USA v. Watkins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
) 	Case No: 1:24-CR-81
v. 	)
) 	Judge Curtis L. Collier
ANTONIO DEWAYNE WATKINS 	)
M E M O R A N D U M
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the application of Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), and United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1998), to the
trial of Defendant, Antonio DeWayne Watkins. 	The United States (the “Government”) and
Defendant and have submitted briefs (Docs. 101, 103, 105, 108), and the Court held a hearing on
August 21, 2025 (Doc. 106). Defendant, who is representing himself,1 also seeks a new trial under
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 103.)
I. 	BACKGROUND
Beginning on August 11, 2025, Defendant was tried before a jury on a seven-count
superseding indictment. (Docs. 26, 80.) As most pertinent here, Count Four charged Defendant
with possession of a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on July 3, 2024. (Doc.
26 at 2.) Counts One and Two charged Defendant with possession with intent to distribute fifty
grams or more of methamphetamine and an unspecified amount of fentanyl, respectively, and
Count Three charged Defendant with possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
crime, all also on July 3, 2024. 	(Id. at 1–2.) 	Counts Five and Six charged Defendant with
1 Defendant has represented himself in this case since April 8, 2025, with appointed
standby counsel available. (Docs. 36, 37.)
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distribution of fifty grams or more of methamphetamine on July 17 and July 31, 2024,
respectively.2 	(Id. at 2–3.) 	Count Seven charged Defendant with assaulting a person assisting
officers and employees of the United States in the performance of official duties, causing bodily
injury, on February 4, 2025. (Id. at 3–4.)
On August 13, 2025, during the morning of the third day of trial, the Government called
Austin Scofield, an Assistant District Attorney for Hamilton County, Tennessee, as a witness. The
Government sought to use the witness to admit into evidence certified copies of three felony
criminal judgments against Defendant: two for drug-trafficking offenses, and one for voluntary
manslaughter.
Defendant objected. He based his argument on the risk of undue prejudice under Rule 403
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, among other grounds, and he offered to state that he was a felon.
The Government argued the evidence was relevant to Count Four, possessing a firearm as a felon.
The Government represented that it had sent Defendant a proposed stipulation before trial that
would have complied with Old Chief, but Defendant had not signed it. Defendant acknowledged
having received the proposed stipulation but complained of having received it only four days
before trial began and not having understood it. Defendant did not offer to sign the Government’s
proposed stipulation. However, he repeated several times his willingness to say he was a felon.
The Court overruled Defendant’s objection based on several factors. First was Defendant’s
failure to accept the proposed stipulation at any time before the third day of trial, thereby requiring
the Government to call a witness, who was then actually on the stand, to offer evidence on the
relevant questions. Second was uncertainty of the details of any stipulation to which Defendant
2 Counts One, Five, and Six also contained enhancement allegations under 21 U.S.C. § 851.
These allegations were bifurcated from the first phase of Defendant’s trial.
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would actually agree. 	And third was some degree of uncertainty about the reliability of
Defendant’s offer to enter a stipulation. Specifically, during the trial up to that point, the Court
had observed multiple instances when Defendant misstated a witness’s previous testimony while
cross-examining that witness. This caused the Court to have questions about the consistency and
reliability of some of Defendant’s assertions.
The three criminal judgments were entered into evidence as Government Exhibits 30, 31,
and 32 during Mr. Scofield’s testimony.
The Court gave the jury two limiting instructions as to the use of the evidence of
Defendant’s convictions. The first instruction was given after the morning break on August 13,
the day of Mr. Scofield’s testimony. The second was given during the final charge to the jury on
August 14, as follows:
You have heard evidence that the defendant was convicted, before the crime
charged in the Indictment regarding the possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in a different court, of crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year.
This prior conviction has been brought to your attention only because it
tends to establish one of the elements of the crime of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon as set forth in the Indictment, specifically, that the defendant had a
prior felony conviction. You may not consider a prior conviction in deciding
whether the defendant was in knowing possession of the gun that he is charged in
this case with possessing, which is a disputed issue in this case.
The fact that the defendant was found guilty of another crime on another
occasion does not mean that he committed any of the crimes charged in the
Indictment, and you must not use his guilt of another crime as proof of any crime
charged in this case except for the one element of this crime which I have
mentioned. You may find the defendant guilty of this crime only if the government
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of this crime and that the
defendant committed it.
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The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all seven counts on August 15, 2025.3 (Doc. 93.)
