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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
28-JAN-2026
08:36 AM
Dkt. 61 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC.,
on behalf of Mari and Vaigai, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
DEPARTMENT OF ENTERPRISE SERVICES and its DIRECTOR,
DITA HOLIFIELD, and the HONOLULU ZOO DIRECTOR,
LINDA SANTOS, Respondents-Appellees

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, with Wadsworth and Guidry, JJ.
concurring separately)

Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (NRP) petitioned the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of two elephants living at the Honolulu Zoo. The Circuit
Court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss.1 NRP appeals
from the Judgment for the City and County of Honolulu.
Writs of habeas corpus under Hawaii Revised Statutes
(HRS) Chapter 660 are available only to "persons" unlawfully
restrained of their liberty. We hold: (1) elephants are not
"persons"; (2) HRS Chapter 660 supersedes the common law writ of
habeas corpus; and, at any rate, (3) the common law writ of

1
The Honorable Gary W.B. Chang presided.
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habeas corpus also applied only to persons. We affirm the
Judgment. NRP's December 5, 2025 motion for retention of oral
argument is denied. We dismiss NRP's December 23, 2024 motion to
admit Jake Davis pro hac vice as moot.
NRP filed a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against the City's Department of Enterprise Services, Dita
Holifield, and Linda Santos. The Department of Enterprise
Services operates the Honolulu Zoo. Holifield is the
Department's director. Santos is the Zoo's director. The
Petition sought an evidentiary hearing to show cause why the
Zoo's two elephants should not be released "to an elephant
sanctuary accredited by the Global Federation of Animal
Sanctuaries."2
The City moved to dismiss. It argued the Petition
failed to state a claim because (1) writs of habeas corpus under
HRS Chapter 660 are only available to persons, and elephants are
not persons; and (2) habeas corpus under the common law was
available only to humans. An order granting the motion, and the
Judgment,3 were entered on March 25, 2024. This appeal followed.
NRP contends the Circuit Court erred by: (1) not
issuing an order to show cause despite the Petition establishing
a prima facie case; and (2) "retroactively denying" pro hac vice
admission to Davis.
(1) We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de
novo. Yamane v. Pohlson, 111 Hawai#i 74, 81, 137 P.3d 980, 987
(2006). We assume the facts alleged in the petition are true and
view them in the light most favorable to the petitioner to see if
they warrant relief under any legal theory. See id.

2
NRP did not seek the elephants' release into the wild; it sought
their transfer to another form of confinement. That is another reason habeas
corpus relief was not appropriate. See Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v.
Cheyenne Mountain Zoological Soc'y, 562 P.3d 63, 70 (Colo. 2025) ("The fact
that NRP merely seeks the transfer of the elephants from one form of
confinement to another is yet another reason that habeas relief is not
appropriate here.").
3
The Judgment was entered for the City. NRP's claims against
Holifield and Santos were dismissed without prejudice.

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Regarding writs of habeas corpus, HRS § 660-3 (2016)
provides:

Issuable by whom. The supreme court, the justices thereof,
and the circuit courts may issue writs of habeas corpus in
cases in which persons are unlawfully restrained of their
liberty; provided that persons committed or detained by
order of the family court or under chapter 334 [("Mental
Health, Mental Illness, Drug Addiction, and Alcoholism")]
may, and if the jurisdiction of the family court is
exclusive, shall, prosecute their applications in the family
court.

(Bold italics added.)
Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed
de novo. Eason v. State, 157 Hawai#i 252, 263, 576 P.3d 765, 776
(2025). The fundamental starting point is the statute's
language. Id.
NRP argues "[t]he scope of the undefined term 'person'
in [HRS] Chapter 660 is not a matter of statutory
interpretation." The word "person" need not be defined; the
plain meaning of the word does not include animals.4 Cf. State
v. LeVasseur, 1 Haw. App. 19, 24-25, 613 P.2d 1328, 1332-33
(1980) (a dolphin is not "any other person" for purposes of
choice of evils defense to theft prosecution); see also, HRS
§ 142-96 (2023) (imposing fine upon one who "frightens,
exasperates, or animates a horse or other animal, and thereby
endangers the personal safety or the personal property of any
person, or the animal itself, being that of another"); HRS § 707-
700 (2014) (defining "deviate sexual intercourse" to include "any
act of sexual gratification between a person and an animal").
NRP incorrectly argues that the word "person" in HRS
§ 660-3 "is merely a placeholder with no substantive meaning."

