Picado v. Hyde et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
MARWELL PICADO,
Petitioner,
v.
PATRICIA HYDE,
Field Office
Director; TODD LYONS,
Acting
Director U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM,
Secretary of Homeland Security; and
MICHAEL NESSINGER,
Warden of
the Donald W. Wyatt Detention
Center,
Respondents.
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No. 26-cv-065-JJM-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.
Marwell Picado is in the custody of Immigration Customs and Enforcement
(“ICE”) at the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility in Central Falls, Rhode Island.
ECF No. 1. He brings this habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking immediate
release from ICE detention.
Id. at 8. Mr. Picado argues that the Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) 	who 	conducted 	his 	bond 	hearing 	failed 	to 	comport 	with 	due 	process
requirements and erred as a matter of law when she denied his request for release on
bond.
Id. at 6-7. The Government objects to Mr. Picado’s petition. ECF No. 4.
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Mr. Picado’s habeas petition
and ORDERS his immediate release.
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I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Picado is a native and citizen of Nicaragua. 	ECF No. 1 at 3. 	He entered
the United States without inspection on or about April 3, 2022.
	Id. 	Upon entry,
immigration officials detained Mr. Picado and placed him in removal proceedings.
Id.
He was subsequently released on humanitarian parole pending his immigration
hearing.
Id.
On the night of October 11, 2025, Sergeant Zachary Hubbard was on patrol in
Lincoln, Rhode Island.
	Id.; ECF No. 1-8 at 37. 	While driving on the highway,
Sergeant Hubbard allegedly observed Mr. Picado driving at 90 mph in a 55-mph zone.
ECF No. 1-8 at 37. 	Mr. Picado then exited the highway, and Sergeant Hubbard
followed him and initiated a traffic stop.
	Id. 	Officer Jonathan Karraz, who was in
the area, assisted Sergeant Hubbard with the traffic stop.
Id. Later, Mr. Picado was
charged with reckless driving.
Id. at 37, 40. The charges have not been adjudicated.
In response to the reckless driving charge, a hearing was scheduled in Rhode
Island state court for November 3, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 4. However, Mr. Picado asserts
that he never received notice of this hearing.
	Id. 	When he failed to appear at the
hearing, the court issued a warrant for Mr. Picado’s arrest.
Id.
A week later, while on his way to traffic court for a different hearing, ICE
officials encountered Mr. Picado and arrested him.
Id. Mr. Picado was subsequently
transferred to the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility in Central Falls, Rhode Island.
Id.
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Mr. Picado later requested a bond hearing before an IJ.
	Id. 	A hearing was
held in the Chelmsford Immigration Court on December 4, 2025, but the IJ concluded
that she lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Picado’s request for release on bond
pursuant to
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).1
Id.
Meanwhile, Mr. Picado filed a habeas petition with this Court, requesting that
the Government provide him with a bond hearing.
Id. Judge Mary S. McElroy of this
Court granted Mr. Picado’s petition and ordered that he be provided with a bond
hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
	Id.;
see also Picado v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-614-MSM-
PAS, Text Order of Dec. 16, 2025 (granting Mr. Picado’s petition).
Pursuant to Judge McElroy’s order, the Government provided Mr. Picado with
a bond hearing before the Chelmsford Immigration Court.
Id.; ECF No. 4-1 at 2. Mr.
Picado, through his attorney, presented several pieces of evidence, including the
police report showing that he was arrested on allegations of reckless driving. 	ECF
No. 1 at 4-5;
see also ECF No. 1-8 at 34-42.
By contrast, the attorney representing the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) did not submit any evidence. 	ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 4-1 at 3. 	When the
1 This decision by the BIA, which is binding on IJs, treats noncitizens who enter
the United States without inspection or admission and who then reside in the country
for several years thereafter as “applicants for admission,” meaning they are subject
to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
	Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). However, that decision is not binding on this Court, and
this Court must instead “exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning
of statutory provisions.”
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024).
