USA v. Brooks

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
) 	Case No. 1:25-cr-101
v. 	)
)
MARCUS DEMETRIUS BROOKS 	) 	Judges Collier/Dumitru
M E M O R A N D U M
On June 15, 2026, Magistrate Judge Dumitru issued a Report and Recommendation (the
“R&R”) as to Defendant Marcus Demetrius Brooks’s amended motion to suppress (Doc. 17).
(Doc. 38.) Defendant timely filed objections to the R&R, which are now before the Court. (Doc.
43.) 	The United States (the “Government”) filed a response in opposition (Doc. 48), and
Defendant filed a reply (Doc. 51).
The Court has reviewed the transcript of the evidentiary hearing before the Magistrate
Judge, the exhibits introduced at the evidentiary hearing, and the briefs the parties filed before and
after the R&R issued, including the supplemental briefs the parties submitted after the hearing.
Defendant’s objections to the R&R (Doc. 43) will be OVERRULED, Defendant’s amended
motion to suppress (Doc. 17) will be DENIED, and the R&R (Doc. 38) will be ADOPTED in
part and MODIFIED in part. As further explained below, the Court will make the following
two modifications to the R&R: (i) Defendant was detained when Sergeant Wood and Officer
Mingo first put their hands on Defendant’s shoulder and arm, respectively, which was before
Defendant handed his bag to a third party (contra id. at 15), and (ii) the inevitable-discovery
doctrine does not justify the officers’ search of Defendant’s bag, but the search-incident-to-arrest
doctrine does (contra id. at 16).
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I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following summary of the factual background is derived from the R&R (Doc. 38) and
the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing held on April 30, 2026 (Doc. 33). The incident
began when Chattanooga Police Department (“CPD”) Officers Mingo and Dagostino received a
dispatch call indicating that a fight was in progress at 2300 Windsor Street in East Chattanooga
(the “Property”) between apartments 105 and 108. The information conveyed to the officers from
the call included that the fight involved a “group of young boys” who were “wearing all different
colors,” and that no weapons had been seen. Based on Officer Dagostino’s experience working in
East Chattanooga for several years, he understood that the Property was located in a high-crime
area that was one of the busiest in terms of police call volume. In fact, Officer Dagostino himself
had responded to calls to the Property many times before, including calls for “disorders,” as well
as for “[d]omestic violence, . . . shootings, homicides, [and] narcotics incidents.” (Hrg. Tr. 43:22–
44:6.)
Officers Mingo and Dagostino arrived at the Property, as did CPD Sergeant Bryan Wood.
As they exited their vehicles and began to walk towards the entrance to a courtyard area between
two apartment buildings, the officers could hear someone yelling. The yelling continued as the
officers turned the corner into the courtyard and approached the man yelling—later identified as
Defendant—as he walked past a small group of people gathered in a covered area in the courtyard,
followed by a young woman. Officer Dagostino testified that Defendant “sounded agitated,” “as
if he was in an argument.” (Hrg. Tr. 14:3–9.) The officers did not see any physical signs of the
reported fight, however. (Id. 28:7–24.) Officer Mingo followed Defendant and the young woman
as they walked towards a covered breezeway within the 105–108 apartment building (the building
that the dispatch call had identified), while Officer Dagostino and Sergeant Wood remained in the
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courtyard. 	Four other individuals were also around the area between the courtyard and the
breezeway, including a young boy getting his hair cut.
Defendant was holding an infant and carrying a small, black cross-body bag (the “Bag”).
Then, as the R&R details:
Officer Mingo attempted to speak with Defendant, but Defendant ignored
him while repeatedly kissing the infant. Officer Mingo then tapped on Defendant’s
shoulder and told him he needed to talk to him. Defendant responded by saying
“what’s up” and walked back into the courtyard away from Officer Mingo and
towards Officer Dagostino and Sergeant Wood. Officer Mingo followed and
continued to ask Defendant to speak with him, asking “what’s going on?”, “why
are you out here yelling?”, and “can you come and talk to me?” But Defendant
continued to walk away from Officer Mingo and did not respond. Officer Dagostino
testified that Defendant’s evasiveness made him suspicious that Defendant was
involved in the reported fight. During this exchange, the four individuals remained
at the entrance to the breezeway along with the young woman that had been
following Defendant, and another woman holding a baby carrier.
