USA v. Brinkley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:26-CR-00060-1-DCLC-CRW
)
JAMES W. BRINKLEY, IV 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant James W. Brinkley, IV’s Motion for
Revocation of Detention Order and Motion for Release under Appropriate Conditions [Doc.
47]. For the reasons below, the Court will deny Mr. Brinkley’s motion.1
I. B ACKGROUND
In June 2026, the United States brought a one-count criminal complaint against Mr.
Brinkley, alleging that he violated § 2252A(a)(5)(B), knowingly possessing or accessing with the
intent to view child pornography. Eric Hilton, an investigator with the Johnson City Police
Department, submitted an affidavit setting out the following facts:
3. On April I, 2026, I began an investigation into five Cyber tips (CT)
received from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC)
and assigned by the ICAC commander in Knoxville, TN. The tip numbers are:
231215440, 231228428, 231265573, 231248985, and 231201082. Between all five
tips, over 400 videos had been reported for content involving child sexual assault
material (CSAM).
4. The tips were reported to NCMEC from Google LLC. Google reported
that a user with the name of J B, a mobile phone number of 1(423) 943-8408, and
an 	email 	address 	was 	provided. 	The 	account 	user 	with 	the 	email 	of
jameswbrinkleyIV@gmail.com uploaded child pornography to Google Photos.
Google classified 400 videos that were uploaded to Google Photos as CSAM. The
1 Mr. Brinkley requests a hearing on his motion. [Def.’s Mot. to Revoke, Doc. 47, at 1]. A second hearing is
not required on a motion for revocation under § 3145(b), however, particularly where “the material information is
already in the record from the initial detention hearing.” United States v. Walden, No. 3:24-CR-19, 2024 WL 2121232,
at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 10, 2024) (citation omitted). The Court may decide the motion on the existing record if it
permits an independent assessment of the disputed issues and the available conditions of release. Having reviewed the
record, the Court finds that a second hearing is unnecessary. His request for a hearing is therefore DENIED.
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date range of the child sexual assault material (CSAM) uploads was from December
14, 2025 through March 2, 2026. The same personal identifiers and account
information were on all five tips. The user uploaded the CSAM files by using IP
address 75.136.200.225.
5. Your affiant submitted a subpoena to Charter Communications for
subscriber information related to the IP address of 75.136.200.225 used for the
internet connection. On April 3, 2026, Charter provided a return containing the
subscriber information. The name registered on the account was James Brinkley.
The address listed for the service was Woodbriar Drive, Johnson City, Tennessee
37604 1 and the registered phone number was (423) 948-8408.
6. The CTs listed the following Gmail account as containing CSAM in
Google Photos: jamesbrinkleyIV@gmail.com. Your affiant applied for a search
warrant for jamesbrinkleyIV@gmail.com. I received a return from Google on May
22, 2026. The search warrant included the contents of Google Photos. I examined
the more than 400 videos contained in Google Photos. Based on my training and
experience, the videos contained CSAM.
7. Specifically, in my review, your affiant observed both prepubescent and
pubescent males. The approximate ages of the males range from four years old to
17 years old. Content in the more than 400 videos showed males, under the age of
18, masturbating, performing oral sex on other males under the age of 18, engaging
in anal sex, and mutual masturbation. In at least three videos, a prepubescent male
would be engaged in anal and oral sex with males over the age of 18.
8. In addition to the CSAM contained in the Google Photos account, your
affiant observed photos depicting both the defendant and other individuals known
to associate with him. These photos were positively identified by using the
department's records management system, WATSON, to search for DMV records
for BRJNKLEY. Officers of the Johnson City Police Department contacted
BRINKLEY on September 12, 2025 during a traffic stop. BRINKLEY was driving
a 2017 black Mercedes Benz registered to him. During this interaction, BRINKLEY
received a traffic citation for speeding. This citation (stored in the WATSON
records management system) included his driver’s license picture.
[Compl., Doc. 3, at 1–3].