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IJ asked the DHS attorney if he intended to submit any evidence or if there were any
objections to Mr. Picado’s proposed evidence, the following conversation2 ensued:
DHS: Uh, no, your Honor. 	I will just note that this bond hearing
appeared on my docket for the first time this morning and so I haven’t
had a chance to get the police reports for the case. 	Um, but I can
certainly argue the matter.
IJ: Understood. 	Yeah, occasionally these get put on with very short
notice as I’m sure you know. 	Alright … do you know, do you have an
estimate as about how long it might take you to get those police reports?
DHS: Um, I don’t, literally I had prepared your docket for today. 	And
then I came on about 20 minutes ago and I saw this there and, and I
didn’t know whether it was an asylum case because he also has a merits
hearing and so I was preparing the merits hearing and, um, at the end
of the day, who know? I don’t know for sure, but it may be this afternoon.
I could certainly have somebody work on it while we’re doing our other
business today.
IJ: Alright. Let’s get-- if that would work. Alright, let’s get started this
morning and I will make a determination later if that’s gonna be
necessary.
ECF No. 4-1 at 3.
The parties went on to devote a significant portion of the bond hearing to the
police report. The DHS attorney argued that the report, which he was just seeing for
the first time at the hearing, merited a finding that Mr. Picado posed a danger to the
community. 	Conversely, counsel for Mr. Picado (“JRA”) argued that DHS could not
meet its burden of proving dangerousness.
IJ: Alright. So I’d like to first hear argument from the department and
department if you need a couple of minutes, I can give you that.
Understood. You got this last minute on short notice.
2 This conversation is taken from the bond hearing transcript, which the
Government submitted pursuant to this Court’s Text Order.
	See Text Order (Jan.
30, 2026). The Government acknowledges that this is “an unofficial transcript of the
bond hearing prepared by the U.S. Attorney’s Office.” ECF No. 4 at 2 n.3.
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DHS: Well, I can make the, the general argument. 	I’m looking at the
BCR and the criminal record here and it appears that there was an
arrest for reckless driving and drag racing, on October 11th of this year.
You know, certainly that would, I believe cause a significant danger to
the community. And so we would argue that [Mr. Picado], uh, would be
a danger to the community and certainly a flight risk based upon the
fact that, um, that he’s been here such a short amount of time. And so
for those reasons we would ask you that you deny bond.
IJ: Alright, thank you. And I do actually see some police-- Lincoln police
reports that were filed by [Mr. Picado] related to that, uh, in the second
exhibit. Alright, counsel for [Mr. Picado], I’ll hear your argument please
on danger and flight risk.
JRA: 	Thank 	you, 	your 	Honor. 	Your 	Honor, 	I 	don’t 	believe 	the
government can meet the burden of proof in this case. As you know, he’s
indicated they haven’t submitted anything. 	But however, the only
arrest that [Mr. Picado] has involves this reckless driving charge that
he got, early October of this year. Um, I’m not sure where counsel gets
the [drag] racing from.
* * *
[Mr. Picado] refused that he was recklessly driving. He initially thought
that he was stopped because of a broken light. 	[Mr. Picado’s] not a
dangerous individual. This is his first arrest. He has been in the United
States, um, since 2023. 	He has lots of family members here in the
United States, including a lawful permanent resident sister, uh, and US
citizen, siblings. He also has a partner, your Honor, who is a US citizen.
She submitted a written statement and her passport, um, that indicates
that they have been dating since about a year ago.
They plan to marry, and through that, [Mr. Picado] will be able to obtain
legal status as he was, uh, paroled in a 212 D 5, um, after being detained
by DHS. 	So he would seek adjustment of status at some point, your
Honor. 	He also has, um, that asylum application pending with this
court. 	[Mr. Picado] is a very humble person. 	He’s been working since
he arrived in the United States. He's lived in Rhode Island since. Um,
and if released, he will return to live with his spouse, and her daughters.
And he will continue working. 	Um, and we’ll be sure to appear every
hearing, set before this court. Thank you, your Honor.