In the courtyard, Sergeant Wood intercepted Defendant—who was still
walking away from Officer Mingo—and asked him to hand the baby to the woman
who had approached with the baby carrier. When Defendant did not respond,
Sergeant Wood put his hand on Defendant’s shoulder and asked him a second time.
At this point, the person cutting the young boy’s hair in the breezeway began to yell
in protest about the officer touching Defendant.
The woman with the baby carrier took the baby and walked away, at which
point Defendant turned away from the group of officers. Officer Mingo reached out
and grabbed Defendant’s arm, told Defendant he was being detained, and asked
Defendant to talk to him. Defendant kept pulling away and told the Officer that he
was “chillin’.” Officer Mingo held onto Defendant’s forearm and continued to ask
what was going on. Officer Mingo asked if Defendant had any weapons on him.
Defendant pulled the Bag off over his head with his free arm and handed it to the
young woman nearby (the same woman that had followed him into the breezeway).
Officer Dagostino immediately approached the woman and retrieved the Bag.
Officer Dagostino testified that he retrieved the Bag because he found it suspicious
that Defendant tried to hand it off so quickly based on his experience with
individuals attempting to distance themselves from contraband during police
encounters. Officer Dagostino also testified that he had, in his experience, seen
individuals carry firearms or drugs and other contraband in that type of bag. Once
he had the Bag, Officer Dagostino testified that he felt that it was disproportionately
heavy for its size and suspected there could be a firearm in it.
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(Doc. 38 at 3–4 (internal citations to hearing transcript and exhibits omitted).)
Meanwhile, Officer Mingo handcuffed Defendant and patted him down, while explaining
that he just wanted to make sure Defendant did not have any weapons. In response, Defendant
stated, “I don’t got no weapons” and “give my girl my bag and let me get on down [to jail].” As
the R&R notes, “Officer Dagostino testified that the purpose of detaining Defendant at that time
was officer safety and investigation. 	He further explained that he did not return the Bag to the
young woman because he was concerned that it contained a firearm and was concerned about the
potential danger of another person on the scene having a firearm.” (Id. at 4–5.) That said, he also
testified that officers may permit arrestees to leave their personal property with a loved one before
being taken to jail. 	(Hrg. Tr. 86:4–8.) 	When Officer Dagostino took the Bag from the young
woman, the Bag was unzipped, but no firearm was visible.
As Defendant continued to pace around the area, Officers Forgey and Woodson arrived at
the scene. 	Officer Forgey immediately recognized Defendant and advised that Defendant was
criminally trespassed from the Property. Officer Forgey testified that Defendant would have been
arrested for trespassing at that point, regardless of whether or not his Bag contained contraband.
(There is no dispute that the officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant for trespassing.)
Officer Dagostino explained to Officer Forgey that Defendant had tried to hand off the Bag.
Officer Forgey then opened the unzipped Bag, manipulated the inside compartment, and saw a
firearm inside.
The officers led Defendant to a patrol car. Officer Dagostino emptied the Bag on the hood
of the patrol car and processed its contents, which included a SCCY Model CPX-2 9-millimeter
pistol. On the subsequent drive to the jail, Defendant made various unsolicited statements about
the fight and the firearm, before and after Officer Dagostino read him his Miranda rights.
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II. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant moved to suppress “1) a firearm seized from a black bag obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and 2) statements which law
enforcement obtained which are the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” (Doc. 17 at 1.) 	The motion
was referred to Magistrate Judge Dumitru, who held a hearing on April 30, 2026. 	(Doc. 33.)
Several exhibits were presented at the hearing, and Officers Mingo, Dagostino, and Forgey
testified.
On June 15, 2026, Magistrate Judge Dumitru issued the R&R on Defendant’s motion,
recommending it be denied based on the following four legal conclusions: (1) the Terry stop and
seizure of the Bag were constitutional; (2) there was probable cause to support Defendant’s arrest;
(3) the firearm would have inevitably been discovered during the related inventory; and (4)
Defendant’s “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument and the Government’s good-faith exception
argument need not be addressed. (Doc. 38 at 8.) In reaching these conclusions, Magistrate Judge
Dumitru noted that the officers’ testimony was “both credible and consistent with the content of
the bodycam videos and has not been challenged by way of any extrinsic evidence.” (Id. at 11.)