Mr. Brinkley moved for a detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) and for a
preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1. In response to his motion,
United States Magistrate Judge Cynthia R. Wyrick held a preliminary hearing2 and a detention
2 In the weeks following the filing of the criminal complaint, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Brinkley on
one count of violating § 2252A(a)(5)(B), [Indictment, Doc. 37], obviating the need for this Court to address the
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hearing. Investigator Hilton appeared as a witness for the United States, and his testimony
overlapped with his sworn statements in the criminal complaint. Mr. Brinkley then called his
own witness, Lora Baumgardner, a friend and neighbor of Mr. Brinkley, and Mr. Brinkley’s
mother. Ms. Baumgardner testified that Mr. Brinkley’s mother could serve as a third-party
custodian3 over Mr. Brinkley if Magistrate Judge Wyrick were to order Mr. Brinkley’s release.
[Order of Det., Doc. 41, at 8].
Mr. Brinkley’s mother is eighty-four years of age, lives in a six-bedroom home, and
proposes that Mr. Brinkley reside there with her pending his trial. [Ms. Brinkley Decl., Doc.
14, at 19, 21–22]. As part of her proposal to serve as Mr. Brinkley’s third-party custodian, she
intends to “cancel her home internet,” but she will continue to have access to the internet via
her cellphone’s hotspot, which has a protected passcode. [Id. at 22]. She cannot forego access
to the hotspot because she needs the internet to manage her business. [Id. at 21]. According to
Ms. Baumgardner, Ms. Brinkley is a “dynamic and tenacious woman” and would suitably serve
as a third-party custodian over Mr. Brinkley if Magistrate Judge Wyrick were to order Mr.
Brinkley’s release. [Order of Det., Doc. 41, at 8]. Ms. Baumgardner testified that she works
from home, “lives close by,” is “very technology savvy,” and “would be more than willing” to
help Ms. Brinkley in ensuring that Mr. Brinkley abides by all conditions of release. [Hr’g Tr.,
Doc. 41, at 49:2–4, No. 2:26-mj-00112-1-CRW]. In addition, Mr. Brinkley proffered two letters
whether there was probable cause that Mr. Brinkley violated § 2252A(a)(5)(B). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(a)(2) (”If a
defendant is charged with an offense other than a petty offense, a magistrate judge must conduct a preliminary hearing
unless . . . . the defendant is indicted[.]”). And in any case, Mr. Brinkley does not expressly challenge the probable-
cause determination.
3 Section 3142(c)(1)(B)(i) states that a judicial officer may order, as a condition of pretrial release, that a
defendant “remain in the custody of a designated person, who agrees to assume supervision and to report any violation
of a release condition to the court, if the designated person is able reasonably to assure the judicial officer that the
person will appear as required and will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community[.]”
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for Magistrate Judge Wyrick’s consideration, both of which are from his in-laws, who express
their confidence that Mr. Brinkley, if released, would comply with all conditions of release and
state that they will assist in ensuring that he does so. [Bethany Smile Letter, Doc. 31-1, at 1–2;
Ellen Smile Letter, Doc. 31-2, at 1].
After taking the parties’ evidence and arguments under advisement, Magistrate Judge
Wyrick issued a written opinion in which she ordered Mr. Brinkley’s detention pending trial.
She concluded that the United States “provided the court with clear and convincing evidence
that Defendant would present a serious danger to the community if released, and that no
condition, or combination of conditions, of release can be imposed which would reasonably
assure the community’s safety.” [Order of Det., Doc. 41, at 11].4 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b),5
Mr. Brinkley now seeks this Court’s review of Magistrate Judge Wyrick’s order detaining him
pending trial and moves this Court to revoke it. The United States has responded in opposition
to Mr. Brinkley’s motion. [United States’s Resp., Doc. 50].
