USA v. Arguello, et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ERIC LADEAUX,
Defendant.
5:21-CR-50052-JLV
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS (DOC. 237)
INTRODUCTION
A grand jury returned an Indictment alleging defendant Eric Ladeaux
and eight other co-defendants with conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance, a violation of federal law under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and
841(b)(1)(A). 	(Doc. 134). 	Mr. Ladeaux filed a motion to dismiss on statutory
and constitutional speedy trial grounds. 	(Doc. 237). 	The pending Motion was
referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
United States District Court District of South Dakota’s Local Rule (LR)
57.11(B).
RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Mr. Ladeaux’s motion to dismiss be
denied.
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BACKGROUND
On March 18, 2021, seven defendants were indicted with Conspiracy to
Distribute a Controlled Substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(B). 	(Doc.
1). 	After a Second Superseding Indictment was filed adding Eric Ladeaux to
the conspiracy charge, he made his initial appearance on November 15, 2021.
(Doc. 146). 	The trial of this matter was set for January 25, 2022. 	(Doc. 150).
On December 30, 2021, co-defendant Taylor Hise moved to continue the
trial. (Doc. 159). 	Co-defendants Dunn and Valenzuela consented to the
continuance. 	(Docs. 161 and 169). 	Mr. Ladeaux objected to the continuance.
(Doc. 160). 	The Court overruled his objection and granted the motion, and the
trial was continued to April 19, 2022. 	(Doc. 163, pg. 1). 	The court found “that
the ends of justice served by continuing this trial outweigh the best interests of
the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.” 	Id.
On February 22, 2022, co-defendant Devina Desersa moved for a
continuance of the trial date. 	(Doc. 179). 	Mr. Ladeaux did not object to that
motion. 	Co-defendant Valenzuela consented to the continuance. 	(Doc. 194).
The Court, granting the motion to continue, found “that the ends of justice
served by continuing this trial outweigh the best interests of the public and the
defendants in a speedy trial.” 	(Doc. 181, pg. 1). 	The trial was set for May 17,
2022. 	Id.
On April 22, 2022, co-defendant Hise filed a motion for a continuance.
(Doc. 202). 	Co-defendant Valenzuela consented to the continuance. 	(Doc.
207). 	The Court granted the motion finding that “the ends of justice served by
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continuing this trial outweigh the best interests of the public and the
defendants in a speedy trial.” 	(Doc. 203, pg. 1). 	The trial was set for August 9,
2022. 	Id.
On July 6, 2022, co-defendant Desersa filed a motion to continue the
deadlines in the Court’s scheduling order. (Doc. 208). On July 18, 2022, Co-
defendant Rita Green joined in Desersa’s motion. 	(Doc. 218). 	Mr. Ladeaux and
co-defendant Dunn opposed the motion. 	(Docs. 209 and 210).
On July 22, 2022, Eric Ladeaux filed a series of motions—to sever (Doc.
221), for bill of particulars (Doc. 223), for disclosure of impeaching information
(Doc. 225), for disclosure of witness inducements (Doc. 226), in limine (Doc.
227), and another limine motion (Doc. 228). 	On July 25, 2022, the Court
vacated the deadlines in its scheduling order pending resolution of these
motions. 	(Doc. 231). 	On August 9, 2022, Eric Ladeaux filed this Motion to
Dismiss asserting that dismissal is proper due to speedy trial violations. 	The
United States filed a brief in opposition to the motion on August 16, 2022.
(Doc. 244).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Dismiss the Indictment
A. Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74, requires that a defendant be
brought to trial within seventy days after his indictment or first appearance,
whichever is later. 	The Act lists the periods of time excludable from the 70
days. 	18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). 	One is for the “delay resulting from any pretrial
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motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on,
or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 	18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); United
States v. Shepard, 462 F.3d 847, 864 (8th Cir. 2006). 	Another reason for delay
to be excluded from the speedy-trial calculation is if a district court finds “the
ends of justice so require” and “sets forth, in the record of the case, either
orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the
granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial.” 	18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)). 	This type of excludable
time can result from “a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or
at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney
for the Government.” 	Id.
“It is the defendant’s burden to show that the motion should be granted.”
United States v. Adejumo, 772 F.3d 513, 521 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United
States v. Villarreal, 707 F.3d 942, 953 (8th Cir. 2013)).
Defendant argues the Act’s 70-day requirement has been violated and
moves to dismiss the indictment on that ground. 	(Doc. 237). 	Defendant
argues that under the Speedy Trial Act, 250 non-excludable days have lapsed
between his Initial Appearance and the filing of his motions on July 22, 2022.
