Von Maur, Inc. v. Dallas County Board of Review

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-2053
Filed October 21, 2026
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Von Maur, Inc.,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Dallas County Board of Review,
Defendant–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County,
The Honorable Michael Jacobsen, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Richard A. Davidson of Lane & Waterman LLP, Davenport, attorney for
appellant.
Jamie L. Cox and Paul S. Wilson of Willson & Pechacek, P.L.C., Council
Bluffs, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.

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TABOR, Chief Judge.
Taxpayer Von Maur, Inc. contests the Dallas County Assessor’s
valuation of its Jordan Creek Mall department store for tax years 2023 and
2024. The assessor valued the real estate at $16,046,520 for both years. The
district court adopted that market value. Relying on its own expert, the
taxpayer contends the property is worth only $12,300,000.
In our independent determination, we do not find the assessments
were excessive. We affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
The Von Maur department store is one of four “anchor” retailers at
the Jordan Creek Town Center. 1 In appraisal terms, Jordan Creek is
considered “a super-regional mall.” Von Maur covers 152,000 square feet of
the mall, and the leased site is 12.51 acres.
Another department store, Younkers, built the two-story structure in
2004 and occupied that location until going out of business in 2018. The mall
owners bought the property from Younkers and leased it to Von Maur in
2019. Von Maur did renovations before opening in 2022.
At issue are Von Maur’s property tax assessments for the two years
after its opening. For both 2023 and 2024, the county assessor appraised the
land at $4,359,490 and the improvements at $11,687,030 for a total value of
$16,046,520. Von Maur protested to the board of review, alleging in its
petitions that the property was “assessed for more than the value authorized
1 Von Maur’s appraiser described it as an “upscale” retailer unlike a “discount
department store” like Walmart. The other three anchors are Dillard’s, Scheels, and
Century Theaters.

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by law.” For 2023, Von Maur’s petition alleged the actual value was
$7,800,000. For 2024, the petition alleged the actual value was $0. The
board of review upheld the assessments. Von Maur then appealed to the
district court, which granted the parties’ request to consolidate the appeals.
Both sides hired experts for the district court hearing. The Dallas
County Board of Review offered the opinions of veteran real estate appraiser
Mark Kenney. Von Maur countered with the opinions of appraiser Chris
Jenkins, who also had decades of experience in commercial appraisals for
retail property.
In his testimony for the board of review, Kenney rated Von Maur’s
location as “excellent” and described it as “the premier retail location in the
state.” But he also acknowledged “department stores aren’t what they used
to be” in this era of online shopping. Yet despite recognizing the store’s
external obsolescence, Kenney valued the Von Maur property at $17,800,000
for 2023 and $18,000,000 for 2024.
Jenkins offered a different view on behalf of Von Maur. Citing high
inflation and climbing interest rates in 2023, Jenkins noted a downward trend
in the value of large retail stores. In his opinion, the value of the property was
considerably lower: $12,300,000 for 2023 and $11,700,000 in 2024.
After hearing testimony from the two experts, the district court
decided Kenney “provided the more credible and persuasive analysis as to
the subject property’s actual market value.” The court found that Kenney
“correctly looked at similar sale-leaseback transactions and made
adjustments taking into account market conditions.” From there, the court
upheld the board of review’s property tax assessments for both years.
Von Maur appeals the district court’s ruling.

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II. Scope and Standard of Review
We review Von Maur’s tax protest de novo. See Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 983 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Iowa 2022). Although the
district court’s findings of fact are not binding on us, we give them weight
and are “especially deferential” to the court’s determinations on witness
credibility. Id.; see also Payton Apartments, Ltd. v. Bd. of Rev. of City of Des
Moines, 358 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (giving weight to district
court’s decision on expert witness credibility even in a de novo review).
Weighing the credibility of competing expert opinions differs from
deciding whether the witnesses are telling the truth. True, “[e]xperts, like
other humans, have been known to lie.” Banwart v. Neurosurgery of N. Iowa,
P.C., 18 N.W.3d 267, 275 (Iowa 2025) (providing example of expert lying
about credentials). This case involves good faith, yet varying, appraisals from
the parties’ experts. When faced with conflicting appraisal testimony, “a
court must necessarily assign weight to the opinion testimony received based
on its view of the qualifications and credibility of the parties’ expert
witnesses.” In re Smith, 267 B.R. 568, 572 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001).
[V]aluation is ultimately the opinion of a particular appraiser and, as such,
the weight to be accorded the opinion rests upon a number of factors
frequently used by courts in evaluating appraisal testimony[, including]:
the appraiser’s education, training, experience, familiarity with the subject
of the appraisal, manner of conducting the appraisal, testimony on direct
examination, testimony on cross-examination, and overall ability to
substantiate the basis for the valuation presented.
In re Buckland, 123 B.R. 573, 578 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).

