State of Iowa v. Christopher William John Dubois

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1366
Filed August 7, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM JOHN DUBOIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,

Linda M. Fangman, Judge.

Defendant appeals his convictions for burglary in the first degree and

domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury. AFFIRMED.

Austin Jungblut of Parrish Kruidenier L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Christopher DuBois appeals his convictions for burglary in the first degree,

a class “B” felony, and domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, a serious

misdemeanor. In this single-issue appeal, DuBois argues the district court

improperly admitted evidence of prior bad acts.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings

“He was choking me. He pulled out my hair. I remember having a bloody

nose.” The victim of the offense, DuBois’s ex-girlfriend, testified at a jury trial about

the actions of DuBois. Around 5:00 a.m. on March 1, 2023, DuBois appeared at

the home of his ex-girlfriend, despite a no contact order that prevented DuBois

from being at the home. The ex-girlfriend’s nine-year-old son was awake playing

video games. Two other children were asleep in the home. DuBois entered the

home and immediately grabbed his ex-girlfriend by the neck. The commotion got

the attention of the family’s German Shepard, which bit DuBois and scared him off.

The nine-year old witnessed the assault.

DuBois was arrested and charged with first-degree burglary and domestic

abuse assault causing bodily injury. DuBois asserted that he and his ex-girlfriend

were “having a conversation” on her doorstep that morning when she ordered her

dog to attack him. He denied assaulting his ex-girlfriend.

At trial, his ex-girlfriend testified to the events of March 1. But in response

to a question from the prosecutor, she also spoke about prior domestic violence

by DuBois. DuBois’s counsel objected after the prosecutor asked several more

questions.
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DuBois was convicted as charged. He was sentenced to indeterminate

terms of incarceration not to exceed twenty-five years for first-degree burglary and

one year for domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury. DuBois appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion.

State v. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Iowa 2022). “An abuse of discretion occurs

when the trial court exercises its discretion ‘on grounds or for reasons clearly

untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’” State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d

234, 239 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997)).

III. Prior Bad Acts

DuBois argues the district court improperly allowed the admission of prior

bad act evidence related to a previous incident of domestic abuse by DuBois

against his ex-girlfriend.

a. Preservation of Error

The State contests error preservation as to a portion of the prior bad acts

evidence, as DuBois failed to issue a timely objection to the introduction of some

of the evidence at trial. “Objections to evidence must be raised at the earliest time

the alleged ground becomes apparent.” State v. Sharkey, 311 N.W.2d 68, 71

(Iowa 1981). But if “an objection is late and follows the answer, a motion to strike

and an application to have the objection precede the answer, or an excuse for the

tardy objection, must be made in order for the objection to preserve error.” Id. In

this case, the objection came after the disputed testimony had already begun:

Q. Did Mr. Dubois ever physically harm you? A. Yes.
Q. When did that first occur? A. There was a time—this is
gonna be hard. But there was a time when I was pregnant we were
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fighting. I got tossed on the ground. But as being pregnant and
emotional, I thought it was my fault, so it was never reported.
Q. Did he ever physically harm you while you lived at your new
trailer home? A. Yes.
Q. Can you describe what happened? A. The first incident
he—it was on October 10th. He was very mad. I had an adult toy
that I got out of the garbage that he threw away. He—he was angry
over that, and I don’t understand why.
[DuBois’s Counsel]: Your Honor, may I approach?
....
Your Honor, I just wanted my objection noted for the record.

Counsel and the court engaged in a sidebar conversation later formalized

on the record by the court:

COURT: Our first sidebar was at [defense counsel’s] request.
We went out. [Defense counsel] was concerned about the testimony
regarding the past domestic violence. The objection seemed to be
that, A, they were talking about past history of domestic violence; and
B, he said he was also concerned that the date of that domestic
violence was given.
The Court overruled that and relies on State v. Taylor, 689
N.W.2d 116. That’s a 2004 case. There’s also a number of other
cases—State v. Newell, State v. Rodriquez—that allow the prior
domestic relationship to come in.
Of significance, the testimony primarily talked about the
events leading up to that event, and then she said he assaulted me.
We didn’t go into great detail about the assault, and then we moved
on.

The State argues that because DuBois’s objection came after the witness’s

testimony about “being tossed to the ground,” the objection was too late to

preserve error as to that specific prior bad act evidence. The State does not

contest error preservation on testimony about an October 2022 incident. While

there may be merit to the State’s assertion regarding the first incident, we choose

to bypass the error-preservation issue and address the claim on its merits. See

State v. Taylor, 596 N.W.2d 55, 56 (Iowa 1999).
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b. Admission of Prior Bad Acts Evidence

Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b)(1), “[e]vidence of any other crime,

wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that

on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”

However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose such as proving

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of

mistake, or lack of accident.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b)(2).

