In the Interest of L.S., L.S., and L.S., Minor Children

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-1275
Filed October 21, 2026
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In the Interest of L.S., L.S., and L.S., Minor Children,
N.S., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Kimberly Ayotte, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Audra F. Saunders, West Des Moines, attorney for appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.
Emily Carr of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad
litem for minor children.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.

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TABOR, Chief Judge.
Nicholas appeals the termination of his parental rights to his three
daughters, seven-year-old Lu.S., almost three-year-old La.S., and eighteen-
month-old Ly.S. He argues termination is not in their best interests and the
juvenile court should have ordered a guardianship with his mother. We
carefully considered his request but agree with the juvenile court that under
these circumstances, a guardianship is not in the children’s best interests.
Their best interests are served by termination.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Ly.S. tested positive for cocaine when she was born in January 2025.
Her mother, Carrie, admitted using cocaine the day of the birth. The parents
worked with the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services to set up
a voluntary safety plan. In April, sweat patch tests for both Nicholas and
Carrie were positive for cocaine. And in May, La.S. also tested positive for
cocaine on a hair test. The department moved to remove the children from
the parents’ care, and the juvenile court adjudicated them as children in need
of assistance (CINA). Since the removal, the children have been placed with
their paternal grandmother.1
In May, the department filed a case plan outlining goals for the parents,
including maintaining their sobriety, completing substance-use treatment,
engaging in mental-health therapy, attending visits, and establishing a stable
1 Carrie has an older daughter from a previous relationship, Li.S., who has lived
with Carrie’s mother in Marshalltown for several years. The maternal grandmother told
the department that Carrie stops by on weekends when she has time. There is little else
in the record about Li.S., whether any custody order exists for her, or whether she has
contact with her half-siblings.

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home. The juvenile court adopted those recommendations in the disposition
order the same month.
Just before the review hearing in July, the parents tested positive for
cocaine again; they had made little progress on their case goals. The court
added an order that the parents seek services for domestic violence when
Carrie disclosed to the family centered services (FCS) provider that Nicholas
had abused her.
In August, Nicholas’s drug test was negative for all substances, but he
failed to test when requested in September and October, and his November
test was positive for cocaine again. Throughout this time, the parents were
homeless, staying with friends or in their car. For the most part, they
consistently attended visits with the children, all supervised by either an FCS
provider or Nicholas’s mother. In December, the parents separated and
started to have separate visits. Still, throughout the case, they vacillated on
whether they were in an intimate relationship.
Progress with substance-use treatment continued to be slow for both
parents, despite negative drug tests in January. Carrie entered a residential
treatment facility that month. But when Nicholas visited her there while he
was drunk, they got into a fight, and Nicholas was banned from further visits.
In March, again despite a negative drug test, Nicholas was charged
with domestic abuse assault against Carrie and criminal mischief for breaking
her phone. The police incident report stated that while out at a bar, Nicholas
and Carrie got in a fight and, when she tried to walk away, he “grabbed her
hair and tackled her to the ground.” The criminal court imposed a no-contact
order, which the parents violated. At Carrie’s request, the State dismissed
the violation charge and the court lifted the no-contact order. Nicholas

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pleaded guilty with an agreement for a deferred judgment and dismissal of
the criminal mischief charge. He is now on probation. Under his plea
agreement, he must complete the Iowa Domestic Abuse Program.
Shortly after the no-contact order was lifted, Carrie and Nicholas
moved from Des Moines to a house in Marshalltown. The department
stressed to Carrie its concerns about further domestic violence, but Carrie
reported wanting to be closer to her mother. And Nicholas said moving to
Marshalltown helped them avoid negative influences in Des Moines.
In its April 2026 permanency order, the juvenile court directed the
State to petition for termination of parental rights. Nicholas’s drug test that
month was positive for cocaine, but a sweat patch applied in May was
negative for all substances, and a June UA was negative. Around then, the
department learned that Carrie and Nicholas were expecting another baby,
due in December 2026.
The juvenile court held a joint permanency review and termination
hearing. The court heard evidence that Nicholas attended substance-use and
mental-health therapy from April to August 2025; he reinitiated treatment in
January of the following year, but those sessions were interrupted by his
incarceration for the assault against Carrie, after which they moved to
Marshalltown. His incarceration also disrupted his participation in a Caring
Dads domestic abuse education class. At the termination hearing, Nicholas
testified he was trying to reenter those services in Marshalltown with the help
of his probation officer. He also planned to attend orientation to begin a new
job at Walmart. In his view, he and Carrie could pay rent on their home and
resume custody of the children soon.

