Moore et al v. Federal National Mortgage Association et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND/ODESSA DIVISION
CHRISTINE M. MOORE and
MICHAEL MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION (FANNIE MAE);
PRISCILLA ALMODOVAR; PETER
AKWABOAH; BARRETT DAFFIN
FRAPPIER TURNER & ENGEL, LLP;
JOSEPH M. VACEK; SHELLEY NAIL
TRUSTEE; OCWEN LOAN
SERVICING, LLC; MACKIE WOLF
ZIENTZ & MANN, PC; ISRAEL
SAUCEDO; ALDRIDGE PITE LLP;
WILLIAM JARRELL; PAUL
MARCHUK; TREVOR SHOELS;
FREEDOM MORTGAGE
CORPORATION; DAVID COBOS; and
MARVIN MOORE;
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
MO:25-CV-00326-DC-RCG
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiffs Christine Moore and Michael Moore’s
(“Plaintiffs”) Motions to Remand to State Court. (Docs. 8, 16).1 This matter is before the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge through a standing order of referral pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636 and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United
States Magistrate Judges. After due consideration of the Parties’ briefing and the relevant law,
the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiffs’ initial Motion to Remand be DENIED (Doc. 8), and
Plaintiffs’ subsequent Motion to Remand be DENIED AS MOOT. (Doc. 16).
I. BACKGROUND
1. All page number citations are to CM/ECF generated pagination unless otherwise noted.
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 1 of 16

2
On May 9, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Original Petition asserting claims for wrongful
foreclosure, quiet title, fraud, and civil rights violations in the 385th Judicial District Court of
Midland County, Texas. (Doc 1-1). In their Original Petition, Plaintiffs allege the Defendants in
this case foreclosed on the real property located at 1001 S. County Road 1060, Midland, Texas
79706 (the “Property”) on December 15, 2015, without clear and lawful authority to do so. Id.
Plaintiffs seek “Actual Financial Damages of $11,140,287.36,” “emotional distress damages
claimed [to] exceed $250 million,” and unspecified punitive, exemplary, constitutional and civil
rights damages. Id. On July 25, 2025, Defendants PHH Mortgage Corporation (“Defendant
PHH”), incorrectly named Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,2 and Federal National Mortgage
Association (“Defendant Fannie Mae”) removed the action to this Court pursuant to federal
question and diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs have since filed two Motions to Remand
setting forth several grounds on which they argue removal was improper. (Docs. 8, 16).
Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae have filed Responses. (Docs. 13, 19). Consequently, the
instant matter is ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251,
256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). A federal court
therefore “cannot entertain cases unless authorized by the Constitution and legislation.” Coury v.
Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996). As a result, a defendant may only remove a case if the
district court has original jurisdiction through either existence of a federal question or diversity
of citizenship. WMS, LLC v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins., 244 F. Supp. 3d 567,
570 (W.D. Tex. 2017). If removed, however, a party may move to remand. Hill Country Villas
2. Defendant PHH notes the Original Petition incorrectly names “Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.” (Doc. 1). Ocwen is
no longer a legal entity, and PHH Mortgage Corporation—Ocwen’s successor by merger—appears on its behalf. Id.
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 2 of 16

3
Townhome Owners’ Assoc., Inc. v. Everest Indem. Ins., No. 19-CV-0936, 2020 WL 373375, at
*2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). On a motion to remand, a court must
consider whether removal to federal court was proper. Removal is proper in any “civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
“On a motion to remand, the removing party bears the burden of establishing that one of
the bases of [federal] jurisdiction exists, and that the removal was not procedurally defective.”
WMS, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 570. To establish federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s complaint
must present a claim that arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331. The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the
well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). To establish federal jurisdiction through diversity of
citizenship, the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000 and the parties must be completely
diverse. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “But removal based on diversity is precluded ‘if any of the parties
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action
is brought.’” Williams v. Homeland Ins., 18 F.4th 806, 812 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1)). Any doubt as to whether removal was proper should be resolved in favor of remand.
WMS, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 570; Villalobos v. Hudson Ins., No. 22-CV-00010, 2022 WL 4594029,
at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2022) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court first notes it is unnecessary and undesirable for litigants to file duplicative
motions as Plaintiffs did here. (See Docs. 8, 16). “Litigants should wait for the Court to resolve a
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 3 of 16