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III. Analysis
To aid our analysis, we survey the legal principles governing property
tax challenges.
A. Taxpayer’s Protest
An aggrieved taxpayer dissatisfied with the county’s property
assessment may petition the board of review alleging one of the statutory
grounds in Iowa Code section 441.37(1)(a)(1) (2024). The ground alleged by
Von Maur is found in paragraph (b): “[T]he property is assessed for more
than the value authorized by law.”
When the board of review declined to reduce the assessment, Von
Maur appealed to the district court, which sits in equity to “determine anew
all questions arising before the board of review” that relate to the amount of
the assessment. Iowa Code § 441.38(3). In that review, the district court must
consider “all of the evidence” and cannot presume that the valuation being
appealed is correct. Id.
Von Maur claims that the district court did not comply with the
directives in section 441.38(3) when deciding the value of the anchor store.
In Von Maur’s view, the district court “rubber stamped” the appraisal from
Kenney, the board’s expert. The taxpayer complains that the district court’s
statements endorsing Kenney’s credibility were too conclusory to comply
with the code. Von Maur also insists that the court failed to discuss whether
it used the comparable sales approach or looked to “other factors” in
determining the store’s value.
We reject Von Maur’s attack on the district court’s reasoning. Nothing
in the ruling suggests that the court presumed the correctness of the
assessor’s valuation. In fact, the court spent twenty pages detailing the

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approaches and opinions of the two battling experts. True, the court devoted
far less space to its conclusion that Kenney was the more credible expert. But
its bottom line was unmistakable; after considering “the totality of the record
presented,” the district court found Kenney’s methods and analysis to be
more persuasive and credited his appraisal over the valuations offered by Von
Maur’s expert. The ruling complied with section 441.38(3).
B. Burden Shifting
The taxpayer generally bears the burden to prove an assessment is
excessive. Iowa Code § 441.21(3)(b)(2). But if the taxpayer “offers
competent evidence that the market value of the property is different than
the market value determined by the assessor, the burden of proof thereafter
shall be upon the officials or persons seeking to uphold such valuation to be
assessed.” Id. § 441.21(3)(b)(1).2 Evidence is competent “when it complies
with the statutory scheme for property valuation.” Compiano v. Polk Co. Bd.
of Rev., 771 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Iowa 2009) (cleaned up).
Von Maur asserts that Jenkins’s appraisal “fits the bill” to shift the
burden of proof to the board. The board does not dispute that assertion but
maintains that “the district court correctly applied the burden shifting
analysis.” We agree that the district court properly recognized that the
burden rested with the board to uphold the county’s assessment.
2 The code previously required competent evidence from at least “two
disinterested witnesses” contesting the market value of the property. See Iowa Code
§ 441.21(3)(b)(1) (2017). But in 2017, the legislature removed that requirement for
assessment years starting in 2018. 2017 Iowa Acts ch. 151, § 8.

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C. Actual Value
“All property subject to taxation shall be valued at its actual
value . . . .” Iowa Code § 441.21(1)(a). Actual value means “the fair and
reasonable market value of such property.” Id. § 441.21(1)(b)(1). The code
defines “market value” as “the fair and reasonable exchange in the year in
which the property is listed and valued between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and each being
familiar with all the facts relating to the particular property.” Id.
Section 441.21 describes two approaches for assessing a property’s
market value: the “comparable sales” approach and the “other factors”
approach. See Compiano, 771 N.W.2d at 396. The code’s preferred valuation
method is the comparable-sales approach—which seeks to determine market
value by reference to actual sales of similar properties. Iowa Code
§ 441.21(1)(b)(1) (“Sale prices of the property or comparable property in
normal transactions reflecting market value . . . shall be taken into
consideration in arriving at its market value.”). But if market value “cannot
be readily established” through the comparable-sales method, then assessors
may rely on “other uniform and recognized appraisal methods,” including
income-capitalization and cost analyses. Id. § 441.21(2). Here, both experts
started with the comparable-sales approach; they also used other approaches
and then gave the sale comparisons the most weight in determining value.
But Von Maur claims that when performing his appraisal, despite
certifying his compliance, Kenney did not follow the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). 3 Rather, in Von Maur’s view,
3 All appraisers performing services regulated by the real estate appraiser
examining board must comply with the USPAP. Iowa Admin. Code r. 481-2035.1(3). But
the administrative code does not list the specific USPAP standards. And we have declined