II. L EGAL S TANDARD
Pretrial detention is permissible only when “the judicial officer finds that no condition
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required
and the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e(1). The Act requires
reasonable assurance, rather than a guarantee, of appearance and safety of the community. A
4 Magistrate Judge Wyrick’s order contains inconsistent conclusions concerning risk of flight. Compare
[Order of Det., Doc. 41, pg. 10] (“the United States failed to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard as to
risk of flight”) with id. at 12](“the United States has met its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that
Defendant presents a serious risk of flight.”_ The Court does not rely on risk of flight as a ground for detention but on
the evidence of the danger he poses to the community is by itself sufficient to warrant his detention pending trial.
5 Section 3145(b) authorizes this Court to revoke or amend the magistrate judge’s detention order and requires
prompt determination of the motion. The Court exercises that authority here.
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defendant detained by a magistrate judge may seek revocation or amendment of the detention order
in the court having original jurisdiction over the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b).
A district court reviews a magistrate judge's detention order de novo, making an
independent determination of the proper pretrial detention or conditions for release. See United
States v. Yamini, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1128-29 (S.D. Ohio 2000); United States v. Brooks, 685
F. Supp. 3d 476, 479 (E.D. Mich. 2023). The Court considers the evidence presented at the
detention hearing, the parties’ submissions, and the pretrial services report. While the Court
“need not defer to the magistrate judge’s ultimate conclusion nor start from scratch,” it “must
engage in some independent review of the decision.” Brooks, 685 F. Supp 3d at 479 (citation
omitted). The United States has the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence,
that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other
person and the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 946 (6th
Cir. 2010). That burden remains with the United States throughout the Court’s review.
III. ANALYSIS
In determining whether the United States has met its burden, the Court considers four
factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense
is “a crime of violence, a violation of section 1591, a Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a
minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device,” (2) the weight
of the evidence against the defendant, (3) the defendant’s history and characteristics, and (4) the
nature and seriousness of the danger that the defendant’s release would present to any person
or the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1)–(4). The Court “has broad discretion to determine how
much weight to assign the factors listed in § 3142(g) based on the circumstances of a particular
case.” United States v. Abrego, 787 F. Supp. 3d 830, 842 (M.D. Tenn. 2025) (citing United
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States v. Zhang, 55 F.4th 141, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2022)). The charge against Mr. Brinkley—
knowingly possessing or accessing with the intent to view child pornography, in violation of
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B)—is not one that carries with it a presumption of detention. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e)(3)(E).
1. 	Section 3142(g)(1): The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense Charged
The nature of Mr. Brinkley’s charge favors detention. Under § 3142(g)(1), whether the
offense charged “involves a minor victim” is a specific consideration, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1),
and § 2252A(a)(5)(B) proscribes conduct involving minors, see 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (defining
“child pornography” as images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct). Also, the Sixth
Circuit has recognized that a charge of knowingly possessing or accessing with the intent to
view child pornography under § 2252A(a)(5)(B) is unequivocally serious in nature. See United
States v. Robinson, 669 F.3d 767, 776 (6th Cir. 2012) (asserting that “[c]hild pornography is,
without qualification, a serious crime”). And notably, § 2252A(a)(5)(B) carries a maximum term
of ten years’ imprisonment, increased to twenty years if the offense involves a prepubescent minor
or a minor younger than twelve. Investigator Hilton described videos depicting prepubescent
children. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). These lengthy statutory terms of imprisonment that can
accompany a conviction under § 2252A(a)(5)(B) reflect the seriousness of the offense Mr.
Brinkley is facing . See United States v. Dixon, No. 20-1998, 2021 WL 1502723, at *1 (6th Cir.
Mar. 22, 2021) (affirming the detention of the defendant and agreeing with the district court’s
view that a possible ten-year term of incarceration “reflected the seriousness of the crime”).
