Huff v. City of Brookings Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REGGIE D. HUFF, 4:22-CV-4020-LLP
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF BROOKINGS POLICE DEPT.,
DAWN M.ELSHERE,DAVID ERICKSON,
JOEL PERRY,SEAN DOREMUS,MARISSA
D. MARSHALL,RICHELLE GUERRIERI,
THE SDSU FOUNDATION,STEVE
ERPENBACH,and JANE &/0R JOHN DOES,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ON MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS
Defendants,
and
DAWN M.ELSHERE,
Nominal Defendant.
Among other motions pending are Plaintiff, Reggie Huffs {"Huff') Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions(Doc. 75), and his Motion to Take Judicial Notice(Doc. 77).
BACKGROUND
On February 14, 2022, Huff filed a lawsuit against Defendants alleging the Defendants
violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Huff also asserted state-law claims for abuse of
process and defamation. (Doc. 1.) In lieu of answering the complaint, Defendants filed five
separate motions to dismiss. The motions were filed in March, April and May of 2022. (Docs.
17, 22, 27, 41 and 49.) Huff responded in opposition to each of the motions to dismiss (Docs.
32, 33, 35, 52 and 56), but he did not move to amend his complaint. On July 6, 2022,this Court
granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss in a Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Doc. 60.)
Judgment was entered in favor of Defendants on July 11, 2022. (Doc. 61.) Huff filed a motion
to vacate the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (Doc. 62.) The motion to
vacate was denied on December 12,2022. (Doc. 91.)
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Following dismissal, some of the defendants (Brookings Police Department, Erickson,
Ferry, Doremus and Marshall) moved for attorney fees as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. §
1988. (Doc. 66.) These defendants argue that Huffs § 1983 claim against them was legally and
factually insufficient to survive dismissal, and that the nature of his case and the way he
prosecuted it without respect for the Court, the parties, or the process, make his conduct
vexatious. (Doc.68.) Argument will be held on that Motion.
In response. Huff sought Rule 11 sanctions against defendants and their lawyers, except
defendants Erpenbach, the SDSU Foundation and their lawyers.(Doc. 75.) He argues that the
motion for attorney fees filed by some of the defendants is frivolous and false and is another
attempt to stifle Huffs free speech. (Doc. 76.)
Huff also asks the Court to take judicial notice of an interview of this Court (Judge
Piersol). (Doc. 77.)
DISCUSSION
1. PLAINTIFF'S RULE 11 MOTION
When submitting a pleading, motion, or other paper to the court, Rule 11 requires an attorney
or unrepresented party to certify the following with regard to the filing:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost oflitigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or,if specifically so identified, will
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery; and
(4) the denials offactual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack ofinformation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Sanctions may be warranted when an attorney, law firm, or party violates
these requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). For example. Rule 11 sanctions might
be warranted when a pleading is "presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,"
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), contains allegations or factual contentions that lack
evidentiary support. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), or contains denials of factual
contentions that are not warranted on the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(4).
Clark V. United Parcel Service, Inc., 460 F.3d 1004, 1008(8th Cir. 2006). Furthermore,"Rule 11
sanctions are imposed only in response to claims that are not 'warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.'"MHC Inv.
Co. V. Racom Corp., 323 F.3d 620,623(8th Cir. 2003)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. li(b)(2)).
The determination whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions requires an examination of the
underlying factual and legal claims, as well as the appropriateness of the sanction to be imposed.
Cf. MHC Inv. Co., 323 F.3d at 624 (stating that an appellate court must undertake such an
examination in order to review the district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions). This is
because determinations as to whether conduct has violated Rule 11 often involve "fact-intensive,
close calls." Cooler & Cell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404(1990)."[W]hether a violation
has occurred is a matter for the court to determine, and this determination involves matters of
judgment and degree. The issue is whether the person who signed the pleading conducted a
reasonable inquiry into the facts and law supporting the pleading." O'Connell v. Champion Int'l
Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395(8th Cir. 1987). See also Bus. Guidesv. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters.,
Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991)(holding that courts evaluate Rule 11 motions for sanctions using
a standard ofobjective reasonableness under the circumstances to assess the litigant's conduct).
