). 	“Once the review concludes, the HQPDU issues a ‘written
decision’ regarding ‘whether there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] will
be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future under the circumstances.’”
	Id.
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g)). “If that likelihood is low or not significant,” then the
noncitizen is released subject to an OSUP.
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h))
Like 8 C.F.R § 241.4, supervised release under the
Zadvydas procedures may
be revoked by ICE.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i)(1), (2). Where the two procedures differ,
however, is that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) permits ICE to re-detain a noncitizen
after they
have been “issued a final order of removal, detained, and subsequently released on
an OSUP.”
Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D. Mass. 2025). In this specific
context, the process for re-detaining a noncitizen requires, under First Circuit
precedent: “(1) an individualized determination (2) by ICE that, (3) based on changed
circumstances, 	(4) 	removal 	has 	become 	significantly 	likely 	in 	the
reasonably foreseeable future.”
Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 619-20 (1st Cir.
2023) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)).5
Revoking supervised release in this context also requires to ICE to: (1) notify
the noncitizen “of the reasons for revocation”; (2) “conduct an initial informal
interview promptly after … return to [ICE] custody to afford the [noncitizen] an
5 Supervised release may also be revoked under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 “upon a
violation of conditions of release.”
	Santamaria Orellana, 2025 WL 2444087, at *4
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1)).
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opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification”; and
(3) permit the noncitizen to “submit any evidence or information” to show that there
is no “significant likelihood” of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” or that
the noncitizen “has not violated the order of supervision.”
Santamaria Orellana, 2025
WL 2444087, at *4 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3)).
3. 	Constitutional Protections
The procedures set forth in both 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 are
intended to provide noncitizens with fundamental due process protections that courts
have found to be constitutionally required.
	Jimenez, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 655 (citing
Detention of Aliens Ordered Removed, 65 F.R. 80281–01, at 80283 (2000));
see also
Santamaria Orellana, 2025 WL 2444087, at *5-6;
D’Alessandro v. Mukasey, 628 F.
Supp. 2d 368, 388-403 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 	This is a principle that Justice Sotomayor
recently reaffirmed in a pivotal immigration case.
	See Noem v. Abrego Garcia, 604
U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 1017, 1019 (2025) (statement of Sotomayor, J.) (recognizing that
the Government was required to provide the petitioner, Mr. Kilmar Abrego Garcia,
“with all the process to which he would have been entitled had he not been unlawfully
removed to El Salvador,” including the procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(
l)).
Therefore, ICE violates a noncitizen’s due process rights when the agency re-
detains them and fails to comply with these revocation procedures.
	Jimenez, 317 F.
Supp. 3d at 656-57;
Rombot, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 388;
Santamaria Orellana, 2025 WL
2444087, at *6.
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B. 	Factual and Procedural History
Mr. Hall came to the United States at age sixteen on September 28, 1996. ECF
No. 1 at 3. He and his family fled Liberia, which was amid a civil war. ECF No. 1-2
at 1. 	His mother was granted asylum in the United States, and Mr. Hall was
admitted into the country on a B-2 visa. 	ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 8-1 at 2. 	Due to
the persecution, he was likely to face in his home country, United States Citizen and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) granted Mr. Hall asylum on May 18, 2000. 	ECF
No. 1-2 at 1; ECF No. 8-1 at 2. He has resided in Rhode Island ever since. ECF No. 1-
2 at 1.
On February 26, 2007, Mr. Hall was convicted of various drug offenses under
R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-28-4.01.6 	ECF No. 1 at 3. 	He was sentenced to five years in
prison and ten years of parole.
Id.
On August 18, 2010, ICE encountered Mr. Hall while he was in prison and
placed him in removal proceedings before the Boston Immigration Court.
	Id.; ECF
No. 8-1 	at 3. 	ICE 	charged 	him 	with 	being 	removable 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).7 ECF No. 8-1 at 3. On January 20, 2011, an IJ ordered Mr. Hall
removed to Liberia.