4
pending motion prior to filing a renewed motion that requests exactly the same relief.” Gevas v.
Ryker, No. 10-CV-0493, 2011 WL 13585696, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2011). Accordingly, as
Plaintiffs’ multiple pending Motions to Remand are substantially similar in substance (See
Docs. 8, 16), the Court confines its analysis to Plaintiffs’ initial Motion to Remand (Doc. 8).
In their original Motion to Remand, Plaintiffs contend removal was based on: (1) the
absence of federal jurisdiction; (2) alleged defects in the state court’s jurisdiction at the time of
removal; and (3) various procedural deficiencies in the removal process. (Doc. 8). In contrast,
Defendants argue (1) federal jurisdiction exists on the face of Plaintiff’s Original Petition; (2) the
procedural posture of the state court action is irrelevant; and (3) all properly served Defendants
timely consented to the removal. (Doc. 13). The Court has considered each of Plaintiffs’ alleged
grounds for remand and finds Defendants’ removal was proper for the reasons discussed below.
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Because Defendants removed this action on both federal question and diversity grounds,
and Plaintiffs contend neither basis is satisfied, the Court begins by addressing each asserted
ground for subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court first examines whether the requirements for
diversity jurisdiction are met and then considers whether the face of the Original Petition
establishes federal question jurisdiction.
1. Diversity Jurisdiction
Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae first invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, alleging
Plaintiffs are Texas citizens and no properly joined defendant is also a Texas citizen. (Doc. 1 at
3). The Parties do not dispute Defendants PHH, Fannie Mae, and Freedom Mortgage
Corporation (“Defendant FMC”) are properly joined parties whose citizenship is diverse from
that of Plaintiffs’. (Doc. 1 at 3). However, Plaintiffs’ Original Petition also names Barrett Daffin
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 4 of 16

5
Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP (“Barrett Daffin”); Mackie Wolf Zientz & Mann, PC (“Mackie
Wolf”); Aldridge Pite LLP (“Aldridge Pite”) as law firms, and Priscilla Almodovar; Peter
Akwaboah; Joseph M. Vacek; Israel Saucedo; William Jarrell; Paul Marchuk; Trevor Shoels;
David Cobos; Marvin Moore; and Shelley Nail as substitute trustees (“Substitute Trustees”).
(Doc. 1-1). Although these are all Defendants, Plaintiffs do not allege the citizenship of these
parties Id. at 3–4. Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae argue the Court should disregard the
presence of Barrett Daffin, Mackie Wolf, Aldridge Pite, and Substitute Trustees because Plaintiff
cannot establish a cause of action against them, rendering them improperly joined. (Doc. 1 at 3–
4). Plaintiffs, in contrast, argue the case must be remanded because “[a]t least one properly
joined defendant is a citizen of Texas, defeating diversity.” (Doc. 8 at 2).
A removing party can establish federal jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by
demonstrating that an in-state defendant has been “improperly joined.” Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.
Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004). The burden is on the removing party, and the burden of
demonstrating improper joinder is a heavy one. Cuevas v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP,
648 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 2011). Under the doctrine of improper joinder, a district court may
disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant if the removing party shows either: (1)
“actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts; or (2) the plaintiff is unable to establish a
cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in state court.” Williams, 18 F.4th at 812. Here,
only the second method of improper joinder applies. (Docs. 8 at 2; 13 at 3–6). To establish
improper joinder under this method, a removing party must show an “inability of the plaintiff to
establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.” Cuevas, 648 F.3d at 249
(quoting Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 646–47 (5th Cir. 2003)). A cause of action cannot be
established against an in-state defendant if there is “no reasonable basis for the district court to
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 5 of 16

