James Russell Walden, Jr. v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1104
Filed September 18, 2024

JAMES RUSSELL WALDEN JR.,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J. Beattie, Judge.

An applicant appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

Sonia M. Elossais of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Greer, P.J., Langholz, J., and Mullins, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024).
2

MULLINS, Senior Judge.

James Walden Jr. was convicted of first-degree murder, stemming from the

brutal death of Sheila Keenan, who suffered “twenty-six blunt force wounds to her

head including two that fractured her skull and caused severe brain hemorrhaging.”

State v. Walden, No. 18-0209, 2019 WL 6358300, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

Nov. 27, 2019). The trial testimony generally pegged Walden as being the only

person who was with Keenan at the time she was beaten to death. See id. at *1–

2. We affirmed on direct appeal. See generally id. at *4–10 (rejecting claims

relating to mistrial, jury instructions, and sufficiency and weight of the evidence but

preserving claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).

Thereafter, Walden filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR),

alleging “prosecutor misconduct” and “ineffective counsel.” At the hearing on the

application, PCR counsel clarified that Walden was raising four claims of

ineffective assistance of his criminal defense attorneys in relation to their failure

to (1) object to the county attorney’s involvement in the prosecution given his prior

representation of Walden; (2) “obtain footage from [a] gas station” that “would have

shown that he was in a friendly financial transaction with the [victim] prior to the

murder in question”; (3) object to “the excessive number of deputies in the

courtroom” during trial, which signaled to the jury that he was guilty; and

(4) properly cross-examine an officer about the details of a pair of khaki pants,

namely “about the size of those pants and the relative size of Mr. Walden.”

Walden testified he didn’t think the county attorney should have been

involved in the 2017 prosecution because he represented Walden sometime in

the 1970s, but his attorneys declined to move for recusal because they thought it
3

was “not a big deal” since it was so “long ago.” Walden agreed with his PCR

counsel that he was concerned that the county attorney might have information

about things he had “told him in confidence.” He did not specify what those things

were, if anything. He later agreed the county attorney didn’t know “some dark

secret” about him. Instead, it was only that the county attorney might have had

knowledge about his criminal history. One of Walden’s defense attorneys testified

in a deposition that, despite the prior representation, Walden liked the county

attorney and didn’t have an issue with him prosecuting the case.

Next, Walden said his attorneys failed to obtain certain footage from a gas

station he directed them to that would have helped his case. That footage was not

presented at the PCR hearing. Walden also thought there were too many deputies

in the courtroom during the criminal proceedings, “at least four or five,” which gave

an indication that “it was all over.” However, Walden’s testimony indicates this only

occurred at the time of closing arguments and the rendering of the verdict. One of

his defense attorneys testified the presence of two to four deputies is pretty

standard, and he only recalled there being a larger number of deputies present

during the reading of the verdict. The other defense attorney testified he didn’t

recall a lot of people being in the gallery or a lot of police presence at the trial.

As to the relevance of the khaki pants that were found at the scene with

blood on them, Walden agreed that they were his, but he claimed he discarded

them a few days before “because they were way too big” and “[t]here is no way”

that they had any blood on them. Despite agreeing the pants were his, Walden

said he wanted his attorney to cross-examine a witness about how they were too

big for him.
4

In its PCR ruling, the district court rejected each of Walden’s claims. The

court found no breach or prejudice on the claim about the county attorney’s

involvement in Walden’s prosecution, reasoning that Walden only complained the

county attorney would know about his criminal history, which “would have been

readily available” to the prosecution in any event. The court also found no breach

or prejudice as to the supposed security footage because the alleged contents of

the video had little probative value. As to the number of deputies in the courtroom,

the court likewise found no breach or prejudice because the heightened law

enforcement presence was during the announcement of the verdict, after the jury

had already made its decision. Last, the court found defense counsels’ failure to

cross-examine witnesses about the size of the khaki pants in order to potentially

show they were not Walden’s did not result in prejudice because the evidence at

trial showed they belonged to someone else. So the court denied Walden’s PCR

application, and this appeal followed.

Appellate review of the district court’s denial of a PCR application alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo. See Sothman v. State, 967

N.W.2d 521, 522 (Iowa 2021). We give weight to the lower court’s factual findings

but are not bound by them. See id. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

requires proof that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice

resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Lopez, 907

N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018). We “may consider either the prejudice prong or

breach of duty first, and failure to find either one will preclude relief.” State v.

McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).
5

On appeal, Walden only argues that the district court erred in finding he did

not prove the prejudice prong of his ineffective-assistance claims. As discussed

above, however, the court also found no breach of duty on Walden’s first three

claims, which Walden does not challenge and would therefore preclude relief on

those claims. See id. We nevertheless choose to address the prejudice prong for

each claim, which requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874, 881 (Iowa 2019) (citation

omitted).

As to the first claim, Walden argues the county attorney’s prior

representation of him might have made the prosecution privy to “confidential

information” that “may include information such as mental health history, but in

particular, information learned from privileged conversations” that “would have

made it easier for him to prosecute” Walden. Given that the county attorney

represented Walden in the 1970s and this prosecution took place in 2017, there is

no reasonable probability that the prosecution would have had a leg up. In

addition, as the district court observed, the only thing Walden testified he was

worried about the prosecution knowing based on the prior representation was his

criminal history. Because this information was readily available to the prosecution

in any event, we find no prejudice.

Turning to the second claim about the alleged video footage from a gas

station, Walden argues he was “prejudiced because this evidence, that had the

potential to create doubt as to [his] motive was not presented to the jury.” Walden

did not present the video as evidence at the PCR hearing and instead rested his
6

case on his self-serving testimony about what it would show. This is not enough

to satisfy the prejudice prong. See, e.g., State v. Reeves, No. 21-1997, 2023

WL 1811137, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023) (“[B]ecause Reeves did not

produce the allegedly exculpatory Facebook messages, [he] cannot prove he was

prejudiced by that supposed failure.”); State v. Banks, No. 21-0787, 2022

WL 1232208, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2022) (requiring “objective corroborating

evidence” to support a claim for relief as opposed to an applicant’s “own subjective,

self-serving testimony”).

On the third claim, Walden argues “[a]n excessive number of deputies could

cut against the presumption of innocence” and, “[t]o a jury of laypeople, an

excessive number of deputies may lead them to believe the defendant is guilty.”

Assuming that’s true, Walden didn’t prove that’s what happened here or establish

a reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel objected.

Furthermore, as the district court observed, the record indicates the heightened

presence was at the time of the reading of the verdict. By this point, the jury had

already made its decision and, thus, no prejudice resulted.

That leaves us with the claim about the khaki pants, in relation to which

Walden argues counsel were ineffective in not cross-examining witnesses about

the size of the pants in order to show they were not his. As we observed on direct

appeal from Walden’s conviction, the evidence already showed the pants belonged

to someone else. See Walden, 2019 WL 6358300, at *2 (“A pair of worn, dirty,

khaki pants stained with blood contained DNA matching the profiles of Walden,

Snyder, and Keenan. Snyder later identified these as his khaki pants.”). As a

result, Walden was not prejudiced by counsels’ alleged failure in this respect.
7

Finding counsel were not ineffective as alleged, we affirm the denial of

Walden’s PCR application.

AFFIRMED.