USA v. Haney, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
)
)
) 	No.: 	3:24-CR-113-TAV-JEM
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
TIFFANY HANEY, ANNE WARREN,
and TINA ROPER,
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This criminal matter is before the Court on consideration of the government’s first
motion in limine, contained within its omnibus motion [Doc. 241, pp. 1, 3–4], defendant Tina
Roper’s fourteenth motion in limine, contained within her omnibus motion [Doc. 242, p. 4],
and defendant Tiffany Haney’s motion in limine [Doc. 244].
I. 	The Parties’ Arguments
A. 	The Government’s Motion in Limine
In its first motion in limine [Doc. 241, pp. 1, 3–4], the government states that it has
identified approximately 1,200 prescriptions filled at Rocky Hill Pharmacy (“RHP”) that it
may introduce at trial as evidence of the alleged fraud, leaving many other prescriptions that
the government does not intend to introduce. The government argues that defendants should
be precluded from eliciting testimony or offering into evidence these “other prescriptions” for
the purpose of showing that defendants “sometimes filled valid prescriptions” [Id. at 3]. The
government submits that “individual instances of non-criminal conduct have no relevance to
the charges at issue” [Id. (quoting United States v. Householder, 645 F. Supp. 3d 844, 852–53
(S.D. Ohio 2022))]. Moreover, evidence of valid prescriptions would confuse the jury about
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the allegations actually at issue and mislead the jury into thinking that “fraudulent conduct
may be excused by other, innocent conduct” [Id. at 4 (citation omitted)]. 	Lastly, the
presentation of such evidence would cause undue delay and waste time [Id. (citing Fed. R.
Evid. 403)].
In 	response, 	defendants 	contend 	that 	evidence 	of 	prescriptions 	outside 	the
government’s exhibit list are admissible pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and
403 because this evidence “bears directly on [d]efendants’ intent, knowledge, absence of
mistake, and the legitimate scope” of RHP’s operations [Doc. 248, p. 7]. 	Furthermore,
“[e]vidence that [RHP] consistently processed valid prescriptions is highly probative of
[d]efendants’ lack of motive or intent to engage in the alleged wire fraud conspiracy” [Id.].
Defendants also argue that excluding valid prescription evidence would “distort the factual
record and mislead the jury[,]” as the absence of such evidence would leave a false impression
that all, or even most, of RHP’s operations were suspect or fraudulent [Id.]. Finally, defendants
submit that prescriptions beyond those identified as government exhibits readily satisfy Rule
403’s balancing test as such evidence “lies at the core of the defense and carries substantial
probative value, while posing no risk of unfair prejudice to the [g]overnment” [Id.].
In reply, the government asserts that defendants seek to argue that “certain prescriptions
cannot have been fraudulent because different, unrelated prescriptions were valid[,]” an
argument prohibited by case law [Doc. 250, pp. 2–3 (citing, in part, United States v. Dimora,
750 F.3d 619, 630 (6th Cir. 2014))]. In particular, the government focuses on two cases out
of the Eastern District of Michigan—United States v. Kouza, No. 20-cr-20430, 2024 WL
3236703 (E.D. Mich. June 28, 2024) and United States v. Judd, 672 F. Supp. 3d 389 (E.D.
Mich. 2023) [Id. at 2–4]. 	In each of these cases, in which healthcare fraud was alleged, the
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government moved to preclude evidence of “legitimate billing” [Id. at 3 (citations omitted)].
And in each case the defendants objected [Id. (citation omitted)]. Specifically, in Kouza, the
defendants argued that such evidence was “critical” to their defense of negligence [Id. (citing
2024 WL 3236703, at *2)]. In Judd, the defendant argued that he should be allowed to present
such evidence “to counter the argument that he was knowingly and willfully trying to defraud”
[Id. (quoting 672 F. Supp. 3d at 393)]. 	In each case, the court granted the government’s
motion, finding that instances of legitimate billing had no bearing on whether the defendant(s)
were guilty of the fraudulent conduct charged by the government [Id. (citations omitted)].
