USA v. LaRoche

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
CENTRAL DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JADE LAROCHE,
Defendant.
3:22-CR-30003-RAL
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISPOSITION OF MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
In this assaulting a 	federal officer case, 	Jade LaRoche 	moves to suppress
statements he made when an officer tried to arrest him at his mother’s house. But
because LaRoche was not interrogated while in custody and made voluntary statements
to the officer, his suppression motion should be denied.
BACKGROUND
Around 2:30 a.m. on October 31, 2021, Josephine Skunk called local dispatch to
report that her son, LaRoche, was acting up and she wanted someone to come resolve
the situation. Dispatch apprised Justin Schmiedt, a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
officer, of the call and he headed toward Skunk’s home in the Lower Brule community.
Along the way, Schmiedt confirmed, through dispatch, that LaRoche had an active
Lower Brule Sioux Tribe arrest warrant but did not know what the warrant was for.
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Upon arriving at the residence, Schmiedt knocked on the front door and Skunk invited
him in.
As Schmiedt stood in the living room, Skunk informed him that she and LaRoche
had a falling-out. She advised LaRoche that Schmiedt was there and had LaRoche join
them in the room. There, Schmiedt and LaRoche conversed for about 14 minutes.
Schmiedt notified LaRoche of the arrest warrant at the outset of the conversation.
LaRoche acknowledged knowing of the warrant and asked if Schmiedt had spoken
with BIA Officer Moran about it. Schmiedt had not and told LaRoche as much. LaRoche
began talking about Moran, the warrant, and himself before Schmiedt asked, “So,
what’s the warrant for? Do you know what it’s for?” LaRoche professed that he “was
supposed to go to treatment,” then initiated a lengthy explanation of the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of the warrant and his life situation. Schmiedt allowed
LaRoche to vent, contributing the occasional cursory interjection and clarifying question
to the confab.
But as the dialogue continued, LaRoche became increasingly anxious. His eyes
started to dart around the home, and he began to shift about on his feet. Noting the
change in demeanor and after giving LaRoche plenty of time to speak his piece,
Schmiedt declared that, “So far as tonight goes okay, I’m going to have to take you
because you got that warrant.” After this, when a brief attempt to cajole his way out of
the impending arrest was ineffective, LaRoche bolted.
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LaRoche fled through the kitchen and into the connecting garage, where he
stayed, that had a large blanket covering the doorway, top to bottom. Skunk warned
Schmiedt there was a back door to the garage through which LaRoche might escape. As
Schmiedt prepared to enter the garage with Taser and flashlight in hand, LaRoche
rushed out from behind the blanket and knocked Schmiedt down. In response,
Schmiedt deployed his Taser twice, but to no avail. LaRoche absconded out the front
door of the house and vanished into the darkness.
A federal grand jury later indicted LaRoche on one count of assaulting, resisting,
and impeding a federal officer. LaRoche moved to suppress what he said after Schmiedt
asked about the arrest warrant.1 The government resisted suppression.2 The Court held
a hearing on LaRoche’s motion, at which Schmiedt testified,3 and then supplemented
the evidentiary record with a dash cam recording of Schmiedt and LaRoche’s colloquy
in the home.4
1 Docket No. 20.
2 Docket No. 26.
3 Mot. Hr’g Tr. 4-50 (June 8, 2022).
4 Docket Nos. 30, 31; see also Mot. Hr’g Tr. 52-53 (granting government’s request
to leave the record open to see if Schmiedt’s dash cam captured the dialogue
inside the residence or anything else pertinent to the suppression motion).
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DISCUSSION
A. Miranda
LaRoche first claims that his statements were obtained in violation of Miranda.5
He experienced custodial interrogation, he says, with no Miranda advisement. The issue
is whether LaRoche was in custody and interrogated before he took off. If so, his
statements must be suppressed because he was never Mirandized. If not, Miranda
provides him no avenue for exclusion of the statements.