The circumstances of the alleged offense also weigh in favor of detention. Magistrate
Judge Wyrick cited evidence that Mr. Brinkley possessed child pornography over an extended
period of time, undetected by family and friends. [Order of Det., Doc. 41, at 10]. This extended
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possession is indicative of dangerousness to the community because it “reflect[s] behavior that
is not isolated but recurring and persistent,” United States v. Goeglein, No. 3:26-CR-19-TAV-
DCP, 2026 WL 2030814, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. July 14, 2026). The alleged collection also contains
more than 400 videos, including videos depicting the sexual abuse of prepubescent children.
[Order of Det., Doc. 41, at 10]. The volume and content of these videos reinforces the concern
that the conduct would continue if Mr. Brinkley had access to similar material while on release.
See United States v. King, No. 3:22-CR-60-TAV-DCP-1, 2022 WL 3645996, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.
Aug. 24, 2022). These circumstances support a finding of dangerousness, but the Court must still
consider whether conditions could reasonably address that danger.
Mr. Brinkley argues that possession is “less serious than related offenses” involving
production, distribution or actual contact with a child. [Def.’s Mot. to Revoke, Doc. 47, at 8]. That
distinction is relevant to the nature and circumstances of the offense, but it does not lessen the
severity of the conduct Mr. Brinkley stands accused of. “Child pornography is, without
qualification, a serious crime.” Robinson, 669 F.3d at 776. Possession of this material contributes
to the continuing harm suffered by the children depicted. See also Paroline v. United States, 572
U.S. 434, 457 (2014). The Court’s concern focuses on the volume and content of the collection
and the evidence that Mr. Brinkley possessed this material for an extended period of time.
Mr. Brinkley also argues that the alleged images of child pornography “might be real but
they might also could be fictitious depictions . . . . generated by Artificial Intelligence,”6 and that
the absence of a forensic examination of the images requires the Court to conclude that the offense
6 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256-57 (2002), the Supreme Court invalidated two
provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CCPA”) that expanded the definition of child
pornography to cover certain visual depictions. That decision does not establish that the videos at issue in this case
are artificially generated.
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does not involve a “minor victim” under § 3142(g)(1).7 [Def.’s Mot. to Revoke, Doc. 47, at 7–
8]. The Court must assess that contention in evaluating the evidence supporting detention.
Investigator Hilton personally reviewed the videos and described the depicted children,
their approximate ages, and the sexual conduct shown in the videos. [Compl., Doc. 3, ¶¶ 6-7].
The Court gives that firsthand review of the material substantial weight at this stage in the case.
The mere possibility that an image could be artificially generated does not, without more, require
the Court to disregard the investigator’s own personal observations. For all these reasons, the
nature and circumstances of Mr. Brinkley’s charged offense favor detention.
2. 	Section 3142(g)(2): The Weight of the Evidence
Next, as to the second factor under § 3142(g)(2), the weight of the evidence—which
“goes to the weight of the evidence of dangerousness, not the weight of the evidence of the
defendant’s guilt,” Stone, 608 F.3d at 948 (citation omitted)—likewise favors detention. This
factor is “somewhat duplicative of § 3142(g)(1) because, “in considering a defendant’s overall
dangerousness, the Court must consider the facts of the crime alleged as well as evidence that
the defendant has been dangerous in the past, such as criminal history.” Goeglein, 2026 WL
2030814 at *6 (quoting United States v. Burn, No. 5:26-CR-2, 2026 WL 411732, at *5 (E.D. Ky.
Feb. 9, 2026)).
Mr. Brinkley’s criminal history is negligible, consisting of a pair of traffic violations,
[Pretrial Servs. Rep. at 3 (on file with the Court)]. That favorable history deserves weight. It does
not eliminate the concern arising from the alleged volume and content of the images and the
evidence of possession over an extended time period. Those circumstances bear on the risk of
dangerousness during release and weigh in favor of detention under § 3142(g)(2).
