State v. Tualaulelei (mem. op., affirmed). Consolidated with CAAP-25-0000072.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-25-0000071
13-OCT-2026
07:56 AM
Dkt. 48 MO
NOS. CAAP-25-0000071 and CAAP-25-0000072
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
CAAP-25-0000071
STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AILAO TUALAULELEI, Defendant-Appellee, and
SHAKA BAIL LLC, Real Party in Interest-Appellant.
(CR. NO. 1CPC-22-0001379)
AND
CAAP-25-0000072
STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AILAO TUALAULELEI and KIANA H. MEDEIROS, Defendants-Appellees,
and SHAKA BAIL LLC, Real Party in Interest-Appellant.
(CR. NO. 1CPC-23-0000744)
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: 	Leonard, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)
Surety-Appellant Shaka Bail LLC appeals from the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit's January 10, 2025 "Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Shaka Bail's
Motion to Set Aside Judgment of Bail Forfeiture" in 1CPC-22-

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
0001379 and 1CPC-23-0000744 (Denial Orders). 	(Formatting
altered.)
1
On appeal, Shaka contends (1) service was improper,
(2) the Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) applied, (3) good
cause existed, and (4) its due process rights were violated. 	We
affirm.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
In Case No. 1CPC-22-0001379, Plaintiff-Appellee the
State of Hawaiʻi charged Defendant-Appellee Ailao Tualaulelei
with Unauthorized Control of a Propelled Vehicle in the First
Degree and Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree.
Shaka posted the $6,000.00 bail bond, insured by Universal Fire
& Casualty Insurance Co.
In Case No. 1CPC-23-0000744, the State charged
Tualaulelei with Burglary in the Second Degree. 	Shaka posted
the $5,000.00 bail bond, insured by Universal.
By executing the bail bond, Shaka ensured the
defendant's presence at court or payment of the bond:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
THAT THE UNDERSIGNED SURETY, OR SURETIES, ASSURETY, HEREBY
UNDERTAKE THAT THE SAID DEFENDANT WILL APPEAR AND ANSWER
ALL CHARGES MENTIONED IN WHATEVER COURT IT MAY BE
PROSECUTED WITHIN THE STATE OF HAWAII, AND WILL AT ALL
TIMES BE AMENABLE TO THE ORDERS AND PROCESS OF THE COURT,
AND WILL APPEAR FOR JUDGEMENT, AND RENDER SELF IN EXECUTION
THEREOF OR FAILURE TO PERFORM EITHER OF THESE CONDITIONS
1 	The Honorable Clarissa Y. Malinao presided.
2

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
WILL PAY TO THE STATE OF HAWAII, AS PROVIDED IN SECTIONS
804-511 [sic], HAWAII REVISED STATUTES.
(Emphases added.)
B. 	Procedural Background
Tualaulelei failed to appear in court in both cases on
November 13, 2024. 	As a result, the circuit court issued a
bench warrant for Tualaulelei's arrest. 	The next day, on
November 14, 2024, the circuit court entered its "Judgment and
Order of Forfeiture of Bail Bond" (Forfeiture Judgment) in both
cases. 	(Formatting altered.)
The State filed a proof of service of the Forfeiture
Judgment upon Universal with the circuit court, indicating
service was by certified mail. 	The proof of service showed the
postmark date as November 18, 2024, and the receipt date as
November 25, 2024.
Tualaulelei was arrested on December 5, 2024, and a
Return of Service for the bench warrant was filed the next day.
Thirty-three days after the receipt date, on
December 28, 2024, Shaka moved to set aside the Forfeiture
Judgment (Motion to Set Aside or Motion). 	The circuit court
denied Shaka's Motion as untimely.
Shaka appealed, and we consolidated the two cases.
II. 	DISCUSSION
We begin with Shaka's argument that good cause existed
to set aside the Forfeiture Judgment, because Tualaulelei was
3

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
returned to custody before the time period in which Shaka could
move to set aside the Forfeiture Judgment expired. 	Shaka's
remaining arguments regarding the adequacy of service, the
applicability of the Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure, and due
process are either waived or without merit.
A. 	No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Untimely Motion to Set
Aside Forfeiture Judgment
Shaka argues that good cause existed to set aside the
Forfeiture Judgment. 	In particular, Shaka appears to argue that
good cause existed because Tualaulelei was returned to custody
before the thirty-day time period to set aside the Forfeiture
Judgment expired. 	Shaka posits that "[r]igidly applying
procedural formalities to deny such relief frustrates the
statute's equitable purpose."
By failing to ensure the defendant's appearance, a
bond is forfeited. 	State v. Nelson, 140 Hawaiʻi 123, 132 n.13,
398 P.3d 712, 721 n.13 (2017). 	Under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes
(HRS) § 804-51 (Supp. 2023), when a bond is forfeited, the court
must immediately enter judgment and execute that judgment thirty
days after giving notice of the entry of judgment, unless a
motion showing good cause is filed within those thirty days:
§804-51 	Procedure. 	Whenever the court, in any
criminal cause, forfeits any bond or recognizance given in a
criminal cause, the court shall immediately enter up
judgment in favor of the State and against the principal or
principals, surety or sureties, and surety insurer or surety
insurers on the bond, jointly and severally, for the full
amount of the penalty thereof, and shall cause execution to
issue thereon immediately after the expiration of thirty
days from the date that notice is given via personal service
4