After excusing the jury,4 the Court gave both sides a copy of the opinion in Walker and
told the parties the Court believed it might have erred in its ruling on Defendant’s objection in
light of Walker. The Court set a hearing on the question for August 21, 2025, and instructed the
parties to submit any briefs by August 19, 2025. (Docs. 90, 91.)
Each party filed a brief on August 19. (Docs. 101, 103.) The Government’s brief argued
the Court had not erred and, even if it had, the error was harmless. (Doc. 101.) Defendant’s brief
argued the Court had erred and also requested a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 103.) On August 21, 2025, the Government filed four attachments to
its previous brief. (Doc. 105.) The Court held a hearing on August 21, 2025, and took the matter
under advisement. (Doc. 106.) Defendant filed a reply on August 27, 2025. (Doc. 108.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
The three questions before the Court are (1) whether the Court erred in admitting evidence
of Defendant’s three prior convictions over Defendant’s objection; (2) if so, whether the error was
harmless; and (3) in either case, whether Defendant should receive a new trial under Rule 33.
A. 	Whether an Error Occurred
Old Chief requires the Government to accept a defendant’s offer to stipulate to the prior-
conviction element of a felon-in-possession offense rather than allowing the Government to
introduce evidence of the Government’s choosing to prove the defendant had a felony conviction
3 The Government later asked the Court to disregard the drug amount for the verdict on
Count Six because of a typographical error on the verdict form. (See Doc. 100.)
4 The Court did not discharge the jury at that time because of the remaining question of
possible enhancements under 21 U.S.C. § 851. The jury was discharged on September 15, 2025.
(Doc. 110.)
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at the relevant time. 519 U.S. at 172. In Walker, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied
Old Chief where the defense had offered to enter into a stipulation during the trial itself. 160 F.3d
at 1086. 	The Walker court held that the trial court had erred under Old Chief by rejecting the
defense counsel’s oral offer during trial to stipulate that the defendant had been convicted of a
prior felony. Id.
The facts in Walker are similar to the facts in this case, in that Defendant said during trial
that he would admit to being a felon in order to keep out the Government’s evidence of his prior
felony convictions. This similarity raises the question of whether the Court erred in allowing the
Government to introduce evidence of Defendant’s previous convictions over Defendant’s
objection.
The Government argues no error occurred. It seeks to distinguish Walker on the grounds
that Walker predated Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), which added a knowledge-of-
status element to firearm possession offenses, id. at 237; that in Walker, the defendant had not
previously rejected a proposed stipulation; and that here, Defendant never offered to stipulate to
his knowledge of his felon status. 	(Doc. 101 at 2–3.) 	For his part, Defendant merely asserts
generally that the Court erred under Old Chief and Walker in admitting the evidence. (Doc. 103.)
The Government’s main argument is that Walker does not apply to the new knowledge-of-
status element the Supreme Court articulated in Rehaif because the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has repeatedly rejected attempts to expand Old Chief beyond the status element of a felon-
in-possession charge. (Doc. 101 at 3 (citing United States v. Carpenter, 157 F.4th 841, 851 (6th
Cir. 2025) (citations omitted) (“The general rule is that the government is ‘entitled to prove its case
by evidence of its own choice.’ An exception arises when a defendant wishes to stipulate that he
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satisfies the prior conviction element of an offense. This court has consistently declined invitations
to expand the government’s obligation beyond this exception.”)).)
As a preliminary matter, the Government’s reliance on United States v. Smith, 70 F.4th 348
(6th Cir. 2023), does not resolve the question. The Government argues Old Chief should not apply
to the knowledge-of-status element added by Rehaif because of Smith, a post-Rehaif case in which
the defendant refused to stipulate to his status as a felon before trial and then unsuccessfully
appealed based on the alleged undue prejudice from the admission of evidence of his eleven prior
convictions. (Doc. 101 at 3.) However, unlike both Walker and this case, there was no mid-trial
stipulation offer in Smith. 	Therefore, the Smith court did not have occasion to address what
happens following Rehaif when a mid-trial stipulation offer occurs.
The Government is correct that the Court of Appeals “has consistently declined invitations
to expand the [G]overnment’s obligation” to accept a stipulation beyond one stating that the
defendant “satisfies the prior conviction element of an offense.” Carpenter, 157 F.4th at 851. In
Carpenter, for example, the Court of Appeals declined to expand Old Chief to a stipulation “that
[the defendant] knew ISIS was a terrorist organization.” Id. And in rejecting expansion of the Old
Chief exception to the nature of images in a child-pornography case, the Court of Appeals also
noted unsuccessful attempts to expand the exception to a prior conviction in a prosecution for
naturalization fraud, to “serious bodily injury in [a] carjacking prosecution,” and to witness bias
in a prosecution for a gambling conspiracy. United States v. Luck, 852 F.3d 615, 624–25 (6th Cir.
