Means v. Dymyda et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COOKEVILLE DIVISION
ROBERT MEANS,
Plaintiff,
v.
IHOR DYMYDA, and AZE INC. d/b/a
E&O GLOBAL, INC.
Defendants.
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No. 2:25-cv-00032
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case presents a straightforward question: whether Robert Means plausibly alleges that
Ihor Dymyda was unfit for commercial driving and that his employer—AZE Inc.—knew or should
have known as much. 	Federal law disqualifies commercial drivers who do not have enough
proficiency to read, speak, respond, and write in English. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.11(b). Dymyda
allegedly cannot speak or understand English. 	(Doc. No. 9 ¶¶ 18-22) (“First Amended
Complaint,” or “FAC”). After Means and Dymyda collided on the highway, Means sued Dymyda
and AZE asserting various negligence theories—one being that AZE negligently hired Dymyda as
a commercial driver because it knew (or should have known) he could not speak and understand
English. 	Because the Court finds that the FAC plausibly alleges Dymyda’s disqualification,
AZE’s partial motion to dismiss the negligent hiring claim1 (Doc. No. 11) will be denied.
1 Before Means amended his Complaint, AZE moved to dismiss the negligent hiring claim from
the original Complaint on similar grounds (Doc. No. 7). That motion is still pending and will be
denied as moot. See Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 306-07 (6th Cir.
2000) (holding that an amended complaint supersedes all previous complaints); Crawford v.
Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2021) (“The general rule is that filing an amended complaint
moots pending motions to dismiss.”).
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I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND BACKGROUND2
AZE is an interstate motor carrier. (FAC ¶ 15). While driving for AZE, Dymyda caused
a collision with Means’s vehicle on I-40 in Cumberland County by driving too slowly and failing
to pull off the highway; Means suffered “severe and permanent injuries.” (Id. ¶¶ 5-8). AZE hired
Dymyda even though it “knew or should have known” that Dymyda is unable to “speak and
understand the English Language.” (Id. ¶¶ 18-22).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Venema v. West, 133 F.4th
625, 632 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 	“A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678). When determining whether the complaint meets this standard, the Court must
accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor, and “take all of those facts and inferences and determine whether they plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief.” Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The question presented is whether Means plausibly alleges that Dymyda was unfit for the
job and that AZE knew or should have known as much. 	49 C.F.R. § 391.11(b) sets forth
qualifications for driving a commercial motor vehicle. 	Among them is that a driver be able to
“read and speak the English language sufficiently” to be able to (1) “converse with the general
2 Unless noted otherwise, the Court draws the facts in this section from the FAC (Doc. No. 9) and
assumes the truth of those allegations for purposes of ruling on the instant motion. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
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public,” (2) “understand highway traffic signs and signals in the English language,” (3) “respond
to official inquiries,” and (4) “make entries on reports and records.” 	49 C.F.R. § 391.11(b)(2).
Means’s negligent hiring claim is deficient, AZE contends, because Means fails to allege that
Dymyda’s 	inability 	to 	speak 	and 	understand 	English 	violated 	any 	of 	those 	enumerated
requirements. 	(Doc. No. 11-1 at 4-5). 	Thus, according to AZE, it was not negligent in hiring
Dymyda because federal law did not disqualify him. 	Means, on the other hand, contends that
Dymyda’s inability to speak and understand any English whatsoever means that he could not meet
any of the enumerated requirements. (Doc. No. 13 at 2-3).3 The Court agrees with Means.
Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff may recover for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention
of an employee if he establishes, in addition to the elements of a negligence claim, that the
employer had knowledge of the employee’s unfitness for the job. Binns v. Trader Joe’s E., Inc.,
690 S.W.3d 241, 254 (Tenn. 2024). 	To establish the employer’s knowledge, the plaintiff must
show that the employer knew, or should have known through the exercise of reasonable care, that
the employee was not qualified to perform the work for which he was hired. 	Bernard v.
Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1051 (M.D. Tenn. 2025).
Here, Means alleges that AZE hired Dymyda even though it “knew or should have known”
that Dymyda is unable to “speak and understand the English Language” and is “disqualified from
operating a commercial motor vehicle.” (FAC ¶¶ 20-21). Put simply, someone who cannot speak
and understand English cannot converse with the public in English, cannot understand traffic signs
and signals in English, cannot respond to inquiries in English, and cannot make entries in English.
Therefore, taking Means’s allegations as true, he plausibly alleges that AZE negligently hired
3 The Court is not aware of—and the parties have not cited—any cases in this circuit (or others)
addressing negligent hiring of an alleged disqualified commercial driver under 49 C.F.R. §
391.11(b)(2).
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Dymyda: he was unfit for the job, and AZE knew or should have known as much by exercising
reasonable care. See Binns, 690 S.W.3d at 254; Bernard, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1051.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
AZE’s first partial motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED AS MOOT. AZE’s second
partial motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 11) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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