Del Rossi v. Dean

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MATTHEW DEL ROSSI,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS B. DEAN, District Attorney
General,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:26-cv-00035
Judge Trauger
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Procedural History
On January 9, 2026, plaintiff Matthew Del Rossi, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Doc. No. 1, “the Complaint”)
against Sumner County District Attorney General Thomas B. Dean, asserting claims against the
defendant in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 2.)
On January 27, 2026, the court screened the Complaint under the pauper statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). (Doc. No. 13.) The court summarized the allegations and claims of the Complaint,
as follows:
The Complaint alleges that, on July 15, 2025, the plaintiff was operating a motor
vehicle in Sumner County “with a firearm stored legally under the passenger seat.”
(Doc. No. 1 at 2.) He was stopped by law enforcement and subjected to a blood
draw, the results of which confirmed that his blood-alcohol content was below the
legal limit. (Id.) However, those results also “indicated the presence of non-
psychoactive THC metabolites.” (Id.) The plaintiff was not impaired at the time of
the stop, but the defendant nonetheless charged him with possessing a handgun
while “under the influence,” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1321. (Id.)
The Complaint claims that Section 39-17-1321 is void for vagueness, in that it “fails
to provide fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence as to what conduct is
prohibited, particularly regarding the presence of non-impairing metabolites.” (Id.)
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It also claims that the statute unconstitutionally burdens his Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms. (Id.) The Complaint asks the court to issue a
preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing
Section 39-17-1321 against the plaintiff, and to declare that the statute is
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to the plaintiff. (Id. at 3–4.)
(Doc. No. 13 at 2–3.)
Because the charge under Section 39-17-1321 was dismissed on January 6, 2026, three
days prior to the Complaint’s filing, the court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge
the state statute’s constitutionality; or, alternatively, that his challenge had been rendered moot by
the dismissal of the charge. (Id. at 4–6.) The court therefore dismissed the case without prejudice
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Id. at 6.)
Two weeks later, on February 9, 2026, the plaintiff filed a “Motion for Relief from
Judgment and to Reopen Proceedings Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) & (3).” (Doc. No. 15,
“the Post-Judgment Motion”.) In the Post-Judgment Motion, the plaintiff asserts that “new
material facts have emerged: on January 6, 2026, Judge C. Ron Blanton dismissed the state charges
after finding NO EVIDENCE of handgun possession. Despite this judicial finding, the
Defendant[] initiated a Bypass Indictment on February 2, 2026. This demonstrates Bad Faith
and necessitates the reopening of this federal civil rights action.” (Id. at 1–2 (emphasis in original).)
Then, on February 25, 2026, the plaintiff made a supplemental filing of evidence in support of his
post-judgment motion (Doc. No. 16), including (1) a Sumner County court notice advising the
plaintiff that his charges of arraignment and indictment include “DUI: First Offense” under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 55-10-401, and “Possession of Handgun While Under Influence” under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-17-1321; and (2) a copy of the grand jury indictment on the single charge of DUI in
violation of Section 55-10-401. (Doc. No. 16-1.)
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II. Analysis of the Post-Judgment Motion
Despite the Post-Judgment Motion’s denomination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b), courts “have long treated Rule 60(b) motions filed within 28 days [of judgment] as … Rule
59(e) motions.” Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 520 n.9 (2020) (citing, e.g., Skagerberg v.
Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 882–883 (10th Cir. 1986)); Inge v. Rock Financial Corp., 281 F.3d 613,
617 (6th Cir. 2002) (“When a party files a motion to reconsider a final order or judgment within
[28] days of entry, we will generally consider the motion to be brought pursuant to Rule 59(e).”).
Relief under Rule 59(e) is only warranted if the plaintiff identifies a clear error of law, newly
discovered evidence, an intervening change in controlling law, or a need to prevent manifest
injustice. Brumley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 F.3d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 2018).
While the plaintiff may be correct in asserting that the fact of his February indictment is
newly discovered evidence that may justify the reopening of this case, his charge of bad faith is
easily disposed of–– “[g]enerally, the State may seek an indictment by the grand jury subsequent
to a dismissal of a warrant and prior to a preliminary hearing, and the indictment starts a new
proceeding.” Jones v. Holloway, No. 2:14-CV-2501-JPM-TMP, 2017 WL 6811990, at *13 (W.D.
Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting State v. Whaley, 51 S.W.3d 568, 570–71 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)).
The Sumner County Online Court Records System indicates that the plaintiff’s case was dismissed
by General Sessions Judge C. Ron Blanton on January 6, 2026, after the entry of several orders of
continuance 	and 	without 	holding 	a 	preliminary 	hearing.
https://sumner.tncrtinfo.com/crCaseForm.aspx?id=62CFBDBB-7EBD-486A-B224-
8DB0B30ED2BF&dsid=957ea97e (last visited July 15, 2026). New charges were then filed
pursuant to indictment in Sumner County Circuit Court on February 5, 2026, and the plaintiff was
subsequently arraigned, had counsel appointed, and received a trial setting in September 2026.
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https://sumner.tncrtinfo.com/crCaseForm.aspx?id=3CEE179E-66A2-4ABC-8099-
EA19BBBEE1D3&dsid=34d8dd1f (last visited July 15, 2026). The plaintiff cites no grounds for
deeming these run-of-the-mill criminal proceedings to have been undertaken in bad faith or for
purposes of harassment.