On July 16, 2026, Defendant filed objections to the R&R, arguing that conclusions (1), (3),
and (4) from the above list were erroneous. (Doc. 43 at 1.) Defendant further argues that the R&R
erred by failing to address “whether Officer Forgey’s manipulation of the bag satisfied the plain
view or search incident to arrest exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement (it
satisfied neither).” 	(Id.) 	In making his arguments, Defendant also disputes certain factual
conclusions in the R&R. (See, e.g., id. at 3 (disputing characterization that Defendant was agitated
and evasive), 7 (disputing conclusion that officers did not have the scene under control, even after
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Defendant was handcuffed).) As a result, Defendant argues, the Court should reject the R&R and
grant Defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence and statements. (See id.)
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A District Judge must determine de novo any part of a Magistrate Judge’s disposition that
has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After reviewing the
evidence, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive
further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3).
As to credibility of witness testimony, de novo review does not require the district court to
rehear witnesses whose testimony has been evaluated by the magistrate judge. See United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–74 (1980). By conducting the evidentiary hearing, the magistrate
judge has the opportunity to observe and hear the witnesses and assess their demeanor, putting the
magistrate judge in the best position to determine witness credibility. Moss v. Hofbauer, 286 F.3d
851, 868 (6th Cir. 2002). The magistrate judge’s assessment of witnesses’ testimony is therefore
entitled to deference by the district court. United States v. Irorere, 69 F. App’x 231, 236 (6th Cir.
2003).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	The R&R properly concluded that the Terry stop was constitutional.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable . . . seizures” to protect “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. It is well established that “[u]nder
the Fourth Amendment, there are three types of permissible encounters between police and
citizens: consensual encounters in which contact is initiated by a police officer without any
articulable reason whatsoever and the citizen is briefly asked some questions; a temporary
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involuntary detention or Terry stop which must be predicated upon ‘reasonable suspicion;’ and
arrests which must be based on probable cause.” United States v. Alston, 375 F.3d 408, 411 (6th
Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Bueno, 21 F.3d 120, 123 (6th Cir. 1994)).
At issue here is the second type of encounter: the Terry stop. 	In evaluating the
constitutionality of a Terry stop, the court engages in a two-part analysis to assess the stop’s
reasonableness. United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 536 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States
v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2006)). The first part of the analysis “ask[s] whether
there was a proper basis for the stop, and, if the stop was proper,” then the second part of the
analysis “determine[s] whether the degree of intrusion . . . was reasonably related in scope to the
situation at hand.” Id. (quoting Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 464). The Court will address both parts of
the Terry analysis in turn.
1. 	The officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the Terry stop.
Reasonable suspicion sufficient to satisfy the first part of the Terry analysis “exists where
the officer can articulate specific, particularized facts that amount to more than a ‘hunch’ that
criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Jeter, 721 F.3d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting
United States v. Young, 707 F.3d 598, 604–05 (6th Cir. 2012)). “In examining the totality of the
circumstances . . . the officer’s reasonable suspicion need not arise exclusively from his own direct
observations.” Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 2008). “Rather, it can be derived
from such sources as informant tips, dispatch information, and directions from other officers.” Id.
(citing Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 779 (6th Cir. 2006)). 	The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has also condoned placing at least a “small amount of weight” on “contextual factors, such
as high-crime,” in assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify a stop. 	Young, 707
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F.3d at 603–04. But such factors “should not be given too much weight because they raise concerns
of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic profiling.” Id. at 603.