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In its order addressing both termination and permanency, the court
denied the parents’ requests for a six-month extension and ordered
termination of their rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) (2026) for
Lu.S., and section 232.116(1)(h) for La.S. and Ly.S. The court found
termination was in the children’s best interests, pointing to ongoing safety
risks, the parents’ lack of participation in services, and the availability of a
stable home with Nicholas’s mother. On the parents’ request that the court
preserve their rights and create a guardianship with Nicholas’s mother, the
court noted that the children were young and then addressed the relative
merits of termination and guardianships.
Guardianships do not provide the same level of permanency that
termination of parental rights and adoption do. The parents would have
the opportunity to seek termination of a guardianship. Even if the court
denied such a request, the process itself is disruptive to children. These
children deserve stable, sober, safe caretakers. Since termination and
adoption are the preferred methods of obtaining permanency for children
who cannot be returned to a parental home, the court finds termination is
in the children’s best interest.
The court then weighed the statutory exception to termination under
section 232.116(3)(c):
[T]he evidence shows that the parents have been inconsistent in exercising
visitation. The parents would cancel visits if they were tired, or fighting, or
using. Their unresolved mental health and substance use was a barrier to
being consistently present in the children’s lives. After considering the
parent’s unresolved mental health, substance use, and domestic violence
as well as the children’s need for permanency, the court finds there are no
legal exceptions in Iowa Code Section 232.116(3) which would argue
against termination.

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Only Nicholas appeals.2
II. Analysis
Generally, termination cases follow three steps. A.B., 957 N.W.2d at
294. First, the State must prove a statutory ground for termination under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1). Id. Second, the State must show termination
is in the children’s best interests under section 232.116(2). Id. Third, a parent
may rely on permissive exceptions to termination under
section 232.116(3). Id. Nicholas doesn’t challenge step one or three, so we do
not address them.3 See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (finding the
court need not address a step not disputed on appeal). Instead, he asks for six
months for reunification,4 contends termination is not in the children’s best
interests and asks for the court to appoint his mother as guardian.
A. Extension.
To delay permanency for another six months, the court must find that
“the need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end” of that time. Iowa
2 We review termination proceedings de novo. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293
(Iowa 2021). That means “[w]e consider both facts and law before adjudicating rights
anew.” In re J.L., 973 N.W.2d 895, 907 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). “We are not bound by the
factual findings of the juvenile court, though we give them respectful consideration,
particularly regarding credibility determinations.” A.B., 957 N.W.2d at 293. Our primary
concern is the best interests of the child. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006).
3 Nicholas raised the termination exception based on the closeness of the parent-
child relationship under section 232.116(3)(c) in the juvenile court but does not reprise it
on appeal.
4 Nicholas mentions an extension of time in his best-interests discussion.
Generally, when a party wishes to raise an issue, it must do so in a separate issue heading
or risk waiving the issue. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 534 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en
banc). But we choose to address the issue here.