IJ: Thank you. 	Any final comments by the department? 	It’s not
required.
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DHS: Well, well, I’m just looking at the police report and, and this is the
first time I’ve seen it, but, uh, 90 miles an hour to 55 that he was clocked.
I mean that’s significantly over the speed limit that is a danger to the
community, the kind of the very definition of that, and could have caused
serious injuries.
* * *
Uh, but even, even with a-- even on the plain language of the police
report, I think it’s obvious that he is a danger to the community, your
Honor.
IJ: Thank you. 	I just want everyone while I-- go ahead. 	Did someone
wanna say?
JRA: Sorry. 	And I was just saying that, um, I don’t believe the
government can meet the burden of proof simply by pointing to, to a
police report, um, where they haven’t presented anybody to, to, um,
corroborate those claims by the police officer, your Honor.
IJ: Alright, thank you. 	Alright, just a moment. 	The court’s reviewing
the record, I’m deliberating.
* * *
All right. 	The court has reviewed the record in its entirety. 	The court
does find that [Mr. Picado] is a danger to the community by clear and
convincing evidence based on the recent arrest. And the court does agree
that the extremely excessive speed is a serious danger with the swerving
and other driving issues. 	The court will note that there is some
corroboration within the police report and that there was more than one
police officer involved in the traffic stop. 	So I am gonna find he’s a
danger and denying bond.
ECF No. 4-1 at 3-5.
Even after the hearing, DHS did not submit any evidence in support of its
position. Nevertheless, the IJ issued a short order in which she denied Mr. Picado’s
request to be released on bond. 	ECF No. 1-9 at 2. 	The basis for her denial was as
follows: “[Mr. Picado] is a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence.”
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Id. Though he reserved the right to appeal this decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”), it is unclear from the record whether Mr. Picado has appealed.3
The IJ then issued another order in which she found Mr. Picado removable to
Nicaragua. ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-10 at 1 (showing removal order). Mr. Picado
has expressed an interest in appealing this decision to the BIA. ECF No. 1 at 5.
Mr. Picado filed this second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking
immediate release from ICE custody.
Id. at 8. He argues that the IJ failed to comport
with due process requirements and erred as a matter of law when she denied his
request for release on bond.
	Id. at 6-8. 	The Government objects to Mr. Picado’s
petition, claiming that Mr. Picado has not exhausted his administrative remedies and
that the IJ’s determination was not an error of law. ECF No. 4 at 3-4.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
Before reaching the merits of Mr. Picado’s petition or the Government’s
exhaustion argument, the Court must first assure itself of its jurisdiction. 	Though
neither of the parties have raised it, this Court is always “under an unflagging duty
to ensure that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases it proposes to
adjudicate.”
	Am. Policyholders Ins. Co. v. Nyacol Prods., Inc., 989 F.2d 1256, 1258
(1st Cir. 1993).
3 The Government notes that, while there is no record that Mr. Picado
appealed, “there is a backlog with the BIA for processing notices to appeal, so it is
possible that [Mr. Picado] filed a notice to appeal that has not yet been processed.”
ECF No. 4 at 3 n.5.
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Regarding bond determinations, this Court is mindful of the jurisdictional
limits contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Section 1226(e) provides that “[t]he Attorney
General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not
be subject to review,” and that “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the
Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of any [noncitizen] or
the revocation or denial of bond or parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
However, this provision of the INA only bars “review of the Attorney General’s
discretionary 	judgment.”
	Saint 	Fort 	v. 	Ashcroft, 	329 	F.3d 	191, 	200 	(1st 	Cir.
2003) (citing
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003)). 	It does not preclude,
however, 	“habeas 	jurisdiction 	over 	constitutional 	claims 	or 	questions 	of 	law.”
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Leonardo v.
Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)).
Here, Mr. Picado is not challenging the IJ’s discretionary judgment. 	Rather,
his challenge is constitutional in nature because he argues that the IJ failed to
comport with due process requirements when she denied him release on bond. ECF
No. 1 at 7-8. As this Court has stated previously, this is “precisely” the type of claim
that belongs in federal court.