	Id. 	Though he initially filed an appeal with the Board of
6 In his petition, Mr. Hall incorrectly states that he was convicted under R.I.
Gen. Laws § 21-48-4.01, but there is no such statutory provision.
7 Under this provision of the INA, noncitizens who are convicted of an
“aggravated felony” after admission into the United States are removable.
Whyte v.
Lynch, 807 F.3d 463, 466 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)). 	An
“aggravated felony” is defined as, among other things, “a crime of violence … for
which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.”
	Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F)).
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Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), Mr. Hall later withdrew that appeal, which rendered
his order of removal final.
Id.
Upon his release from prison, Mr. Hall was turned over to ICE custody. ECF
No. 1 at 3. He remained in ICE detention for about ten months.
Id. While he was in
custody, ICE attempted to secure a travel document for Mr. Hall’s removal to Liberia.
Id. at 2-3. 	However, the agency was unsuccessful in its efforts, later notifying Mr.
Hall in July 2011 that the Liberian “Consulate stated on 7/14/11 they are unlikely to
issue us your ID.”
Id. at 3;
see also Ex. A, ECF No. 1-3 at 1. As such, ICE issued Mr.
Hall an OSUP and ordered him released on or about November 26, 2011. ECF No. 1
at 2-3; ECF No. 8-1 at 3.
As part of his supervised release, ICE required Mr. Hall to attend biannual
and then annual check-ins at its Enforcement and Removal (“ERO”) office in
Warwick, Rhode Island. 	ECF No. 1 at 2-3; ECF No. 1-2 at 1. 	Mr. Hall regularly
attended these check-ins for about thirteen years. 	ECF No. 1 at 2-3. 	During that
period, Mr. Hall completed his parole for his earlier criminal conviction, and he has
not been charged with any criminal offenses since being released from ICE custody.
ECF No. 1-2 at 1.
On October 7, 2025, almost 14 years after being released, when Mr. Hall
appeared at the ERO office for his annual check-in, ICE officials told him that it had
revoked his supervised release. ECF No. 1 at 4. ICE cited “changed circumstances”
as the basis for its revocation and stated that the “case is currently under review by
Liberia for the issuance of a travel document.”
Id.; ECF No. 1-4 at 1.
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ICE officials subsequently re-detained Mr. Hall under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and 8
C.F.R. § 241.13. 	ECF No. 1-4 at 1. 	They transferred him to the Donald W. Wyatt
Detention Facility in Central Falls, Rhode Island, where he remains today. 	ECF
No. 1 at 4.
On November 21, 2025, Mr. Hall attended a virtual interview with two ICE
officers and a representative from the Liberian Embassy.
	Id. 	The representative
asked Mr. Hall if he could produce certain identity documents, including a birth
certificate. 	ECF No. 1-2 at 2. 	Mr. Hall answered that he could not because he had
never had those documents in his possession, nor had he ever seen his birth
certificate.
Id.
The representative then asked the ICE officials if they had any identity
documents for Mr. Hall, or if they could produce any travel documents for him.
	Id.
The ICE officials said they had neither.
Id. The representative told the ICE officials
that 	they 	would 	have 	to 	provide 	this 	documentation, 	and 	the 	meeting 	was
rescheduled for a later date.
Id.
On December 12, 2025, Mr. Hall filed the instant petition, seeking release from
ICE custody. ECF No. 1. He argues that the revocation of his supervised release and
subsequent re-detention violate the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the
APA, and the INA.
Id. at 11.
The Government objects, arguing that the Court should dismiss Mr. Hall’s
petition because his detention is “presumptively reasonable” under
Zadvydas and
because his removal to Liberia “is significantly likely to occur in the reasonably
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foreseeable future.” ECF No. 8 at 2-4. Additionally, Keith M. Chan, ICE’s Assistant
Field Office Director, asserts in a declaration that the Liberian Embassy issued a
travel document for Mr. Hall on or around December 3, 2025. ECF No. 8-1 at 4.