Huff makes three main arguments in favor of Rule 11 sanctions against Defendants and
their lawyers. First, Huff alleges that the brief in support of Defendants' motion for attorney
fees falsely states that Huff harassed Marshall because she refused a date with him. Huff
contends that he sent the letter to Marshall threatening a lawsuit not because she refused a date
with him, but because of his "disgust and righteous indignation" that Marshall reported her
concerns about Huff to the Brookings Police Department, and then Detective Perry contacted
Huff to discuss Marshall's concems and desire not to be contacted by Huff. (Doc. 76, p. 6.)
(Huff believes the real reason detective Perry contacted Huff was due to jealously on the part of
another police officer, defendant Doremus, who was dating Marshall.) Huff does not deny
sending the letter to Marshall after being told by Perry not to contact her. Rather, he contends
that he had a First Amendment right to send the letter to notify Marshall of his intent to sue her
3
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for making a false police report. Huff says that Defendants' counsel has no evidence that any
contact he made was due to Marshall's refusing a date with him. Huff asserts that, in fact, he
was dating someone else within hours after Marshall declined his dating invitation. The Court
concludes that Defendants' assertion of their belief that Huff sent the letter to Marshall because
she refused a date does not rise to the level ofsanctionable conduct.
Second, Huff alleges that defendant Detective Perry committed a crime by fabricating
facts about Huff and putting them in a police report. He also alleges that defendant Judge
Elshere committed a crime by entering a "false" protective order against Huff when she knew his
conduct did not warrant it. The purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings, not to resolve the
merits of issues not before the Court.
Finally, Huff contends that counsel for Defendants continues to fnvolously and falsely
claim that Huff is trying to re-litigate the state court proceedings when Huff asserts that nothing
was actually litigated in state court. Even if it is not Huffs intent to re-litigate other
proceedings. Defendants' opinion that he is attempting to do so is not sanctionable under Rule
11.
None ofthe allegations Huff puts forth in his request for Rule 11 sanctions lead the Court
to conclude that Defendants, or Defendants' lawyers, have engaged in sanctionable conduct. The
law entitles Defendants to file a motion to dismiss. The facts and law supporting this Court's
dismissal of Huffs federal § 1983 claims previously were set out at length, and there is no need
to reiterate them here. The law also entitles Defendants to file a motion for attomey fees as
prevailing defendants under § 1988. The Court does not find that any of the Defendants'
pleadings in this case were presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Nor do they contain allegations
or factual contentions that lack evidentiary support. There is no reason to doubt that the person
who signed the pleadings for Defendants conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law
supporting the pleading. After reviewing all of the pleadings, and the factors for determining the
appropriateness of Rule 11 sanctions, the Court denies Huffs motion for sanctions against
Defendants and their lawyers.
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II. Plaintiffs Motion to Take Judicial Notice
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, Huff asks the Court take judicial notice of a
2018 interview of this Court (Judge Piersol) that was done in connection with the Federal
Judiciary Oral History Project conducted by the University of Kentucky. Huff contends that the
interview reveals biases by this Court which led the Court to dismiss Huffs complaint and to
ignore criminal conduct by defendants and misconduct by defendants' lawyers.
However, Rule 201 does not apply to judicial notice of facts such as the contents of an
interview given by this Court. The Rule "governs only judicial notice of 'adjudicative' facts."
Fed. R. Evid. 201(a). "Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case." United
States V. Wolny, 133 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cii. 1998)(quoting Advisoiy Committee Notes to
rule 201). The Eighth Circuit has described adjudicative facts:
When a court * * * finds facts concerning the immediate parties who did
what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent the court » ♦ * is
performing an adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called
adjudicative facts. * *
Stated in other terms, the adjudicative facts are those to which the law is
applied in the process of adjudication. They are the facts that normally go to the
juiy in a jury case. They relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their
businesses.
United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1976)(quoting 2 K. Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise § 15.03, at 353(1958)). This Court's interview does not contain adjudicative facts.
It is in no way related to the facts concerning the parties in this case, nor is it a fact that would
traditionally go to the jury.
For these reasons, the Court declines to take judicial notice of the interview, and Huffs
motion is denied. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. That Plaintiffs motion for Rule 11 sanctions is denied (Doc. 75); and
2. That Plaintiffs motion to take judicial notice is denied(Doc. 77).
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Dated this If day of January, 2023.
BY THE COURT:
^
awrence L. Piersol
United States District Judge
ATTEST:
MATTHEW W.THELEN,CLERK
7=^
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