Cooley v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
KEVIN (?OOLEY,
Plaintiff,
V.
BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC., et. al.,
Defendants.
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ORDER
Civil Action No. H-25-2040
Pending before the Court is Defendant Mistras Group, Inc.'s Motion for
Summary 	Judgment 	(Document 	No. 	41). 	Having 	considered 	the 	motion,
submissions, and applicable law, the Court determines that the motion for summary
judgment should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a negligence matter brought under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act ("OCSLA"). On October 3, 2024, Plaintiff was working as an engineer on
Thunder Horse, a platform owned by Defend.ant BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
• ("BP"). Plaintiff alleges that he was walking down a hallway when his coveralls
became caught on a piece of protruding rnetal. Plaintiff alleges that he fell and
suffered injuries. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Mistras Group, Inc.
("Mistras"), STC Coatings, Inc. ("STC"), and Defendant Surface Technologies
l
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
October 09, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Corporation ("Surface Tech") "were performing maintenance operations on the crew
quarter floors at or near the time of the incident." 1
Based on the foregoing, on April 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit in the 157th
Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, asserting claims against Defendants
for negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. 2 On May 5, 2025, Defendant
BP removed this matter to this· Court pursuant to the OCSLA. 3 On September 16,
2025, Plaintiff amended his complaint. 4 On June 16, 2026, Defendant Mistras moved
for summary judgment. 5 On July 14, 2026, Plaintiff responded in opposition. 6
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Coleman v. Haus. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
1 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Document No. 19 at 3.
2 See Notice of Removal, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 1 (Plaintiff's Original
Complaint).
3 See Notice of Removal, Document No. 1 at 1.
4 See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Document No. 19·at 1.
5 See Defendant Mistras Group, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment, Document
No. 41 at 1.
6 See Plaintiff's Response to Mistras Group's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Document No. 44 at L
2
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Initially, the movant bears the burden of presenting the basis for the motion and the
elements of the causes of action upon which the nonmovant will be unable to
establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with specific
facts showing there is a genuine dispute for trial. 	See Fed. 	R. 	Civ. P. 56(c);
MatsushitaElec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). "A
dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 5 F.3d 955,956 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
But the nonmoving party's bare allegations, standing alone, are insufficient to
create a material dispute of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. If a
reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then summary
judgment is appropriate. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmovant's
burden cannot be satisfied by "conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or
'only a scintilla of evidence."' Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337,
343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994)). Uncorroborated self-serving testimony cannot prevent summary judgment,
especially 	if the 	overwhelming 	documentary 	evidence 	supports 	the 	opposite
scenario. Vais Arms, Inc. v. Vais, 383 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, it
is not the function of the Court to search the record on the nonmovant' s behalf for
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evidence which may raise a fact issue. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1137
n.30 (5th Cir. 	1992). Therefore, "[a]lthough we consider the evidence and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of
its pleadings but must respond by setting forth specific facts indicating a genuine
issue for trial." Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 2000).
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Defendant Mistras moves for summary judgment, contending there is no
genuine issue of material fact for a jury to consider in this matter. In response,
Plaintiff contends that there is a dispute as to a material fact and that Mistras 's
motion for summary judgment should be denied.
Generally, under the OCSLA, the law of the adjacent state applies. See 43
U.S.C. 	§ 1333(a)(2)(A). 	Here, 	the 	parties 	agree that, 	to 	the 	extent it is not
inconsistent with federal law, Louisiana law applies. 7 To succeed on a negligence
claim in Louisiana, "a plaintiff must prove five separate elements: (1) the defendant
has a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific standard of care; (2) the
defendant failed to conform his or her conduct to the appropriate standard of care;
7 See Defendant Mistras Group, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment, Document
No. 41 at 6; Plaintiff's Response to Mistras Group's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Document No. 44 at 7.
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(3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs
injuries; (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiffs
injuries; and (5) actual damages." S.J. v. Lafayette Par. Sch. Bd., 2009-2195 (La.
7/6/10), 41 	So. 3d 1119, 1125 (citation omitted). "One independent contractor
owe[s] no duty to another independent contract's employee where it does not
employ, share a contract, or actually supervise the plaintiff." McCarroll v. 	Wood
Group Management Services, Inc., 561 Fed. Appx. 407,410 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing
Parker v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 2002 WL 461655 at *1 (E.D. La. March 20,
2002)).
Here, Mistras contends that "Mistras owed no duty of care to Cooley because
there was no employment relationship; Mistras did not supervise or control Cooley's
work or the work Cooley complains of; and Mistras and Cooley's employer, Valaris,
were contractors on the Thunder Horse, performing entirely separate work." 8 In
response, Plaintiff contends that "[b]y accepting and performing the cleanup tasks,
Mistras owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in completing the tasks as to not
create a hazard, nor increase the risk of harm to a third party. " 9
8 See Defendant Mistras Group, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment, Document
No. 41 at 2.
9 Plaintiff's 	Response 	to 	Mistras 	Group's 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment,
Document No. 44 at 12.