4
NRP has unsuccessfully litigated this issue before. See, e.g.,
Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. DeYoung Fam. Zoo, LLC, ___ N.W.3d ___, 2025 WL
2957821 (Mich. App. 2025); Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. Cheyenne Mountain
Zoological Soc'y, 562 P.3d 63 (Colo. 2025); Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v.
Breheny, 197 N.E.3d 921 (N.Y. 2022); Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. R.W.
Commerford & Sons, Inc., 231 A.3d 1171 (Conn. App. 2020).

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It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts
are bound, if rational and practicable, to give effect to
all parts of a statute, and that no clause, sentence, or
word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or
insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found
which will give force to and preserve all the words of the
statute.

Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 215–16, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984).
NRP also argues that HRS Chapter 660 is "merely
procedural" and does not supplant the common law writ of habeas
corpus. That is also not correct. The "common law may generally
be overridden by statute." Priceline.com, Inc. v. Dir. of Tax'n,
144 Hawai#i 72, 82, 436 P.3d 1155, 1165 (2019); see also HRS
§ 1-1 (2009) (declaring common law of England to be the common
law of Hawaii "except as otherwise expressly provided by . . .
the laws of the State").
A complete statutory remedy supersedes the common law
remedy. "In such case the statutory remedy is not merely
cumulative upon the common law action, but an entire substitution
for it, and must be exclusively pursued[.]" Herring v. Gulick, 5
Haw. 57, 58 (Haw. Kingdom 1883).
The remedy provided by HRS Chapter 660 is complete
because the common law writ of habeas corpus also applied only to
persons. In re Apuna, 6 Haw. 732, 734 (Haw. Kingdom 1869)
(noting that writ of habeas corpus was in substance the same as
the English common law "designed to release persons from illegal
confinement" (emphasis added)). At common law, the category of
"persons" was confined to humans, and the law separately
addressed animals as objects of property. Nonhuman Rts. Project,
Inc. v. DeYoung Fam. Zoo, LLC, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL
2957821, at *8 (Mich. App. 2025).
HRS Chapter 660 thus prescribes the sole means
available for obtaining a writ of habeas corpus from a Hawai#i
state court. A habeas writ is not available to animals
restrained of their liberty. The Circuit Court did not err by
dismissing NRP's Petition.

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(2) NRP contends, "The Circuit Court violated pro hac
vice counsel's procedural due process rights and abused its
discretion when it retroactively denied the [pro hac vice]
Motion." NRP misstates the record.
NRP first applied for Davis's admission pro hac vice on
November 2, 2023. The application was denied without prejudice
because it "failed to comply with Rules 7 and 7.2 of the Rules of
the Circuit Courts of the State of Hawaii."
NRP reapplied for Davis's admission pro hac vice on
November 10, 2023. The application was heard on January 16,
2024. The Circuit Court orally granted the application subject
to six conditions specified during the hearing. NRP's Hawai#i-
licensed counsel Cheryl Nolan was asked to prepare an order.
Nolan's proposed order omitted parts or all of the
second, third, fourth, and sixth conditions. The proposed order
was "rejected by the court without prejudice" because it "failed
to state all of the conditions that the court stated in
announcing its ruling during the hearing." NRP does not argue
that any of the Circuit Court's conditions were contrary to law.
Nolan never resubmitted a conforming form of order.
The Circuit Court did not retroactively deny Davis's application.
NRP's point of error lacks merit.
(3) NRP moved to admit Davis pro hac vice three times
in this appeal. The first motion was filed on July 22, 2024. It
was denied because the supporting declarations did not comply
with Rule 1.9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of
Hawai#i (RSCH) (eff. July 1, 2024). Another motion was filed on
December 5, 2024. It was denied for failure to comply with RSCH
Rule 1.9.
Briefing for this appeal was completed on September 23,
2024. NRP again moved to admit Davis pro hac vice on
December 23, 2024. We entered an order of no oral argument on
November 28, 2025. See Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 34(a). NRP's December 5, 2025 motion for retention of oral

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argument is denied. NRP's pending motion for Davis to appear pro
hac vice is dismissed as moot.
The March 25, 2024 Judgment for the City and County of
Honolulu Department of Enterprise Services and against NRP is
affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, January 28, 2026.

On the briefs:
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Cheryl Nolan, Presiding Judge
for Petitioner-Appellant.

Daniel M. Gluck,
Jacqueline M. De Leeuw Huang,
Patricia A.V. Sendao,
Deputies Corporation Counsel,
City and County of Honolulu,
for Respondents-Appellees.

