Kiner v. Esurance Insurance Services, INC et al

2:25-cv-02831TnwdDec 17, 2025

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
________________________________________________________________
GERALD KINER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 25-cv-2831-TLP-tmp
)
NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE 	)
COMPANY, INC., ALLSTATE 	)
INSURANCE COMPANY, and 	)
ESURANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR RECUSAL
________________________________________________________________
Before 	the 	Court 	are 	Plaintiff 	Gerald 	Kiner’s 	Motion 	for
Recusal and Amended Motion for Recusal. (ECF Nos. 8, 22.) For the
following reasons, both motions are DENIED.
28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	144(a) 	provides 	that 	“[w]henever 	a 	party 	. 	. 	.
makes 	and 	files 	a 	timely 	and 	sufficient 	affidavit 	that 	the 	judge
before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice
either 	against 	him 	or 	in 	favor 	of 	any 	adverse 	party, 	such 	judge
shall 	proceed 	no 	further 	therein[.]” 	An 	affidavit 	of 	bias 	or
prejudice 	must 	be 	made 	in 	a 	timely 	manner, 	or 	“not 	less 	than 	ten
days 	before 	the 	beginning 	of 	the 	term 	at 	which 	the 	proceeding 	is
to 	be 	heard.” 	Id. 	Recusal 	becomes 	mandatory 	only 	when 	counsel 	of
record 	certifies 	that 	the 	§ 	144 	affidavit 	is 	made 	in 	good 	faith—
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which 	is 	not 	applicable 	here 	because 	Kiner 	is 	proceeding 	pro 	se—
and 	the 	affidavit 	is 	both 	timely 	and 	sufficient. 	See 	Scott 	v.
Metro. 	Health 	Corp., 	234 	F. 	App’x 	341, 	352 	(6th 	Cir. 	2007); 	see
also 	Dalton 	v. 	State, 	No. 	2:25-cv-00071, 	2025 	WL 	2524232, 	at 	*4
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 2, 2025). Facts in the affidavit are accepted as
true, 	but 	the 	Court 	only 	gives 	weight 	“to 	facts 	that 	are
sufficiently 	definite 	and 	particular 	to 	convince 	a 	reasonable
person 	that 	bias 	exists; 	simple 	conclusions, 	opinions, 	or 	rumors
are insufficient.” Id. (quoting Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368
F.3d 	709, 	718 	(7th 	Cir. 	2004)); 	see 	also 	Meier 	v. 	Wyndham 	Hotels
& 	Resorts 	Co., 	No. 	22-12991, 	2023 	WL 	1811240, 	at 	*1 	(E.D. 	Mich.
Jan. 26, 2023).
Bias sufficient to justify recusal must be personal, arising
out 	of 	the 	judge’s 	background, 	and 	not 	based 	on 	the 	judge’s
interpretation of the law. Ullmo ex rel. Ullmo v. Gilmour Acad.,
273 	F.3d 	671, 	681 	(6th 	Cir. 	2001); 	see 	also 	Cardello-Smith 	v.
Combs, 	No. 	24-cv-12647, 	2025 	WL 	1951722, 	at 	*3 	(E.D. 	Mich. 	June
30, 	2025). 	A 	judge’s 	participation 	in 	the 	proceedings 	or 	prior
contact 	with 	a 	litigant 	in 	related 	cases 	cannot 	support 	a 	demand
for 	recusal. 	Liteky 	v. 	United 	States, 	510 	U.S. 	540, 	556 	(1994);
Murphy 	v. 	Brixworth 	Homeowners 	Ass’n, 	Inc., 	No. 	24-5823, 	2025 	WL
3459587, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025). “[A] judge is presumed to
be 	impartial, 	and 	the 	party 	seeking 	disqualification 	bears 	the
substantial 	burden 	of 	proving 	otherwise.” 	Scott, 	234 	F. 	App’x 	at
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352 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted); 	see 	also 	Lopez 	v. 	Trans
Union 	LLC, 	No. 	25-12733, 	2025 	WL 	3278015, 	at 	*1 	(E.D. 	Mich. 	Oct.
24, 2025).
In both motions, Kiner cites what he claims are errors of the
court, but all these alleged errors stem from previous rulings of
the 	court. 	(See 	ECF 	Nos. 	8, 	22.) 	In 	his 	original 	motion, 	Kiner
states that the motion is “based upon what Plaintiff contends are
prior rulings and conduct . . . that demonstrate bias and prejudice
toward 	[Kiner] 	in 	earlier 	proceedings[.]” 	(ECF 	No. 	8 	at 	PageID
73.) 	In 	this 	motion, 	he 	does 	not 	note 	any 	specific 	instances 	of
bias. In his amended motion, Kiner states that he has “identified
well over one hundred (100) distinct reversible errors across the
eleven 	(11) 	orders 	listed[.]” 	(ECF 	No. 	22 	at 	PageID 	176.) 	These
orders include various decisions in one of Kiner’s previous cases
before 	this 	court, 	including 	a 	denial 	of 	a 	motion 	to 	compel,
striking 	a 	reply 	brief, 	and 	limiting 	discovery. 	(ECF 	No. 	22-1 	at
PageID 	182.) 	Kiner 	only 	cites 	actions 	taken 	by 	the 	court 	in
previous proceedings, which is an insufficient basis for recusal.
Therefore, based on the above, Kiner’s Motion for Recusal and
Amended Motion for Recusal are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
December 17, 2025
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Case 2:25-cv-02831-BCL-tmp
Document 66 Filed 12/17/25 Page 1 of 4 PageID