6
predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state defendant.” Smallwood,
385 F.3d at 573.
A court may resolve the issue in one of two ways. The court may conduct a Rule
12(b)(6)-type analysis, looking initially at the allegations of the complaint to determine whether
the complaint states a claim under state law against the in-state defendant. Villalobos,
2022 WL 4594029, at *12. Ordinarily, if a plaintiff can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, there
is no improper joinder. Wilkins v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., No. 10-CV-40, 2010 WL
11652141, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2010). However, in some cases, a plaintiff may state a
claim but misstate or omit discrete facts that would determine the propriety of joinder; in such
cases, the district court may, in its discretion, pierce the pleadings and conduct a summary
inquiry. Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. In this case, Defendants dispute the sufficiency of
Plaintiffs’ pleadings, thus the Court finds the Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis appropriate. DeForest
v. WPX Energy Permian, LLC, No. 23-CV-00026, 2024 WL 1080463, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17,
2024) (“A district court has discretion to choose the analysis to apply, but the 12(b)(6)-type
analysis is preferred.”).
In the Rule 12(b)(6)-type improper joinder analysis, the federal pleading standard applies.
Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., LLC v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 204 (5th Cir.
2016). The Court must consider whether Plaintiffs pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 208 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint and view
those facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff. See Raj v. La State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 329–30
(5th Cir. 2013) (citing Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2012)). A plaintiff
“must provide enough factual allegations to draw the reasonable inference that the elements
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 6 of 16

7
exist.” Innova Hosp. San Antonio, L.P. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d
587, 602 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2014) (citing Patrick v. Wal–Mart, Inc.-Store No. 155, 681 F.3d 614,
617 (5th Cir. 2012)); Torch Liquidating Tr. ex rel. Bridge Assocs. LLC v. Stockstill, 561 F.3d
377, 384 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he complaint must contain either direct allegations or permit
properly drawn inferences to support every material point necessary to sustain recovery”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When considering whether a plaintiff has
stated a claim against a non-diverse party in state court, the test is whether the defendant has
demonstrated that there is no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant,
which stated differently means that there is no reasonable basis for the district court to predict
that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state defendant. This means that there
must be a reasonable possibility of recovery, not merely a theoretical one.” Palmquist v. Hain
Celestial Grp., Inc., 103 F.4th 294, 304 (5th Cir. 2024). If there in any possibility that Plaintiffs
could recover against a defendant whose citizenship might destroy complete diversity—such as
Barrett Daffin, Mackie Wolf, Aldridge Pite, or Substitute Trustees—the Court must remand the
entire case to state court. Gray v. Beverly Enters.-Miss., Inc., 390 F.3d 400, 412 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“Although our fraudulent joinder decisions have never made the issue entirely pellucid, §
1441’s holistic approach to removal mandates that the existence of even a single cause of action
against in-state defendants (despite the pleading of several unavailing claims) requires remand of
the entire case to state court.”).
In their Original Petition, Plaintiffs allege causes of action for (1) wrongful foreclosure;
(2) fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation; (3) quiet title; (4) trespass; (5) civil conspiracy;
(6) abuse of process; (7) deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (8) violation of Texas
Constitutional Rights, Article I, Section 19. (Doc. 1-1 at 12). Plaintiffs assert generally
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 7 of 16

8
“Defendants wrongfully conducted [the] foreclosure sale of the Property despite having no clear
title and no lawful authority to foreclose,” “fabricated, forged, and recorded false documents to
falsely assert ownership rights,” and “Defendants’ attorneys falsely claimed Fannie Mae owned
the property.” (Doc. 1-1 at 11). Consequently, the Original Petition fails to identify which
Defendant allegedly engaged in which conduct. Under the federal pleading standard, however,
“the complaint must specify the acts of the defendants individually, not collectively, to meet the
pleading standards of Rule 8(a).” Shemwell v. Cannon, 352 F. Supp. 3d 690, 697 (N.D. Tex.
2019); See Callier v. Nat’l United Grp., LLC, No. 21-CV-71, 2021 WL 5393829, at *3
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2021) (“[G]eneral assertions directed at no one in particular are not
sufficient to raise an inference of plausibility against a particular defendant.”). This principle was
further confirmed by Cobarobio v. Midland County, where the court held the federal pleading
standard was not met by a complaint containing “global assertions of fault,” “lump[ing] all
Defendants together without identifying actions of any individual Defendant,” and failing to “set
out the specific factual allegations . . . [relating to] any particular defendant.” No. 13-CV-00111,
2015 WL 13608102, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2015), aff’d, 695 F. App’x 88 (5th Cir. 2017); see
Stephens v. Uranium Energy Corp., No. 15-1862, 2016 WL 3855860, at *13 (S.D. Tex. July 15,
2016) (“The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly ‘rejected the group pleading doctrine.’”). Here,
Plaintiffs’ allegations fall squarely within the type of improper group pleading rejected in
Shemwell, Cobarobio, and Stephens. Put simply, Plaintiffs do not tie any factual allegations to
Barrett Daffin, Mackie Wolf, Aldridge Pite, or any Substitute Trustee. Instead, the Original
Petition pleads only identical, collective accusations against all defendants without any factual
differentiation. Courts have routinely held that such allegations cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
challenge because they fail to satisfy the federal pleading standard. See Cobarobio, 2015 WL
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 8 of 16