An officer’s decision to conduct a Terry stop must be “justified at its inception.” Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). So, before assessing the officers’ basis for the stop, the Court must
first clarify when Defendant was stopped within the meaning of Terry. On this point, the Court
will modify the R&R, which concluded that Defendant “was not yet detained when he handed the
Bag to a third party.” (Doc. 38 at 15.) The Court finds that Defendant was already detained (i.e.,
Terry-stopped) at that point. In fact, the inception of the stop occurred when Sergeant Wood and
Officer Mingo first put their hands on Defendant’s shoulder and arm, respectively. 	Doing so
constituted a seizure by force—not to be confused with a seizure by show of authority, which
“involves either voluntary submission to a show of authority or the termination of freedom of
movement.” Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 322 (2021). By contrast, a seizure by force requires
only the use of force with intent to restrain. Id. at 317; see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 625 (1991) (“[A]n arrest is effected by the slightest application of physical force[.]”). “Put
another way, an officer’s application of physical force to the body of a person for the purpose of
arresting him [i]s itself an arrest—not an attempted arrest—even if the person d[oes] not yield.”
Torres, 592 U.S. at 311 (cleaned up).
Therefore, the Court will assess whether reasonable suspicion existed at the moment the
officers made physical contact with Defendant with intent to restrain him. At that point, the totality
of the circumstances included: (1) the dispatch call, which had described an ongoing fight; (2)
Defendant (and no one else nearby) “yelling loudly,” “as if he was in an argument,” and
“sound[ing] agitated” when the officers arrived (Hrg. Tr. 14:3–9); (3) Defendant’s evasive
behavior, including walking away from the officers (towards the 105–108 apartment building),
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and then ignoring or giving vague answers to their questions; and (4) contextual factors, namely
the Property’s location in a high-crime area and Officer Dagostino’s experience responding to a
high volume of calls to the Property, including calls for “disorders” (Hrg. Tr. 44:1–6).
The Court concludes that together, these facts sufficed to give the officers reasonable
suspicion to execute a Terry stop of Defendant. “[T]he threshold for reasonable suspicion is ‘quite
low: a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing’ is sufficient.” United States v. Smith,
140 F.4th 316, 320 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. McAllister, 39 F.4th 368, 373 (6th
Cir. 2022)). 	When the officers detained Defendant, there was a moderate chance of finding
evidence of criminal activity, namely disorderly conduct (whether or not directly related to the
fight that was reported). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-305(b). In reaching this conclusion, the
Court finds United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2010), instructive. In Smith, the Court
of Appeals concluded that police officers had reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop because
the totality of the circumstances “included: (1) the emergency 911 call; (2) Smith’s efforts, with
his head down, to push past the officers and exit the building as the officers entered; (3) that these
events took place in a high-crime area in (4) the very early hours of the morning; and (5) Smith’s
vague responses to the officers’ questions.” Id. at 539.
All but one of these considerations (the time of day) similarly factored into Sergeant Wood
and Officer Mingo’s seizure of Defendant. 	First, the information from the dispatch call validly
contributed to the officers’ reasonable suspicion when they arrived on the scene and heard, then
observed, Defendant yelling. Defendant tries to discredit the dispatch call because “an anonymous
tip alleging criminal conduct, alone, is typically insufficient for police to have reasonable suspicion
to perform a Terry stop.” (Doc. 17 at 9 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) and Alabama
v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).) 	The Court agrees that the dispatch call alone likely would not
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have given the officers a valid justification to stop Defendant—particularly because, as the R&R
notes and the officers described in their testimony, various individuals remained in the courtyard
area throughout the incident, and there were no physical signs that the reported fight had actually
occurred. 	But the officers did not act on an uncorroborated, anonymous tip alone. 	Rather, the
dispatch call was just the initial factor of several that, combined, had created reasonable suspicion
by the time Defendant was seized.
Second, although Defendant did not try to push past the officers like the defendant in Smith,
he repeatedly walked around or away from them. Thus, although Defendant’s behavior was not
“aggressive” like that of the Smith defendant, it was similarly evasive. See Smith, 594 F.3d at 540–
41 (noting, in addition to Smith’s aggressive behavior, that his efforts to push through the officers
constituted flight or, at minimum, “nervous, evasive behavior,” and that “throughout the
encounter,” Smith was “very agitated and unsettled”); see also Robinson v. Howes, 663 F.3d 819,
830 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Nervousness, hurrying away from the police, and other evasive behavior are
relevant factors in the reasonable suspicion analysis.”) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
125 (2000)).
