Carter & Carter Construction LLC v. Masram Mechanical LP

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CARTER & CARTER
CONSTRUCTION LLC,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-00517-X
MASRAM MECHANICAL LP,
Defendant.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Carter & Carter Construction LLC’s Petition to
Confirm Arbitration Award (ECF No. 1) and Motion for Default Judgment (ECF
No. 9), which the District Judge referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for
findings and a recommendation (ECF No. 14). For the reasons explained below,
the District Judge should confirm the arbitration award.
Background
Carter & Carter Construction LLC (Carter) served as the general contractor
for the construction of a residential building project in Frisco, Texas. Pet. at 2, ¶ 6
(ECF No. 1); see also id., Ex. 2, at 3, ¶ 7 (ECF No. 1-1). Carter subcontracted with
MasRam Mechanical LP (MasRam) to perform the HVAC work on the project. Id.
The 	project 	encountered 	a 	series 	of 	delays, 	ultimately 	resulting 	in 	Carter
terminating MasRam as a subcontractor on the project. Id. at 3, ¶ 7 (ECF No. 1);
id., Ex. 2, at 3, ¶ 8 (ECF No. 1-1).
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Subsequently, 	MasRam 	brought 	claims 	in 	arbitration 	against 	Carter
pursuant to the subcontractor agreement’s arbitration clause alleging that Carter
wrongfully terminated the subcontractor agreement. Id. at 3, ¶ 8 (ECF No. 1); see
also id., Ex. 1 at 27 (ECF No. 1-1) (arbitration agreement). Carter and MasRam
participated in an arbitration hearing on November 4–7, 2024, in Dallas, Texas,
before an arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Id.,
Ex. 2 at 1–2 (ECF No. 1-1). On January 15, 2025, the arbitrator issued the
arbitration award in favor of Carter. See generally id., Ex. 2 (ECF No. 1-1)
(arbitration award). MasRam filed a motion to modify the arbitration award, which
the arbitrator denied on February 20, 2025. Id., Ex. 3 (ECF No. 1-1) (order on
motion to modify).
On February 28, 2025, Carter filed its Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award
(ECF No. 1), which was served on MasRam. See Aff. of Service (ECF No. 7); see also
Mot. for Default J., Ex. A (ECF No. 9) (affidavit of service). To date, MasRam has
not filed an answer or otherwise appeared in this action. On April 4, 2025, Carter
filed a Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 9).
Legal Standard
Confirmation of Arbitration Award
A party to an arbitration proceeding may file an application to confirm an
arbitration award with the appropriate district court. 9 U.S.C. § 9. The Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) reflects a strong national policy favoring arbitration. Cooper
v. WestEnd Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing to Hall
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St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008)). In light of this strong
policy, “[j]udicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow and [the
court] should defer to the arbitrator’s decision when possible.’” Antwine v.
Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Rain CII
Carbon, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 674 F.3d 469, 471–72 (5th Cir. 2012). Under
the FAA, an arbitration award must be confirmed unless it is vacated, modified, or
corrected. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 582; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (listing
grounds 	for 	vacating 	arbitration 	award); 	9 	U.S.C. 	§ 11 	(listing 	grounds 	for
modifying or correcting arbitration award).
Motion for Default Judgment
Rule 55 governs applications for default and default judgment. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55. However, the FAA provides that an application for confirmation of an
arbitrator’s award “shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the
making and hearing of motions[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 6. Accordingly, Rule 55 “does not
operate in the context of applications to confirm arbitration awards; rather, an
unanswered application to confirm an arbitration award should be ‘treated as akin’
to an unopposed motion for summary judgment.” Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Energy Prod. Co., 2020 WL 1493663, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2020) (Scholer, J.)