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the surety
or sureties or the surety insurer or surety insurers on the
bond, of the entry of the judgment in favor of the State,
unless before the expiration of thirty days from the date
that notice is given to the surety or sureties or the surety
insurer or surety insurers on the bond of the entry of the
judgment in favor of the State, a motion or application of
the principal or principals, surety or sureties, surety
insurer or surety insurers, or any of them, showing good
cause why execution should not issue upon the judgment, is
filed with the court.
(Emphases added.)
In other words, a surety either guarantees a
defendant's appearance in court or it forfeits the bond. 	And
should the bond be forfeited, a forfeiture judgment is entered
and the surety is given an opportunity to stay execution of the
forfeiture judgment through the "unless" clause.
The "unless" clause provides a conditional exception
to the mandatory and immediate execution of the forfeiture
judgment at the expiration of thirty days. 	The condition
requires, "before the expiration of thirty days from" receiving
notice of the judgment, a "motion or application" "showing good
cause" to be "filed with the court." 	State v. Vaimili, 131
Hawaiʻi 9, 15, 313 P.3d 698, 704 (2013) ("[O]nce a bond is
forfeited pursuant to HRS § 804-51, a surety has thirty days
from the time it receives notice of forfeiture to set aside the
forfeiture judgment[.]").
HRS § 804-51 provides no further remedy to stay
execution of a forfeiture judgment once the thirty days in the
"unless" clause expires. 	State v. Deplae, 158 Hawaiʻi 225, 590
5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
P.3d 354, No. CAAP-24-0000492, 2026 WL 1683929, at *2 (App.
June 10, 2026) (SDO) ("A circuit court is 'without power to
consider' a motion to set aside a forfeiture that is 'not filed
within the time limit imposed by HRS § 804-51[.]'") (citation
omitted).
Here, Shaka guaranteed Tualaulelei would appear at
court or it would forfeit the bond. 	Shaka did not honor its
guarantee. 	Because Tualaulelei did not appear in court, the
circuit court entered the Forfeiture Judgment.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the
challenged finding that notice of the Forfeiture Judgment was
received on November 25, 2024, as the State provided a copy of
the signed and dated return receipt.
Any motion to set aside the Forfeiture Judgment was to
be filed "before the expiration of thirty days" — here,
December 25, 2024. 	Because December 25 was a holiday, Shaka's
Motion must have been "filed with the court" by December 26,
2024. 	HRS §§ 1-29, -32 (2009). 	Shaka, however, filed its
Motion on December 28, 2024, two days after the deadline.
Shaka's Motion did not comply with time requirements set forth
in HRS § 804-51.
Shaka nonetheless argues that, because Tualaulelei was
in custody before the thirty days expired, good cause existed
for staying execution of the Forfeiture Judgment.
6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
In State v. Camara, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court
reiterated that a forfeiture judgment shall be executed upon the
expiration of thirty days, "unless the principal or the surety
(or both) files a motion or application 'showing good cause why
execution should not issue upon the judgment,' HRS § 804-51,
prior to the expiration of the thirty-day search period." 	81
Hawaiʻi 324, 330, 916 P.2d 1225, 1231 (1996) (second emphasis
added).
Furthermore, "'good cause why execution should not
issue upon the judgment' of forfeiture may be satisfied by the
defendant, prior to the expiration of the thirty-day search
period: 	(1) providing a satisfactory reason for his or her
failure to appear when required; or (2) surrendering or being
surrendered." 	Id. at 330, 916 P.2d at 1231. 	"Surrendering"
means "both voluntary and involuntary surrender by the principal
to law enforcement officials[.]" 	Id. at 332, 916 P.2d at 1233.
The supreme court explained that "returning the bond
to the surety, less costs, is consistent with the general
principle that the primary purpose of bail is not to punish the
defendant or surety, . . . but to secure the presence of the
defendant to answer the charges against him or her." 	Id. at
332, 916 P.2d at 1233. 	Accordingly, "if the State regains
custody of the defendant prior to the expiration of the thirty-
day search period and the surety receives partial return of its
7