At the final pretrial conference [Doc. 255], defendants claimed that the case law cited
by the government was distinguishable from this case. In particular, defendants asserted that
such cases dealt with the introduction of “isolated instances” of proper billing, and here, the
predominant practice was proper billing. And, on the other side of the coin, defendants argued
that the government here is attempting to take isolated instances of alleged fraudulent billing
and prove a pattern and practice from these instances. 	Specifically, defendants averred that
the government intends on introducing select prescriptions out of a larger “stack” that do not
accurately portray the prescriber’s pattern and what defendants understood the prescriber’s
pattern to be, going to knowledge and intent. 	In response, the government maintained that
defendants were seeking to introduce evidence of “other prescriptions” for propensity
purposes, which is forbidden [Id.].
B. 	Defendant Roper’s Motion in Limine
In her motion in limine, defendant Roper requests that, pursuant to Rules 401 and 402,
the Court exclude “irrelevant pharmacy/medical/billing records not directly related to the
alleged conspiracy and limit the government to the relevant issues specific to the charges
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alleged” in the Third Superseding Indictment [Doc. 242, p. 4]. 	In support of this request,
defendants1 submit that they “seek to limit the evidence in this trial to the relevant issues and
manageable exhibits” [Id. at 8].
In response, the government contends that defendants do not specify which “records”
they are referring to, and therefore, the Court cannot rule on their relevance [Doc. 247, p. 6].
At the final pretrial conference [Doc. 255], the Court first noted the seeming
relationship between defendant Roper’s motion [Doc. 242, p. 4] and the government’s first
motion in limine [Doc. 241, pp. 1, 3–4]. Defendants appeared to agree with this assessment,
arguing that, if the government puts on proof of a single prescription, defendants should be
able to put in every other prescription that the same provider had filled at RHP. Accordingly,
defendants asserted that the relevance of “pharmacy/medical/billing records” would depend
on the government. Furthermore, defendants stated that they should be able to use such records
in assessing the credibility of witnesses, particularly providers who may testify as to not
authorizing specific prescriptions.
C. 	Defendant Haney’s Motion in Limine
In her motion in limine, defendant Haney moves the Court to preclude the government
from introducing at trial:
[A]ny evidence, testimony, exhibits, or argument concerning [her] alleged
“lavish” or “extravagant” lifestyle, including but not limited to references to
expensive purchases, private aircrafts, boats, high-end vehicles, designer goods,
real estate, or photographs and/or videos depicting such items.
1 At the final pretrial conference [Doc. 255], the Court granted defendant Anne Warren and
defendant Haney’s motions to adopt defendant Roper’s motion in limine [See Docs. 243, 245].
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[Doc. 244, p. 1]. 	In support of this request, defendant Haney draws the Court’s attention to
United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 369, 378 (6th Cir. 2002), in which the Sixth
Circuit “devised a three-factor test to evaluate the admissibility of evidence of a defendant’s
wealth” [Id. at 3]. Specifically, as defendant Haney submits, evidence of wealth is admissible
under Rule 403 only if all the following factors are met: “(1) there is other credible evidence,
direct or circumstantial, of the illegal activity; (2) the money spent was not available to the
defendant from a legitimate source; and (3) the accumulation of great wealth or extravagant
spending 	relates 	to 	the 	period 	of 	the 	alleged 	illegal 	activity” 	[Id. 	at 	3–4 	(citing
Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d at 378)]. 	The government, defendant Haney argues, cannot
satisfy the Jackson-Randolph framework [Id. at 4].
