USA v. Holton et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LYLE HOLTON,
Defendant.
CR. 19-50112-01-JLV
ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Lyle Holton filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as
the result of the stop of the vehicle he was driving on May 17, 2019. 	(Docket
112). 	The motion was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Daneta
Wollmann pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and the standing order of April
1, 2018. 	The magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing. 	(Docket
149). 	Magistrate Judge Wollmann issued a report and recommendation
(“R&R”). 	(Docket 140). 	The magistrate judge recommended the defendant’s
motion be denied. 	Id. at pp. 1 & 9. 	Mr. Holton timely filed his amended
objections to the R&R. 	(Docket 146). 	For the reasons stated below, the
defendant’s amended objections are sustained in part and overruled in part
and the R&R is adopted consistent with this order.
DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS
Mr. Holton objects to the R&R for four reasons, summarized as follows:
1. 	The surveillance team did not continue to relay information
relating to the location of defendant’s vehicle;1
1 The court uses the phrase “defendant’s vehicle” for ease of clarity as law
enforcement was unaware of the name of the male driver until the vehicle was
stopped. 	(Docket 149 at p. 36:8-13 and p. 37:5-8).
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2. 	The suburban was not speeding;
3. 	The baggie was not tested for heroin; and
4. 	The stop of defendant’s vehicle was not constitutional.
(Docket 146). 	Each of the defendant’s objections will be addressed.
Under the Federal Magistrate Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), if a party files a
written objection to the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendation,
the district court is required to “make a de novo determination of those portions of
the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.” 	Id. 	The court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 	Id. 	See also Fed.
R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). 	The court completed a de novo review of those portions of the
R&R and the record before the magistrate judge. 	Unless otherwise indicated, the
court’s findings are consistent with the findings made by the magistrate judge.
ANALYSIS
1. 	THE SURVEILLANCE TEAM DID NOT CONTINUE TO RELAY
INFORMATION RELATING TO THE LOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S
VEHICLE
The magistrate judge found:
Troopers Griffith and Nelson stationed themselves in their patrol
vehicles closer to Rapid City in a median crossover near mile marker
65 on Highway 79 in Pennington County, a four-lane highway with
two lanes in both directions. 	Surveillance units continued to relay
information on the Suburban’s location as it traveled towards Rapid
City, they also advised that a male was driving the Suburban.
(Docket 140 at p. 5).
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Defendant objects to the magistrate judge’s finding. 	(Docket 146 at
pp. 1-2). 	Mr. Holton claims this finding “is factually inaccurate.” 	Id. at p. 2.
He argues there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing that the
surveillance team continued to relay information to the troopers as to the
progress of defendant’s vehicle as it approached Rapid City. 	Id. 	Rather, he
asserts the evidence only disclosed the troopers were advised as to what the
“vehicle looked like, and that it was traveling north bound on Highway 79 after
it left Hot Springs.” 	Id.
The suppression hearing developed the following evidence. 	Ryan
Gephardt, a detective with the Rapid City Police Department and member of
the Unified Narcotics Enforcement Team, testified during the suppression
hearing. 	(Docket 149 at p. 4). 	Detective Gephardt testified law enforcement
surveillance team members were set up along the route it was expected
defendant’s vehicle would take returning to Rapid City from Denver, Colorado.
Id. at p. 18:12-13. 	Detective Gephardt testified the surveillance team relayed
to Trooper Griffith the vehicle had been spotted and was coming back to Rapid
City. 	Id. at p. 19:19-22 & p. 20:3-5.
South Dakota Highway Patrol Trooper Griffith testified. 	Id. at p. 28. 	He
stationed his Highway Patrol vehicle at a median crossover on Highway 79
between Rapid City and Hermosa. 	Id. at p. 37:16-19. 	Once the defendant’s
vehicle was spotted back in South Dakota, Trooper Griffith was advised the
surveillance team reported the vehicle was being driven by a man. 	Id. at
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p. 37:9-13. 	The surveillance team reported the vehicle, a green Suburban with
the license plate number, with two people in the Suburban was reported as
getting close to Trooper Griffith’s location. 	Id. at pp. 38:25-39:25. 	After this
report, the defendant’s vehicle came into the trooper’s view. 	Id. at p. 40:17-22.
This information was confirmed during defendant’s cross-examination of the
officer. 	“[Y]ou guys were given information by the team from south of you, the
UNET units, that this vehicle is approaching your direction. Right? . . . Yes.”
Id. at p. 49:17-20. 	The evidence supports the magistrate judge’s finding.
Defendant’s first objection to the R&R is overruled.
2. 	THE SUBURBAN WAS NOT SPEEDING
The magistrate judge found “Trooper Griffith used his radar to obtain the
Suburban’s speed. 	The radar gave a reading of 66 miles per hour [in a 65-
miles per hour zone].” 	(Docket 140 at p. 5). 	Mr. Holton objects that this
statement “is not entirely accurate nor [sic] supported by the objective
evidence.” 	(Docket 146 at p. 2).