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Kenney was pushing the agenda of the International Association of Assessing
Officers (IAAO), a “trade organization” for government assessors. Von Maur
claims that the flawed theories that Kenney offered from the IAAO tainted
his entire appraisal report. The board responds that appraisers must resolve
any conflicts between industry standards and Iowa law in favor of Iowa law
and that Kenney did so in appraising the property at issue. The board also
faulted Jenkins, the taxpayer’s expert, for using comparable sale properties
“with artificially low sale prices” and for making “inconsistent and
questionable adjustments.”
While competing industry standards may have influenced the
methodology of both appraisers, we focus on whether the board satisfied its
burden of proof to uphold the assessments at issue. Von Maur argues that the
board failed to meet its burden because Kenney’s appraisal violated Iowa law
in three ways: (1) he applied a faulty definition of a fee simple property
interest; (2) he did not value the property according to its present use; and
(3) he made unreliable adjustments to the sales of three comparable
properties to account for the fact that they involved lease-fee rather than fee-
simple sales. We consider each of those complaints in turn.
i. Fee simple interest
The parties agree that the real estate should be appraised “free of all
encumbrances, including leases.” See I.C.M. Realty v. Woodward, 433 N.W.2d
760, 762 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he proper measure of value is what the
property would bring if sold in fee simple free and clear of any leases.”). But
to take judicial notice of those standards. RV Cent. v. Plaats, No. 19-1812, 2020 WL
4197758, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2020). So without going outside the record on
appeal, we cannot evaluate Von Maur’s claim concerning Kenney’s compliance with the
USPAP.

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they disagree whether Kenney impermissibly strayed from the definition of
fee simple by assuming the Von Maur property was “leased at market rates”
at the time of valuation. Von Maur insists Kenney undermined his own report
by determining the value of the property as if it were leased rather than
cabining the valuation to how much a willing buyer would pay for the
property free of any leases. See Merle Hay Mall v. City of Des Moines Bd. of
Rev., 564 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Iowa 1997) (rejecting mall owner’s argument that
unfavorable lease should be considered as part of income-capitalization
approach to valuation).
We reject Von Maur’s position. When property is subject to a lease, an
appraiser may make an adjustment to reflect the effect of the lease on the
value of the property. See Soifer v. Floyd Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 759 N.W.2d 775,
783 (Iowa 2009) (“When sales of other properties are admitted, the market
value of the assessed property must be adjusted to account for differences
between the comparable property and the assessed property to the extent any
differences would distort the market value of the assessed property in the
absence of such adjustments.”); I.C.M. Realty, 433 N.W.2d at 762 (noting that
while property should be valued as if free and clear of any leases, the evidence
of leases is a factor that may be used to determine the value of the property
without the leases).
ii. Present Use
Von Maur next argues that, despite professing to do so, Kenney did
not appraise the property based on its present use as “an anchor department
store at a super-regional shopping mall.” The taxpayer points to Kenney’s
reliance on comparable sales of properties as disparate as “a furniture store,
farm supply stores, a hobby store, and big box discount stores.” Von Maur
accuses Kenney of using “comparable sales of other retail uses because he

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knows a department store value will never be high enough to support the
assessor’s value.”
We find this argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, a
comparable sale should be similar but need not be identical. Wellmark, Inc. v.
Polk Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 875 N.W.2d 667, 681 (Iowa 2016). “Similar means
having a resemblance, and properties may be similar even though they have
some different characteristics.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sieren, 460 N.W.2d
887, 890 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Second, many of the varied retail properties
referenced by Kenney also appeared on Jenkins’s list of comparable sales.
Kenney’s appraisal did not ignore Von Maur’s current use of the department
store.
iii. Lease-Fee Sales
Related to its other complaints, Von Maur criticizes Kenney’s method
of adjusting the value of his comparable-sale properties based on lease-fee
sales rather than fee-simple sales. The taxpayer contends that Kenney failed
to “properly adjust his comparable sales for the long-term sale-leaseback
transactions that taint sales.”
But as the district court noted, “comparable sales are not necessarily
excluded from consideration simply because they involve sale-leasebacks, if
appropriate adjustments are made to reflect the value of the fee simple
interest of the owner.” See HyVee v. Dallas Cnty. Bd. of Review, No. 13-1377,
2014 WL 4937892, at *2 n.3,*5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014) (finding that
assessor who adjusted for present use with comparable sale-leaseback
transactions “most accurately assessed the value of the property at issue”).
We agree with the district court that Kenney’s adjustments properly took
into account market conditions.

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Finally, we address Von Maur’s argument that “department store
comparable sales are the best indication of value” for this anchor store. The
taxpayer points to three properties from Jenkins’s appraisal and four from
Kenney’s report to show that the pre-adjustment price per square foot
averaged about $85 for both experts. Von Maur seizes on that figure to
advocate for its overall valuation of $12,300,000.
The board pushes back on that figure, recounting that Von Maur paid
at least $10,000,000 in renovations to the real estate in 2021 and 2022. We
agree that the costs of the improvements added value to the real estate. See
Wellmark, 875 N.W.2d at 683 (finding it ironic that taxpayer “having
expended more than $150 million on its new corporate headquarters, now
urges that the property is worth less than half of that amount for tax
purposes”).
We reject any remaining arguments advanced by the taxpayer, whether
stated expressly or not. And based on our de novo review of the record, we
affirm the board’s assessment of $16,046,520 for both tax years.
AFFIRMED.