	Garcia v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-585-JJM-PAS, 2025 WL
3466312, at *5 (D.R.I. Dec. 3, 2025).
Additionally, Mr. Picado argues that the IJ erred as a matter of law in
determining that he poses a danger to the community. 	ECF No. 1 at 6-7. 	Section
1226(e) does not bar this type of claim either considering recent developments at the
Supreme Court and in the Ninth Circuit. 	In 2024, the Supreme Court clarified the
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boundaries of judicial review in immigration cases by differentiating between what
constitutes 	an 	unreviewable 	“discretionary 	judgment” 	and 	what 	constitutes 	a
reviewable “question of law.”
	See Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024). 4 	The
Court made clear that “[t]he application of a statutory legal standard … to an
established set of facts is a quintessential mixed question of law and fact.”
Id. at 212.
Relying on an earlier case, the Court concluded that “mixed questions of law and fact”
are reviewable as “questions of law.”
	Id. at 225;
see also Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,
589 U.S. 221, 228 (2020).
After this decision, the Supreme Court vacated an earlier Ninth Circuit ruling
that found that, under Section 1226(e), a district court lacked jurisdiction to review
an IJ’s dangerousness determination because it was “discretionary” in nature.
	See
Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2022),
cert. granted, judgment
vacated, ––– U.S. ––––, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). 	The Supreme Court remanded this
case “for further consideration in light of
Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024).”
Martinez v. Clark, ––– U.S. ––––, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024) (mem.). 	On remand, the
4 More specifically,
Wilkinson concerned a noncitizen who asked a federal court
of appeals to review a decision by an IJ (and the affirmance of that decision by the
BIA) to deny his application for cancellation of removal, a form of immigration relief
requiring the noncitizen to show that their removal would result in “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident family
member. 	601 U.S. at 211-212 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)). 	The appeals court
held that such a decision was “discretionary,” and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction
to review it.
Id. at 216 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)).
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the application of a legal standard
to facts, such as whether the noncitizen met the “hardship” standard, is “inescapably,
a mixed question of law and fact,” which is reviewable as a “question of law.”
	Id. at
221, 225;
see Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 228 (2020).
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Ninth Circuit reasoned that, after
Wilkinson, the determination over whether a
noncitizen is “dangerous” for immigration-detention purposes is “a mixed question of
law and fact and is reviewable as a ‘question of law.’”
	Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th
775, 779 (9th Cir. 2024).
Accordingly, because the IJ’s finding of dangerousness is a finding based on
the application of a statutory legal standard to an established set of facts, it is not a
“discretionary judgment” barred by Section 1226(e) and is also reviewable by this
Court as a “question of law.”
	See Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 212, 225;
Martinez, 124
F.4th at 779;
see also Mayancela Mayancela v. FCI Berlin, Warden, Civ. No. 25-cv-
348-LM-TSM, 2025 WL 3215638, at *5 n.5 (D.N.H. Nov. 18, 2025).
B. 	Exhaustion
The Government primarily argues that Mr. Picado should be required to
exhaust his administrative remedies before pursuing habeas relief in this Court.
ECF No. 4 at 3-6. Specifically, the Government contends that Mr. Picado must first
appeal the IJ’s denial of his request for release on bond to the BIA.
Id. at 3-4.
The Court will not require exhaustion in this case. 	There is no statute that
requires exhaustion under the present circumstances.
See Garcia, 2025 WL 3466312,
at 	*6. 	Instead, 	this 	case 	is 	governed 	by 	the 	“more 	permissive” 	common-law
exhaustion standard.
Brito v. Garland, 22 F.4th 240, 256 (1st Cir. 2021). Under this
standard, the Court may find exhaustion to be unnecessary where “a particular
plaintiff 	may 	suffer 	irreparable 	harm 	if 	unable 	to 	secure 	immediate 	judicial
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consideration of his claim.”