Since filing his petition, ICE officials conducted a custody review of Mr. Hall’s
detention on December 26, 2025.
	Id. at 4.; ECF No. 1 at 4. ICE has yet to release a
decision regarding this custody review.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Does
Zadvydas Apply?
The Government first argues that Mr. Hall’s petition is “premature” because
his “current detention is well within the six-month period deemed presumptively
reasonably by
Zadvydas.” 	ECF No. 8 at 2. 	As of its filing, the Government asserts
that Mr. Hall has been in custody for only 76 days, and it is “presumptively
reasonable” for the Government to continue to detain him.
Id. at 3.
This position is not well taken. 	Mr. Hall has been detained by ICE for more
than six months. 	Following his release from prison, Mr. Hall was detained by ICE
for about ten months from January 2011 to November 2011. 	ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF
No. 1-2 at 1. 	Then, Mr. Hall was re-detained by ICE in October 2025. 	ECF No. 1
at 4; ECF No. 1-2 at 2. 	In total, he has been in ICE custody for more than twelve
months and counting, meaning that his detention is
not “presumptively reasonable”
under
Zadvydas. 533 U.S. at 701.
Though it does not say so explicitly, the Government seems to suggest that the
presumptively reasonable six-month clock restarted for Mr. Hall once he was re-
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detained by ICE. 	ECF No. 8 at 2 (“Petitioner’s
current detention is well within the
six-month period deemed presumptively reasonable by
Zadvydas….”) (emphasis
added). 	But this position “has no basis in either the statutes, the regulations, or
Zadvydas itself.”
	Villanueva v. Tate, No. H-25-3364, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL
2774610, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2025). Indeed, most courts to consider this issue
have concluded that the
Zadvydas period is cumulative.
See, e.g.,
Siguenza v. Moniz,
No. 25-cv-11914-ADB, 2025 WL 2734704, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2025) (collecting
cases). 	To rule otherwise would mean that the Government could simply hold
noncitizens indefinitely by continuously releasing and then re-detaining them—a
type of “gamesmanship” that runs afoul of
Zadvydas. 	533 U.S. at 690 (recognizing
that the “indefinite detention” of a noncitizen “would raise a serious constitutional
problem”);
see also Villanueva, 2025 WL 2774610, at *9;
Siguenza, 2025 WL 2734704,
at *3.
The Government’s argument is unpersuasive for another reason:
Zadvydas no
longer applies to Mr. Hall’s particular circumstances.
	Zadvydas involved “ICE’s
authority to detain
in the first place upon an issuance of a final order of removal.”
Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (emphasis added);
see also Escalante v. Noem,
No. 9:25-cv-00182-MJT, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025) (“
Zadvydas,
relied upon by Respondents, dealt with the
initial detainment of [a noncitizen]
awaiting removal.” (emphasis added)). 	Critically, the petitioners in
Zadvydas were
never granted supervised release following a final order of removal.
Yan-Ling X. v.
Lyons, No. 1:25-cv-01412-KES-CDB (HC), 2025 WL 3123793, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7,
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2025) (citing
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). Thus, in that specific context, the Supreme
Court held that once a noncitizen has been detained for six months and “provides
good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient
to rebut that showing.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Now that Mr. Hall has been re-detained, the Government seems to suggest
that he bears the initial burden under
Zadvydas of proving that there is no significant
likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. ECF No. 8 at 4. The
Government even goes as far as to argue that “[a]t this juncture, the government is
not obligated to produce evidence to rebut [Mr. Hall’s] speculation that his removal
is unlikely.”
Id. at 3-4. But the Government misunderstands its evidentiary burden.
“[T]his is not your typical first round detainment of [a noncitizen] awaiting
removal.”