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CONCURRING OPINION BY WADSWORTH, J., IN WHICH GUIDRY, J., JOINS

I join the court's opinion in Parts (2) and (3). I
respectfully concur in Part (1) and write separately to more
fully explain my position.
Mari and Vaigai are two Asian elephants in residence at
the Honolulu Zoo. Petitioner-Appellant Nonhuman Rights Project
(NRP) filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the
elephants' behalf, seeking to end their captivity in the zoo and
move them to a less confining environment – a "rewilding"
facility in Asia or "a suitable elephant sanctuary in the United
States or Brazil." The Circuit Court granted a motion to dismiss
the petition brought by the City and County of Honolulu and
related defendants. NRP appealed to this court.
In the petition, NRP alleges and provides supporting
declarations opining, in summary, that "[e]lephants are
autonomous and extraordinarily cognitively complex beings" and
"[z]oo captivity physically and psychologically harms elephants."
For purposes of this appeal, we do not dispute the evolving
understanding that elephants are intelligent creatures deserving
proper care and treatment.
But Mari and Vaigai are plainly not "persons" within
the ordinary definition and common meaning of the word. In
Hawai#i, the writ of habeas corpus is made available only to
"persons." Specifically, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 660-3
(2016) authorizes the supreme court and the circuit courts to
issue writs of habeas corpus "in cases in which persons are
unlawfully restrained of their liberty[.]"1/ (Emphasis added.)

1/
We further note that Article I, section 15 of the Hawai #i
Constitution, states:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended unless, when in cases of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require it.
The power of suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the laws or the execution thereof,
shall never be exercised except by the legislature, or
by authority derived from it to be exercised in such
particular cases only as the legislature shall
expressly prescribe.
Section 15 does not purport to define the writ more broadly than
the legislature has or to otherwise override the provisions of HRS chapter
660, the original version of which was adopted in 1870. See Eason v. State,
157 Hawai#i 252, 269, 576 P.3d 765, 782 (2025).
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NRP argues that HRS chapter 660 "merely governs habeas
corpus procedure, not substantive entitlement to the common law
right to bodily liberty that habeas corpus protects." This
argument presents a false dichotomy, obscuring a central feature
of the habeas corpus remedy; it is – and was at common law – a
procedural vehicle intended to secure the liberty rights of
persons who are unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. See HRS
§ 660-3; In re Apuna, 6 Haw. 732, 734 (Haw. Kingdom 1869). HRS
chapter 660 prescribes, among other things, the courts that may
issue that procedural vehicle, and the manner and conditions
under which it may be exercised. As much as we may sympathize
with the plight of Mari and Vaigai, we are not at liberty to
ignore the legislature's clear directive in this regard. See
Brown v. Goto, 16 Haw. 263, 265 (Haw. Terr. 1904).
That is not to say that elephants like Mari and Vaigai
have no available remedy in our constitutional system – NRP can
petition the legislature for the change in the law it seeks.2/
The Hawai#i legislature has shown itself quite capable of
providing for the safety and welfare of nonhuman animals, while
navigating their complicated relationship with humans. For
example, Hawai#i statutes prohibit and penalize various forms of
cruelty to animals, including depriving a "pet animal" of
"necessary sustenance" or confining the animal in a kennel or
cage in a cruel or inhumane manner. HRS § 711-1109 (2014 & Supp.
2021) (penalizing the offense of cruelty to animals in the second
degree); see HRS § 711-1108.5 (2014) (penalizing cruelty to
animals in the first degree); HRS § 711-1100 (2014 & Supp. 2015)
(defining "animal" as "every living creature, except a human
being" and "necessary sustenance" as care sufficient to preserve
the health and well-being of a pet animal, including adequate
food, water, shelter, and veterinary care). These and other laws
affecting the treatment of nonhuman animals not only recognize
the legal distinction between human beings and other animals, but
also demonstrate the willingness of the legislature to enact

2/
NRP characterizes such a suggestion as an "abdication of judicial
duty . . . ." We cannot abdicate a duty that the rule of law has not imposed
upon us.

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statutory protections for nonhuman animals in specific
circumstances. As the relationship between human beings and
other animals continues to evolve, NRP is free to direct its
effort to hasten that evolution and to develop and strengthen
laws that safeguard animals like Mari and Vaigai to the
legislature. The writ of habeas corpus, however, is not an
available remedy in these circumstances under current Hawai#i
law.

/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Associate Judge

/s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge