Robertson v. Hatfield et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER DEWAN ROBERTSON,
# 322628,
Plaintiff,
v.
GARY HATFIELD, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:24-cv-00621
Judge Richardson
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Christopher Robertson, who is currently in the custody of the West Tennessee State
Prison in Henning, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint alleging that his life sentence and the statue
under which he was sentenced violate the Constitution. (Doc. No. 1). The Complaint is now before
the Court for initial review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
I. 	FILING FEE
Plaintiff filed an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”)
(Doc. No. 2). Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). From a review of Plaintiff’s IFP Application and supporting documentation,
it appears that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay the full filing fee in
advance. Therefore, his IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) will be granted.
Under § 1915(b), Plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing fee.
The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides prisoner-
plaintiffs the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the remainder
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in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby assessed the full civil filing fee of $350, to be paid
as follows:
(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now
resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the
greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly
balance in Plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from
Plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all deposits
credited to Plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this
Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the
account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along
with the payment. All submissions to the Court must clearly identify Plaintiff’s name and the case
number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States
District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate
trust fund accounts at the West Tennessee State Prison to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiff’s
inmate trust account complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of
the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the custodian of his
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inmate trust fund account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place
of confinement for continued compliance.
II. 	SCREENING STANDARDS
The Court must conduct an initial review and dismiss the Complaint if it is facially
frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A. Review of the Complaint to determine whether it states a claim upon which relief may be
granted asks whether it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470−71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although pro se pleadings must be liberally construed,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the plaintiff must still “plead[ ] factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, upon “view[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff[.]” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009).
III. 	ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was convicted of first-degree murder on
February 26, 1999, and sentenced to life imprisonment under Tennessee Code § 39-13-204.
(Doc. No. 1 at 23). He argues that Section 39-13-204, when read in conjunction with other
Tennessee statutory provisions, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. (Id. at 24). He further
argues that his sentence violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, the Eighth
Amendment’s bar on cruel and unusual punishment, and the Ex Post Facto Clause. (Id.) Plaintiff
sues Amber Phillips, the sentencing manager for the Tennessee Department of Corrections,
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alleging that she has arbitrarily calculated his sentence under Tennessee’s life-imprisonment
sentencing regime. (Id. at 2). He also sues Gary Hatfield (Id. at 1), but the Complaint does not
make any factual allegations against Mr. Hatfield.
In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff requests the following:
A. Plaintiff prays for this Court to issue an injunction directing the Defendant to
cease and desist in the cruel and unusual punishment of Plaintiff and all those
similarly situated under the unconstitutional 1995 life sentence Amendment.
B. A finding that the relevant sentencing statutes as described herein to be
unconstitutionally vague and therefore unenforceable;
C. A finding 	that 	Plaintiffs 	rights 	pursuant 	to 	the 	Eighth 	and 	Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution have been violated via the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, substantive due process violation,
Ex Post Facto violations and Equal Protection violations.
D. Order Defendant and all relevant Tennessee agencies and departments to
immediately 	implement 	constitutionally 	sound 	policies, 	practices 	and
procedures to timely, efficiently and accurately process the sentence of Plaintiff,
and all those similarly situated, in accordance to constitutional mandates. The
Plaintiffs sentence must be calculated under § 40-35-501(h) under the 1989
Sentencing Reform Act (formerly 501(g) parole eligible). Resentencing the
Plaintiff under the 1989 Sentencing Reform Acts is not a favorable judgment
and would “at most speed a parole hearing application, but would not
automatically 	result 	in 	speedier 	release. 	(Tennessee 	authorities 	retained
discretion to deny parole.)
E. 	Award Plaintiff all costs, expenses and reasonable attorneys’ fees as permitted
by law, including under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
F. 	All other relief, legal or equitable, that the Court deems just and proper.
(Id. at 29−30) (emphasis in original).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
“Congress in enacting habeas and civil rights statutes and the Supreme Court in interpreting
them have tried to mark that line using clear principles for when a claim falls into habeas versus
§ 1983.” Kitchen v. Whitmer, 106 F.4th 525, 544 (6th Cir. 2024). “[P]risoners can ‘proceed under
§ 1983’ if (1) they do not seek an ‘injunction ordering immediate or speedier release into the
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community,’ and (2) ‘a favorable judgment would not necessarily imply the invalidity of their
convictions or sentences.’” Id. at 539 (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533−34 (2011)).
Otherwise, habeas is the proper vehicle.
Here, Plaintiff asserts that a judgment in his favor would not necessarily result in a speedier
release into the community. (Doc. No. 1 at 29) (“Resentencing the Plaintiff under the 1989
Sentencing Reform Acts is not a favorable judgment and would ‘at most’ speed a parole hearing
application, but would not automatically result in speedier release.” (emphasis in original)). Even
assuming this to be true, Plaintiff cannot bring his claims in a Section 1983 action, because a
judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence. Kitchen, 106 F.4th
at 539; see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (“[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a
§ 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.”). Indeed, the foundation of Plaintiff’s claim is that his sentence and the statute
pursuant to which he was sentenced are unconstitutional.
Plaintiff cannot sidestep the Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit’s clear guidance by
advancing 	a 	claim 	against 	Defendant 	Phillips 	for 	improperly 	calculating 	his 	sentence.
(See Doc. No. 1 at 25−27). This claim asserts that “Defendant Phillips calculation procedures
method, due to the arbitrary interpretation of Tennessee’s vague life sentence statutes, has failed
to apply Plaintiff’s life sentence pursuant to statutory and constitutional mandates.” (Id. at 26).
Plaintiff does not specify how Defendant Phillips has incorrectly calculated his sentence—aside
from applying Section 39-13-204—and his prayer for relief for this claim seeks a declaration that
the relevant sentencing statute is unconstitutionally vague and an order for Plaintiff to be
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resentenced under prior statutes. (Id.). A judgment in Plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his sentence. Accordingly, the claims “must be brought through habeas.” Kitchen,
106 F.4th at 544 (directing district court to dismiss claims on remand). Plaintiff’s complaint will
therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id.
at 534 n.4 (“Our court, following the Supreme Court’s lead, has phrased Heck challenges in terms
of whether a § 1983 claim is “cognizable,” which likely implies that a Heck challenge more
properly sounds in failure to state a claim as opposed to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
This dismissal will be without prejudice to Plaintiff raising the same claims in a habeas
corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1
V. 	CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. This dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff raising the same claims in a habeas corpus
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Plaintiff’s request to ascertain status, contained in “Plaintiff’s Motion for Status and Notice
of Change Address [sic]” (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED as moot.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment under Rule 58(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 Any Section 2254 petition must comply with all applicable statutes, including the statute of limitations,
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), statutory exhaustion requirement, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), and the statute governing
second or successive petitions, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
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