	Escalante, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3. ICE
already detained Mr. Hall back
in 2011—beyond the 90-day removal period and the presumptively reasonable six-
month 	period—and 	then 	subsequently 	released 	him 	on 	supervised 	release 	for
thirteen years. 	ECF No. 1 at 3. 	ICE’s own regulations provide that supervised
release may be revoked if, “on account of changed circumstances [ICE] determines
that there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” 	8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). 	The regulations also state
that, “if [ICE] determines, because of a change of circumstances, that there is a
significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future to the country to which the [noncitizen] was ordered removed or to
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a third country, the [noncitizen] shall again be subject to the custody review
procedures under [8 C.F.R. § 241.4].” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(4).
These regulations clearly indicate that, upon revocation of supervised release,
it is
the Government’s burden to show a significant likelihood that the noncitizen may
be removed.
	See, e.g.,
Escalante, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3;
Yan-Ling X., 2025 WL
3123793, at *3;
Roble v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3196 (LMP/LIB), 2025 WL 2443453, at *4
(D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025);
Abuelhawa v. Noem, No. 4:25-cv-04128, 2025 WL 2937692,
at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025). “Imposing the burden of proof on the [noncitizen] each
time he is re-detained would lead to an unjust result and serious due process
implications.”
	Escalante, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3. 	Therefore, because this case
involves ICE’s authority to
re-detain Mr. Hall after the agency revoked his supervised
release, the Court must determine whether the Government has shown that, on
account of changed circumstances, there is a significant likelihood of Mr. Hall’s
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (citing
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)).
B. 	The Application of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)
First Circuit precedent recognizes that “ICE’s decision to re-detain a noncitizen
like [Mr. Hall] who has been granted supervised release is governed by ICE’s own
regulation requiring (1) an individualized determination (2) by ICE that, (3) based on
changed circumstances, (4) removal has become significantly likely in the reasonably
foreseeably future.”
	Kong, 62 F.4th at 619-20 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)). 	“The
plain language of the regulation, however, does not allow a court in the first instance
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to make the required individualized finding.”
	Id. at 620. “To the extent ICE claims
that it made such a determination, the court should review that claim in light of the
regulations instructing ICE on how it should make such a determination.”
Id. (citing
8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(f), (i)(2)).
On October 7, 2025, ICE notified Mr. Hall of its intent to revoke his supervised
release and re-detain him. ECF No. 1-4 at 1. ICE’s notice simply stated that such a
decision was made “based on a review of [Mr. Hall’s] official alien file and a
determination that there are changed circumstances in [his] case.”
	Id. 	The notice
further provided that “ICE has determined that [Mr. Hall] can be removed from the
United States pursuant to the outstanding order of removal against him…. [Mr.
Hall’s] case is currently under review by Liberia for the issuance of a travel
document.”
Id.
These generic and conclusory statements are insufficient bases for revoking
Mr. Hall’s supervised release. 	Indeed, dozens of federal courts across the country
have analyzed identically worded notifications by ICE and have found them to be
deficient.
See, e.g.,
Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 150, 152 (finding notice of revocation
of supervised release insufficient where it stated that the detention decision was
“made based on a review of [the noncitizen’s] official alien file and a determination
that there are changed circumstances in [his] case” and that his “case is under current
review” by his native country “for the issuance of a travel document”);
Perez-Escobar,
792 F. Supp. 3d at 225-26 (same);
M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-cv-01204-AA, 2025 WL
2430267, at *10 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025);
Sarail A. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-2144 (ECT/JFD),
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--- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2533673, at *2, 10 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025) (same);
Rokhfirooz v. Larose, No.: 25-cv-2053-RSH-VET, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2646165,
at *1-3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025) (same);
Rasakhamdee v. Noem, No.: 3:25-cv-02816-
RBM-DEB, 2025 WL 3102037, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (same).
As one court put it, “[s]imply to say that circumstances had changed or there
was a significantly likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future is not enough.”