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Code § 232.104(2)(b). The court must state “specific factors, conditions, or
expected behavioral changes” to support its decision. Id. Like the juvenile
court, we don’t see that light at the end of a six-month tunnel here. After
years of using substances, achieving sobriety is difficult, and Nicholas has not
made the strides necessary to address the removal issues. See In re A.P.,
No. 19-1880, 2020 WL 1049543, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020). On top
of that, many of his recent decisions show poor judgment and dishonesty
rather than progress. This record does not show factors, conditions, or
behavioral changes that suggest he could resume custody in six months, so
delaying permanency is not warranted.
B. Guardianship and Best Interests.
Nicholas next challenges the court’s best-interests finding, citing Iowa
Code section 232.116(2). 5 He asks us to reverse the termination order and
remand for the appointment of his mother as guardian under section 232.104.
After a termination hearing, the juvenile court has several options.6 In
relevant part, if the court orders termination, the department had custody of
the child at the filing of the termination petition, and transfer to the child’s
other parent is not in their best interests, the court must transfer
5 In a termination proceeding, the State has the burden to prove termination is in
the children’s best interests by clear and convincing evidence. See In re J.R., 20 N.W.3d
839, 842–43 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc); In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Iowa 2021).
Evidence is clear and convincing when “we harbor no serious or substantial doubts about
the accuracy of the legal conclusions drawn from the evidence.” In re S.O., 967 N.W.2d
198, 201 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021).
6 If the court finds the facts don’t support termination, it must dismiss the petition.
Iowa Code § 232.117(2). If it finds the facts sufficient, it “may” order termination.
Id. § 232.117(3). If the court orders termination, it can transfer guardianship and custody
to a parent whose rights are not terminated. Id.

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guardianship and custody to the department, unless the department “waives
its priority.” Iowa Code § 232.117(3)(a); see also In re J.B., 35 N.W.3d 132, 137
(Iowa 2026).
If the court doesn’t order termination but finds clear and convincing
evidence that the child is still in need of assistance, the court has the option
to order a guardianship with a relative. Iowa Code §§ 232.117(5),
232.104(2)(d)(2). To do so, the court must find (1) termination would not be
in the children’s best interests, (2) the department offered the family services
to correct the removal concerns, and (3) the children can’t be returned home.
See id. § 232.104(4)(a)–(c).
In seeking a guardianship,7 Nicholas argues that his case is similar to
In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017), where a panel of this court
found termination was not in the child’s best interests and ordered a
guardianship under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(d)(1) and (4) (2016)
(allowing transfer of “custody of the child to a suitable person for the purpose
of long-term care”). In that case, the child had been in his maternal
grandmother’s care throughout the case and was in her custody at the time
of the termination proceeding. B.T., 894 N.W.2d at 31–32. Meanwhile, the
mother’s substance-use treatment, while not complete, was progressing.
Id. at 31. Ten-year-old B.T. was close with his mother and wanted to maintain
the relationship if she was sober but otherwise wanted to stay with his
grandmother. Id. at 34. Our court found a guardianship would “allow for both
scenarios, thereby serving the child’s best interests and needs.” Id. The
mother and grandmother also had “a close, mature, and healthy relationship
that [wa]s free of conflict.” Id. Our court recognized the longstanding
7 Nicholas does not specify whether he is advocating for a guardianship under
chapter 232 or chapter 232D.

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proposition that “guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to
termination,” but asked, “Is the child’s placement with the grandmother as
his guardian less permanent than requiring the grandmother to adopt the
child?” Id. at 33. The answer: “[W]e think not.” Id.
That same year, our court decided In re A.S., No. 17-0851, 2017 WL
4317339 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 27, 2017), also ordering a guardianship where
maternal grandparents had custody. On further review, the supreme court
vacated our decision, finding termination was in the child’s best interests. In
re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 474 (Iowa 2018). The court focused on the mother’s
intellectual impairment and parenting deficiencies, concluding that she
couldn’t remedy those shortcomings in the foreseeable future to parent on
her own. Id. at 474–75. And, because it found termination was in the child’s
best interests, it couldn’t order a guardianship under
section 232.104(2)(d)(1) and (4) (2016). Id. at 477 & n.4.8
The supreme court then considered guardianship under a different
provision. Under then-existing language of section 232.117 (2016), the
juvenile court had the option to order termination but transfer guardianship
and custody to “[an]other relative.” Iowa Code § 232.117(3)(c). The court
recognized B.T. but pointed out that two-year-old A.S. was “too young to
express a preference”; the guardianship would impose sixteen years of
reporting duties on the guardians; the service provider, court-appointed
special advocate, and guardian ad litem all recommended termination; and
there were substantial doubts about the safety and stability of the proposed
8 The court also found the mother failed to establish an exception to termination
for relatives having custody of the child. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a); A.S., 906 N.W.2d
at 475–77. The court relied on the recommendations of the department and guardian ad
litem, who had concerns about the fitness of the maternal grandparents. A.S., 906 N.W.2d
at 475–77.

