USA v. Ward et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF
TENNESSEE AT GREENEVILLE
LYNN RICHARD NORTON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
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No. 2:24-CV-221-JRG
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Lynn Richard Norton’s Motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody [Doc.
1]. The Court has determined that the files and records in the case conclusively establish that Mr.
Norton is not entitled to relief under § 2255 and, therefore, no evidentiary hearing is necessary.
For the reasons herein, the Court will deny Mr. Norton’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In September 2020, a superseding indictment was filed charging Mr. Norton with one count
of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), one count of distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of, aided and abetted by James Alan Ward, possession
with the intent to distribute 5 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 18 U.S.C. § 2, and Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). [2:19-
cr-00145-7, Superseding Indictment, Doc. 250, at 1, 3-4]. In March 2021, Mr. Norton stood trial
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and was convicted on 3 of the above counts, but was acquitted on Count 11, aiding and abetting
the possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. [Id., Jury Verdict, Doc. 389].
At sentencing, Mr. Norton’s guidelines sentencing range was 360 months to life, based on
a total offense level of 40 and a criminal history category of VI. [Id., Presentence Investigation
Report, Doc. 454, at 32]. Each count of conviction carried a statutory minimum, the longest of
which is 20 years under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(C). [Id.]. The Court sustained an
objection to a two-level enhancement pursuant to USSG §2D1.1(b)(12), which produced a new
offense level of 36 and guidelines range of 324-405 months. [2:19-cr-00145-7, Statement of
Reasons, Doc. 504, at 1] Ultimately, the Court varied from the applicable guidelines range, and
Mr. Norton was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment with a term of 5 years of supervised
release to follow. [Id., Judgment, Doc. 503, at 2-3].
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under § 2255, “a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court claiming the right
to be released … may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct
the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A court must vacate and set aside a sentence if it concludes
that the “judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not
authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or
infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to
collateral attack.” Id. § 2255(b). The legal standard that governs collateral review under § 2255
as opposed to direct review on appeal is significantly higher. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 162–66 (1982); see Hampton v. United States, 191 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1999).
A prisoner seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must show as a basis for relief: (1) an
error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an
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error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid. Pough
v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006). To obtain relief for a denial or infringement
of a constitutional right, a petitioner must establish an “error of constitutional magnitude which
had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings”. Watson v. United States,
165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993)).
To obtain relief for a non-constitutional claim, a petitioner must establish that a fundamental
defect in the proceeding resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious error that
deprived him of the “rudimentary demands of fair procedure”. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339,
354 (1994).
A petitioner has the burden of proving that “an error has occurred that is sufficiently
fundamental to come within” one of the three “narrow limits” for § 2255 relief. United States
v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979); see Pough, 442 F.3d at 964. Conclusory allegations
alone, without supporting factual averments, are generally insufficient to demonstrate a valid
claim under § 2255. Jefferson v. United States, 730 F.3d 537, 547 (6th Cir. 2013).
III. 	ANALYSIS
In support of his § 2255 petition, Mr. Norton presents several arguments. Many of his
arguments involve alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but he also brings several
claims challenging the calculation of his sentence, decisions made by this Court at trial, the
constitutionality of his firearm conviction, and his classification as a career offender under the
Armed Career Criminal Act. See generally [Motion, Doc. 1]. As the Court will explain below,
none of these arguments have merit and Mr. Norton’s § 2255 petition will be denied as a result.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
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The Sixth Amendment states that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right… to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” This right is not merely to
representation, but to effective representation. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
When a petitioner contests his sentence by raising the specter of ineffective assistance of counsel,
he normally can succeed only by satisfying the familiar Strickland test, a two-pronged test that
requires a showing of deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984).
To obtain relief based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
Id. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id.
In other words, there must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. A court has license to address
the two prongs of the bipartite tests in any order, and if a petitioner fails to establish either prong
of this test, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. Id. at 697.
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Id. at 673. Because of the
difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
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“might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id.
“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
371 (2010). In fact, “counsel’s performance is strongly presumed to be effective.” Jones v.
Bell,801 F.3d 556, 562 (6 th Cir. 2005). Even if a particular aspect of counsel’s performance proves
to be deficient, that deficiency “does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal
proceeding” unless it has a prejudicial effect on the judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 691 (1984).