As to Rule 401, defendant Haney submits that evidence concerning her luxury travel,
vehicles, real estate, or discretionary spending has no bearing on whether she committed any
of the offenses charged in the indictment [Id.]. 	As to the money laundering allegations
specifically, defendant Haney argues that the transactions identified in the indictment are
“limited to alleged transfers from a [RHP] account to a personal bank account[,]” and
therefore, “[w]hether [she] later used those funds . . . for travel, purchases, or personal expenses
is wholly irrelevant” to the charged offenses [Id. at 5]. 	Even if such evidence had some
marginal relevance in this case, defendant Haney contends that Rule 403 mandates its
exclusion because “its minimal probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice and jury confusion” [Id. at 6]. Specifically, the admission of such evidence
would subject defendant Haney to “class-based prejudice” [Id.].
Furthermore, defendant Haney argues that the government neither alleges, nor can it
prove, that the funds she used to support her “lifestyle” or “purchases” were derived from an
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illegitimate source [Id.]. 	Defendant points out that the prescriptions at the core of the
government’s case only account for approximately $2.9 million in reimbursements, which is
only a fraction of the estimated $32 million revenue generated by RHP during the relevant
period [Id.]. 	And given that the government has requested the Court exclude evidence of
prescriptions beyond which it has identified as trial exhibits, the government has confined itself
to that $2.9 million [Id.]. Defendant Haney submits that, therefore, there remains millions of
dollars of unchallenged revenue which she used to support her lifestyle [Id. at 6–7].
Moreover, defendant Haney asserts that allowing the government to allude to “luxury
purchases and/or experiences” presents a substantial risk of inflaming the jury, and it invites a
“verdict driven by emotion, moral judgment, or socioeconomic bias, rather than proof of the
charged offenses” [Id. at 7 (citation omitted)]. 	Ultimately, defendant Haney contends,
allowing such evidence would divert the jury’s attention away from guilt and transform this
trial into “a referendum on wealth rather than culpability” [Id.].
In response, the government argues that the evidence of defendants’ lavish and
extravagant lifestyles is not unfairly prejudicial and is relevant to show “that the charged fraud
occurred, that the defendants knew about it, and that they had a motive to participate in it”
[Doc. 246, p. 1]. The government states that it intends to show at trial that defendants profited
from their fraud by introducing evidence that, only a few years after RHP opened, defendants
were living lifestyles “above the means of legitimate pharmacists[,]” e.g., the accrual of
millions of dollars in stocks and real estate, the purchase of a luxury lake house, and chartered
flights on private planes [Id.].
This evidence, the government asserts, is relevant to the charged offenses in three ways
[Id.]. 	First, it directly supports the alleged fraud as defendants’ high revenue “makes the
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existence of the alleged fraud more probable” [Id. at 1–2]. Second, the evidence is relevant to
prove defendants’ motive as “[f]inancial gain and a luxurious lifestyle are powerful incentives”
[Id. at 2]. Third, the evidence is relevant to prove defendants’ knowledge [Id.]. Specifically,
“[t]he fact that the defendants were living lifestyles far above the means of legitimate
pharmacists makes it less likely they were ignorant of the fraud and less plausible that they
believed in good faith that the pharmacy was doing only legitimate business” [Id.]. 	And
furthermore, the government avers, evidence of large personal expenditures shows that
defendants knew they were making a lot of money [Id.].
As to Rule 403, the government submits that expenditures such as stocks, real estate,
and chartered flights are “not particularly salacious[,]” and do not suggest that defendants
committed other, charged crimes or that defendants were involved in inflammatory vices such
as gambling [Id. at 2–3]. And while defendants raise the danger of “class-based animus,” this
danger can be “easily neutralized through voir dire and jury instructions” [Id. at 3].