	Portela-Gonzalez v. Sec’y of the Navy, 109 F.3d 74, 77
(1st Cir. 1997) (citing
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147 (1992)).
As this Court has found repeatedly, the loss of liberty endured by a noncitizen
in ICE custody is a “severe form of irreparable injury.”
Garcia, 2025 WL 3466312, at
*6 (quoting
Ferrara v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 2d 351, 360 (D. Mass. 2005);
Tomas
Elias v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-540-JJM-AEM, 2025 WL 3004437, at *3 (D.R.I. Oct. 27,
2025). This loss of liberty is further compounded due to the considerable amount of
time—up to six months, in many cases—it takes for the BIA to decide bond appeals.
See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1248-49 (W.D. Wash. 2025)
(“According to data released by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, the
average processing time for bond appeals exceeded
200 days in 2024.” (emphasis
added)).
This Court will not require Mr. Picado to sit in an ICE detention facility for six
months while he awaits a BIA decision. 	Any exhaustion requirement is hereby
waived, and the Court will proceed to the merits of Mr. Picado’s petition.
C. 	The Merits
1. 	Standard of Review
As mentioned, in cases involving challenges to IJs’ bond determinations,
federal courts retain “habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of
law.”
	Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 987. 	Importantly, the First Circuit has held that
placing the burden on a noncitizen to prove at their bond hearings that they do not
present a danger to the community or pose a flight risk is a violation of the Fifth
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 39, 41 (1st
Cir. 2021). 	Instead, the Government bears the burden of proving “by clear and
convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by a
preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.”
Id. at 41.
Thus, to obtain habeas relief, the noncitizen must show that the IJ “failed to
place the burden of proof on the Government” to either show dangerousness by clear
and convincing evidence or flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence.
Mayancela
Mayancela, 2025 WL 3215638, at *5 (citing
Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140,
143 	(D. 	Mass. 	2019)). 	The 	noncitizen 	can 	make 	this 	showing 	either 	by: 	(1)
demonstrating that the IJ erred because the evidence itself could not, as a matter of
law, have supported the IJ’s decision to deny bond; or (2) pointing to the IJ’s opinion
itself and showing that the IJ failed to apply the correct standard to the facts.
Garcia,
2025 WL 3466312, at *7 (citing
Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 240
(W.D.N.Y. 2019)).
2. 	Analysis
The Court is mindful of its obligation to afford a degree of deference to the IJ’s
findings of fact and weighing of evidence.
	See Hechavarria, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 240
(citing
United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 882 (1st Cir. 1990));
see also Diaz Ortiz,
384 F. Supp. 3d at 144. 	However, as relevant here, an IJ’s “dangerousness”
determination is not one that is shielded entirely from judicial review. 	As the First
Circuit has observed, “[m]erely stating the proper standard does not discharge the
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obligation to correctly apply the standard.”
Akinsanya v. Garland, 125 F.4th 287, 297
(1st Cir. 2025).
In Mr. Picado’s case, the sole evidence relied on by the IJ in determining that
he posed a danger to the community was the police report that listed Mr. Picado’s
arrest for reckless driving. ECF No. 4-1 at 5 (“The court does find that [Mr. Picado]
is a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence based on the recent
arrest.”). 	Notably, though the Government is required to prove dangerousness by
clear and convincing evidence,
see Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41, the attorney
representing DHS at the bond hearing did not submit any evidence, either before or
after, in support of Mr. Picado’s continued detention. The DHS attorney looked only
to the police report that Mr. Picado himself supplied, a copy of which he had obtained
just 20 minutes before the bond hearing started.5 ECF No. 4-1 at 3.
In the context of bond determinations, this Court has previously held that an
uncorroborated police report cannot, by itself, establish dangerousness as a matter of
law.
	See Alvarez Puerta v. Nessinger, No. 25-cv-108-JJM-AEM, slip op. at 1 (D.R.I.
June 17, 2025) (finding that an uncorroborated police report is not clear and
convincing evidence sufficient for a finding of dangerousness);
	Rosa Pineda v.