(quoting SmartPrice.Com, Inc. v. Long Distance Servs., 2007 WL 1341412, at *3
(W.D. Tex. May 4, 2007)); see also Wells Fargo Clearing Servs., LLC v. Miller,
2025 WL 3270664, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2025) (Starr, J.) (“But the Court
informed [the movant] that [a motion for default judgment] was not proper for
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confirmation of an arbitration award, and recommended a motion for summary
judgment instead.”); Accelerated Sols., LLC v. Star Med. Ctr., LLC, 2021 WL
3128540, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2021) (“[W]hen an opposing party fails to
respond to a motion to confirm an arbitration award, the proper course is to treat
the 	motion 	as 	the 	court 	would 	treat 	an 	unopposed 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment.”).
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
showing the absence of a genuine issue for trial. Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods.,
Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The movant’s burden can
be satisfied by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case, which the nonmovant bears the burden of proving at trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may satisfy its
burden “by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence.”
Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Int’l Shortstop, Inc.
v. Rally’s, 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
Analysis
Confirmation of Arbitration Award
Because default judgment is unavailable as a remedy in this case, the Court
treats Carter’s Motion for Default Judgment as an unopposed motion for summary
judgment. See Energy Prod. Co., 2020 WL 1493663, at *1. The arbitration award
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at issue was made within the Northern District of Texas, and therefore, this Court
has jurisdiction to enter judgment upon the award. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (“If no court is
specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the
United States court in and for the district within which such award was made.”);
Pet., Ex. 2 at 2, ¶ 1 (ECF No. 1-1) (“By agreement the Parties agreed to arbitrate in
Dallas, Dallas County, Texas.”).
A party seeking to confirm an arbitration award must file the following:
(a) 	The agreement; the selection or appointment, if any, of an
additional arbitrator or umpire; and each written extension of
the time, if any, within which to make the award.
(b) 	The award.
(c) 	Each notice, affidavit, or other paper used upon an application
to confirm, modify, or correct the award, and a copy of each
order of the court upon such application.
9 U.S.C. § 13. In support of its Petition, Carter provided the final award, the
underlying agreement, and other relevant documents. See Pet., Exs. 1–3 (ECF No.
1-1) (providing the agreement, the arbitrator’s award, and the arbitrator’s order on
MasRam’s motion to modify); Mot. for Default J., Exs. A–C (ECF No. 9) (providing
affidavit of service of Carter’s Petition on MasRam, the arbitrator’s award, and
certificate of MasRam’s last known address). Accordingly, Carter has complied
with the requirements of 9 U.S.C. § 13.
The Court finds no reason to modify or vacate the arbitration award. “[I]n
reviewing arbitration proceedings, courts are limited to the question [of] whether
the proceedings were fundamentally unfair.” See Grp. 32 Dev. & Eng’g, Inc. v. GC
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Barnes Grp., LLC, 2015 WL 144082, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2015) (Boyle, J.)
(quoting Pac. Breakwater W., Inc. v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 2000 WL
276812, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2000) (Fitzwater, J.)). MasRam, represented by
counsel, meaningfully participated in the arbitration hearing, including presenting
four live witnesses and the deposition transcripts for four additional witnesses.
Pet., Ex. 2 at 2–3, ¶¶ 4–5 (ECF No. 1-1). The arbitrator also noted in his award that
the parties “offered numerous exhibits,” “presented all claims and defenses at the
final hearing,” and submitted post-hearing briefing. Id. at 3, ¶ 6. Therefore, the
Court does not doubt the fundamental fairness of the underlying arbitration
proceeding. And there is no evidence that the arbitration award was the product of
corruption or fraud or that the arbitrator was biased, engaged in prejudicial
behavior, or exceeded his authority. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (listing grounds for vacatur
of an arbitration award).
Further, 	the 	specific 	damages 	awarded 	by 	the 	arbitrator 	should 	be
confirmed. “This Court is ‘very deferential’ to awards issued by arbitrators and
finds them valid as long as they are derived from the ‘essence of the contract.’”