The government also contends that Jackson-Randolph actually supports its position
[Id.]. Specifically, in Jackson-Randolph, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the admission of evidence
about defendant’s “extravagant lifestyle and spending” in a mail fraud and money laundering
case, finding such evidence “probative of [the defendant’s] participation in the alleged fraud
and embezzlement because it demonstrated expenditures and wealth accumulation grossly in
excess of her legitimate income and assets” [Id. (quoting 282 F.3d at 380)]. And here, all three
factors laid out by the Sixth Circuit in Jackson-Randolph are present [Id.]. First, the
government submits that defendants do not appear to dispute the first and third factors, leaving
only the second factor: “the money spent was not available to the defendant from a legitimate
source” [Id.]. 	See Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d at 378. 	As to this second factor, the
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government highlights that “defendants do not assert that their money came from any source
but the pharmacy” [Id. at 4]. And the gross revenue of RHP says “very little about [RHP’s]
profits in the absence of fraud” [Id.]. Ultimately, the government submits, if defendants are
asserting that a small, relatively new pharmacy could, through legitimate business alone,
“generate sufficient profit in a few years to fund multi-million-dollar investment accounts”
and luxury expenses, “that assertion should be left for the jury to evaluate” [Id.].
The government cites to two cases in support of its arguments: United States v.
Chalhoub, 946 F.3d 897 (6th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Sosa-Baladron, 800 F. App’x
313 (6th Cir. 2020) [Id. at 4–5]. 	In Sosa-Baladron, the government submits that the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s admission of two photographs of the defendant’s home
despite “[t]he lack of direct connection between the house . . . and [the] illegal activity” [Id. at
5 (quoting 800 F. App’x at 327)]. Furthermore, the Sosa-Baladon court provided that while a
direct connection “would certainly enhance the probative value of such evidence, it is not
necessary” [Id. (quoting 800 F. App’x at 327)].
At the final pretrial conference [Doc. 255], defendants argued that the vast majority of
the prescriptions in this case are unchallenged, and therefore, whatever the government seeks
to introduce needs to be connected to the $2.9 million of reimbursements. 	In response, the
government contended that evidence that a pharmacy is making more than a legitimate
pharmacy should be expected to make is relevant for the same reasons outlined in its response
[See Doc. 246]. In reply, defendants asserted that they had not received disclosure of any type
of argument related to the benchmark of what a pharmacy typically profits.
After questioning, the government stated that it was not seeking to introduce this
“pharmacy-profit-benchmark” 	evidence. 	Rather, 	the 	government 	intends 	to 	introduce
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evidence that in 2018, RHP was struggling, and within just a few years, the pharmacy was
making more money than one could expect a pharmacy to make. When asked by the Court if
such argument opened the door for defendants to discuss legitimate prescriptions, the
government replied it did not.
In response to the government’s line of argument, defendants asserted that lifestyle
choices should not be discussed unless the government could tie such choices to the alleged
fraudulent activity. Furthermore, defendants argued that RHP opened in 2018 and then became
successful, which is not against the law and does not suggest criminal activity.
II. 	Analysis and Ruling
The Court has broad discretion “in determinations based on considerations of relevance
and prejudice.” Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d at 376 (citing United States v. Hawkins, 969 F.2d
169, 174 (6th Cir. 1992); and then citing United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 445 (6th Cir.
1984)). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less
probable than it would be without that evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401(a)–(b). Courts “employ
an ‘extremely liberal’ relevancy standard.” 	Sosa-Baladron, 800 F. App’x at 325 (quoting
United States v. Ramer, 883 F.3d 659, 681 (6th Cir. 2018)). 	Rule 403, however, instructs
courts to exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of such evidence “is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” 	Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,
687 (1988); accord Fed. R. Evid. 403. 	Notably, the balancing test of Rule 403 “is strongly
weighted toward admission.” United States v. Asher, 910 F.3d 854, 860 (6th Cir. 2018).
