Deng v. Nessinger et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
YING LIANG DENG,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL NESSINGER,
Warden,
Wyatt Detention Facility; PATRICIA
HYDE,
Field Office Director, U.S.
I.C.E. Enforcement and Removal
Operations, Boston Field Office;
MICHAEL KROL,
HSI New England
Special Agent in Charge; TODD
LYONS,
Acting Director, U.S. I.C.E.;
and PAMELA BONDI,
U.S. Attorney
General,
Respondents.
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No. 26-cv-113-JJM-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.
Ying Liang Deng brings this habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
arguing that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) acted unlawfully when
it revoked his Order of Supervision and re-detained him at the Donald W. Wyatt
Detention Facility in Central Falls, Rhode Island. ECF No. 1. He seeks immediate
release from ICE custody, as well as an order restoring him to his prior Order of
Supervision.
	Id. at 12. The Government opposes Mr. Deng’s petition, claiming that
he was properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. 	ECF No. 5. 	For the reasons that
follow, the Court GRANTS Mr. Deng’s petition and ORDERS his immediate release,
subject to the conditions of his preexisting Order of Supervision.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Deng is a native of China who arrived in the United States as a teenager
in 1998. ECF No. 1 at 6. He later became a Lawful Permanent Resident (“LPR”) in
2002. ECF No. 5-1 at 2.
On or about June 7, 2006, Mr. Deng was found guilty in Minnesota state court
of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree.
	Id. at 3. 	He was sentenced to four
years in prison and fifteen years of probation.
Id.
Following his release from prison, ICE officers encountered Mr. Deng on or
about May 16, 2012.
	Id. He was detained and charged with being removable due to
his 	conviction 	qualifying 	as 	an 	“aggravated 	felony” 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).1
	Id. 	An immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered Mr. Deng removed to
China on or about June 11, 2012.
	Id. 	Mr. Deng did not appeal that decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).
Id.
On or about September 12, 2012, ICE released Mr. Deng from custody on an
Order of Supervision.
Id. He remained on supervised released for more than thirteen
years. ECF No. 1 at 7. During that time, Mr. Deng complied with all of the conditions
of his release and attended regular check-ins with ICE.
Id.
Then, on November 18, 2025, Mr. Deng appeared for a check-in at ICE’s Boston
Field Office in Burlington, Massachusetts.
Id. During that check-in, ICE officers told
1 Under this provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
noncitizens who are convicted of an “aggravated felony” after admission into the
United States are removable.
	Whyte v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 463, 466 (1st Cir. 2015)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
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Mr. Deng that his supervised release had been revoked, and they took him into
custody.
	Id. He was later transferred to the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility in
Central Falls, Rhode Island.
Id.
In a declaration, ICE’s Assistant Field Office Director Mark Anzelmo states
that Mr. Deng’s Order of Supervision was revoked “because the purposes of release
had been served, and it was appropriate to enforce his removal order.” ECF No. 5-1
at 3. He further alleges that, on or about November 21, 2025, an ICE officer served
Mr. Deng with a Notice of Revocation of Release and “conducted an informal
interview to allow him an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation of the
order of supervision.”
	Id. at 4. 	Mr. Anzelmo states that, during the informal
interview, Mr. Deng “provided a written statement, and he did not provide any
documents.”
Id.
Mr. Deng filed the instant petition on February 25, 2026, challenging his re-
detention and the revocation of his supervised release. ECF No. 1. However, “given
the filing of the habeas petition,” Mr. Anzelmo says that “ICE is working to expedite”
Mr. Deng’s removal. ECF No. 5-1 at 4.
Specifically, Mr. Anzelmo avers that “ICE has been working diligently to
prepare [a] travel document request for China.”
	Id. 	He states that “China is
reviewing a proposal for a charter during the month of March for repatriation of three
hundred (300) Chinese nationals.”
	Id. 	Mr. Anzelmo further asserts that ICE has
contacted an attaché of the Chinese government who “intends to add [Mr. Deng] to
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the charter list when the Government of China agrees to the charter and if [Mr.
Deng’s] nationality is verified with the Government of China.”
Id.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Section 1231(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to detain noncitizens who are subject to
“administratively final” orders of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). An important
caveat is that a noncitizen’s removal must occur within a 90-day removal period, after
which the noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention, meaning that they “‘may
be detained’ 2 or may be released under terms of supervision.”
	Johnson v. Arteaga-
Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 575 (2022) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)).
Although Section 1231(a) does not specify how long DHS may subject a
noncitizen to discretionary detention following the 90-day removal period, the
Supreme Court has read an implicit limitation into the statute and stated that it
“does not permit indefinite detention.”
	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).
Rather, the Court held that a noncitizen’s detention is “presumptively reasonable” for
up to six months.
Id. at 701.
After the six months are up, the noncitizen may obtain release from detention
if they can “provide[ ] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
2 After the 90-day removal period, the Government “may” detain only four
categories of noncitizens: “(1) those who are ‘inadmissible’ on certain specified
grounds; (2) those who are ‘removable’ on certain specified grounds; (3) those it
determines ‘to be a risk to the community’; and (4) those it determines to be ‘unlikely
to comply with the order of removal.’”
Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 578-79 (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)).
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removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
	Id. 	The burden then shifts to the
Government to either rebut this showing or release the noncitizen.
Id. at 699-700.
In its opposition to his petition, the Government argues that the
Zadvydas
framework 	applies 	to 	Mr. 	Deng’s 	circumstances, 	and 	that 	his 	detention 	is
“presumptively reasonable” because he has been in ICE custody for fewer than six
months. 	ECF No. 5 at 4. 	On this point, the Government is mistaken because Mr.
Deng has been detained for
longer than six months. 	Following his release from
prison, ICE officers detained Mr. Deng for about five months from May 2012 to
September 2012.
See ECF No. 5-1 at 3. ICE then re-detained Mr. Deng in November
2025, and he has remained in detention ever since.
Id. That amounts to nearly nine
months 	of 	detention, 	meaning 	that 	his 	detention 	is 	no 	longer 	“presumptively
reasonable” under
Zadvydas. 3 533 U.S. at 701.
The Government’s argument is unconvincing for another reason, which is that
the
Zadvydas framework no longer applies to Mr. Deng’s circumstances.
	Zadvydas
specifically concerned “ICE’s authority to detain
in the first place upon an issuance
of a final order of removal.”
	Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D. Mass.
2025) (emphasis added). Because Mr. Deng previously obtained release on an order
3 This Court has previously expressed alarm regarding the Government’s
position that the “presumptively reasonable” six-month clock simply resets once ICE
releases and then re-detains a noncitizen.
See Hall v. Nessinger, No. 25-cv-667-JJM-
PAS, 2026 WL 18583, at *6 (D.R.I. Jan. 2, 2026);
Bulle v. Wesling, No. 26-cv-019-
JJM-AEM, 2026 WL 183840, at *4 (D.R.I. Jan. 23, 2026). This would, in essence, lead
to “indefinite detention,” which runs counter to
Zadvydas.
	See 533 U.S. at 690
(recognizing that the “indefinite detention” of a noncitizen “would raise a serious
constitutional problem”).
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of supervision following a final order of removal, and has now been re-detained, his
case is instead governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i).
Id.
Section 241.13 provides that ICE may revoke a noncitizen’s supervised release
if “on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant
likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). 4 	The First Circuit has provided ICE with four key elements
that it must meet in order to re-detain a noncitizen, like Mr. Deng, pursuant to this
regulation: “(1) an individualized determination (2) by ICE that, (3) based on changed
circumstances, 	(4) 	removal 	has 	become 	significantly 	likely 	in 	the 	reasonably
foreseeable future.”
	Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 619-20 (1st Cir. 2023)
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)). A reviewing court, such as this one, is not permitted
to make the individualized finding in the first instance; rather, it must review the
finding “in light of the regulations instructing ICE on how it should make such a
determination.”
	Id. at 620 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(f), (i)(2)). The burden is on the
Government to show that the noncitizen’s removal is significantly likely to occur in
the reasonably foreseeable future.
	See Hall v. Nessinger, No. 25-cv-667, 2026 WL
18583, at *7 (D.R.I. Jan. 2, 2026) (collecting cases).
4 Another regulation permits ICE to revoke a noncitizen’s supervised release if
he “violates any of the conditions of release.” 	8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1). 	However, the
Government does not contend that Mr. Deng violated any of the conditions of his
release. 	Indeed, Mr. Deng was arrested as he was fulfilling one of the conditions of
his release, which was appearing for a check-in with ICE.
	See ECF No. 1 at 7; ECF
No. 6 at 2.
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Turning to the facts of Mr. Deng’s case, it is clear that the justification provided
by ICE for his re-detention fails to meet the standards set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i).
After more than thirteen years of being out on supervised release, ICE officers
arrested and re-detained Mr. Deng on November 18, 2025, as he appeared for an ICE
check-in appointment. ECF No. 1 at 2. According to Mr. Anzelmo’s declaration,5 Mr.
Deng’s order of supervision was revoked “because the purposes of release had been
served, and it was appropriate to enforce his removal order.” ECF No. 5-1 at 3;
see 8
C.F.R. § 241.4(
l)2) (providing that DHS may revoke supervised release if an official
determines that “the purposes of release have been served” or if “[i]t is appropriate to
enforce a removal order”).
Notably missing from Mr. Anzelmo’s declaration are any reasons as to
why the
purposes of release had been served or
why it was appropriate to enforce Mr. Deng’s
removal order now, thirteen years after it had been entered by the IJ. 	But it is not
just the Court that wants answers to these questions; due process
requires the
Government to provide Mr. Deng with these answers. Under ICE’s own regulation,
“in order to revoke conditional release, the Government must provide adequate
notice” and give the noncitizen “an opportunity to respond to the reasons” offered for
the revocation.
	Noem v. Abrego Garcia, 604 U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 1017, 1019 (2025)
5 The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of the “Notice of
Revocation of Release” that ICE is required to issue to noncitizens upon their re-
detention.