DuBois argues the court improperly admitted testimony by his ex-girlfriend

as to prior instances of domestic violence by DuBois. The State argues the

evidence was properly admitted to show intent or motive. To determine whether

prior bad act evidence can be admitted, the court should consider the following:

(1) “the evidence must be relevant and material to a legitimate issue
in the case other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts”;
(2) “there must be clear proof the individual against whom the
evidence is offered committed the bad act or crime”; and (3) if the
first two prongs are satisfied, “the court must then decide if [the
evidence’s] probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”

State v. Richards, 879 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting

State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Iowa 2004)).

Our supreme court has determined that, in a domestic violence case,

evidence of prior instances of domestic abuse can be admitted to show intent or

motive. State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 125–28 (Iowa 2004) (“The defendant’s

prior acts of violence toward his wife, while certainly illustrative of a propensity to

use violence, also reflect his emotional relationship with his wife, which as our

discussion shows, is a circumstance relevant to his motive and intent on the day

in question.”).
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In examining the admission of this evidence, we highlight the crimes DuBois

was charged with, including first-degree burglary. Iowa Code section 713.1 (2023)

defines burglary:

Any person, having the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft
therein, who, having no right, license or privilege to do so, enters an
occupied structure, such occupied structure not being open to the
public, or who remains therein after it is closed to the public or after
the person’s right, license or privilege to be there has expired, or any
person having such intent who breaks an occupied structure,
commits burglary.

A crucial element of burglary is intent. Id. DuBois denies he arrived at his

ex-girlfriend’s home that morning with any intent to do harm. DuBois maintains he

went there only to have a conversation, and after she let him in the home, she

ordered her dog to attack him. He denies any intent to assault her. The prior

domestic violence is relevant to show his intent in arriving at her home that

morning. See State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 21 (Iowa 2006) (“We have held the

prior relationship between the defendant and the victim, including bad feelings,

quarrels, and physical acts, is a circumstance that may be shown to prove the

defendant's state of mind and motivation at the time of the crime.”).

The history of violence that DuBois inflicted on his ex-girlfriend is relevant

to his motive and intent when he showed up at her home at 5:00 a.m. in violation

of a no contact order. See Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 125 (“[T]he defendant’s prior

conduct directed to the victim of a crime, whether loving or violent, reveals the

emotional relationship between the defendant and the victim and is highly

probative of the defendant’s probable motivation and intent in subsequent

situations.”).
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Further, any risk of unfair prejudice does not outweigh the probative value

of this evidence. “In evaluating the prejudice factor, we consider the likelihood that

the prior-acts evidence will prompt the jury to base its decision on an improper

emotional response toward the defendant.” Newell, 710 N.W.2d at 23. Intent goes

to the heart of at least one issue. Further, both DuBois and his ex-girlfriend testified

to very different circumstances, and consequently, evidence which clarifies his

intent in those circumstances is highly probative. See Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 129.

We conclude that the admission of the prior bad act evidence was not in

error as it was introduced for a valid non-propensity purpose. See Iowa R.

Evid. 5.404(b)(2); Richards, 879 N.W.2d at 145.

c. Harmless Error

Even had admission of the prior bad act evidence been in error, it would

have been harmless. When a court errs in admitting evidence that should have

been excluded, we do not reverse if that error was harmless. State v. Thoren, 970

N.W.2d 611, 636 (Iowa 2022). “The test for harmless error ‘is whether the rights

of the objecting party have been “injuriously affected by the error” or whether the

party has “suffered a miscarriage of justice.”’” Id. (quoting State v. Parker, 747

N.W.2d 196, 209 (Iowa 2008)). An error can be harmless when there is

overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 636–37. But unless the

record shows otherwise, we presume there has been prejudice. Id.

There was overwhelming evidence of DuBois’s guilt. The brief statements

by his ex-girlfriend on prior instances of domestic violence do not establish

prejudice. DuBois’s ex-girlfriend testified as the details of events on March 1. Her

son, who witnessed the violence, also testified. This testimony and photographic
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evidence present an overwhelming case for Dubois’s guilt and reduces any

prejudicial effect the brief statements on prior violence may have had. See

Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d at 244.

IV. Conclusion

The admitted evidence of DuBois’s previous domestic violence against his

ex-girlfriend was relevant to his intent and motive when he arrived at her home.

Even absent that evidence, other evidence not objected to by DuBois at trial was

overwhelming as to DuBois’s guilt. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.