(Doc. 238, pg. 3). 	However, motions filed by one defendant in a multi-
defendant case count as motions filed by all of the defendants, and the
reasonable time taken to determine those motions will count as excludable
time for all defendants. 	United States v. Fuller, 942 F.2d 454; see also United
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States v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that
“[e]xclusions of time attributable to one defendant apply to all codefendants”).
Co-defendants in this case have requested numerous motions for
continuances which has tolled Mr. Ladeaux’s speedy trial clock. 	The first
motion for continuance occurred on December 30, 2021. 	(Doc. 159). 	This
court granted the motion based on an explicit finding “that the ends of justice
served by continuing this trial outweigh the best interests of the public and the
defendants in a speedy trial.” 	(Doc. 163, pg. 1). 	The next request for
continuance was on February 22, 2022; the court found “that the ends of
justice served by continuing this trial outweigh the best interests of the public
and the defendants in a speedy trial.” 	(Docs. 179 and 181, pg. 1). 	The trial
was set for May 17, 2022. 	(Doc. 181, pg. 1). 	The third motion for continuance
occurred approximately one month prior to trial on April 22, 2022. 	(Doc. 202).
The Court granted the motion finding that “the ends of justice served by
continuing this trial outweigh the best interests of the public and the
defendants in a speedy trial.” 	(Doc. 203, pg. 1). 	The trial was set for August 9,
2022. 	Id. The final motion for continuance occurred approximately one month
prior to trial on July 6, 2022. 	(Doc. 208).
These motions, made before the scheduled trial date, were all granted
based on finding by the Court that the continuances were in the interest of
justice and the court noted on its orders that the delays associated with the
continuance were excluded from the calculation of when trial had to begin;
thus, the time was excluded though the trial date, which was August 9, 2022.
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(Docs. 163, 181, and 203). 	Finally, Mr. Ladeaux filed a series of motions on
July 22, 2022, follow by this motion on August 9, 2022. 	(Docs. 221-228 and
238). 	The filing of motions again stopped the clock. 	The clock is currently
stopped because the court has time for the “prompt disposition” of the motion.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D)).
Thus, the time prior to August 9, 2022, is excluded from statutory
calculation, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), and the time after August 9, 2022, is
excludable time under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D)); therefore, the Speedy Trial
Act has not been violated.
B. Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
“Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial Act challenges for delay are reviewed
independently of one another.” 	United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 943, 951
(8th Cir. 2009). 	“As to the separate Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, [the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit] stated that ‘[i]t would be
unusual to find the Sixth Amendment has been violated when the Speedy Trial
Act has not.’ ” 	Shepard, 462 F.3d at 864 (quoting United States v. Titlbach,
339 F.3d 692, 699 (8th Cir. 2003)). 	A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial “attaches at the time of arrest or indictment, whichever comes first,
and continues until the trial commences.” 	United States v. Erenas-Luna, 560
F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. McGhee, 532 F.3d 733,
739 (8th Cir. 2008)). 	Unlike a Speedy Trial Act analysis, the Sixth Amendment
does not specify a time limit in which an accused must be brought to trial. 	See
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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To assist the courts in evaluating speedy trial claims, a four-factor
balancing test was established in Barker, “in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” 	Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
522 (1972). 	These factors are the 1) length of the delay; 2) the reason for the
delay; 3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to speedy trial; and 4) the
prejudice to the defendant. 	Id.
1) Length of the Delay
“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attach at the time of
arrest or indictment, whichever comes first, and continues until the trial
commences.” 	United States v. Sprouts, 282 F.3d 1037, 1042 (8th Cir. 2002)).
This Court acknowledges that 300 days (or 10 months) is a lengthy delay. 	But
the Eighth Circuit has permitted even longer delays under the Sixth
Amendment. 	Mallett, 751 F.3d 907 (deciding over seventeen months between
indictment and trial was “justifiable”); United States v. Jenkins–Watts, 574
F.3d 950, 966–67 (8th Cir.2009) (over eighteen months); United States v.
Summage, 575 F.3d 864, 870, 876 (8th Cir.2009) (over thirty-two months);
Aldaco, 477 F.3d at 1018–20 (forty months).