Miller, 2025 WL 3270664, at *2 (quoting Timegate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak
Interactive L.L.C., 713 F.3d 797, 802 (5th Cir. 2013)). The underlying arbitration
agreement incorporates the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. See
Pet., Ex. 1 at 27 (ECF No. 1-1); see also id., Ex. 2 at 1 (“The Parties chose to arbitrate
under the AAA [Construction Arbitration Rules].”). These rules allow an arbitrator
to award “interest at such rate and from such date as the arbitrator may deem
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appropriate[.]” 	Construction 	Industry 	Arbitration 	Rules 	and 	Mediation
Procedures, Am. Arbitration Ass’n 33 (effective Mar. 1, 2024), construction-
industry-arbitration-rules-and-mediation-procedures-2024.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YM3B-6DHS].
The arbitrator determined 	that Carter was justified in supplementing
MasRam’s labor due to delays and awarded $32,143.00 in supplementation costs;
$150,000 in attorney’s fees and costs; $28,744.75 in administrative fees and
expenses; $14,219.70 in prejudgment interest; and post-award1 interest at a rate of
7.75% per annum. Pet., Ex. 2 at 5–8, ¶¶ 12, 15, 17 (ECF No. 1-1). And, again, there
is no evidence that the arbitrator erred in awarding these damages. Under the
Court’s deferential standard, the Court finds that the damages awarded by the
arbitrator are fair. Therefore, the District Judge should CONFIRM the arbitration
award.
1 The Court notes that the arbitrator awarded post-award interest rather than post-
judgment interest, and thus, the post-award interest is not subject to the statutory
rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1916(a)). See Tricon Energy Ltd. v. Vinmar Int’l, Ltd.,
718 F.3d 448, 456–60 (“[B]ecause the arbitrators in this case did not award
postjudgment 	interest, 	but 	post-award 	interest, . . . that 	distinction 	makes 	a
difference.”); LALO, LLC v. Hawk Apparel, Inc., 2022 WL 1173801, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 20, 2022) (Lindsay, J.) (“[W]hile arbitrators have authority to specify the
rate of post-award interest, they do not have authority to specify the rate of
postjudgment interest, which is governed by the federal statutory rate, unless an
arbitrator has been granted authority by the parties to award a nonstatutory rate
of postjudgment interest.”).
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Costs, Fees, and Postjudgment Interest
Finally, Carter requests that it be “awarded the costs and fees incurred in
connection with this proceeding, including postjudgment interest pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1961[.]” Pet. at 7 (ECF No. 1). “A judgment confirming an arbitration
award—like any other civil judgment—is subject to § 1961.” Tricon Energy Ltd.,
718 F.3d at 457; see also 9 U.S.C. § 13 (“The judgment so entered shall have the
same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be subjected to all the provisions of
law relating to, a judgment in an action[.]”). Section 1961 grants interest “from the
date of the entry of the judgment” at a rate “equal to the weekly average 1-year
constant maturity Treasury yield . . . for the calendar week preceding . . . the date
of the judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Postjudgment interest compounds annually
and is “computed daily to the date of payment.” Id. § 1961(b). The principal for
calculating postjudgment interest is “the entire amount of the final judgment,”
including attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. Fuchs v. Lifetime Doors,
Inc., 939 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir. 1991).
Because “district courts do not have the discretion to deny post-judgment
interest on monetary judgments,” Carter’s request for postjudgment interest
should be granted. Paisano Capital SA de CV v. 23 Tex. Produce, Inc., 2019 WL
3239152, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2019) (Boyle, J.). Therefore, the Court should
GRANT Carter’s request for postjudgment interest for all damages awarded herein,
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at the statutory rate provided in § 1961,2 from the date of final judgment until it is
paid in full. Id.
Any request by Carter to recover a particular amount of attorney’s fees and
costs associated with this Motion must be filed postjudgment in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2).
Recommendation
For the reasons explained above, the District Judge should GRANT Carter’s
Petition (ECF No. 1), treat the Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 9) as a
motion for summary judgment, and confirm the underlying arbitration award
against MasRam. Further, the District Judge should GRANT Carter’s request for
postjudgment interest.
SO RECOMMENDED.
December 19, 2025.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
2 	The 	postjudgment 	interest 	rate 	can 	be 	found 	at:
https://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/post-judgment-rates.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
judge, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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