Third, the Property was located in a high-crime area. As noted above, the Court of Appeals
has cautiously condoned some reliance on such contextual factors. See Young, 707 F.3d at 603–
04. 	And lastly, Defendant continued to respond vaguely to the officers’ questions as he paced
around the area. As the Smith Court noted, “while a suspect’s refusal to answer or listen does not,
by itself, justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it can be a factor that, together with
other factors, supports a finding of reasonable suspicion.” Smith, 594 F.3d at 541. Applying that
logic, the court found that “Smith’s evasive, non-responsive, and vague answers to the officers’
questions, which (in part) prompted [the officer’s] instruction to stop, also provided some
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additional basis for the officers’ reasonable suspicion.” 	Id. 	Defendant argues that “[w]hile his
answers may not have been descriptive or polite, Mr. Brooks was interacting and actively engaging
with the officers, not running away or becoming aggressive with them.” (Doc. 43 at 3.) But this
argument overlooks the fact that a defendant’s evasiveness and non-responsiveness, although less
obviously suspicious than running away or displaying aggression, are also traits that officers may
properly consider as part of the totality of the circumstances. The Court agrees that “[t]here are
multiple reasons that a person might want to minimize their contact with police officers; it does
not necessarily suggest that a person is engaged in criminal conduct.” (Id.) But ultimately, officers
may properly weigh evasiveness in response to police questioning as one consideration in their
determination of whether or not reasonable suspicion exists to conduct a stop. See Smith, 594 F.3d
at 539; United States v. Lewis, 843 F. App’x 683, 691 (6th Cir. 2021) (defendant’s evasiveness
when asked for his name contributed to officer’s reasonable suspicion). Moreover, officers do not
need to rule out every innocent explanation of conduct in order to develop reasonable suspicion.
See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221,
1229 (6th Cir. 1983).
Thus, despite finding that Defendant was detained earlier in the interaction with the
officers, the Court still agrees with the R&R’s final conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed
to justify the Terry stop at its inception.
2. 	The stop was reasonable in scope.
The Court concludes also that the stop was reasonable in scope. 	See Smith, 594 F.3d at
536 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 464). 	“Courts consider the length of the
detention, the manner in which it is conducted, and the degree of force used in determining whether
an investigative stop is ‘reasonably related to the basis for the original intrusion.’” Smoak, 460
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F.3d at 781 (quoting Houston v. Clark Cnty. Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 814 (6th
Cir. 1999)). Here, the length of detention was brief before ripening into an arrest supported by
probable cause for trespassing. 	The officers conducted the detention reasonably, including by
continuing to communicate with Defendant throughout and instructing him to hand off the infant
he was holding to someone else. Likewise, the degree of force used was reasonable. The officers
first placed their hands on Defendant’s shoulder and arm, and then, when Defendant displayed
some resistance, they handcuffed him. 	Officer Dagostino testified that the officers detained
Defendant for both officer safety and investigation. In light of these facts and how they correspond
to the officers’ reasonable and articulable suspicion, the Court finds that the scope of the stop was
reasonable.
B. 	The R&R likewise properly concluded that the “Terry seizure” of the Bag was
constitutional.
Although less familiar than the Terry stop, the Supreme Court has also recognized the
authority to conduct a “Terry seizure” of personal property. See Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 401
F.2d 810, 825 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Saperstein, 723 F.2d at 1231 (noting that “seizures of
personal effects when based on anything less than probable cause” must “f[a]ll within the
permissible bounds of a Terry-type investigative detention”). In short, “some brief detentions of
personal effects may be permitted based upon reasonable suspicion falling short of probable cause,
provided that such detentions are ‘minimally intrusive.’” Farm Lab. Org. Comm. v. Ohio State
Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 544 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
706 (1983)).