Turning specifically to the question of “lifestyle evidence,” the Court begins by noting
that the Supreme Court has stated, and the Sixth Circuit has recognized, that “appeals to class
prejudice are highly improper and cannot be condoned and trial courts should ever be alert to
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prevent them.” United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 239 (1940); accord
Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d at 376; Chalhoub, 946 F.3d at 908. Furthermore, “it is illogical
and improper to equate financial success and affluence with greed and corruption” as most
wealth and affluence “are gained through honest and socially desirable or socially neutral
means.” 	Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d at 377 (citation omitted). 	But, the Sixth Circuit
recognized, “there is a distinction between evidence that impermissibly appeals to class
prejudice and wealth-related evidence that passes muster under Rule 403.” 	Chalhoub, 946
F.3d at 908 (citation omitted). To that end, the Sixth Circuit established a three-part test that,
if satisfied, establishes that any unfair prejudice from wealth-related evidence does not
outweigh its probative value: “(1) there is other credible evidence, direct or circumstantial, of
the illegal activity; (2) the money spent was not available to the defendant from a legitimate
source; and (3) the accumulation of great wealth or extravagant spending relates to the period
of the alleged illegal activity.” Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d at 378.
To start, the Court finds that, generally, the “lifestyle” evidence the government seeks
to introduce satisfies the “extremely liberal” standard of relevance. See Sosa-Baladron, 800
F. App’x at 325 (citations omitted). As noted by the Sixth Circuit, a direct connection between
“lifestyle” evidence and a defendant’s illegal activity “would certainly enhance the probative
value of such evidence, [but] it is not necessary.” Id. at 327 (quoting Jackson-Randolph, 282
F.3d at 379). Rather, “[w]hat is important is a ‘natural connection’ from which the jury may
reasonably infer that the funds derived from the illegal activity financed the subject of the
wealth evidence.” 	Id. (citation omitted). 	Here, acknowledging that the Court is presently
relying on a limited factual record, the Court finds that a jury could reasonably infer a natural
connection between the general “lifestyle” evidence the government seeks to introduce
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regarding defendants and the proceeds of defendants’ alleged offenses. 	See Chalhoub, 946
F.3d at 907, 909 (noting that the district court admitted evidence of a lavish lifestyle, finding
in part that such evidence showed the jury a motive to commit the alleged crimes). 	In so
finding, the Court reiterates again that “[r]elevance of evidence is a low bar.” United States v.
Burrell, 114 F.4th 537, 556 (6th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Wilder, 87 F.4th 816, 819 (6th Cir. 2023)).
Turning to Rule 403, the main point of contention between the parties here appears to
be the second prong of the Jackson-Randolph test: “the money spent was not available to the
defendant from a legitimate source[.]” 	282 F.3d at 378. 	The Court notes the difficulty in
assessing the second prong of Jackson-Randolph test as the parties’ arguments are largely
circular in nature. Defendants submit that the wealth to make particular lifestyle choices and
purchases can be attributed to the other business revenue of RHP that does not fall within the
scope of the government’s proposed trial exhibits. And the government, in turn, argues that
its selection of exhibits is only a portion of defendants’ fraudulent conduct at RHP.
Furthermore, at this juncture, the Court is operating in a factual vacuum in which the record
has not been developed as to the monetary aspects of this case, e.g., the extent of legitimate
business RHP was performing and the amount of revenue attributable. Cf. Jackson-Randolph,
282 F.3d at 378 (finding that the government had adequately demonstrated that the money at
issue was not available from another source because the government estimated, using the
defendant’s credit card statements and checking account activity, that the defendant’s
expenditures amounted to approximately $3.9 million, but tax returns and testimony from the
defendant’s accountant revealed legitimate income of only $2.5 million).
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Nonetheless, the Court recognizes the following. 	First, the Court acknowledges that
the case law generally indicates a pattern of admitting, or affirming the admittance of, lifestyle
evidence given its probative value in similar cases. 	See Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d at
376–80; Chalhoub, 946 F.3d at 907–09; Sosa-Baladron, 800 F. App’x at 326–27. Second, and
on the other side of this coin, the Court finds that the admittance of such lifestyle evidence by
the government increases the relevance and probative value of defendants’ evidence as to valid
prescriptions.
Therefore, in recognition of the parties’ arguments, the case law, and the rules of
evidence, particularly Rules 401 and 403, the Court will impose the following parameters.