Reinforcing 	the 	Fifth 	Amendment, 	the 	Miranda 	decision 	requires 	law
enforcement to warn suspects of their rights before engaging in custodial interrogation.6
Interrogation 	is 	any 	question, 	word, 	or 	action 	that 	an 	officer 	should 	know 	is
“reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”7 Custody,8 for purposes of
Miranda, occurs when: (1) a suspect is formally arrested, or (2) the suspect’s “freedom of
movement” is restricted to a “degree associated with a formal arrest.”9 In determining
5 Docket No. 21 at 2-5; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (setting forth the rights a suspect, who is taken into
custody, must be advised of before being questioned to safeguard the privilege
against self-incrimination).
7 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
8 See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508-09 (2012) (“As used in our Miranda case
law, ‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought
generally to present a serious danger of coercion.”).
9 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).
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the extent to which a suspect’s freedom of movement was restricted, a court examines
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and whether a reasonable person
would “have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”10
Certain 	“relevant 	factors,” 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	instructed, 	should 	be
considered in the custody determination, including, “the location of the questioning, its
duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical
restraints during the questioning, and the release of [the suspect] at the end of the
questioning.”11 The Eighth Circuit has also set forth common “indicia” which tend to
either mitigate or aggravate an atmosphere of custodial interrogation.12 These indicia,
while useful, are not dispositive or exhaustive.13 They are merely one way to determine
whether the suspect’s movement was curtailed, as if he were under formal arrest, and
subjected to the same inherently coercive pressures as the station house questioning at
issue in Miranda.14
10 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011).
11 Howes, 565 U.S. at 509.
12 See United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990).
13 See id.; see also United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 222 (8th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Brave Heart, 397 F.3d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Czichray,
378 F.3d 822, 827 (8th Cir. 2004).
14 See Howes, 565 U.S. at 509.
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Skunk invited Schmiedt, who was by himself, into her home.15 She then called
LaRoche to come out to the living room.16 While Schmiedt mentioned the arrest warrant
early in the conversation, “you know you got that warrant on you,” he did not arrest
LaRoche or deprive LaRoche of his liberty in a manner tantamount to a conventional
arrest.17
LaRoche and Schmiedt spoke with each other, in conversational tones and in
Skunk’s presence, for a while about LaRoche’s life, past issues, and the circumstances
preceding the warrant’s issuance.18 LaRoche controlled the conversation and did most
of the talking.19 Schmiedt did not announce that he was taking LaRoche in (arresting
15 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 16 (“Q. And you approached the front door. Josephine lets
you in? A. Correct.”).
16 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 1 at 03:06-03:08 (June 13, 2022) (“Cops are here to talk to
you.”); Mot. Hr’g Tr. 35 (“Q. Ms. Skunk was the one that called for him to come
to … the living room area; is that correct? A. That is correct….”).
17 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 34 (“A. [H]e wasn’t in handcuffs at any point in time. Q. Did
you block his ability to move at all, whether it was in the living room or the front
room or elsewhere? A. No…. At no point in time did I … put him in a corner
where he couldn’t go or move freely throughout the house.”).
18 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 1 at 03:21-17:10; see also Mot. Hr’g Tr. 18, 43 (explaining the
importance of having rapport and cooperation and not grabbing or putting
hands on people with warrants without telling them what’s going on).
19 See Mot. Hr’g Ex 1 at 03:21-17:10.
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him) until the very end of the discourse.20 Then, when his last ditch effort to persuade
Schmiedt to give him a break failed, LaRoche skedaddled.21
The conversation: (1) was relatively brief, amicable, and one LaRoche steered;22
(2) took place in a familiar and relaxed setting and in the company of LaRoche’s
mother;23 (3) did not involve any display of weapons, physical force, or heavy-handed
tactics on the part of Schmiedt;24 (4) went on without restraint to LaRoche’s freedom of
movement;25 and (5) ended when LaRoche scampered off to the garage (his bedroom)
20 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 1 at 17:15-17:18 (“So as far as tonight goes okay, I’m going to
have to take you because you got that warrant.”); Mot. Hr’g Tr. 36 (“Q. And
when was it, in the scheme of things, that you announced to Mr. LaRoche that he
was under arrest or going to be placed under arrest? A. We’d come to a – the end
where I had listened to him. I gave him time to explain what’s been going on in
his life and his life situation.”).
21 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 36 (“A. [H]e asked me not to arrest him. I said it wasn’t a
negotiation. And right when I said “You’re under arrest” is when he fled….”).
22 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 1 at 03:21-17:10.