2017) (citations omitted).
But expanding Old Chief to a different type of crime is a very different question than
expanding Old Chief to a new, closely related element of the same crime. 	That is the situation
here, where two closely related elements of being a felon in possession of a firearm—felon status
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and knowledge of felon status—are at issue. These two elements can often be proven by the same
evidence, and the likely evidence for both elements generally carries the same risk of prejudice to
the defendant. In addition, “the keystone in Old Chief’s holding was the fact that felon status was
outside the natural sequence of concrete events that the prosecution has an interest in presenting
with robust evidence and a coherent, unbroken narrative.” Id. at 626. Here, neither a defendant’s
status as a felon nor the defendant’s knowledge of that status are within “the natural sequence of
concrete events” the Government needs to present “with robust evidence and a coherent, unbroken
narrative.” See id.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals has given similar treatment to the elements of status and
knowledge of status in a felon-in-possession case. 	In Smith, the Court of Appeals analyzed the
potential for a stipulation on both elements and the type of proof allowable for both elements in
the same way. It stated, “[e]vidence of prior felony convictions has a significant tendency to prove
both facts,” namely felon status and the defendant’s knowledge of that status, and also noted that
there was no evidentiary alternative to proving either of those facts “absent a stipulation.” Smith,
70 F.4th at 352. The Court of Appeals did acknowledge that slightly different, and more, proof
may be necessary to prove knowledge than to prove mere status, but it treated the potential for a
stipulation on both elements in the same manner throughout the opinion. In fact, it seems to have
assumed that a single stipulation would cover both elements. See, e.g., id. at 354 (“after declining
a stipulation that would preempt concerns of unfair prejudice, defendants face an uphill climb to
demonstrate on appeal why their decision should unduly hinder the government’s prosecution”)
(emphasis added).
It is thus highly likely the Court of Appeals would treat a stipulation on the knowledge
element added by Rehaif in the same way as a stipulation on the status element under Old Chief.
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The two elements are closely tied conceptually, proving them both carries the same risk that led
the Supreme Court to decide Old Chief as it did in the first place, and both elements are “wholly
independent[] of the concrete events of later criminal behavior charged against” the defendant.
See Luck, 852 F.3d at 624 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190).
The Government’s second basis on which to distinguish Walker is that in Walker, the
defendant had not rejected a stipulation before the trial began. The Government does not explain
in what way a previous rejection would have changed the simple and straightforward reasoning of
Walker: “Clearly, under Old Chief, the court’s decision to admit [the witness’s] testimony rather
than accept [the defendant’s] stipulation was error.” 	160 F.3d at 1086. 	The Court concludes
Defendant’s failure to accept the Government’s pretrial offer of a stipulation is not determinative.
The Government’s third basis on which to distinguish Walker is that Defendant here said
only that he was a felon, and never offered to stipulate to his knowledge of that felony status at the
time of the offense. The Government similarly argued during the hearing that, given Defendant’s
obstreperousness during the trial, it is not clear to what he would have ultimately agreed, if
anything. However, the Court of Appeals has held that the insufficiency of an offered stipulation
does not automatically allow its rejection: “We acknowledge that the stipulation offered by
Defendant was insufficient without more. 	An instruction would have been necessary . . . .
However, this does not preclude the application of Old Chief . . . .” United States v. Daniel, 134
F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1998).
In addition, even if Defendant was in fact only willing to stipulate to his status and not his
knowledge, the Government itself points out that “[a] jury may ‘infer knowledge of prohibited
status . . . from [a defendant’s] stipulation that he had a prior felony conviction,’ especially if the
prior conviction was for possessing a firearm as a felon.” (Doc. 101 at 3 (2nd alteration in original)
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(quoting United States v. Conley, 802 F. App’x 919, 924 (6th Cir. 2020)).) The fact that a prior
conviction is some evidence of knowledge cuts against the Government’s position that it would
have had no evidentiary alternative to prove knowledge if Defendant had been willing to stipulate
only to his status.
Ultimately, despite Defendant’s failure to make an explicit offer to stipulate to his
knowledge of his status, and despite the Court’s statement during the trial that Defendant might
not follow through on agreeing to the necessary stipulation, the Court now concludes Defendant
was likely to have done so once he understood that a stipulation was the only way to keep evidence
of his convictions out of the trial. For example, later in the trial, Defendant chose to say in front
of the jury that he was willing to plead guilty to a lesser-included offense of Count Seven rather
than let evidence of his assault on a corrections officer be admitted unopposed. 	This incident
demonstrates Defendant’s ability to grasp the seriousness of certain types of evidence and his
willingness to take steps to avoid their introduction.