	See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). 	This Court has previously stressed the
importance of the Government supplying this Notice to the Court so that it can be
assured of ICE’s compliance with the notice requirement contained in 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3).
See Bulle, 2026 WL 183840, at *6.
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(statement of Sotomayor, J.) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(
l))(1));
see also Mard v. Town
of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of notice
under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit
adequate preparation for,” the opportunity to be heard (quoting
Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978))).
Without more, ICE’s conclusory assertions that “the purposes of release had
been served” and that “it was appropriate to enforce his removal order” failed to
provide Mr. Deng with adequate notice of the reason for the revocation of his Order
of Supervision.
See Perez-Escobar v. Moniz, 792 F. Supp. 3d 224, 226 (D. Mass. 2025)
(“ICE’s conclusory 	explanation for revoking Petitioner’s release did not offer him
adequate 	notice 	of 	the 	basis 	for 	the 	revocation 	decision 	such 	that 	he 	could
meaningfully respond at the post-detention ‘informal interview.’”). 	Also, if this was
all that ICE had to offer, then it cannot realistically be said that Mr. Deng was given
any 	meaningful 	opportunity 	to 	challenge 	the 	revocation 	at 	his 	post-detention
“informal interview.”
See Hashemi v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-10335-HDV-SR, --- F. Supp.
3d ----, 2025 WL 3468694, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) (reasoning that, to be
regulation-compliant, a notice of revocation is not required to “include any particular
magic words; but it must provide real, specific, concrete information that a noncitizen
could actually respond to”).
If 	anything, 	Mr. 	Anzelmo’s 	declaration 	makes 	clear 	that 	it 	is 	wholly
inappropriate to enforce Mr. Deng’s removal order at this time. 	By his own
admission, Mr. Anzelmo concedes that ICE does not have a travel document to
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process Mr. Deng’s removal. ECF No. 5-1 at 4. Critically, Mr. Anzelmo acknowledges
that ICE did not even submit a travel document request for Mr. Deng until
February 3, 2026.
	Id. 	That is to say that the purported rationale for revoking Mr.
Deng’s supervised release did not materialize until more than two and a half months
after he was re-detained. As this Court has warned before, ICE’s pattern of detaining
first and seeking justification for those detentions months after the fact should be
cause for concern.
See Hall, 2026 WL 18583, at *8.
Nor can ICE fairly claim that circumstances have changed such that Mr.
Deng’s removal is significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i)(2);
Kong, 62 F.4th at 619-20. 	Mr. Anzelmo merely states
that a travel document request has been submitted, and that an attaché intends to
add Mr. Deng’s name to a list of Chinese nationals that China will then consider
accepting as part of a repatriation agreement with the United States. 	ECF No. 5-1
at 4.
But this tells the Court nothing about how long this process will take and, as
a result, how many additional months Mr. Deng will be forced to sit in a detention
facility.
	See Nguyen, 2026 WL 125093, at *4 (“The Respondents have presented
nothing from which this Court can even begin to estimate the length of time the
document processing may take.”);
Hamidi v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1205-G, 2025 WL
4034263, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 14, 2025) (“Respondents’ contention that Petitioner
could be removed to a third country ‘at some point in the future’ ... does not establish
a reasonable timeline.”).
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Mr. Anzelmo essentially offers that Mr. Deng’s removal remains a work in
progress, but this falls woefully short of justifying the revocation of his supervised
release and subsequent re-detention.
See, e.g.,
Bulle v. Wesling, No. 26-cv-019-JJM-
AEM, 2026 WL 183840, at *8 (D.R.I. Jan. 23, 2026) (finding the Government’s
assertion that it is “actively working to obtain travel papers” for a noncitizen’s
removal to a third country to be insufficient to justify his re-detention);
Lu v. Joyce,
No. 2:26-cv-00041-SDN, 2026 WL 352447, at *3 (D. Me. Feb. 9, 2026) (finding
insufficient the Government’s assertion that a noncitizen’s “document request is
pending with the Chinese government” so as to constitute “changed circumstances”).
Taken altogether, it is clear to the Court that ICE has failed to comply with 8
C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). The agency cannot point to any changed circumstances in Mr.
Deng’s case, and it has not established that his removal is significantly likely to occur
in the reasonably foreseeable future.
See Kong, 62 F.4th at 619-20.
The Court therefore finds ICE’s revocation of Mr. Deng’s supervised release
and his subsequent re-detention to be unlawful. 	Mr. Deng shall be immediately
released 	from 	custody, 	subject 	to 	the 	conditions 	of 	his 	preexisting 	Order 	of
Supervision.
See Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 153 (ordering similar relief);
Hall, 2026
WL 18583, at *9 (same);
Bulle, 2026 WL 183840, at *9 (same).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Mr. Deng’s habeas petition. ECF No. 1.
The Government is hereby ORDERED to release Ying Liang Deng immediately, and
he shall be subject to the conditions of his preexisting Order of Supervision.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
DATE: March 9th, 2026
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