23 See Czichray, 378 F.3d at 826 (“When a person is questioned ‘on his own turf,’
we have observed repeatedly that the surroundings are ‘not indicative of the
type 	of 	inherently 	coercive 	setting 	that 	normally 	accompanies 	a 	custodial
interrogation.’”); Griffin, 922 F.3d at 1355 n.15 (“an interrogation in familiar
surroundings such as one's home softens the hard aspects of police interrogation
and moderates a suspect's sense of being held in custody.”).
24 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 34-35 (“At no point in time did I put my hands on him…. [A]t
no point was my handgun taken out of its holster. As far as the Taser, it would
have been taken out right in that kitchen area, as I was preparing to go into the
back room….”).
25 See id. at 33-35.
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and then out the front door.26 That LaRoche was never told he was free to leave is not
dispositive.27 Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person, in
LaRoche’s position, would not have understood he was in custody until Schmiedt said
he had to execute the warrant and take LaRoche into custody.28
Regardless, 	none 	of 	Schmiedt’s 	inquiries 	amounted 	to 	impermissible
interrogation. His questions, “So, what’s the warrant for? Do you know what it’s for?,”29
were not interrogatory. Given their context,30 they were designed to help him assess the
26 See id. at 37-39.
27 See United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 474 F.3d 1142, 1147 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding
no custody even when suspect was not advised that he was free to leave).
28 	See 	Beckwith 	v. 	United 	States, 	425 	U.S. 	341, 	343-48 	(1976) 	(three-hour
interrogation in dining room of residence was not so inherently coercive to
require compliance with Miranda’s prophylactic rule); United States v. Giboney,
863 F.3d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 2017) (suspect’s freedom of movement not to be
restrained when detective escorted him to bathroom and outside for a smoke);
Czichray, 	378 	F.3d 	at 	830 	(finding 	that 	defendant, 	accompanied 	by 	law
enforcement to his bedroom and bathroom during questioning, was not in
custody for purposes of Miranda); see also United States v. Circle Bear, 3:14-CR-
30122-RAL, 2015 WL 1969413, at *4-5 (D.S.D. May 1, 2015) (defendant not in
custody when questioned briefly by one officer in hotel room without restraints,
deception, or strong arm tactics); United States v. Long, 30 F.Supp.3d 835, 865
(D.S.D. 2014) (no custody when officer did not tell suspect that he was able to
leave but suspect was free to move around near his home in the open air and the
encounter was brief, friendly, and voluntary).
29 Docket No. 21 at 5; Mot. Hr’g Ex. 1 at 05:11-05:20.
30 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 15 (“Q. Did they tell you whether it’s an arrest warrant?
There’s a bond? Anything else? A. Typically, they do not go into details. We need
to go back to the police department and grab the hard copy.”).
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situation he faced and clarify LaRoche’s earlier statements31 and not to expand the scope
of 	them 	and 	enhance 	LaRoche’s 	guilt.32 LaRoche’s 	other 	statements 	were 	either
spontaneous 	or 	arose 	from 	Schmiedt’s 	follow-up 	of 	volunteered 	information.33
Schmiedt’s queries did not create culpability for LaRoche or worsen his predicament.34
31 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 1 at 03:12-04:09 (Schmiedt: “Okay, you know you got that
warrant on you.” LaRoche: “Yeah but…. You talk to Moran, right? … [H]e just
told 	me 	to 	please 	take 	care 	of 	it you 	know. 	I’ve 	been 	minding 	by 	own
business…” Schmiedt: “When? I don’t know what you’re talking about bud. I’m
just here on that warrant, that’s it.” LaRoche: “… I mean you can’t talk to Moran
and maybe let me, because I will, it’s a DLOC warrant.”).
32 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (“Volunteered statements of any kind are not
barred by the Fifth Amendment”); United States v. Jackson, 852 F.3d 764, 771-74
(8th Cir. 2017) (limited follow-up to volunteered statement did not constitute
interrogation); United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 445-46 (8th Cir. 2005) (when
defendant volunteered he knew one FBI agent was looking for him and another
agent asked how long defendant had known about the warrant, that was only a
request for clarification and not an attempt to enhance defendant’s guilt); Mot.
Hr’g Ex. 1 at 03:58-05:20.