9
13608102, at *28; see also Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 699 (5th Cir.
1999); Searcy v. Knight (In re Am. Int’l Refinery), 402 B.R. 728, 738 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008).
Plaintiffs’ only remaining factual allegation directed at any specific in-state Defendant is
the assertion that “Defendant William Jarrell transmitted [a] false Writ of Possession to the
Midland County Precinct Constable without any lawful court order.” (Doc. 1-1 at 11). Even
taking this allegation as true, it does not satisfy the Rule 12(b)(6)-type standard applied to the
improper-joinder analysis. As required under the federal pleading standard, Plaintiffs must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
And a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to permit “the reasonable inference that the elements
exist.” Innova Hosp., 995 F. Supp. 2d at 603. Here, Plaintiffs allege no facts showing how the
writ was false, what legal duty Defendant William Jarrell owed, what wrongful conduct he
committed beyond transmitting the allegedly false document, or how that act satisfies the
elements of any of Plaintiffs’ claims. A single conclusory statement, devoid of supporting factual
detail, cannot plausibly establish liability under any of Plaintiffs’ theories and thus cannot
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. See Torch Liquidating Trust, 561 F.3d at 384 (“[T]he
complaint must contain either direct allegations or permit properly drawn inferences to support
every material point necessary to sustain a recovery.”). Because this threadbare allegation does
not plead the elements of any claim with the factual specificity required under the federal
standard, it does not provide a reasonable basis to predict recovery against Defendant William
Jarrell and cannot defeat improper joinder.
In sum, Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to show a reasonable probability of recovery against
Barrett Daffin, Mackie Wolf, Aldridge Pite, or Substitute Trustees. The Original Petition largely
groups these Defendants together and relies on conclusory allegations, without providing specific
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 9 of 16

10
facts showing any individual defendant engaged in actionable conduct. Even if the Court accepts
the allegations as true, they are insufficient to survive as Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. Because
Plaintiffs have pled no factual basis to support a claim against these parties, the Court concludes
their citizenship may be disregarded for purposes of removal. Accordingly, Defendants have met
their burden of showing the in-state defendants were improperly joined, and complete
diversity—and thus subject-matter jurisdiction—exists.
2. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs next argue removal was improper because their Complaint does not provide a
basis for federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. 8 at 2). A defendant may remove a civil action
properly filed in state court only if this court would have had original jurisdiction in the case.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Original “federal question” jurisdiction exists only if the action arises under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The task of determining
the existence or nonexistence of a federal question in a particular case always begins with the
time honored “well-pleaded complaint” rule. Louisville and Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149 (1908); Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995). The
plaintiffs are the master of their complaint and may choose to assert only claims arising under
state law, foregoing other theories of recovery which might be federal in nature. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 (1986); Carpenter, 44 F.3d at 366. If the
plaintiffs’ pleadings assert a viable claim under state law, they can avoid removal by the
defendant. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391 (1987); Carpenter, 44 F.3d at 367.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs assert claims for: (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) fraud and
fraudulent misrepresentation; (3) quiet title; (4) trespass; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) abuse of
process; (7) deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (8) violation of Texas
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 10 of 16