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guardians’ home. A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475–77. In that scenario, termination
and adoption would provide the child “a normal life” with “appropriate
adoptive parents” to be determined by the department. Id.
The 2022 amendments to chapter 232 eliminated the option of
guardianship post-termination unless the department lacks custody when the
petition is filed or waives its priority. See Iowa Code § 232.117(3)(a) (2026).
Here, the department had custody and, because it advocates termination, is
unlikely to waive its priority. See, e.g., J.B., 35 N.W.3d at 137 (“[W]e struggle
to imagine a situation in which [the department] would waive its priority to
guardianship without a willing and capable replacement guardian awaiting
appointment.”). So Nicholas is limited to arguing that guardianship, not
termination, is in the children’s best interests. See Iowa Code §§ 232.116(2);
232.117(2), (5), (7); 232.104(4)(a).
In considering the children’s best interests, we prioritize their safety,
the best placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth, and
the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of each child.
Id. § 232.116(2). We consider whether Nicholas’s ability to provide for their
needs is affected by his mental capacity and condition. See id. § 232.116(2)(a).
We also consider the conditions of the placement, including how long the
children have been in a stable environment, the desirability of maintaining
that environment, and whether the placement is willing to integrate the
children into the family. See id. § 232.116(2)(b).
We recognize that, in certain circumstances, a guardianship may be in
a child’s best interests. See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Iowa 2021)
(finding “[t]here are some instances where a guardianship may be
appropriate,” citing B.T. as one example); B.T., 894 N.W.2d at 34 (citing
empirical research showing caregiving relationships without termination can

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be as stable as adoption). And the circumstances here align with B.T. in some
respects. The children are placed with a grandmother who has provided a
stable and nurturing home since their removal. See § 232.116(2)(b); B.T., 894
N.W.2d at 34; see also In re W.N., No. 21-0476, 2022 WL 108612, at *3–4
(Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (reversing and remanding denial of post-
termination placement noting grandparents could provide a permanent home
through either guardianship or adoption).
The grandmother has no preference between guardianship and
adoption and is willing to do either. Neither the guardian ad litem (GAL) nor
the department expressed concerns about the placement, other than noting
the grandmother’s house was small for accommodating sleeping
arrangements for all the children. The record revealed the children received
quality care. Each child was developmentally on track or getting appropriate
assistance. For example, Lu.S. is in advanced classes at school and receives
some behavioral therapy, which the grandmother reports is going well. La.S.
and Ly.S. have no extraordinary medical, mental health, or behavioral needs.
The younger two attend daycare. And the grandmother works from home, so
she can be flexible in caregiving. The grandmother offers and supervises
weekly visits with Nicholas. She is also a licensed kinship foster care provider.
So this is not a case where the children’s future placement would
“remain in limbo if the [father’s] parental rights are not terminated.” B.T.,
894 N.W.2d at 34. It’s also not a case where there are doubts about the safety
or stability of the proposed guardian’s home. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475–
78; In re M.P., No. 24-1841, 2025 WL 1324255, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 7,
2025) (affirming denial of guardianship where the proposed guardians,
paternal grandparents, enabled and made excuses for the father and could not
tell when he was intoxicated). Under similar circumstances, this court found