1. 	Counts 1 & 11 – “James Ward Charges”
As best the Court can discern, Mr. Norton argues that his attorney, Jessica McAfee, made
several mistakes, both at trial and at the appellate level, as it relates to Counts 1 & 11 of the
superseding indictment. See generally [Motion, Doc. 1]. The Court will refer to these charges as
the “James Ward charges”, as the Assistant United States Attorney did at trial and as Mr. Norton
does throughout his motion.
These charges stemmed from a traffic stop conducted on May 11, 2019. [2:19-cr-00145-7,
Presentence Investigation Report, Doc. 454, at 6]. Deputies with the Hamblen County Sheriff’s
Office were conducting surveillance on Mr. Norton’s residence when they observed a truck leaving
the residence. [Id.]. Deputies followed the truck and attempted to stop the truck after observing the
driver, James Ward, driving left of the center line. [Id.]. After a short pursuit, James Ward fled on
foot, and Mr. Norton, the passenger, remained in the truck. [Id.]. During this stop, deputies
observed a small pink baggie in the floorboard, prompting a search of the vehicle which produced
a Crown Royal bag in the center console. [Id.]. Inside the bags were methamphetamine and digital
scales. [Id. at 7]. 	Mr. Norton and James Ward were subsequently charged in Count 1 of the
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indictment with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, and in Count 21
of with aiding and abetting each other to possess with the intent to distribute 5 grams or more of
methamphetamine. [2:19-cr-00145-7, Indictment, Doc. 1, at 1, 8].
a. 	False Charges
To begin, Mr. Norton argues that both of these charges are “false charges”. [Id., Motion, Doc.
1, at 1]. To support the claim that his aiding and abetting charge was false, Mr. Norton points out
that Mr. Ward pleaded guilty to “possessing” the methamphetamine found in the truck as well as
the paraphernalia. [Id.]. In Mr. Norton’s view, Mr. Ward’s decision to plead guilty to his charges
means that he took sole responsibility for possessing the evidence found in the truck, and that Mr.
Norton should have been absolved of responsibility as a result. However, aiding and abetting a
drug offense covers a broader range of conduct than simply possessing drugs. “We recognize that
aiding and abetting a drug offense may encompass activities, intended to ensure the success of the
underlying crime, that take place after delivery and after the principal no longer possesses the
narcotics.” United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 1994 WL 247428 (6th Cir. 1994). Therefore,
Mr. Norton did not need to have sole possession over the drugs to be charged with aiding or
abetting. In any event, he was acquitted on Count 11, meaning that even if his attorney’s decision
not to challenge this charge was deficient, he cannot show that he was prejudiced by that decision
as required by Strickland, 466. U.S. 668.
As for Count 1, the conspiracy charge, Mr. Norton does not make a clear argument as to why
that charge would be “false”. He states several times that Mr. Ward’s testimony was “perjured” or
“false”, or that the charge was unlawfully pursued because the grand jury did not have enough
evidence to indict him. [Motion, Doc. 1]. As for his allegations of perjury against Mr. Ward, he
provides no evidence for the Court to consider. He simply states multiple times, as a fact, that Mr.
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Ward’s testimony was perjured. [Id.].
At one point during sentencing proceedings, Mr. Norton addressed the Court and asked, “If
James Ward’s testimony was perjury and I can prove it was perjury, then how you going to accept
100-500 grams of methamphetamine, if he committed perjury on the witness stand and I can prove
it by the record?”. [2:19-cr-00145-7, Transcript, Doc. 517, at 12:11-16]. The Court answered this
question, informing Mr. Norton that the jury believed at least some of Mr. Ward’s testimony and
that the Court cannot inquire of the jury why or what part was believed. [Id., lines 17-21, 24-25].
The Court reiterates its earlier reasoning: the jury is tasked with assessing the credibility of a
witness, and the jury must have believed at least some of James Ward’s testimony to reach a verdict
of guilty on Count 1. Further, Mr. Norton continues to allege that the testimony was perjury, but
has not attempted to produce any evidence of such, although he previously told the Court he could
prove it.
Without any corroborating evidence, Mr. Norton’s belief that James Ward’s testimony at trial
was perjury is not enough for the Court to decide that the “James Ward charges” were false
charges. Nor would it have been enough for his attorney to argue such at either the trial or appellate
level. Her decision to not challenge the “James Ward charges” on the bare bones assertion that
James Ward’s testimony was perjury was reasonable, and does not render her performance
deficient or prejudicial as required by Strickland, 466. U.S. 668.
b. 	Fourth Amendment Violations
Mr. Norton also faults his attorney for not continuing to argue at the trial level and on appeal
that he was unlawfully detained, the vehicle was unlawfully searched, and that excessive force was
used to remove him from the vehicle during the May 11, 2019, traffic stop. [Motion, Doc. 1, at 2].