A court engages in a two-step inquiry, which resembles the ordinary Terry-stop analysis,
to assess the validity of such a seizure. 	“First, the Court must determine whether the detaining
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officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the property he wishes to seize is connected
with criminal activity.” Bennett, 410 F.3d at 825 (quoting Farm Labor, 308 F.3d at 544; United
States v. Sanders, 719 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1983)). Next, the court must ask whether the seizure
was reasonable “in both duration and intrusiveness.” Farm Labor, 308 F.3d at 544 (citing Place,
462 U.S. at 709).
With respect to the first step, Defendant argues that the officers’ only basis for seizing the
Bag was, as Officer Dagostino described in his testimony, that people “have a tendency to carry
firearms or narcotics in those style bags” (Hrg. Tr. 51:6–9). (Doc. 37 at 2.) But, as the R&R points
out, the officers acted on more than that. 	Most notably, Officer Dagostino also testified that
Defendant’s attempt to hand off the Bag or distance himself from the Bag was suspicious because,
in his experience, people often attempt to distance themselves from contraband. 	The Court of
Appeals has confirmed that such movement may validly increase an officer’s level of suspicion.
See, e.g., United States v. Peake-Wright, 126 F.4th 432, 439 (6th Cir. 2025) (concluding that the
police had probable cause to believe that defendant’s jacket contained contraband, based in part
on his abrupt removal of the jacket when an officer approached); United States v. Allison, 814 F.
Supp. 3d 848, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2026) (highlighting defendant’s distancing himself from his phone
as one factor that justified temporary seizure of the phone). 	And this analysis does not change
because Defendant may have been giving the Bag to the young woman in preparation to be taken
to jail. (See Doc. 43 at 7.) As already noted, “[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists
. . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” 	Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277; see also
Saperstein, 723 F.2d at 1229. 	Therefore, even if the officers considered this possibility, that
consideration would not have negated their “reasonable and articulable suspicion that the [Bag]
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. . . [wa]s connected with criminal activity,” namely possession of contraband. See Bennett, 410
F.3d at 825.
Turning to the second step, the Court again concludes that the seizure of the Bag was
reasonable “in both duration and intrusiveness.” See Farm Labor, 308 F.3d at 544 (citing Place,
462 U.S. at 709). 	The duration of the seizure was brief. 	Officer Forgey arrived and identified
Defendant as trespassed from the Property less than one minute after Officer Dagostino had seized
the Bag. (Doc. 38 at 16.) 	This information from Officer Forgey established probable cause for
Defendant’s arrest, and the officers then properly searched the Bag incident to the arrest. 	(See
IV.C, infra.) Naturally, this search incident to arrest terminated the mere Terry seizure of the Bag.
This brief duration of the seizure was reasonable because of the officers’ suspicions that the Bag
contained contraband and, relatedly, the officer-safety concerns that would have arisen from an
unknown third party’s taking the Bag. 	The level of intrusiveness—again, scrutinizing only the
period during which Officer Dagostino had seized the Bag, but Officer Forgey had not yet
identified Defendant as trespassed from the Property—was also limited and therefore reasonable.
Officer Dagostino merely held the unzipped Bag by its strap while Defendant was being
handcuffed and patted down for weapons.
C. 	The inevitable-discovery doctrine is inapplicable, but the firearm was properly
discovered as part of a search incident to arrest.
The next dispute centers on the search of the Bag upon Officer Forgey’s arrival, which led
to the discovery of the firearm that Defendant seeks to suppress. With respect to the search of the
Bag, the R&R concluded “that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies, as the Bag would have
been searched (and the firearm recovered) under inventory protocol pursuant to CPD policy.”
(Doc. 38 at 16.) 	The Court disagrees. 	Because Officer Dagostino admitted that it was in the
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officers’ discretion to detain the Bag or allow the young woman to take it from Defendant, given
that he was going to jail (see Hrg. Tr. 86:4–8), it was not inevitable that the firearm would have
been discovered during an inventory search. (See Doc. 43 at 9–10.) The Court cannot assume that
under the CPD’s “routine procedures that police would have used regardless of the illegal search,”
the officers would have seized the Bag from the young woman. See United States v. Keszthelyi,
308 F.3d 557, 574 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Ford, 184 F. 3d 566, 577 (6th Cir.
1999)). And the Government has not demonstrated that it would have, or could have, obtained a
search warrant for the Bag had the officers left the scene without it. Given this uncertainty, the
inevitable-discovery doctrine cannot apply.