7 The Bail Reform Act does not define the term “minor victim.”
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Mr. Brinkley’s arguments to the contrary do not convince the Court otherwise. First,
Mr. Brinkley contends that Magistrate Judge Wyrick, in evaluating the weight of the evidence
under § 3142(g)(2), erred by “address[ing] [her] view of Mr. Brinkley’s guilt, not his future
dangerousness if released,” [Def.’s Mot. to Revoke, Doc. 47, at 10 (emphasis in original)], and
in support of this contention, he highlights language from her order:
Specifically, in evaluating the weight of the evidence against Defendant, the
Court notes the volume and specific content of the CSAM found on the micro-SD
card and hard drive in Defendant’s home, and the other evidence contained on those
devices clearly tying them to Defendant. Further, the Government was able to
connect Defendant’s email and IP addresses, and his home address and telephone
number to CSAM, and Defendant admitted to using the email address at issue.
Additionally, the presence of a video containing a victim with a likeness so similar
to Defendant’s stepson, particularly in light of Defendant’s Google search history,
adds to the seriousness of the potential harm to the community. In short, the
evidence against Defendant is strong.
[Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting [Order of Det., Doc. 41, at 11])]. Evidence linking the account
and devices to Mr. Brinkley is relevant to whether the alleged conduct can reliably be attributed to
him. The strength of the Government’s case is not itself the reason for detention. The Court must
consider the alleged volume and content of the collection and the evidence of extended possession
because they all bear on the risk of Mr. Brinkley remaining a danger during release. The Court’s
assessment under § 3142(g)(2) directly addresses that risk, not the determination of guilt. This
evidence—the evidence of the quantity of the images, the content, and length of time of
possession—goes to the weight of the evidence of Mr. Brinkley’s dangerousness, not his guilt.
Mr. Brinkley also argues that Magistrate Judge Wyrick’s “findings overstate the evidence
presented against Mr. Brinkley at the hearing,” [Def.’s Mot. to revoke, Doc. 47, at 10], because
Investigator Hilton’s testimony was “largely summary hearsay,” [id. at 11]. But the Sixth Circuit
has recognized that “the government may proceed in a detention hearing by proffer or hearsay,”
Stone, 608 F.3d at 949 (quotation omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (“The rules concerning
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admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and consideration of
information at the [detention] hearing.”); see also Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) (“These rules—except
for those on privilege—do not apply to . . . whether to release on bail or otherwise.”), so Mr.
Brinkley’s contention that Investigator Hilton’s testimony was hearsay is not, by itself, a basis
to disturb Magistrate Judge Wyrick’s detention order. And apart from complaining of hearsay,
Mr. Brinkley makes no other argument against Investigator Hilton’s reliability. See United
States v. Robinson, No. 1:07-CR-1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53290 E.D. Tenn. July 23, 2007)
(“Credibility determinations of the magistrate judge who personally listened to the testimony of
a witness should be accepted by a district judge unless in his de novo review of the record he
finds a reason to question the magistrate judge’s assessment.”); see also United States v. Sutton,
38 F. App’x 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that a magistrate judge’s “credibility determination
will only be set aside if it is clearly erroneous”). The Court credits the firsthand description of
the videos for purposes of reviewing the detention order.
And lastly, although Mr. Brinkley also argues against detention because it will “be
extended significantly” while his attorney awaits a forensic review of the electronic devices that
law enforcement seized from his home, [Def.’s Mot. to Revoke, Doc. 47, at 12], any potential
for a prolonged period of detention is harm that does not outweigh the danger to the community
from his release. See Fox, 2017 WL 11546291 at *2 (“Certainly, [the defendant] will suffer
some harm from his detention. But that harm does not outweigh the danger to the public from
his release.” (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987)). The prospect of further
delay does not, by itself, require release, though detention that becomes excessively prolonged
may raise due process concerns. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4. On the record before the Court,
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the anticipated time to conduct the forensic review is uncertain and thus cannot establish that
the continued detention of Mr. Brinkley will be excessive.