5 That the DHS attorney only skimmed the police report is evident given that
he falsely told the IJ that Mr. Picado had been arrested on a charge of “drag racing”
in addition to reckless driving. ECF No. 4-1 at 3-4 (“I’m looking at the BCR and the
criminal record here and it appears that there was an arrest for reckless driving and
drag racing…. You know, certainly that would, I believe cause a significant danger to
the community.”). 	Mr. Picado’s attorney quickly pointed out that the “drag racing”
accusation was baseless.
	Id. at 4 (“Um, I’m not sure where counsel gets the [drag]
racing from.”).
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Nessinger, No. 25-cv-522-MSM-AEM, 2025 WL 3267328, at *1 (D.R.I. Nov. 24, 2025)
(“[A]n uncorroborated police report cannot, alone, be ‘clear and convincing evidence
sufficient for a finding of dangerousness.’”);
cf. I.G.S. v. Nessinger, No. 25-cv-339-
MRD-PAS, slip op. at 2-4 (D.R.I. Sept. 12, 2025) (finding that the Government could
not meet its burden of showing “flight risk” by a “preponderance of the evidence”
where the IJ relied only on a dismissed criminal charge and an unsubstantiated claim
that the noncitizen had gang affiliations).
The First Circuit has held the same in the context of immigration hearings
concerning adjustment of status.
See Rosa v. Garland, 114 F.4th 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2024)
(holding that “the agency may not give ‘substantial weight’ to a police report in the
absence of ‘a conviction or corroborating evidence of the allegations contained’ in the
report”) (quoting
In Re Arreguin De Rodriguez, 21 I&N Dec. 38, 42 (BIA 1995)).
The Government attempts to distinguish
	Alvarez Puerta from this case,
arguing that the underlying criminal charges had been dismissed in
Alvarez Puerta,
whereas Mr. Picado’s reckless driving charge remains pending. 	ECF No. 4 at 6.
However, this is a distinction without a difference. As the First Circuit has observed,
that a noncitizen may have been arraigned or indicted on a criminal charge “adds no
substance to the allegations” against him, and the Government’s “reliance on the fact
of the indictment … is simply additional reliance on the police report.”
	Rosa, 114
F.4th at 21.
The IJ also noted that there was “some corroboration within the police report”
because “there was more than one police officer involved in the traffic stop.” ECF No.
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4-1 at 5. But the reliance on the additional police officer is misplaced. A close review
of the police report shows that only Sergeant Zachary Hubbard allegedly observed
Mr. Picado driving 90 mph in a 55-mph zone. 	ECF No. 1-8 at 37. 	According to the
report, the second police officer, Officer Jonathan Karraz, arrived on the scene only
after Mr. Picado took an exit off the highway.
Id. (“The black Dodge Charger turned
right onto Sayles Hill Rd where I activated my emergency lights and conducted a
traffic stop. 	Officer Karraz was in the area and assisted me with the traffic stop.”).
This means that Officer Karraz could not have corroborated the reckless driving
charge because he did not witness the alleged offense occur.
The Court therefore finds that the Government did not meet its burden in
proving that Mr. Picado posed a danger to the community. 	Without more, an
uncorroborated police report is simply not clear and convincing evidence sufficient for
a finding of dangerousness.
See Alvarez Puerta, slip op. at 1;
Rosa Pineda, 2025 WL
3267328, at *1;
Rosa, 114 F.4th at 17. As such, the IJ erred because the evidence she
relied on could not have, as a matter of law, supported her decision to deny Mr.
Picado’s bond request.
	See Mayancela Mayancela, 2025 WL 3215638, at *5;
Garcia,
2025 WL 3466312, at *7;
Hechavarria, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 240.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Mr. Picado’s Habeas Petition. ECF
No. 1. By now, Mr. Picado has participated in two bond hearings that two separate
judges have found to be deficient. It makes little sense to provide him with a third.
Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Government is hereby ORDERED to release
Marwell Picado immediately under reasonable conditions of supervision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
February 9, 2025
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