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Mr. Norton’s attorney first brought this argument in a pretrial Motion to Suppress. [2:19-cr-00145-
7, First Mot. to Suppress, Doc. 255]. The motion was heard by Magistrate Judge Cynthia R.
Wyrick. [Id., Minute Entry, Doc. 323]. Magistrate Judge Wyrick then entered a report and
recommendation, recommending that Mr. Norton’s motion be denied. [Id., Doc. 330]. The Court
reviewed the record and the recommendation and agreed with the Magistrate Judge. [Id., Doc.
332]. Mr. Norton appealed the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, but did so without
his attorney. [Id., Appeal, Doc. 344]. This appeal was denied as the Court had warned him several
times that pro se filings would not be entertained because he was represented by counsel. [Id.,
Motion, Doc. 378]. His attorney did not appeal.
Mr. Norton’s attorney’s decision not to appeal the adoption of the Report and Recommendation
denying 	the 	First 	Motion 	to 	Suppress 	cannot 	be 	deemed 	deficient. 	The 	Report 	and
Recommendation provided binding case law justifying the officers’ actions and thoroughly applied
that law to Mr. Norton’s experience. Such an argument at either the trial or appellate level would
have likely been futile, and at worst, frivolous. Therefore, Mr. Norton fails to show that his
attorney’s actions were deficient as required by Strickland, 466. U.S. 668.
c. 	Mistrial
Mr. Norton also argues that his attorney should have moved for a mistrial due to James
Ward’s “perjured testimony” and the alleged Fourth Amendment violations. For the same reasons
discussed above, his attorney cannot be deemed deficient for failing to move for a mistrial on
issues that were not likely to prevail.
2. 	Prosecutor’s Use of “Hearsay”
Next, Mr. Norton argues that his attorney’s failure to “object to the due process violation by
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the prosecutor’s misconduct in using false hearsay information that the District Court ordered
limited” amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. [Motion, Doc. 1, at 17]. In support of his
argument, Mr. Norton refers to a notice of intent to use 404(b) evidence: that his home was a “drug
house”. [Id.]. Mr. Norton challenges this, arguing that the only evidence that his residence was a
“drug house” was the pistol and “fertilizer” obtained by informant Cheree Greene, which he alleges
was planted by Ms. Greene on his property and later retrieved to turn over to law enforcement.
[Id.].
He is correct in arguing that the District Court ordered that the Government could only use
limited 404(b) evidence, but he is mistaken as to what the Government was prevented from using.
At a hearing for the Defense’s Motion in Limine [2:19-cr-00145-7, Doc. 375], the Court made an
oral ruling to grant the Motion in Limine but only as to Paragraph 1 of the Government’s Notice.
[Id., Doc. 531, at 37:15-19]. That paragraph only included that Mr. Norton’s residence was known
by the Hamblen County Sheriff’s Office to be a place where illegal drugs were used, but that
knowledge was based on hearsay information from anonymous informants. [Id., Notice, Doc. 353,
at 1].
The Court did not limit the testimony of Ms. Greene. Further, Mr. Norton offers no evidence
that Ms. Greene was colluding with law enforcement to plant evidence on his property, and only
points out that Ms. Greene had pending felony drug warrants and did so in exchange for money
and assistance from law enforcement. [Id.]. Mr. Norton’s allegation, without any supporting
evidence, is not enough to support a motion for mistrial or otherwise challenge this evidence.
Mr. Norton also argues that the Government used hearsay information, against the Court’s
order, when presenting James Ward’s testimony. [Motion, Doc. 1, at 17]. However, as discussed
above, the Court did not order any evidence to be excluded other than the Hamblen County
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Sheriff’s Office’s knowledge that his residence was a “drug house.” James Ward’s testimony was
not ordered excluded, nor was it hearsay. Again, his attorney cannot be found to have provided
ineffective assistance for failing to argue a meritless argument. Therefore, Mr. Norton has not
shown his attorney’s performance to be deficient or prejudicial in this regard, as required by
Strickland, 466. U.S. 668.