3. 	Section 3142(g)(3): History and Characteristics
As to the third factor under § 3142(g)(3), Mr. Brinkley’s history and characteristics
neither favor nor disfavor his release. The Court considers Mr. Brinkley’s “character, physical
and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the
community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal
history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3). While
Mr. Brinkley points out that Magistrate Judge Wyrick’s “order of detention does not describe
[her] findings about Mr. Brinkley’s personal history and characteristics,” [Order of Det., Doc.
41, at 12], the Court can and will give its own consideration to his history and characteristics
now. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 675 (acknowledging that a de novo review requires “fresh
consideration” of the issues (quotation omitted)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (permitting the
district court to modify the report and recommendation).
Mr. Brinkley is fifty-seven years old and has lived in East Tennessee for twenty years.
[Pretrial Servs. Rep. at 1]. During the last four years, he has resided with his husband, Faysal
Smile II, and Mr. Smile’s ten-year-old son, Faysal Smile III, in Johnson City, Tennessee. [Id. at
1–2]. His mother also resides in Johnson City. [Id. at 2]. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the
University of Tennessee and is employed. [Id.]. Last year, he underwent surgery for a right hip
replacement, and next year, he will undergo surgery for a left hip replacement. [Id.]. Apart from
high blood pressure and unidentified “other medical issues,” he appears to be in reasonably
good physical health. [Id.]. He suffers from no mental-health problems and has no history of
substance abuse. [Id.]. And again, he has no significant criminal history.
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Mr. Brinkley’s employment, longstanding community ties, family support, and lack of
significant criminal history weigh in favor of release. The Court gives those factors meaningful
weight. The evidence of sustained possession of child pornography also bears on his past conduct,
which the Court has already addressed. His favorable personal history does not eliminate the
concern the Court has expressed concerning his past conduct. It does require careful consideration
of whether appropriate restrictions and supervision would reasonably assure the safety of the
community.
4. 	Section 3142(g)(4): Nature and Seriousness of the Danger Posed by Release
As to the fourth and final factor under § 3142(g)(4), the nature and seriousness of the
danger that Mr. Brinkley’s release would pose to the community favors detention. The danger at
issue here is the risk of Mr. Brinkley continuing to acquire and possess material depicting the
sexual abuse of children and the resulting harm to the children so depicted. The Court must also
consider the evidence concerning Mr. Brinkley’s stepson, while recognizing the limits of that
evidence.
Investigator Hilton testified that while reviewing the 400 videos that he recovered from
the Google account, he “observed a child in one of the videos who had a striking similarity” to
the minor stepson. [Hr’g Tr., Doc. 39, at 36:2–4, No. 2:26-mj-00112-1-CRW]. In this vein,
Magistrate Judge Wyrick, in her opinion, stated that “[a] clip from the video of the child’s face
along with an image of Defendant’s stepson were entered into evidence and the Court was able to
personally observe the similarity.” [Order of Det., Doc. 41, at 4 n.5]. Investigator Hilton also
testified that he discovered two searches that were performed from the Google account: “movie
where drunk dad goes into son’s room” and “movie where drunk dad goes into son’s room and
tries to assault him.” [Hr’g Tr., Doc. 39, at 40:21–22, 40:25, 41:1, No. 2:26-mj-00112-1-CRW].
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Although Investigator Hilton testified that the stepson did not disclose that Mr. Brinkley had
sexually abused him. [Hr’g Tr., Doc. 41, at 26:12–15, No. 2:26-mj-00112-1-CRW]. But by
proffer, the United States introduced evidence showing that Mr. Brinkley’s stepson, during an
interview with law enforcement, had intimated that he had been sexually abused by someone:
The United States: The interviewer had asked the child if he had been touched on
his genitalia. The child disclosed that he had been touched but did not want to
further speak about that.
Magistrate Judge Wyrick: And what was the nonverbal?
The United States: Both touching and looking towards his genital area, Your Honor.