Mr. Holton asserts the report generated by the electronic tracking
surveillance equipment (“ETSE”) placed on the vehicle pursuant to a search
warrant contradicts Trooper Griffith’s testimony.2 	(Docket 146 at p. 2). 	He
2The ETSE digital report was admitted during the suppression hearing as
Exhibit 106. 	(Docket 137). 	The report is actually saved on Exhibit 104,
which is the thumb drive containing the dash camera video produced from
Trooper Griffith’s vehicle. 	(Docket 149 at pp. 63:3-64-2).
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argues “the [GPS]3 tracking information . . . shows when the vehicle is first
seen by Trooper Griffith, [the Suburban] was actually traveling 65 miles per
hour.” 	Id. 	Mr. Holton submits the GPS report verifies the Suburban “never
went above 64 miles per hour after Trooper Griffith encountered it.” 	Id. at
pp. 2-3. 	For these reasons, defendant contends “[t]here is no objective
evidence” that the Suburban ever broke the speed limit during the time in
question. 	Id. at p. 3.
Defense counsel engaged Trooper Griffith in a discussion about the
accuracy of the ETSE by the GPS readings generated. 	(Docket 149 at p. 64-
69). 	The essence of the trooper’s observations of Exhibit 106 is summarized
by the following statement:
I don’t use GPS to monitor a vehicle’s speeds, I guess. 	I don’t know
anybody who does. 	So I’m explaining why my radar might have
acted in your client’s benefit supporting what I’m saying. 	It might
show a slower speed, I guess, because of the angle between the radar
and the target. 	There’s also a margin of error. 	The radar has a
margin of error plus or minus one mile per hour when it’s in the
stationary mode.
Id. at p. 68:2-10.
3 Defense counsel identifies the ETSE report as disclosing the “GIS”
tracking information, but throughout the suppression hearing the questions
posed of Trooper Griffith indicated the report illustrated the “GPS” [global
positioning system] tracking information of the vehicle. 	(Docket 149 at
pp. 62:3, 68:3 & 25, 69:3, 74:16, 75:12 & 76:17). 	On only one occasion
during the hearing did defense counsel use the term “GIS.” 	See id. at p. 76:5.
For these reasons, the court presumes counsel intended defendant’s argument
to address the GPS tracking information generated by the ETSE placed on the
Suburban.
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The magistrate judge accepted Trooper Griffith’s testimony over the GPS
readings generated by the ETSE. 	That decision is consistent with the evidence
presented on the issue. 	The fact that Trooper Griffith recorded the vehicle’s
speed at 66 miles per hour but waited almost four miles to stop the vehicle is
neither illogical nor contrary to his initial observation. 	Trooper Griffith
explained:
I don’t necessarily flip on my lights as soon as I see something
wrong. 	It would communicate that I’m going to stop the car. 	And
then turn on my lights in an area that’s safe to do so. . . . [The
location where the stop occurred] is very wide . . . with a good
shoulder.
Id. at p. 72:10-17. 	There is no error in the magistrate judge’s analysis or the
factual finding made.
Defendant’s second objection to the R&R is overruled.
3. 	THE BAGGIE WAS NOT TESTED FOR HEROIN
Defendant objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that the plastic bag
discovered in Mr. Holton’s mouth tested positive for heroin residue. 	Id. 	He
claims the substance “was never tested.” 	(Docket 146 at p. 3).
The magistrate judge found “a plastic bag with heroin residue was found
in Mr. Holton’s mouth.” 	(Docket 140 at p. 6). 	This finding is generated from
Exhibit 101, the primary report of Trooper Griffith, which was offered by
defendant during the suppression hearing. 	(Docket 149 at pp. 45:22-46:6).
The report indicates once Ms. Mink and Mr. Holton were placed in separate
patrol cars, Mr. Holton was observed “making furtive movements in the patrol
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vehicle.” 	Exhibit 101 at p. 2. 	At that point, Special Agent B. J. George
removed from Mr. Holton’s mouth “a jeweler bag . . . with suspected Heroin
residue.” 	Id. 	When Mr. Holton was questioned about his potential ingesting
of heroin, he “would not tell [law enforcement] if he ingested anything, saying
he didn’t want to incriminate himself.” 	Id. 	Concerned Mr. Holton may have
ingested heroin and observing Narcan, an opioid overdose injectable drug, in
the vehicle, law enforcement chose to have Mr. Holton taken by ambulance for
an evaluation. 	Id.
More accurately, the finding should be “a plastic bag with suspected
heroin residue was found in Mr. Holton’s mouth.” 	The R&R is amended to
reflect this clarification.
Mr. Holton’s third objection to the R&R is sustained in part and
overruled in part.