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION
GERALD KINER,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
No. 25-cv-2831-TLP-tmp
NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE
)
COMPANY, INC. , ALLSTATE
)
INSURANCE COMPANY, and
)
ESURANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF' S MOTIONS FOR RECUSAL
Before the Court are Plaintiff Gerald Kiner's Motion for Recusal and Amended Motion for Recusal. (ECF Nos. 8, 22.) For the following reasons, both motions are DENIED.
28 U.S.C. § 144 (a) provides that "[w] henever a party . .
. makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein [.]" An affidavit of bias or prejudice must be made in a timely manner, or "not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard." Id. Recusal becomes mandatory only when counsel of record certifies that the $ 144 affidavit is made in good faith-
AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO
)
)

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which 	is 	not 	applicable 	here 	because 	Kiner 	is 	proceeding 	pro 	se—
and 	the 	affidavit 	is 	both 	timely 	and 	sufficient. 	See 	Scott 	v.
Metro. 	Health 	Corp., 	234 	F. 	App’x 	341, 	352 	(6th 	Cir. 	2007); 	see
also 	Dalton 	v. 	State, 	No. 	2:25-cv-00071, 	2025 	WL 	2524232, 	at 	*4
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 2, 2025). Facts in the affidavit are accepted as
true, 	but 	the 	Court 	only 	gives 	weight 	“to 	facts 	that 	are
sufficiently 	definite 	and 	particular 	to 	convince 	a 	reasonable
person 	that 	bias 	exists; 	simple 	conclusions, 	opinions, 	or 	rumors
are insufficient.” Id. (quoting Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368
F.3d 	709, 	718 	(7th 	Cir. 	2004)); 	see 	also 	Meier 	v. 	Wyndham 	Hotels
& 	Resorts 	Co., 	No. 	22-12991, 	2023 	WL 	1811240, 	at 	*1 	(E.D. 	Mich.
Jan. 26, 2023).
Bias sufficient to justify recusal must be personal, arising
out 	of 	the 	judge’s 	background, 	and 	not 	based 	on 	the 	judge’s
interpretation of the law. Ullmo ex rel. Ullmo v. Gilmour Acad.,
273 	F.3d 	671, 	681 	(6th 	Cir. 	2001); 	see 	also 	Cardello-Smith 	v.
Combs, 	No. 	24-cv-12647, 	2025 	WL 	1951722, 	at 	*3 	(E.D. 	Mich. 	June
30, 	2025). 	A 	judge’s 	participation 	in 	the 	proceedings 	or 	prior
contact 	with 	a 	litigant 	in 	related 	cases 	cannot 	support 	a 	demand
for 	recusal. 	Liteky 	v. 	United 	States, 	510 	U.S. 	540, 	556 	(1994);
Murphy 	v. 	Brixworth 	Homeowners 	Ass’n, 	Inc., 	No. 	24-5823, 	2025 	WL
3459587, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025). “[A] judge is presumed to
be 	impartial, 	and 	the 	party 	seeking 	disqualification 	bears 	the
substantial 	burden 	of 	proving 	otherwise.” 	Scott, 	234 	F. 	App’x 	at
Case 2:25-cv-02831-BCL-tmp Document 66 Filed 12/17/25 Page 2 of 4 PageID
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- 3 -
352 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted); 	see 	also 	Lopez 	v. 	Trans
Union 	LLC, 	No. 	25-12733, 	2025 	WL 	3278015, 	at 	*1 	(E.D. 	Mich. 	Oct.
24, 2025).
In both motions, Kiner cites what he claims are errors of the
court, but all these alleged errors stem from previous rulings of
the 	court. 	(See 	ECF 	Nos. 	8, 	22.) 	In 	his 	original 	motion, 	Kiner
states that the motion is “based upon what Plaintiff contends are
prior rulings and conduct . . . that demonstrate bias and prejudice
toward 	[Kiner] 	in 	earlier 	proceedings[.]” 	(ECF 	No. 	8 	at 	PageID
73.) 	In 	this 	motion, 	he 	does 	not 	note 	any 	specific 	instances 	of
bias. In his amended motion, Kiner states that he has “identified
well over one hundred (100) distinct reversible errors across the
eleven 	(11) 	orders 	listed[.]” 	(ECF 	No. 	22 	at 	PageID 	176.) 	These
orders include various decisions in one of Kiner’s previous cases
before 	this 	court, 	including 	a 	denial 	of 	a 	motion 	to 	compel,
striking 	a 	reply 	brief, 	and 	limiting 	discovery. 	(ECF 	No. 	22-1 	at
PageID 	182.) 	Kiner 	only 	cites 	actions 	taken 	by 	the 	court 	in
previous proceedings, which is an insufficient basis for recusal.
Therefore, based on the above, Kiner’s Motion for Recusal and
Amended Motion for Recusal are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
December 17, 2025
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