11
Constitutional Rights, Article I, Section 19. (Doc 1-1). Among these claims, Plaintiffs’ § 1983
cause of action controls the jurisdictional analysis. As courts have recognized, “[an] action
brought . . . under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is a case arising under the laws of the United States, for
which this Court has original jurisdiction.” Bowie v. Hodge, No. CV 20-1218, 2020 WL
3026617, at *4 (E.D. La. June 5, 2020);
Pace v. Hunt, 847 F. Supp. 508, 509 (S.D. Miss. 1994). And although Plaintiffs now contend
they did not intend to raise a federal cause of action (Doc. 8 at 2), jurisdiction must be
determined from the face of the complaint as it existed at the time of removal. See Pidgeon v.
Parker, 46 F. Supp. 3d. 692, 697 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (“To determine whether federal jurisdiction
exists, the court looks to the record in the state court at the time of removal.”). Because one of
Plaintiffs’ claims arise under a federal statute, this Court has original jurisdiction over that claim,
and the whole case is removable.
B. Defective State Court Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs further argue remand is required because, in their view, the state court lacked a
lawfully assigned judge at the time of removal and that “[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), removal is
permitted only from a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Doc. 8 at 3). Plaintiffs’ contention that
removal was improper because no state judge was “lawfully” presiding at the time of removal is
without merit. Section 1441(a) permits removal of “any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts . . . have original jurisdiction” to the federal district court embracing the
place where the action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The statute turns on the existence of a
pending civil action in a state court—not on the internal procedural status of the particular judge
assigned, recused, or reassigned under state law. Regardless of any alleged irregularities in the
state court’s assignment or recusal process, the case indisputably existed as a pending civil action
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 11 of 16

12
at the time of removal, and this Court possesses original jurisdiction over it. Because the
argument identifies no defect relevant to § 1441(a) or to this Court’s jurisdiction, remand on this
ground is unwarranted.
C. Procedural Defects
Lastly, Plaintiffs argue the case must be remanded due to the existence of procedural
defects—namely: (1) not all Defendants joined or consented to removal and (2) the Notice of
Removal was not filed within the statutory deadlines. (Doc. 8 at 3). The Court addresses each
argument in turn below.
1. Consent to Removal
In their Motion, Plaintiffs argue “not all defendants joined or consented to removal as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).” (Doc. 8 at 3). Under § 1446(b), notice of removal must
be filed within thirty days of a defendant’s receipt of service. While not stated explicitly in the
statute, in cases with multiple served defendants, all defendants must consent to removal prior to
the expiration of the thirty-day period. Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 2002).
This requirement is frequently referred to as the “rule of unanimity.” Spoon v. Fannin Cnty.
Cmty. Supervision & Corr. Dep’t, 794 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705 (E.D. Tex. 2011). If the removing
parties fail to comply with the rule of unanimity, the plaintiff may move for remand within thirty
days of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “In cases involving alleged improper or fraudulent joinder
of parties, however, application of this requirement to improperly or fraudulently joined parties
would be nonsensical, as removal in those cases is based on the contention that no other proper
defendant exists.” Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1993).
With these principles in mind, the Court finds all properly joined Defendants properly
consented to removal. As discussed above, Defendants have met their burden of showing Barrett
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 12 of 16