[Hr’g Tr., Doc. 42, at 2:6–12, No. 2:26-mj-00112-1-CRW]. Finally, the evidence also showed
that a juvenile court had issued a restraining order, which prohibited Mr. Brinkley from having
any contact with his stepson. [Hr’g Tr., Doc. 41, at 61:19–23, No. 2:26-mj-00112-1-CRW].
Magistrate Judge Wyrick concluded that the resemblance between the child in the video
and Mr. Brinkley’s stepson, considered with the search history, added to the seriousness of the
potential harm. [Order of Det., Doc. 47, at 11]. The evidence warrants serious concern, but it
does not alone establish that the child depicted was Mr. Brinkley’s stepson. The stepson did not
identify Mr. Brinkley as the person who touched him, and the proffer does not explain the
circumstances of that touching. The juvenile court’s no-contact order, without more, also does
not establish that Mr. Brinkley assaulted his stepson.
The Court does not find on the evidence in this record that Mr. Brinkley sexually assaulted
his stepson or produced a video depicting him. But this Court’s decision regarding detention does
not depend on that finding. The alleged volume and content of Mr. Brinkley’s alleged collection
of child sexual abuse material and his sustained possession over an extended period of time bear
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on the risk of continued dangerousness. Those circumstances, considered with the available
conditions of release, provide the principal reason for the Court’s assessment of dangerousness.
5. 	Availability of Mitigating Conditions
Lastly, against the backdrop of the Court’s analysis of § 3142(g)’s factors, the Court
now addresses Mr. Brinkley’s argument that his release to his proposed third-party custodian—
his mother—would reasonably assure the community’s safety. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i).
Magistrate Judge Wyrick determined that Ms. Brinkley, even with the help of her in-laws and
Ms. Baumgardner, “would be unlikely to be as diligent as necessary in preventing Defendant’s
access to the internet or to prevent Defendant from engaging with minor children, including
his stepson.” [Order of Det., Doc. 41, at 11]. In making this determination, Magistrate Judge
Wyrick reasoned that “neither [Ms. Brinkley] nor the others who wrote letters on Defendant’s
behalf were truly open to believing that Defendant had intentionally viewed the type and
volume of CSAM at issue in this case.” [Id. at 10].
Mr. Brinkley argues that Magistrate Judge Wyrick’s “logic” is faulty because it “would
require evidence to be produced by the defense of 24/7 third-party supervision of Mr. Brinkley
(not something required by statute) and that his family and friends believe in his guilt before
they are credible third-party custodians.” [Def.’s Mot. to Revoke, Doc. 47, at 19]. Again, under
a de novo standard of review, the Court has license “to give fresh consideration” to the record
evidence, Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 675, and may affirm Magistrate Judge Wyrick’s decision of
detention on other grounds different from those on which she relied, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
cf. Campbell, 600 F.3d at 677. The relevant issue is whether the custodian can supervise
compliance with the imposed restrictions and will report any violations of those conditions.
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While conditions of release that require Mr. Brinkley to reside with his mother would
likely reasonably assure the safety of his minor stepson, the Court cannot conclude, in light of
the United States’s clear and convincing evidence of Mr. Brinkley’s dangerousness, that they
would reasonably assure the community’s safety. As an initial matter, the Court notes that Mr.
Brinkley allegedly violated § 2252A(a)(5)(B) from the privacy of his own residence, so his
proposal that he await trial in a similarly private environment—a large residence, with six
bedrooms, in fact—is problematic. See United States v. Bigham, No. 2:25-mj-00310, 2025 WL
3214328, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2025) (“[The defendant] was able to commit the alleged
crimes from the privacy of his home, armed with internet access, and the notion of returning
him to a similar environment of privacy is concerning.” (citations omitted)). And the fact that
Mr. Brinkley will be residing at this large residence alone with his elderly mother is of further
concern to the Court, especially when the Court considers the evidence that Mr. Brinkley was
able to successfully hide his possession of child pornography from his friends and family for
years. See [Order of Det., Doc. 41, at 11 (observing that “the evidence appears to show that
Defendant has been in possession of CSAM undetected by friends and family”). The Court must
assess whether restrictions on devices and access, together with supervision, would reasonably
address that risk posed by his release.