3. 	Grand Jury Transcripts
Next, Mr. Norton argues that his attorney’s failure to “investigate and move for the
disclosure of the Grand Jury transcript charging counts 1 and 16” constitutes ineffective assistance
of counsel. [Motion, Doc. 1, at 22]. The Sixth Circuit already determined that Mr. Norton had no
right to the Grand Jury transcripts. [2:19-cr-00145- 7, Doc. 579]. His attorney was reasonable in
her decision not to pursue the grand jury transcripts further. Therefore, Mr. Norton has not shown
that his attorney’s performance in this regard was deficient or prejudicial, as required by
Strickland, 466. U.S. 668.
4. 	Cross Examination of Cheree Greene/Illegal Entry
Next, Mr. Norton argues that his attorney’s failure to “raise the confidential informant’s
‘veracity’” and failure to “cross examine Greene’s trial testimony” amounts to ineffective
assistance. [Motion, Doc. 1, at 26]. It is unclear what Mr. Norton believes his attorney should have
done at cross examination. Instead, he begins to argue that Ms. Greene’s entry into his home was
a Fourth and Fifth Amendment violation because she entered without a warrant or permission to
intercept oral communication. [Id., at 27]. Without a clear argument supporting his allegation that
his attorney failed to cross-examine Ms. Greene or challenge her veracity, the Court moves on to
the alleged constitutional violations.
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The Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] person’s Fourth Amendment Rights are not infringed if he
or she consents to the invasion”, and that “[a] person may still validly consent to a guest’s entry,
even if the guest lies about his or her identity or the reasons for the entry.” United States v. Hankins,
195 Fed. Appx. 295, 302 (6th Cir. 2006). Mr. Norton allowed Ms. Greene into his home. That she
was wired and working with law enforcement is of no consequence. His attorney’s decision not to
challenge this was neither deficient nor prejudicial, and does not meet the requirements of
Strickland, 466. U.S. 668.
5. 	Forfeiture of Appellate Arguments
a. 	Denial of Forensic Testing
Next, Mr. Norton argues that his attorney’s failure to include the District Court’s denial of his
motion for DNA and fingerprint testing in the statement of issues as required by Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 28(a)(5), resulting in the forfeiture of that argument, amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel. [Motion, Doc. 1, at 10].
While it is true that the argument was forfeited for failure to include it in the statement of
issues, it is not likely that Mr. Norton would have prevailed. Mr. Norton asked the Court to order
DNA and fingerprint testing for the handgun he provided to Cheree Greene. [2:19-cr-00145- 7,
Motion to Compel Forensic Testing, Doc. 91]. A hearing was held before Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Wyrick, and the motion was subsequently denied.
The Court reasoned that forensic testing would not yield exculpatory evidence, and that both
Defendant’s counsel and the United States agreed that testing any firearm for DNA only yields
results in about 10% of cases, meaning that even if the results did not produce Mr. Norton’s
fingerprints on the gun, the United States could still argue that the results were not meaningful and
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did not prove that the gun was never in his possession. [Id., Order, Doc. 116, at 2]. Further, if
testing did produce Mr. Norton’s fingerprints on the gun, those results would deprive his attorney
of the ability to argue that there is no forensic evidence against him. [Id., at 2-3]. Therefore, the
decision to deny his motion to compel forensic testing was strategically beneficial for him, and his
attorney’s forfeiture of the argument on appeal was not prejudicial, as required by Strickland, 466.
U.S. 668.
b. 	Admission of Prejudicial Evidence
Lastly, Mr. Norton also argues that his attorney’s failure to develop an argument challenging
the Court’s admission of certain pieces of evidence amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.
[Motion, Doc. 1, at 25]. The Sixth Circuit deemed this argument abandoned because his attorney
asserted that the audio recording from the informant was unfairly prejudicial, but did not provide
any law to support that argument. [2:19-cr-00145- 7, Opinion, Doc. 547, at 6]. In its response, the
United States argues that the recording was relevant and not prejudicial, because, under Federal
Rule of Evidence 401, it tended to make more probable that Norton had sold a handgun and meth
to Ms. Greene, as she testified. [U.S. Resp., Doc. 14, at 14]. The Court agrees with the United
States.
The audio recording of an encounter that Ms. Greene testified to did nothing but corroborate
her testimony. It may seem prejudicial to Mr. Norton because without the audio recording, the jury
may not have believed Ms. Greene’s testimony. However, an audio recording that makes it more
likely that a witness is telling the truth about the defendant committing the crime he is on trial for
is not unfairly prejudicial. His attorney’s abandonment and waiver of a meritless argument is not
prejudicial, and does not meet the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel as required by
Strickland, 466. U.S. 668.