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The Court begins by considering Mistras' s role with respect to the Thunder
Horse. "Mistras was hired to perform sandblasting, coating, and painting work in the
outdoor areas of the Thunder Horse." 10 The only time Mistras was involved with any
work relating to the living quarters aboard Thunder Horse was helping remove trash
bags from the living quarters in preparation for a hurricane. 11 Plaintiff attempts to
argue that "Louisiana's Supreme Court confirmed that a person or party who agrees
to perform a task is subject to liability to a third person for physical harm resulting
from a failure to exercise reasonable care[.]" 12
In support of this argument, Plaintiff relies on an overly broad misapplication
of Pickard. Despite Plaintiffs contention, Pickard does not impose a duty on anyone
who agrees to perform a task for a third person. Rather, Pickard holds that a
defendant assumes a duty "when undertaking the rendition of services to another,
which the defendant should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person." Pickard v. Amazon.com, Inc., 387 So. 3d 515, 524 (La. 2024) (citation
omitted). Pickard further holds that "the courts should consider the scope of the
10 Defendant Mistras Group, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment, Document No.
41 at 9.
11 Defendant Mistras Group, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment, Document No.
41, Exhibit Cat 200:23-201 :05 (Deposition of Jesus Salinas).
12 Plaintiff's 	Response 	to 	Mistras 	Group's 	Motion for 	Summary 	Judgment,
Document No. 44 at 10 (citing Pickard v. Amazon.com, Inc., 387 So. 3d 515 (La. 2024)).
6
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defendant's 	involvement, the 	extent 	of defendant's 	authority, 	and defendant's
underlying intent." Pickard, 387 So. 3d at 525 (citation omitted). The Court notes
that Mistras was merely assisting with the removal of trash in preparation for a
hurricane. 13 With respect to the crew quarters, Mistras' s scope was limited to this
task. 14 Mistras had essentially no authority and certainly no intent to make sure the
floors were safe. 15 Plaintiff provides no relevant summary judgment evidence to the
contrary and provides no evidence to suggest that Mistras should recognize that
moving trash bags was necessary for the protection of Plaintiff. 16
Plaintiff further contends that "[r]emoving trash was not a task independent
of ensuring floor safety" and that "'the inspection of the flooring work is done in
13 See Deposition of Jesus Salinas, supra note 11 at 200:23-201:05.
14 See Deposition of Jesus Salinas, supra note 11 at 200:23-201:05; Defendant
Mistras Group, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment, Document No. 41, Exhibit A at
149:04-149:13 (Deposition of Richard Reiter) ("We helped move debris for about 10
minutes and allowed a Surface tech to go back to work on their jobsite.").
15 See Deposition of Jesus Salinas, supra note 11 at 200:23-201:05; Defendant
Mistras Group, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment, Document No. 41, Exhibit D at
141:13-142:12 (Deposition of Michael White).
16 The Court notes that Plaintiff provides evidence that Mistras accepted the cleanup
tasks. However, the Court further notes that Plaintiff provides no evidence suggesting that
the scope ofMistras's tasks, Mistras's authority, or Mistras's intent rise to a level of where
Mistras would owe a duty towards Plaintiff.
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connection with throwing trash[.]'" 17 However, the record in this matter clearly
establishes that Mistras was asked to take "trash from one location down a hallway
and [place] it out of the ... living quarters." 18 The Court notes that the fact that
clearing trash was generally done in conjunction with flooring inspections by other
contractors does not necessitate that Mistras, when asked specifically to move trash
bags, became responsible for inspecting the floors.
Based on the foregoing, and the clear guidance of the Fifth Circuit that two
independent contractors do not owe a duty to one another when one does not employ,
share a contract, or supervise the other, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
produce sufficient summary judgment evidence suggesting that Mistras owed a duty
to Plaintiff. As such, the Court finds that no dispute of material fact exists with
respect to Defendant Mistras' s duty, and thus, that Mistras' s motion should be
granted. 19
17 Plaintiff's 	Response 	to 	Mistras 	Group's 	Motion for 	Summary 	Judgment,
Document No. 44 at 	12 (citing Plaintiff's Response to Mistras 	Group's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Document No. 44, Exhibit 3 at 18-19, 20-21 (Deposition of Michael
White)). 	•
18 	Plaintiff's 	Response 	to 	Mistras 	Group's 	Motion for 	Summary 	Judgment,
Document No. 44, Exhibit 4 at 124:1-2 (Deposition of Richard Reiter).
19 Considering the Court's finding that Mistras did not owe a duty to Plaintiff, the
Court declines to consider Mistras' s remaining argument that no duty was breached.
Furthermore, having found that Mistras owed no duty to Plaintiff, the Court notes that
Plaintiffs claims for gross negligence and negligence per se should also be dismissed
pursuant to this Order and Mistras' s current motion.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS 	that Defendant Mistras 	Group, 	Inc.'s 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment (Document No. 41) is GRANTED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Mistras Group, Inc. are
··hereby DISMISSED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this _!j_ day of October, 2026.
~- 	»
·DAVIDHIT 	R
United States District Judge
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