In light of this evidence of Mr. Brinkley’s ability to deceive his family and friends, the
Court has concerns about whether Ms. Brinkley could recognize signs of any further illegal
activity. See United States v. Phelps, No. 2:20-CR-00074-2-JRG-CRW, 2021 WL 84534, at *4
(E.D. Tenn. Jan. 11, 2021) (ruling that a proposed third-party custodian could not reasonably
assure the defendant’s appearance at trial partly because she “was unable to identify the signs
that Defendant was engaged in this [unlawful] activity”). And although Ms. Baumgardner, Ms.
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Bethany Smile, and Ms. Ellen Smile make assurances that they will aid Ms. Brinkley with her
custodial duties if necessary, none of them lives at Ms. Brinkley’s residence, and while their
assurances are admirable, they lack any details or specifics from which the Court can conclude
that they will lend effective oversight of Mr. Brinkley’s release.
Also, the fact that a cellular hotspot will be active in Ms. Brinkley’s residence only
enhances the Court’s concerns that Mr. Brinkley’s release to Ms. Brinkley’s custody will not
reasonably protect the community. See United States v. Hoilman, 2022 WL 17640199, No.
3:22-CR-91-KAC-DCP, 2022 WL 17640199, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 2022) (“Where, as
here, the Defendant allegedly committed an internet-dependent crime, the ubiquity of the
internet—in homes, at work, in stores and establishments, at places of worship, and through
mobile hotspots on a smart device or phone that can be turned on and off at will—creates a
significant obstacle to reasonably assuring the safety of any other person or the community.”
(citations omitted)); United States v. Foster, No. 20-5548, 2020 WL 6791572, at *3 (6th Cir.
July 20, 2020) (“‘[T]here is simply no failsafe way to prevent any and all exposure,’ even if a
defendant forfeits all electronic devices and is denied access to the internet.” (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted))).
And even when the Court focuses less on the general ubiquity of the internet and more
on an individualized assessment of the evidence, Ms. Brinkley’s plan to wall off the internet
from Mr. Brinkley does not strike the Court as one that can reasonably assure the community’s
safety. Although Ms. Brinkley states that her cellular hotspot will have a “protected passcode”
(which all cellular hotspots generally, if not always, have), [Ms. Brinkley Decl., Doc. 14, at
19, 22], the record contains no evidence that her cellphone itself has a protected passcode. If
Mr. Brinkley were to gain access to the cellphone, he would have access to the internet. Also,
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law enforcement recovered multiple electronic devices from Mr. Brinkley’s home, [Hr’g Tr.,
Doc. 39, at 19:16–18, No. 2:26-mj-00112-1-CRW], so the Court can infer that Mr. Brinkley is
technologically adept. Neither of these pieces of evidence—the possible lack of a passcode on
Ms. Brinkley’s cellphone and Mr. Brinkley’s apparent technological savvy—bodes well for the
community’s safety when the Court views them together or separately.
So for all these reasons, Mr. Brinkley’s plan to take up residence in a private home—
the very type of setting where he allegedly committed a violation of § 2252A(a)(5)(B)—and
to reside there with a continually present source of internet service, which may or may not have
adequate protections that will exclude his access, is not a plan that will reasonably assure the
community’s safety. The United States has therefore demonstrated, by clear and convincing
evidence, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the community’s
safety.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having conducted a de novo review of the record, the Court concludes that the United
States has satisfied its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Brinkley’s
release pending trial would pose a danger to the community and “no condition or combination
of conditions will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community.” 18
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). Mr. Brinkley’s Motion for Revocation of Detention Order and Motion for
Release under Appropriate Conditions [Doc. 47] is therefore DENIED, and Magistrate Judge
Wyrick’s Order of Detention [Doc. 41] is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED:
s/ Clifton L. Corker
United States District Judge
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