The Court concludes that admitting the evidence was an error under Walker and Old Chief.
B. 	Whether the Error Was Harmless
The next question is whether the error was harmless or the Court should declare a mistrial.
See Walker, 160 F.3d at 1086 (harmless-error analysis applies to admission of testimony as to
convictions instead of an offered stipulation). “When the other evidence of guilt, apart from the
evidence admitted in violation of Rule 403, is overwhelming, the Rule 403 error is rendered
harmless.” Id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Instead of engaging directly with the other evidence of his guilt, Defendant focuses on the
prejudice from admitting evidence of one particular conviction, which was for voluntary
manslaughter. 	Defendant makes two critical mischaracterizations in this argument. 	First, he
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argues the “details” of the conviction were prejudicial, when in fact only the name of any of the
three offenses were introduced, not any of the underlying facts. 	Second, he characterizes the
conviction as being for murder, when the actual evidence admitted was of a conviction for
voluntary manslaughter. Evidence of a murder conviction could carry a higher risk of prejudice
than a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, but that evidence is simply not present here. All the
jury heard or saw was that Defendant had a previous conviction for voluntary manslaughter.
Defendant’s argument on this question is therefore not persuasive.
The Court turns next to the evidence of Defendant’s guilt on the seven charges in the
superseding indictment, apart from the Government’s evidence on Defendant’s three prior
convictions.
Counts One through Four charged Defendant with possessing fifty grams or more of
methamphetamine and an unspecified amount of fentanyl with intent to distribute them, possessing
a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and possessing a firearm as a felon on July 3,
2024. 	(Doc. 26 at 1–2.) 	The Government offered detailed testimony of two law-enforcement
officers regarding the events of that day, extensively supported by recordings from two different
dash cameras and two different body cameras. The videos showed the drugs and firearm in the
passenger seat of the vehicle where Defendant had been sitting, and showed Defendant walking
away from the officer who was trying to detain him and surreptitiously dropping what the officers
testified were the keys to that same vehicle. 	The videos also showed a large wad of cash in
Defendant’s pocket. The Government introduced the firearm at issue in Counts Three and Four
and the drugs at issue in Counts One and Two. 	A special agent with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (the “ATF”) testified that the firearm in question met the
definition of a firearm and was manufactured in another country. A forensic chemist with the Drug
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Enforcement 	Administration 	(the 	“DEA”) 	testified 	to 	the 	nature 	and 	quantity 	of 	the
methamphetamine and fentanyl charged in Counts One and Two. A special agent with the DEA
testified that the quantities of both drugs were far in excess of what would typically be possessed
for personal use, and that the large quantities of the drugs and other factors present in Defendant’s
case were more consistent with distribution than use. 	Defendant presented no countervailing
evidence for the Court to weigh against the Government’s evidence; Defendant cross examined
the witnesses against him, but did not solicit any meaningful countervailing evidence or reason to
doubt the credibility of the Government’s witnesses. The Court finds the evidence of Defendant’s
guilt on Counts One through Four to have been overwhelming.
Counts Five and Six charged Defendant with distribution of fifty grams or more of
methamphetamine on July 17 and July 31, 2024, respectively. 	(Id. at 2–3.) 	The Government
offered the detailed testimony of a different law-enforcement officer, DEA Task Force Officer
Justin Headen, who testified to overseeing a controlled buy from Defendant through a confidential
informant on each day. Officer Headen’s testimony was supported by recordings of phone calls
between the confidential informant and Defendant before both of the controlled buys. As to the
July 17 controlled buy, the Government also offered a recording of the controlled buy itself. The
Government introduced the illegal drugs at issue in Counts Five and Six and presented the
testimony of a second DEA forensic chemist as to the nature and quantity of the methamphetamine
at issue in the July 17 and July 31 transactions. 	As with Counts One through Four, Defendant
presented no evidence of his own and his cross examinations did not solicit any meaningful
countervailing evidence or reason to doubt the credibility of the Government’s witnesses. 	The
Court finds the evidence of Defendant’s guilt on Counts Five and Six to have been overwhelming.