Sarail A., 2025 WL 2533673, at *10. The noncitizen “must be told
what circumstances
had changed or
why there was now a significant likelihood of removal in order to
meaningfully respond to the reasons and submit evidence in opposition, as allowed
under § 241.13(i)(3).”
Id. (emphasis in original). ICE’s failure to provide a noncitizen
with adequate notice of its basis for revoking supervised release violates the
noncitizen’s due process rights.
	See Perez-Escobar, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 226;
see also
Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 152-53.
Here, from the moment Mr. Hall was detained on October 7, 2025, ICE failed
to provide him with sufficient notice regarding the revocation of his supervised
release. 	ICE chose to re-detain Mr. Hall on account of “changed circumstances in
[his] case,” but did not tell him
what circumstances had changed.
Cf. Sarail A., 2025
WL 2533673, at *10. 	At that time, Mr. Hall’s case was simply “under review by
Liberia for the issuance of a travel document,” but Liberia had not actually issued
any travel document when he was detained.
By November 21, 2025—a month and a half into Mr. Hall’s re-detention—
Liberia had still not issued a travel document. 	ECF No. 1 at 4. 	In fact, Mr. Hall
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attended a virtual interview that day with a representative from the Liberian
Embassy, and the meeting ended without Mr. Hall or ICE officers being able to
produce the necessary identity documents to process Mr. Hall’s removal to Liberia.
Id.;
see also ECF No. 1-2 at 2.
The Government, however, claims that the analysis has changed in recent
weeks. Mr. Chan, ICE’s Assistant Field Office Director, asserts in a declaration that
“[o]n or around December 3, 2025, the Embassy of Liberia issued a travel document
for [Mr. Hall].” ECF No. 8-1 at 4. The Government contends that Mr. Hall’s removal
is “significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future,” now that ICE is
in possession of this travel document. ECF No. 8 at 4.
The Court feels the need to point out that this logic is concerning. 	According
to the Government’s own admission, the purported rationale for revoking Mr. Hall’s
supervised release did not materialize until December 3, 2025—nearly two months
after Mr. Hall had been re-detained by ICE. This creates a perverse incentive: if ICE
had its way, it could simply revoke a noncitizen’s supervised release and provide a
post hoc rationalization for doing so months after the fact.8 	All the while, the
noncitizen—sitting 	in 	an 	ICE 	detention 	center—would 	be 	deprived 	of 	their
fundamental interest in their liberty.
	See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529
8 Though the Court need not decide this case on APA grounds, it is important
to note that, under arbitrary and capricious review in the administrative law context,
“[t]he basic rule is clear: [a]n agency must defend its actions based on the reasons it
gave
when it acted,” not on “impermissible post hoc rationalizations.”
	Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 22, 24 (2020) (emphasis
added).
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(2004) (recognizing “the most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being free
from physical detention by [the] government”).
There is also another problem regarding the purported evidence in the record.
As mentioned earlier, the burden is on
the Government to show that, on account of
changed circumstances, there is a significant likelihood of the noncitizen’s removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future.
Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 149. The Government
suggests that Mr. Chan’s declaration alone is “evidence” sufficient to prove that Mr.
Hall’s removal is “significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
ECF No. 8 at 2.
The Court disagrees. 	First, the Government has not produced the alleged
travel document or provided any verifiable proof that such a document exists, “such
as a document number, validity period, expiration date, or scheduled removal date.”
ECF No. 9 at 4. Second, the Government has failed to respond to multiple requests
made by Mr. Hall’s attorneys to produce the alleged travel document.
	Id.;
see also
ECF No. 9-1 at 1 (showing unanswered email dated December 6, 2025 from Mr. Hall’s
counsel, requesting that ICE produce “removal information for Malcolm Eldridge
Hall”). 	The Government claims it “is not obligated to produce [this] evidence,” but
this again goes against the clear weight of authority holding otherwise.
Nguyen, 788
F. Supp. 3d at 149;
Escalante, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3;
Yan-Ling X., 2025 WL
3123793, at *3;
Roble, 2025 WL 2443453, at *4;
Abuelhawa, 2025 WL 2937692, at *8.