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
bond, the primary purpose of bail would be met. 	To hold
otherwise would result in punishment of the surety and possibly
of the defendant." 	Id.
On December 6, 2024, the Return of Service was filed
with the court, which was before the expiration of thirty days.
And that Return of Service showed Tualaulelei was arrested on
December 5, 2024, which was also before the expiration of thirty
days. 	Based on Camara, the Return of Service could have
provided a basis for good cause in a motion or application as it
showed Tualaulelei was in custody, i.e., surrendered before the
expiration of the thirty days.
However, Shaka waited twenty-three days after
Tualaulelei was arrested, and twenty-two days after the Return
of Service was filed, to move to set aside the Forfeiture
Judgment, resulting in the Motion being two days late. 	In other
words, Shaka simply sat on its rights.
At some point, there must be finality in a judgment.
In re Peoro, 793 F.2d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 1986) ("One of the
fundamental requirements of a judicial system is finality.").
Here, the legislature set the point of finality by plainly
stating that the judgment shall be executed "immediately after
the expiration of thirty days." 	HRS § 804-51.
8

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
It is not for this court to expand this period of
time, and we leave it to the legislature to amend HRS § 804-51
if it did not intend this result.
Consistent with Camara, which reiterated that a motion
or application showing good cause must be made "prior to the
expiration of the thirty-day search period," we hold that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shaka's
Motion. 	See 81 Hawaiʻi at 330, 916 P.2d at 1231; U.S. v. Amwest
Sur. Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 601, 602 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We review a
district court's decision to set aside or remit the forfeiture
of an appearance bond for abuse of discretion.").
B. 	Shaka's Remaining Arguments Are Waived or Without Merit
1. 	Service
Shaka contends service was improper. 	In its opening
brief, Shaka acknowledges that Darci Todd was Universal's
secretary and that Todd signed the return receipt on
November 25, 2024, but argues that it "never agreed that . . .
Todd was its agent[.]" 	Shaka then argues that, under HRS
§ 431:2-205 (2019), the State failed to serve notice upon the
insurance commissioner.
Shaka, however, fails to point to where in the record
it raised these arguments before the circuit court. 	Shaka
argued, both in its Motion to Set Aside and at the hearing, that
its Motion was timely because it had until December 30, 2024 to
9

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
file its Motion under Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 45(d)
and that good cause existed.
Shaka made no argument regarding Todd or HRS § 431:2-
205, and we need not consider unpresented arguments. 	See HRS
§ 641-2 (2016) ("The appellate court . . . need not consider a
point that was not presented in the trial court in an
appropriate manner."); Hawaii Ventures, LLC v. Otaka, Inc., 114
Hawaiʻi 438, 500, 164 P.3d 696, 758 (2007) ("As a general rule,
if a party does not raise an argument at the circuit court
level, that argument will be deemed to have been waived on
appeal[.]" (citation modified)).
Thus, we deem these arguments waived.
2. 	HRCP Does Not Apply
Shaka next contends the circuit court should have
applied the rules of civil procedure to afford HRCP Rule 60(b)
relief. 	But HRCP Rule 81(a)(8) provides that the HRCP does not
apply to "[p]roceedings for the forfeiture of bonds." 	Vaimili,
131 Hawaiʻi at 14, 313 P.3d at 703 (reiterating that "HRCP
Rule 81(a) provides that the rules of civil procedure do not
apply to bond forfeiture proceedings."). 	Thus, the HRCP does
not apply in the instant case.
Shaka then argues that the circuit court should have
applied the HRCP by invoking HRCP Rule 81(h), which provides,
"[i]n any proceeding in the land court or listed in subdivision
10

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
(a) of Rule 81 the court may by order direct that any one or
more of these rules, not otherwise applicable to said proceeding
pursuant to this Rule 81, shall be applicable to said
proceeding." 	See State v. Nelson, 139 Hawaiʻi 147, 165, 384 P.3d
923, 941 (App. 2016) (explaining "the circuit court properly
declined to act under HRCP Rule 81(h) to order any civil
procedure rule, particularly HRCP Rule 60(b), applicable to the
instant bail forfeiture proceedings").
But Shaka does not point to where in the record it
requested the circuit court apply HRCP Rule 81(h). 	Thus, we
deem this argument waived.
3. 	Due Process
Finally, Shaka contends it was denied due process.
Shaka argues the statute is overbroad and the circuit court's
"interpretation of HRS § 804-51 offers no mechanism for judicial
consideration of good faith, mistake, or the actual recovery of
the defendant." 	Shaka argues "the statute fails rational basis
review."
Shaka fails to show where in the record it raised this
argument before the circuit court. 	See State v. Biton, 158
Hawaiʻi 220, 590 P.3d 349, No. CAAP-25-0000480, 2026 WL 1481525,
at *2 (App. May 27, 2026) (SDO) (determining the argument that
HRS § 804-51 fails rational basis review was waived because it
11

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
was not raised before the circuit court). 	This argument is also
waived.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's
January 10, 2025 Denial Orders.
DATED: 	Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, October 13, 2026.
On the briefs:
Michael C. Carroll,
Keri Ann N. Yatogo,
(Lung Rose Voss & Wagnild),
for Real Party in Interest-
Appellant.
Dean A. Soma,
Steve A. Bumanglag,
Chad K.L. Au,
Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Presiding Judge
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Associate Judge
/s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Associate Judge
12