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Count Seven charged Defendant with assaulting a person assisting officers and employees
of the United States in the performance of official duties, causing bodily injury. (Id. at 3–4.) The
Government introduced testimony by a Hamilton County Sheriff’s Deputy that Defendant punched
him in the face on February 4, 2025, while the deputy was working at the detention facility in
which Defendant was housed. The deputy testified to suffering injuries including a bruise on his
face, swelling, a sore jaw, and its having been painful to eat as a result. 	The Government
introduced a video recording showing Defendant punching the deputy in the face. 	Finally, the
Government offered the testimony of a Deputy U.S. Marshal explaining that on February 4, 2025,
the deputies at Defendant’s detention facility were assisting the Marshals Service in performing
the official duty of keeping custody of Defendant as he awaited federal trial. As with Counts One
through Six, Defendant presented no evidence of his own and his cross examinations did not solicit
any meaningful countervailing evidence or reason to doubt the credibility of the Government’s
witnesses. 	The Court finds the evidence of Defendant’s guilt on Count Seven to have been
overwhelming.
Thus, 	despite 	Defendant’s 	assertions 	to 	the 	contrary, 	the 	Government’s 	proof 	of
Defendant’s guilt on each of the seven counts of the superseding indictment was overwhelming.
In addition, some of the testimony Defendant himself elicited through cross examination
added to the weight of the evidence against him. 	Defendant himself elicited testimony from
Officer Headen that Officer Headen initiated his July 2024 investigation of Defendant because he
knew Defendant to be a drug trafficker; that Officer Headen knew Defendant to be a validated
gang member; that Officer Headen knew Defendant to be an associate of individuals currently
serving lengthy periods of incarceration for drug trafficking; and that drug trafficking is a crime
that hurts the community. This testimony both added to the weight of evidence against Defendant
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and reduced or canceled out the danger of unfair prejudice to Defendant from the Government’s
evidence on Defendant’s two previous drug-trafficking convictions.
The Court concludes that the error in admitting testimony regarding Defendant’s three prior
convictions and in admitting Exhibits 30, 31, and 32 was harmless. 	Declaring a mistrial is
therefore not appropriate.
C. 	Whether Defendant Should Receive a New Trial
A court may vacate a judgment and grant a defendant a new trial on the defendant’s motion
“if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). The decision to order a new trial is
committed to a court’s sound discretion, which is subject to review for abuse. 	United States v.
Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 1002 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir.
1994). In deciding whether a new trial is warranted, a court should primarily concern itself with
whether the prior proceedings were fair for the accused. Talley, 164 F.3d at 1002. Motions for
new trials are not favored and should only be granted with great caution and in extraordinary
circumstances. United States v. Garner, 529 F.2d 962, 969 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hoffa,
382 F.2d 856, 862 (6th Cir. 1967). A defendant bears the burden of proving a new trial should be
granted. United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 1991).
Under Rule 33, a judge may permit a new trial if a verdict is against the “manifest weight”
of the evidence. United States v. Mallory, 902 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing United States
v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 592 (6th Cir. 2007)). A Rule 33 motion requires “the trial judge to take
on the role of a thirteenth juror, weighing evidence and making credibility determinations firsthand
to ensure there is not a miscarriage of justice.” Id. (citing Hughes, 505 F.3d at 593). Rule 33 does
not require the court to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Id.
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For the reasons explained in the preceding section, and in its role as a thirteenth juror, the
Court concludes that the verdict in this case was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
See supra § II(B).
Nor were the proceedings unfair to Defendant. See Talley, 164 F.3d at 1002 (court should
primarily consider whether proceedings were fair in deciding a Rule 33(a) motion). 	Defendant
knowingly waived his right to counsel and instead exercised his right to represent himself.
Defendant did so despite multiple warnings from the Court of the risks of self-representation, both
before and during the trial. Despite Defendant’s election to represent himself, the Court appointed
standby counsel to assist Defendant in his defense. 	And while representing himself, Defendant
was able to participate in every phase of the trial. 	He was given the opportunity to present an
opening statement both at the start of trial and again at the close of the Government’s case,
provided he would confine himself to stating what the evidence would show. He availed himself
of the opportunity to make evidentiary objections, cross examine witnesses, move for a directed
verdict, participate in the charge conference, and make a closing argument. 	Defendant had the
opportunity to present his own evidence, but elected not to do so, as was his right.
In all, the Court concludes the proceedings were fair to Defendant, the verdict was not
against the weight of the evidence, and the interests of justice do not require a new trial for
Defendant.
III. 	CONCLUSION
While the Court erred in allowing the Government to introduce evidence of Defendant’s
three prior convictions during the trial, the error was harmless. Neither a mistrial nor a new trial
under Rule 33 are appropriate in this case.
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AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
/s/
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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