There are issues with Mr. Chan’s declaration as well. He states, for instance,
that the Embassy of Liberia issued the travel document for Mr. Hall. 	ECF No. 8-1
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at 4. 	But this ignores the fact that just a few weeks prior, during the virtual
interview, a representative from the Liberian government informed ICE officials that
Mr. Hall’s removal could not be processed without his identity documents. ECF No. 1
at 4. The Government has not shown what steps, if any, were taken to overcome this
obstacle. 	Nor has the 	Government 	produced these 	identity 	documents. 	The
Government has not even shown that any communication with Liberia has occurred
since the virtual interview was held in November.
Cf. Elshourbagy v. Bondi, No. 2:25-
cv-02432-TL, 2025 WL 3718993, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2025) (holding that the
Government failed to show that Petitioner’s removal to Uganda was significantly
likely to occur due to lack of evidence in record that “steps [had] been taken to obtain
a Ugandan travel document for Petitioner, that Uganda [had] any interest in
accepting Petitioner, or even that there [had] been any communication with Uganda
regarding Petitioner at all”).
The Government also contends, based on Mr. Chan’s assertions, that Mr. Hall’s
removal should be no trouble because it “has been removing aliens [to Liberia]
throughout this year.” 	ECF No. 8 at 2 (citing ECF No. 8-1 at 3-4). 	However, this
claim does not aid the Government’s position either. 	If the total number of travel
document requests and the total number of removals to Liberia were disclosed, the
Court might be able to gauge how likely it is that Mr. Hall would be removed there.
Cf. Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 151 (conducting same analysis, but for noncitizens
from Vietnam);
Thai v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 57, 61 (D. Mass. 2025) (finding
petitioner’s removal foreseeable where the Government “previously removed at least
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25 similarly situated” noncitizens to Cambodia). For example, if DHS had requested
350 travel documents from Liberia and 300 individuals had been deported there, then
the Government may very well have shown that removal is significantly likely to
occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.
	Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 151. 	If, on
the other hand, DHS had submitted 3,500 travel document requests and only 300
individuals had been deported there, then the Government would fail to meet its
burden.
Id. Thus, in the absence of these statistics, this claim does not weigh in the
Government’s favor.
Therefore, on the record before the Court, the Government cannot make the
showing necessary to prove that circumstances have changed such that there is a
significant likelihood that Mr. Hall will be removed to Liberia in the reasonably
foreseeable future pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2).
	Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d
at 152.
C. 	Remedy
Having concluded that the Government has failed to meet its evidentiary
burden, the Court must now determine the appropriate remedy for Mr. Hall. Taken
together, ICE’s decision to revoke Mr. Hall’s supervised release and re-detain him is
not in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, and it violated his procedural due process
rights.
	Perez-Escobar, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 226 (“Noncitizens, even those subject to a
final removal order, are entitled to due process.”). 	Of course, “ICE, like any agency
‘has the duty to follow its own federal regulations.’”
	Rombot, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 388
(quoting
Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 205 (1st Cir. 2003)). 	As here, “where an
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immigration ‘regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from
the Constitution or a federal statute’ ... ‘and [ICE] fails to adhere to it, the challenged
[action] is invalid.’”
Id. (quoting
Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Given these regulatory and constitutional violations, the Court finds that Mr.
Hall’s immediate release is appropriate.
	See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972) (“It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation
of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.”). Mr. Hall’s immediate release shall be subject to
the conditions of his preexisting Order of Supervision.
See Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d
at 153 (ordering similar relief);
Perez-Escobar, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 226-27 (same).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons articulated above, the Court GRANTS Mr. Hall’s
habeas petition. 	ECF No. 1. 	The Government is hereby ORDERED to release
Malcolm Eldridge Hall immediately under the conditions of his preexisting Order of
Supervision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
January 2, 2026
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