First, the government is PERMITTED to put on proof of RHP’s profitability and the
defendants’ lifestyles, subject to the limiting instruction discussed infra. 	The government,
however, is PROHIBITED from using inflammatory phrases such as “lavish lifestyle” or
“extravagant lifestyle” at trial. As this case approaches trial, the Court continues to be guided
by the Sixth Circuit’s decisions in Jackson-Randolph and Chalhoub. In particular, the Court
would note that the Sixth Circuit in Chalhoub expressed a preference towards the use of
generic categories as compared with the direct presentation of luxury expenditures when
introducing lifestyle evidence. 946 F.3d at 909.
Second, defendants are PERMITTED to rebut the government’s evidence as to RHP’s
profitability and their lifestyles and may do so with evidence of prescriptions outside those
identified by the government as its proposed trial exhibits. In other words, defendants are not
limited to the alleged fraudulent dealings of which the government intends to introduce proof.
The Court further notes that, at this juncture, it will not place a limit on the scope or extent of
defendants’ rebuttal, leaving such determination for trial.
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On balance, the Court finds that these parameters allow the admission of probative
evidence while curbing any unfair prejudice defendants may suffer from the introduction of
such evidence. In so finding, the Court also notes that “[a] ruling on a motion in limine is no
more than a preliminary, or advisory, opinion.” United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007
(6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); accord Householder, 645 F. Supp. 3d at 849. 	Thus, the
“[d]enial [or granting] of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all evidence
contemplated by the motion [will or] will not be admitted at trial.” Householder, 645 F. Supp.
3d at 849 (quoting Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004)).
The Court can alter its ruling at any point before or during the trial. 	Id. (citing Yannott, 42
F.3d at 1007; and then citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41–42 (1984)).
In addition to the above set parameters, the Court also finds a limiting instruction to be
appropriate for this evidentiary issue as aspects of defendants’ lifestyle will be admitted for a
limited purpose. Accordingly, the Court proposes the following limiting instruction:
You have heard evidence regarding defendants’ lifestyles. 	You may consider
evidence of defendants’ lifestyles as evidence of their motive, knowledge, or
intent, if any, to commit the charged offenses. 	You must not consider the
evidence of these defendants’ lifestyles for any other purpose.
If the parties have any comments as to this proposed limiting instruction, such comments must
be filed no later than Monday, February 2, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.
III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons explained herein, and subject to the development of proof at trial, the
Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	At trial, the government is PERMITTED to put on proof of RHP’s
profitability and the defendants’ lifestyles but PROHIBITED from
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using inflammatory phrases such as “lavish lifestyle” or “extravagant
lifestyle.”
2. 	At trial, defendants are PERMITTED to rebut the government’s
evidence as to RHP’s profitability and their lifestyles and may do so
with 	evidence 	of 	prescriptions 	outside 	those 	identified 	by 	the
government as its proposed trial exhibits.
3. 	Any comments as to the Court’s proposed limiting instruction must
be filed no later than Monday, February 2, 2026, at 2:00 p.m.
Eastern Standard Time.
4. 	The government’s first motion in limine [Doc. 241, pp. 1, 3-4],
defendant Roper’s fourteenth motion in limine [Doc. 242, p. 4], and
defendant Haney’s motion in limine [Doc. 244] are DENIED.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 The Court acknowledges argument made in the parties’ written briefing and at the final
pretrial conference as to the admission of valid prescriptions for purposes other than those
described in the Court’s above ruling. 	The Court reserves ruling on the admission of such
prescriptions for other purposes for trial.
At the final pretrial conference [Doc. 255], the Court also took under advisement the
government’s seventh motion in limine [Doc. 241, pp. 1, 9–11]. In consideration of the present
factual vacuum, and noting that “[g]enerally, it is better to address admissibility questions as they
arise at trial[,]” see Wolff v. Maybech Int’l Grp., Inc., No. CV 2:19-149-DCR, 2023 WL 3602810,
at *4 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 4, 2023), the Court will DENY this motion [id.] with leave to make appropriate
objections at trial.
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