Nonetheless, the Court is persuaded by an alternative justification put forth by the
Government: the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. 	In short, the Court finds that the officers
validly searched the Bag incident to Defendant’s arrest despite the Bag’s no longer being on
Defendant’s person when the search occurred. 	Defendant argues that this conclusion conflicts
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 	But as the parties
acknowledged in their briefs and at the hearing, some uncertainty exists in the law regarding the
reach of the Supreme Court’s holding in Gant—namely, as to whether Gant applies only to
searches of automobiles or also covers searches of other personal property. Defendant argues that
“Arizona v. Gant clarified that the search incident to arrest exception centers on the accessibility
of the item or place at the time of the search” and that Gant’s logic extends to other property that
a suspect is unable to access at the time of the search. 	(Doc. 31 at 2–4.) 	The Government
responded to this argument at the hearing, asserting that “the Sixth Circuit has had numerous
opportunities to extend Gant beyond the automobile exception and has declined every time. Gant
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does not apply to Search Incident to Arrest of personal property and belongings in the Sixth
Circuit.” (Hrg. Tr. 101:13–20.)
The Court has not identified any Court of Appeals cases expressly declining to extend
Gant. But there is case law that speaks to the narrow issue here—the authority to search personal
property that was in the arrestee’s control at the beginning of his encounter with law enforcement,
but in the officers’ control by the time they conducted the search on the scene. See United States
v. Blevins, 234 F.3d 1270 (Table), 2000 WL 1597821 (6th Cir. 2000). 	In Blevins, the Court of
Appeals held that “‘when a container is within the immediate control of a suspect at the beginning
of an encounter with law enforcement officers; and when the officers search the container at the
scene of the arrest[,] the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a reasonable delay . . . between the
elimination of danger and the search.’” Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1239 (1996)) (alteration in original but emphasis added).
In Blevins, both the Ohio police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had been searching
for the defendant when officers located him at a motel and confronted him as he headed towards a
waiting car. Id. at *1. After arresting him, an officer proceeded to search a small blue bag that
Blevins had been carrying over his shoulder, but had put on the ground when the officers
approached and ordered him to lie down. 	Id. at *3. 	In challenging the search of the bag, the
defendant argued that “once officers have gained exclusive control over a suspect’s property, a
subsequent search of the property is unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.” Blevins,
234 F.3d at *3. Defendant puts forth a similar argument here. (See Doc. 51 at 2.) But the Blevins
Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that “arresting officers are privileged to search a
suspect’s baggage at the same time of the arrest even though the danger to the officers or the risk
of evidence destruction has passed.” Blevins, 234 F.3d at *3 (emphasis added).
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Here, the scenario resembles that in Blevins. Even though the officers had gained exclusive
control over the Bag by taking it from the young woman when Defendant was placed under arrest,
they were still authorized to search the Bag incident to his arrest at that point in time. Any danger
posed by the young woman’s possession of the Bag had passed. 	But given the close temporal
proximity between Defendant’s arrest and the search of the Bag, and the fact that Defendant had
been wearing the Bag when he was initially detained, the search still qualifies as one incident to
arrest. The Court will therefore modify the R&R (Doc. 38) to reflect that the search of the Bag
was justified as a search incident to arrest, not based on the inevitable-discovery doctrine.
D. 	The Court need not analyze Defendant’s “fruit of the poisonous tree”
argument, nor the Government’s argument that the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule applies, in order to make its ruling.
Finally, the Court addresses Defendant’s objections to the R&R’s declining to consider
certain arguments. (See Doc. 43 at 1, objecting to the R&R’s failure “to address the ‘fruit of the
poisonous tree’ or the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule” and “whether Officer Forgey’s
manipulation of the bag satisfied the plain view or search incident to arrest exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement”). Besides the search-incident-to-arrest exception, which the
Court has already discussed (see IV.C, supra), the Court will likewise decline to analyze these
additional arguments. 	The conclusions reached above suffice to resolve Defendant’s motion to
suppress. 	Therefore, judicial economy and constitutional avoidance are best served by not
engaging in additional deliberations that are unnecessary to the disposition of the motion.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Defendant’s 	objections 	to 	the 	R&R 	(Doc. 	43) 	are
OVERRULED, the R&R (Doc. 38) is ADOPTED in part and MODIFIED in part, and
Defendant’s amended motion to suppress (Doc. 17) is DENIED.
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AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
/s/
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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