Next, the court needs to determine if the delay was “presumptively
prejudicial” and stretches beyond the “bare minimum” needed to trigger
judicial examination of the remaining factors. 	United States v. Sims, 847 F.3d
630, 636 (8th Cir. 2017). 	The Sims Court found that a delay of twenty-two and
a half months was “presumptively prejudicial” and stretches beyond the “bare
minimum” needed to trigger judicial examination of the remaining factors. 	Id.;
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see United States v. Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (noting that lower courts
had generally found “delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches
one year”); Shepard, 462 F.3d at 864 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding seventeen-month
delay “compels us to look to the other factors”). 	Due to the lengthy delay, the
Court will examine the other factors.
2) Reason for the Delay
The second Barker factor evaluates the reasons for the delay and
evaluate whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame.
Summage, 575 F.3d at 876. 	The reason for delay in this case has been largely
due to co-defendants’ motions, not due to the government. 	As discussed
previously, motions filed by one defendant in a multi-defendant case amount
as motions filed by all of the defendants, and the reasonable time taken to
determine those motions will count as excludable time for all defendants.
Fuller, 942 F.2d 454. 	Therefore, the reason for delay has been due to the
Defendant, not the government.
3) Defendant’s Assertion of his Right to Speedy Trial
“The third Barker factor considers ‘whether in due course the defendant
asserted his right to a speedy trial.’ ” 	Erenas–Luna, 560 F.3d at 778 (quoting
United States v. Walker, 92 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 1996)). 	Mr. Ladeaux first
asserted his rights to a speedy trial on January 3, 2022, in an objection to a
Motion to Continue. 	(Doc. 160). 	Mr. Ladeaux again asserted his rights to a
speedy trial on July 6, 2022, in an objection for a Motion to Continue. 	(Doc.
209). 	This factor weights in Mr. Ladeaux’s favor.
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4) Prejudice to the Defendant
Finally, the court must consider whether the delay prejudiced Mr.
Ladeaux. 	“A showing of prejudice is required to establish a violation of the
Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause.” 	Mallett, 751 F.3d at 915 (quoting
Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 353, 114 S.Ct. 2291, 129 L.Ed.2d 277 (1994)
(finding that the “necessary ingredient [prejudice] is entirely missing here”). 	In
finding whether prejudice existed, the court should assess the interests served
by the speedy trial right, which are “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to
limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” 	Sims, 847 F.3d at 636
(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
Where the Government has been negligent, prejudice can be presumed if
there has been an excessive delay. 	Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d at 778-79.
“Whether or not a showing of prejudice is required in every case, [the Eighth
Circuit has] been clear that the degree of prejudice required, if any, depends on
the defendant’s showing under the preceding Barker factors.” 	Sims, 847 F.3d
at 636. 	Of the three interests provided, prejudice “is the most serious . . .
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system.” 	Erenas-Lunas, 560 F.3d at 778 (internal
quotation marks omitted). 	However, when there is not a contention that the
Government has been negligent nor failed to exercise reasonable diligence, a
“showing of actual prejudice is required.” 	Id. at 778-79.
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Mr. Ladeaux believes that “prejudice is apparent” by the delay of trial
(Doc. 238, pg. 6); however, there has been no showing that the government
failed to exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing Mr. Ladeaux. 	Thus, Mr.
Ladeaux must establish actual prejudice.
In using the factors from Sims to determine whether actual prejudice has
occurred, the court finds no prejudice. 	Sims, 847 F.3d at 636. 	First, although
Mr. Ladeaux has been incarcerated pretrial, the court does not believe the
approximately 300-day period of incarceration was oppressive. 	Next, Mr.
Ladeaux has been able to regularly confer with his attorney; thus, minimizing
any undue anxiety or concern of the accused. 	Finally, Mr. Ladeaux’s defense
has not been impaired. 	Mr. Ladeaux cannot point to a specific “example of how
Defendant’s defense has been impaired.” 	(Doc. 238, pg. 6). 	Mr. Ladeaux,
although incarcerated, has been able to properly prepare for trial.
Mr. Ladeaux’s unsupported assertion that the delay allows the
government to gather additional statements and allegations is unfounded and
unpersuasive. 	The delays in this case have been largely due to the co-
defendants’ motions, there has been no showing that the delays are due to the
government’s attempts to secure more time to investigate. 	Therefore, actual
prejudice has not been established.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby recommended that the court deny
Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 	(Doc. 221).
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The parties have fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),
unless an extension of time for good cause is obtained. 	Failure to file timely
objections will result in the waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.
Objections must be timely and specific in order to require de novo review by the
District Court. 	Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1990); Nash v. Black,
781 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1986).
DATED this 9th day of September 2022.
BY THE COURT:
DANETA WOLLMANN
United States Magistrate Judge
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