33 See United States v. Becerra, 958 F.3d 725, 729-30 (8th Cir. 2020) (no interrogation
when follow-up question to suspect’s prior volunteered statement was intended
to clarify rather than enhance guilt or expand scope of inquiry); Butzin v. Wood,
886 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1989) (agent’s question about how long defendant
knew 	of 	warrant 	did 	not 	enhance 	guilt 	because 	defendant’s 	volunteered
statement indicated he had known of warrant for some time); United States v.
Tail, 	CR04-50026-01-KES, 	2005 	WL 	2114227, 	at 	*3 	(D.S.D. 	Aug. 	31, 	2005)
(“Clarification of volunteered information qualifies as interrogation only if it
attempted to enhance [ ] defendant’s guilt.”).
34 See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr,
Criminal Procedure, § 6.7(d) (4th ed. 2015 & Nov. 2021 update) (“Volunteered”
statements and follow-up questioning).
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Lacking both custody and interrogation, LaRoche cannot prevail on his Miranda
claim. That portion of his suppression should accordingly be denied.
B. Voluntariness
LaRoche next claims that his statements were involuntary under the Fifth
Amendment. He points to these circumstances that, when combined, he says overbore
his will and critically impaired his capacity for self-determination:
1. 	The time (during the wee hours of the morning), manner (asked incriminating
and unnecessary questions), and location (his mother’s living room) of the
interrogation; and
2. 	Schmiedt’s attire (BIA uniform), room position (blocking the front door), weapon
on his person (Taser), and suspicions (LaRoche may be under the influence).35
The Court is not persuaded.
When statements to law enforcement are “the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained 	choice 	by 	their 	maker,” 	they 	are 	voluntary.36 	Statements 	are 	not
considered involuntary unless the police extorted them from the accused through
coercive activity.37 Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that
35 Docket No. 21 at 5-6.
36 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
37 United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 482 (8th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
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statements are not voluntary under the Due Process Clause.38 Voluntariness is judged
by the totality of the circumstances.39
Neither the recording nor Schmiedt’s testimony offer any hint of coercive or
improper conduct from Schmiedt.40 And as an adult with extensive experience in the
criminal justice system,41 LaRoche did not show any hesitancy about speaking to
Schmiedt 	during 	the 	short-lived 	interaction.42 	Nothing 	Schmiedt 	said 	or 	did
undermined LaRoche’s free-will and decision-making abilities. LaRoche’s flight—to the
garage and from the house—is proof positive of this. LaRoche made his statements
voluntarily. As a result, they are admissible as substantive evidence against him at trial.
CONCLUSION
LaRoche was not in custody or interrogated while in his mother’s home. So no
Miranda warnings were necessary. His statements were likewise voluntary and not the
product of compulsion on Schmiedt’s part. The government may use them, therefore, as
trial evidence in its case-in-chief.
38 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
39 United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
40 See generally Mot. Hr’g Tr; Mot. Hr’g Ex. 1.
41 See Docket No. 7 at 2-12 (detailing LaRoche’s criminal history); Mot. Hr’g Ex. 1
at 08:47-08:50 (“So, I’ve been to prison, you know like I said, 16, 17 years.”).
42 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 1 at 03:10-14:72; Mot. Hr’g Tr. 36 (“Q. At any point in time,
was Mr. LaRoche reluctant to talk … about the warrant or anything that related
to it? A. No….”).
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RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the authorities and legal analysis set forth in this report, and
the record now before the Court, it is
RECOMMENDED that LaRoche’s Motion to Suppress Evidence43 be denied.
NOTICE
The parties consented to a seven-calendar day objection period (agreeing to cut
the prescribed time44 in half). They thus have seven days after service of this report and
recommendation to file their objections to the same. Unless an extension of time for
cause is later obtained,45 failure to file timely objections will result in the waiver of the
right to appeal questions of fact.46 Objections must “identify[] those issues on which
further review is desired[.]”47
Dated this 21st day of June, 2022, at Pierre, South Dakota.
43Docket No. 20.
44See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b).
45See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990); Nash v. Black, 781 F.2d 665,
667 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985)).
46See Thompson, 897 F.2d at 357; Nash, 781 at 667.
47Arn, 474 U.S. at 155.
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BY THE COURT:
MARK A. MORENO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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