4. 	THE STOP OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE WAS NOT
CONSTITUTIONAL
Mr. Holton objects to the magistrate judge’s finding the stop of
defendant’s vehicle was constitutional. 	(Docket 146 at pp. 3-4) (referencing
Docket 140 at p. 8). 	He asserts the evidence supports his claim that “this is a
pre-textual stop, and that Trooper Griffith had no probable cause to stop the
vehicle since it was not in violation of any law.” 	Id. at p. 3 (referencing Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); United States v. Portwood, 857 F.2d
1221 (8th Cir. 1988)). 	Because Trooper Griffith acknowledged during the
hearing he was going to stop the defendant’s vehicle “regardless of probable
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cause,” defendant submits that analysis must “apply the standard set forth [in]
Portwood . . . and W[h]ren . . . .” 	Id.
At issue is the constitutionality of the May 17, 2019, stop. 	Specifically,
the issue is whether the stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment
because: (1) Trooper Griffith had probable cause to believe Mr. Holton’s vehicle
was speeding, or (2) Trooper Griffith had reasonable suspicion the vehicle
contained 	illegal 	narcotics 	at 	the 	time 	he 	initiated 	the 	stop 	based 	on 	the
information he had received during a drug task force debrief earlier that day
which connected the vehicle to an ongoing drug investigation.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” 	U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 	“Temporary detention of individuals
during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period
and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the
meaning of” the Fourth Amendment. 	Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10. 	In order
not to run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop must therefore “be
supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” 	United States v.
Gordon, 741 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2013).
Probable cause exists when an officer has an objectively reasonable basis
to believe the driver has committed a traffic violation. 	Id. at 876. 	“Any traffic
violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” 	United
States v. Adler, 590 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).
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“This is true even if a valid traffic stop is a pretext for other investigation.”
United States v. Sallis, 507 F.3d 646, 649 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations
omitted). 	Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer is “aware of
particularized, objective facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that a crime is being
committed.” 	Gordon, 741 F.3d at 876 (internal quotations omitted). 	When a
stop is conducted in the context of an investigation by a team of officers,
however, “the issue is whether all the information known to the team provided
specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant the investigative stop.” 	United States v.
Collins, 883 F.3d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). 	In
evaluating whether a stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the court
considers “‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.’ ” 	United
States v. Winters, 491 F.3d 918, 921-22 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)).
In addition to accepting Trooper Griffith’s testimony that defendant’s
vehicle was going 66 miles per hour in a 65 miles per hour zone, the magistrate
judge found the stop constitutional as “Trooper Griffith had probable cause for
the stop of the Suburban based on the ongoing investigation concerning a
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances.” 	(Docket 140 at p. 8.). 	The
magistrate judge provided a detailed outline of the information developed in the
investigation. 	Id. at pp. 8-9. 	Without restating the information in this order,
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the magistrate judge found “[l]aw enforcement was entitled to stop the
Suburban based on this information alone, regardless of whether Mr. Holton,
as driver of the Suburban committed any traffic violations.” 	Id. at p. 9.
Even if the trooper’s stop of defendant’s Suburban for going one mile an
hour over the speed limit was pretextual, the magistrate judge properly
considered all the evidence collectively known to law enforcement on May 17,
2019, and properly found the stop constitutional. 	The underlying drug
investigation provided reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.
A 	traffic 	stop 	is 	a 	seizure 	within 	the 	meaning 	of 	the 	Fourth
Amendment 	and, 	as 	such, 	must 	be 	supported 	by 	reasonable
suspicion 	or 	probable 	cause. 	A 	law 	enforcement 	officer 	has
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop when the
officer 	is 	aware 	of 	particularized, 	objective 	facts 	which, 	taken
together 	with 	rational 	inferences 	from 	those 	facts, 	reasonably
warrant suspicion that a crime is being committed.
United States v. Williams, 929 F.3d 539, 544 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal
quotations, citations and alteration omitted). 	A stop “may be based on the
collective knowledge of all law enforcement officers involved in an investigation
and need not be based solely upon the information within the knowledge of the
officer on the scene if there is some degree of communication.” 	United States
v. Edwards, 891 F.3d 708, 711-12 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld stops where
the officer on scene knew nothing but that investigators wanted the vehicle
stopped. 	United States v. Robinson, 664 F.3d 701, 703-04 (8th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Jacobsen, 391 F.3d 904, 907 (8th Cir. 2004).
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The court finds law enforcement had reasonable suspicion, based on the
totality of the investigation, to stop the vehicle in which Mr. Holton was the
driver. 	Edwards, 891 F.3d at 711-12; Winters, 491 F.3d at 921-22. 	That
reasonable suspicion included a belief the Suburban was carrying illegal
substances from Denver for distribution in South Dakota.
Defendant’s fourth objection to the R&R is overruled.
ORDER
Based on the above analysis, it is
ORDERED that the defendant’s objections (146) are sustained in part
and overruled in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the report and recommendation (Docket
140) is adopted consistent with this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to suppress (Docket
112) is denied.
A scheduling order will be entered.
Dated January 25, 2023.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Viken
JEFFREY L. VIKEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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