13
Daffin, Mackie Wolf, Aldridge Pite, and the Substitute Trustees were improperly joined,
meaning their consent was not required. See Jernigan, 989 F.2d at 815. This leaves Defendants
PHH, Fannie Mae, and FMC as the only properly joined Defendants—each of which maintains a
citizenship diverse from that of Plaintiffs. (Doc. 1 at 3). Thus, as it relates to the properly joined
Defendants, the Fifth Circuit has stated “[w]hile it may be true that consent to removal is all that
is required under section 1446 . . . this does not mean that each defendant must sign the original
petition for removal.” Getty Oil Corp., a Div. of Texaco v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254,
1262 n.11 (5th Cir. 1988). Rather, “there must be some timely filed written indication . . . from
some person or entity purporting to formally act on [Defendant’s] behalf in this respect and to
have authority to do so, that [Defendant] has actually consented to such action.” Id. This
principle applies regardless of whether each defendant had been formally served at the time of
removal. Serafini v. Sw. Airlines Co., 485 F. Supp. 3d 697, 702 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (“[T]he Fifth
Circuit also does not require service before removal.”). In this case, Attorney Kathryn B. Davis
entered an appearance on behalf of Defendants PHH, Fannie Mae, and FMC and signed the
Notice of Removal. (Doc. 1 at 9). Accordingly, because counsel of record expressly represented
all properly joined Defendants in the filing, their consent to removal was properly established.
See Mauldin v. Allstate Ins., 757 F. App’x 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2018) (“There is no requirement
that [Defendant] actually sign the petition for removal.”).
2. Timeliness of Removal
Lastly, Plaintiff argues removal was “not filed within the statutory deadlines.” (Doc. 8 at
3). Section 1446(b) provides that a removal must be filed within 30 days of receiving the initial
pleading or summons that affirmatively reveals the basis for federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b). In making their argument, however, Plaintiffs appear to rely on the so-called “first-
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 13 of 16

14
served defendant rule,” which the Fifth Circuit applied until the 2011 amendments of the
removal statute. Mire v. Oxnley, No. 17-CV-620, 2017 WL 4128859, at *2 (W.D. La. Aug. 9,
2017), R. & R. adopted, 2017 WL 4128854 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2017). Prior to the amendments,
“[i]n cases involving multiple defendants, the thirty-day period [began] to run as soon as the first
defendant [was] served (provided the case [was] then removable).” Getty Oil Corp., v. Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262–63 (5th Cir. 1988). However, after the 2011 amendment of the
removal statute, “Congress [a]dopted a last-served rule pursuant to which ‘each defendant [has]
30 days after receipt by or service on that defendant of the initial pleading or summons . . . to file
the notice of removal.” Andrews v. Miss. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 187 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755 (S.D.
Miss. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B)). Therefore, “[u]nder the 2011 amendment to the
federal removal statute, the deadline to file a notice of removal runs from service of each
defendant.” Mire, 2017 WL 4128859, at *2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B)-(C)). Additionally,
the 2011 amendment added section (b)(2)(C), which states “[i]f defendants are served at different
times, and a later-served defendant files a notice of removal, any earlier-served defendant may
consent to the removal even though that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate or
consent to removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C).
Here, Plaintiffs served Defendant FMC on June 24, 2024, and Defendant PHH on June
25, 2024. (Doc. 1-1 at 65, 68). Defendants, jointly represented by the same counsel, filed their
Notice of Removal on July 25, 2024—exactly thirty days after service upon Defendant PHH.
(Docs. 1; 1-1 at 65). And although Defendant Fannie Mae had not yet been served, it expressly
consented to and joined the Notice of Removal. (Doc. 1 at 9). That is all the Fifth Circuit
requires. Serafini, 485 F. Supp. at 702. Section 1446(b)(2)(C) permitted FMC, as an earlier-
served defendant, to “join in removal by later-served defendants who remove within their own
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 14 of 16

15
individual statutory thirty-day removal period.” Mire, 2017 WL 4128859 at *2 (citing Gibbs v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 14-CV-1153, 2014 WL 2767206, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 18,
2014)). As a result, the Notice of Removal was timely because it occurred within thirty days of
Defendant PHH’s service, and Defendant FMC and Defendant Fannie Mae properly consented to
the removal by joining the Notice, even though more than thirty days had elapsed since Plaintiffs
served Defendant FMC. Accordingly, none of Plaintiffs’ arguments justify remand, and the
Court concludes it has subject-matter jurisdiction to retain this case.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the discussion above, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Remand be DENIED (Doc. 8), and Plaintiffs’ subsequent Motion to Remand be DENIED AS
MOOT. (Doc. 16).
SIGNED this 1st day of December, 2025.
RONALD C. GRIFFIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 15 of 16

16
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
In the event that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and
Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is
ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to this report must serve and
file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which
objections are being made; the District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general
objections. Such party shall file the objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the
objections on all other parties. A party’s failure to file such objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo
determination by the District Judge. Additionally, a party’s failure to file written objections to
the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Judge. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 27 Filed 12/01/25 Page 16 of 16