Moreover, even if it were otherwise justifiable to reopen this previously non-justiciable
case, to do so in the absence of bad faith or a motive of harassment on the prosecution’s part would
be futile. That is because, as another district court aptly explained:
Federal courts generally are forbidden “to stay or enjoin pending state court
proceedings except under special circumstances.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
41 (1971). Younger reversed a lower court injunction which had enjoined a state
prosecution of the defendant under a state statute which the lower federal court had
found to be void for vagueness and overbreadth in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 40. Younger observed that normally a state-court
defendant “should first set up and rely on his defense in the state courts, even though
this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears
that this course would not afford adequate protection.” Id. at 45. For an injunction
to issue, plaintiff must show irreparable injury that is both “great and immediate.”
Id. “Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of
having to defend against a single prosecution, could not by themselves be
considered ‘irreparable’ in the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the threat to
the plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by
his defense against a single criminal prosecution.” Id. at 46.
…
As with the defendant in Younger, the injury [the plaintiff in this case] faces is solely
that incident to every criminal proceeding and the threat to his federally protected
rights can be eliminated by his defense against the pending prosecution. Plaintiff is
not entitled to an injunction even if the statutes under which he is being prosecuted
are unconstitutional.
Younger also applies to actions seeking a declaration that state statutes, under which
the plaintiff is being prosecuted in a state prosecution begun prior to the federal
suit, are unconstitutional. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971); see also,
Milchtein v. Chisolm, 880 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Younger applies to
requests for declaratory judgments as well as requests for injunctions.”) Therefore,
plaintiff is not entitled to a declaration that the [state] statutes under which he is
being prosecuted are unconstitutional.
Wigginton v. City of Belvidere, No. 22 C 50292, 2022 WL 14634952, at *2–4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25,
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2022).
The criteria for abstention under Younger––an ongoing state criminal prosecution, the
proceedings involve an important state interest, and the state proceedings will provide the federal
plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims, see Alexander v. Morgan,
353 F. Supp. 3d 622, 627 (W.D. Ky. 2018)––are met here as they were in Younger itself, where the
federal plaintiff sought to enjoin “an acute, live controversy with the State and its prosecutor”
based on the claimed unconstitutionality of the state criminal statute he was “actually being
prosecuted under.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 41, 42. Abstention would thus be mandatory if this case
were reopened, “absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, [because] federal
jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings.” Sun Ref.
& Mktg. Co. v. Brennan, 921 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1990); see id. (“[U]nlike other forms of
abstention, when a case is properly within the Younger category of cases, there is no discretion on
the part of the federal court to grant injunctive relief.”)
As previously discussed, a finding of bad faith or harassment is not justified in this case.
While the plaintiff argues in conclusory fashion that his indictment is harassing because it followed
dismissal of the matter in General Sessions Court, and is retaliatory because it was procured as
punishment for filing the instant lawsuit (Doc. No. 15 at 2), these arguments have no merit. This
lawsuit was never served upon the defendant. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has noted that the “types
of threats, or other similar actions,” which would trigger the harassment exception include
“repeated 	threats 	by 	prosecutors 	designed 	to 	discourage 	individuals 	from 	asserting 	their
constitutional rights.” Doe v. Univ. of Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2017). No such
harassment is evident here. Cf. Alexander, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 629 (bad faith and harassment are
“exceptional circumstances” that are “‘exceedingly rare”) (quoting Tindall v. Wayne Cty. Friend
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of Court, 269 F.3d 533, 539 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Finally, although the abstention requirement may be avoided in the case of “a patently
invalid” or “flagrant[ly] unconstitutional[]” state statute, Brennan, 921 F.2d at 639; Doe, 860 F.3d
at 371, the plaintiff has not articulated any reason for finding that such an exception applies to the
challenged statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1321. He claims that the statute is unconstitutionally
vague in that it “prohibits possessing a handgun while ‘under the influence’ without providing a
measurable standard for what constitutes ‘under the influence.’” (Doc. No. 1 at 2–3.) The pertinent
subsection of the statute criminalizes possession of a handgun “while under the influence of
alcohol or any controlled substance or controlled substance analogue,” notwithstanding any permit
to possess the handgun. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1321(a). “The term ‘driving under the influence’
has a common meaning, which has consistently been construed by the courts” as implying
substance-related impairment in the ability to drive. Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Steven, 962 F. Supp.
682, 686 (D.V.I. 1997), aff’d, 134 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 1998). The plaintiff has a legal argument
concerning whether this element is met in his case, where allegedly only non-psychoactive THC
metabolites and alcohol below the legal limit were found in his bloodstream, and his counsel may
make that argument in defending against his pending criminal charges. But the language of Section
39-17-1321 is not patently invalid or flagrantly unconstitutional. See Doe, 860 F.3d at 371 (“For
the flagrant unconstitutionality exception, ‘a statute might be flagrantly and patently violative of
express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever
manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.’”) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S.
at 53–54). There are thus no applicable exceptions to the rule that abstention would be required
under Younger if this case were reopened.
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III. Conclusion
This case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, based on
the January 2026 dismissal of the state’s attempt to enforce Section 39-17-1321 against the
plaintiff. If the case were reopened based on the February 2026 re-institution of a charge under
that same statute, on which charge the plaintiff is currently awaiting trial in state court, it would
again be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Younger. See,
e.g., Doe v. Lee, No. 3:21-CV-00809, 2022 WL 1164228, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 2022)
(declining to exercise jurisdiction based on Younger and dismissing case without prejudice). Given
that “a court should refrain from ordering a vain or futile act,” Pavarthi, LLC v. City of Toledo,
Ohio, No. 3:22-CV-0461-DAC, 2022 WL 3227366, at *4 & n.4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2022), this
court will not reopen this case only to close it again. The plaintiff’s Post-Judgment Motion (Doc.
No. 15) is DENIED.
It is so ORDERED.
____________________________________
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge
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