De La Luz v. Facility Administrator of the Western Tennessee Detention Facility et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
MARIANO RAIMUNDO DE LA LUZ,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 2:26-cv-3253-BCL-tmp
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, et al.,
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
______________________________________________________________________________
Petitioner Mariano Raimundo De La Luz has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas by which
he seeks immediate release or a new bond hearing. Doc. 2 at 8. Petitioner also filed an Emergency
Temporary Restraining Order. Doc. 4. Petitioner presents two claims: (1) that there was
insufficient evidence to justify the immigration judges who earlier denied bond in concluding
Petitioner presented a danger to the community; and (2) that the Due Process Clause requires that
the Government bear the burden of proving that a detained alien should not receive bond. This
Court ordered a response and further provided a window for Petitioner to file a reply to that
response. Doc. 6. Petitioner did not reply. For the reasons that follow, the Petition is DENIED.
First, the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s first claim, which asserts that the
immigration judge lacked sufficient evidence to deem him a danger to the community. Under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(e), “[t]he Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of
this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the
Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial
Case 2:26-cv-03253-BCL-tmp Document 9 Filed 10/09/26 Page 1 of 4 PageID
<pageID>

2
of bond or parole.” Petitioner has offered no reason for the Court to disregard that plain statutory
language.
Second, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Respondent notes that
Petitioner has already received two bond hearings, both of which resulted in denial of bond. Doc.
8 at 4-6. By his own admission, Petitioner has not sought review from the Board of Immigration
Appeals, meaning he seeks to bypass an important part of the administrative process. That is
inappropriate—particularly where, as here, the petition was filed after the Sixth Circuit held in
Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026), that some applicants are entitled to
individualized bond hearings. See Aguilar v. Bullock, No. 2:26-CV-02563-BCL-CGC, 2026 WL
1987574, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. June 24, 2026) (“[T]he doctrine of prudential exhaustion bars review
because Plaintiff could, but has not, appealed the Immigration Judge's decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals.”)
The Supreme Court “long has acknowledged the general rule that parties exhaust
prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts.” McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). Exhaustion gives an agency “the opportunity to correct its
own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers”; “discourages disregard of the agency's
procedures”; promotes efficiency because “[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly
and economically before an agency”; and “may produce a useful record for subsequent judicial
consideration.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
And the doctrine arguably helps to protect and promote the separation of powers, insofar as it
leaves it to the Executive Branch to make the call in the first instance, without the Judicial Branch
jumping in to dictate the results before the Executive has had an opportunity to reach a final
decision on the Petitioner’s claim through its own processes. See Smith v. U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Case 2:26-cv-03253-BCL-tmp Document 9 Filed 10/09/26 Page 2 of 4 PageID
<pageID>

3
Comm’n, 178 F.4th 312, 325 (6th Cir. 2026) (“This rule is designed to afford the agency the
opportunity to reconsider its position in the first instance, and to promote efficient litigation.”
(citing Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec’y of Lab., 898 F.3d 669, 673 (6th Cir. 2018))). Petitioner must
exhaust his remedies before seeking judicial relief in this Court.
Petitioner makes two cursory arguments to the contrary. In one, Petitioner asserts that
exhaustion does not apply because his bond hearings were constitutionally deficient. Whatever the
merit of the rule excluding some constitutional arguments from the need (even prudential) for
exhaustion, it does not extend to situations—like this one—where the alleged constitutional error
is apparently an issue that the BIA could correct (as opposed to, say, a facial challenge to the very
statutes administered by the BIA). See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he alien must raise correctable procedural errors to the BIA.”). Particularly in a case like this
one where the petitioner also makes a sufficiency of the evidence argument, to hold otherwise
would both undermine exhaustion doctrine (and the separation of powers it protects) and
contravene the basic principle that sub-constitutional issues should be resolved before
constitutional ones (which likewise serves in part to protect the separation of powers by leaving
room for the political branches to act). New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 110 (1986); see
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346–347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In the other
argument, Petitioner simply asserts that continued detention would constitute irreparable harm—
a rule which would excuse the exhaustion requirement in every matter involving an alien’s
detention—an extreme result that would effectively dispense with administrative bond hearings,
making Article III courts the destination of first resort for bond hearings and in the process
undercutting Section 1226(e)’s limitation on federal court jurisdiction. The Court will not impose
that nonsensical result absent authority compelling it.
Case 2:26-cv-03253-BCL-tmp Document 9 Filed 10/09/26 Page 3 of 4 PageID
<pageID>

4
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 2) is
DENIED. Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 4) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 9th day of October, 2026.
s/ Brian C. Lea
BRIAN C. LEA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:26-cv-03253-BCL-tmp Document 9 Filed 10/09/26 Page 4 of 4 PageID
<pageID>