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6. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Conclusion
Taking all of the above arguments together, Mr. Norton has not shown that his attorney’s
performance, at either the trial or appellate level, was deficient or prejudicial as required by
Strickland, 466. U.S. 668. Therefore, his motion will be denied on these grounds.
B. Procedurally Defaulted Arguments
Mr. Norton argues several issues that are procedurally defaulted because he did not bring them
on appeal. Except for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a federal prisoner’s failure to
raise a claim on direct appeal results in a procedural default of that claim. See Bousley v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998), Peveler v. United States, 269 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2001). For
a federal prisoner to obtain review of a defaulted claim in a § 2255 motion, he must show cause to
excuse his failure to raise the claim previously and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged
violation. Id. If the prisoner is unable to show cause and prejudice, he may still be able to obtain
review of his claims if his case fits within a narrow class of cases permitting review in order to
prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice, as when he submits new evidence showing that a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in a conviction of one who is actually innocent.
Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622-23.
Mr. Norton argues that the District Court erred in admitting James Ward’s testimony into
evidence, erred when allowing “false” evidence that Mr. Norton offered James Ward a firearm,
that his firearm conviction was unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v.
Bruen, 597 U.S. 11, that his sentence was unusually long, and challenges the legality of his
conspiracy conviction. [Motion, Doc. 1]. Each of these arguments could have been argued on
1 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
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appeal, and Mr. Norton provides no explanation as to why they were not. Therefore, they are
procedurally defaulted, and the Court declines to consider them.
C. Arguments Already Brought on Appeal
Mr. Norton brings two arguments that were already brought on appeal – that the Court erred
in calculating his drug quantity and in applying a U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 enhancement. [2:19-cr-00145-
7, Opinion, Doc. 547]. A § 2255 petition may not be employed to relitigate an issue that was raised
and considered on direct appeal, absent highly exceptional circumstances such as an intervening
change in the law. Wright v. United States, 182 F.3d 458, 467 (6th Cir. 1999). Mr. Norton does not
attempt to show any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the relitigation of these issues.
Therefore, the Court declines to consider them.
D. Erlinger v. United States
Lastly, Mr. Norton challenges his classification as a career criminal under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA). In support, he cites Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 144 S.Ct. 1840,
219 L.Ed.2d 451 (2024). In Erlinger, the Supreme Court found that under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, defendants are entitled to have a jury unanimously determine beyond a reasonable
doubt whether past offenses were committed on separate occasions for the purposes of the ACCA.
Mr. Norton was sentenced subject to an enhancement under the ACCA. [Presentence Investigation
Report, Doc. 454, at 12]. However, because he was sentenced before Erlinger was decided, a jury
was not required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that his past offenses were committed on
separate occasions.
While a jury would be required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Norton’s past
offenses were committed on separate occasions today, Erlinger is not retroactively applicable to
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cases on collateral review and cannot provide a basis for relief under § 2255. Bonds v. United
States, No. 1:17-CR-108, 2025 WL 2166431 (E.D. Tenn, July 30, 2025). This Court has held the
same in Bawgus v. United States and Smith v. United States. Bawgus v. United States, No. 2:22-
CV-00132-JRG-CRW, 2024 WL 3837752 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 2024), United States v. Smith, No.
2:24-CV-66-JRG-CRW, 2026 WL 1295050 (E.D. Tenn. May 12, 2026). Because Erlinger is not
retroactively applicable, it does not entitle Mr. Norton to § 2255 relief.
IV. 	CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Lastly, the Court must determine whether to issue a certificate of appealability, which is
necessary for Mr. Norton to appeal its ruling. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), (c)(1)(B). The Court may issue a
certificate of appealability only when a petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). To make this showing, Mr. Norton must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the Court’s assessment of those claims “debatable or wrong.” Slack
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not find
that its dismissal of Mr. Norton’s claims for procedural default and lack of merit is debatable or
wrong. The Court therefore declines to issue a certificate of appealability to Mr. Norton.
V. 	CONCLUSION
As the petitioner under § 2255, Mr. Norton fails to meet his burden of establishing that his
conviction and sentence are in violation of the Constitution, or that a fundamental defect resulted
in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious error. His Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody [Doc. 1] is therefore
DENIED. The Court will enter an order consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
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ENTER:
s/ J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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