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the children’s “stability and long-term interests will not be affected if the
[parent’s] rights are not terminated and a guardianship is created.” B.T., 894
N.W.2d at 34.
Urging that view, Nicholas also argues termination is not in the
children’s best interests because the loss of the father-child relationship
would cause them confusion and stress. “[T]he parent-child bond is a
relevant consideration in the best-interests analysis.” L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 535.
“A child’s mental and emotional condition and needs is inherently impacted
by the child’s bond with a parent . . . .” Id. The department case worker
praised Nicholas’s parenting during visits. The FCS provider backed up
those observations in testimony and monthly progress notes, which
consistently reflect that the children are excited to see their parents, the
parent-child interactions are positive, and Nicholas feeds and plays with the
children. The older two children are sad when visits end. True, Nicholas
missed nineteen of ninety-six FCS-supervised visits. But he also attended an
unrecorded number of visits supervised by his mother, who reports that the
children are happy and excited for visits. The GAL agreed and reported that
Lu.S. looks forward to her visits and the activities the family does together.
She told the GAL that she feels “the most safe when she is with her grandma,
her mom, and her dad.” We also consider that “it is usually in the best
interests of siblings to remain together.” W.M., 957 N.W.2d at 314; In re L. B.
T., 318 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Iowa 1982) (“Wherever possible brothers and
sisters should be kept together, a factor we have consistently recognized.”).
Maintaining the legal relationship with their father allows the children to
retain the legal relationship with the new sibling their parents are expecting.
Still, the GAL and the department recommended termination so that
the grandmother could adopt the children. When asked whether the

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department would support a guardianship, the case work manager testified
that she considered it, “but given the young ages of the children, it’s just not
the preferred option for permanency” because it “could be disrupted” and
“is just not a permanent option.” True, the younger two children would be
in the guardianship for fifteen and sixteen years respectively. See A.S., 906
N.W.2d at 477–78. But Lu.S. is closer to the age of the child in B.T. And
there’s no evidence that the grandmother objects to the length of the
reporting obligation this would create for her. Id. Such tasks may be “a small
price to pay for the children’s near and long-term stability.” W.N., 2022 WL
108612, at *5.
On the other hand, none of the children expressed a preference for a
guardianship over termination. See B.T., 894 N.W.2d at 34. The GAL thought
the children were too young to take an informed position, even if the record
shows they value the relationship with their father.
This case presents a close call. But we defer to the juvenile court’s
perceptions of the prospects for a stable guardianship and agree that many
factors show it would not serve the children’s best interests. The service
providers and GAL advocated for termination. And this case is not like B.T.,
where the mother made progress toward her case goals and had achieved long
periods of sobriety. 894 N.W.2d at 34. As the juvenile court put it, “Nicholas
has not taken services seriously” and made decisions that did not show that
he considered the children as his priority.9
9 Nicholas has not been sober for more than two months at a time during this case.
And he committed an assault against the children’s mother a few months before the
termination hearing. Although the charges were dismissed at Carrie’s insistence, the
parents violated the no-contact order repeatedly. And despite their volatility, Nicholas
chose to live with Carrie over the department’s objections. He cannot provide a stable
home as long as he lives with the terminated parent. And despite more than a year of

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For the same reasons, we question whether he could maintain safe and
stable contact with the children if they were in their grandmother’s custody.
Granted, there is no evidence of conflict between the grandmother and
Nicholas. But there is also no proof of a strong cooperative relationship
between them. Cf. B.T., 894 N.W.2d at 34. Our concerns find no
counterbalance from professionals advocating to preserve the parental
relationship or from the children expressing that preference. As the supreme
court cautioned in A.S., “[a]n appropriate determination to terminate a
parent-child relationship is not to be countermanded by the ability and
willingness of a family relative to take the child.” 906 N.W.2d at 475. We
cannot avoid termination on the bare hope that Nicholas will someday be able
to parent on his own. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41. The children’s daily lives
and long-term prospects will not change substantially if his rights are
terminated, and the grandmother provides another ready and “viable
permanency option[]” through adoption. Id. at 478. Safety and the “need for
a permanent home” remain the defining elements of best interests. In re H.S.,
805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (quoting J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 802 (Cady, J.,
specially concurring)). We do not see sufficient indicia in this case to
convince us that the guardianship would be as stable as termination or would
better support the children’s interests. So, under these circumstances,
termination is the best permanency option for these children.
AFFIRMED.
services, Nicholas had not completed substance-use or mental-health treatment or
domestic abuse education.