In the Interest of T.R., N.R., K.R., and I.R., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0914
Filed October 16, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF T.R., N.R., K.R., and I.R.,
Minor Children,

T.R., Mother,
Appellant,

N.R., Minor Child,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour,

Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to four of her

children. The mother’s daughter also appeals termination of parental rights as to

her. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Clara Avenarius of Branstad & Olson Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant

mother.

Audra F. Saunders, West Des Moines, attorney for appellant minor child

N.R.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Nicole Garbis Nolan, Des Moines, attorney for T.R., K.R., and I.R. and

guardian ad litem for all minor children.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Sandy, JJ.
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SANDY, Judge.

A mother’s parental rights to four of her children were terminated pursuant

to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (f), and (h) (2023). The mother appeals the

termination. The mother contends that: (1) the juvenile court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction; (2) the State did not meet its burden to support termination; (3) the

juvenile court erred by not granting a six-month extension for reunification; (4) the

guardian ad litem (GAL) for all of the children and attorney for three failed to meet

her statutory duties; (5) several procedural errors that occurred during the

termination proceedings amounted to structural error; and (6) her and the

children’s substantive due process and equal protection rights under the state and

federal constitutions were violated.

Additionally, the mother’s daughter—N.R.—appeals the juvenile court’s

termination order, arguing (1) termination of the mother’s rights was not in her best

interest and (2) a statutory exception to termination should have been applied by

the juvenile court.

After our independent review of the record, we affirm the juvenile court’s

termination order.

I. Background and Proceedings

This case has followed a long and tortured path to get to us. The children

who are the subjects of this appeal include N.R., born in 2010; K.R., born in 2014;

I.R., born in 2016; and T.R., who was born 2022. M.D. is the father of N.R., K.R.,

and I.R. T.M. is the father of T.R.

The mother has an extensive history of bouts with mental-health struggles.

Throughout her life she has been diagnosed by several mental-health
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professionals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), attention-

deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), bipolar disorder, borderline personality

disorder, and dissociative personality disorder. The mother’s mental health has

significantly interfered with her ability to properly care for her children. The record

discloses the mother has a habit of repeatedly dropping off the children with

others—sometimes lasting months at time—when she experienced mental-health

episodes and felt overwhelmed.

M.D. and the mother were in a relationship until 2017. After their

relationship ended, the mother told M.D. that he “could forget about” seeing their

children. The mother took physical care of the children after the relationship

ended. Even so, after the mother suffered a mental-health episode in July 2019,

she dropped N.R., K.R., and I.R. off with M.D. and did not return. Eventually, the

mother asked that the children be returned to her care. But M.D. refused because

of concerns relevant to the mother’s mental health and stability. N.R., K.R., and

I.R. remained in M.D.’s physical care for nearly a year.

In October 2020, the mother filed a petition for custody of the children. A

temporary order was entered by the district court granting both parents joint legal

custody. M.D. was granted physical care of the children, and the mother was

granted visitation. Still, following entry of the temporary order, the mother’s

attorney requested authorization to file a child in need of assistance (CINA)

petition. The petition was authorized.1 N.R., K.R., and I.R. were later adjudicated

1 The juvenile court made clear in its ruling and from the record that when it
authorized the filing of a CINA petition it was unaware that a district court order on
temporary matters had recently been filed. We also note the CINA petition for
M.D.’s children with the mother was filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.87(3)
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CINA. The juvenile court noted the children reported M.D. abused alcohol while

watching them, used excessive force in disciplining them, and threatened them

with physical violence. The children were placed back in the custody of the mother

under the supervision of the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services

(DHHS).

Amid the mother’s strife with M.D. over the custody of their children, the

mother began a relationship with T.M. In early 2021, the mother and T.M.

conceived a son—T.R. For the first seven months of T.R.’s life, he was under the

exclusive care of the mother. The mother denied T.M. visitation with T.R.

N.R., K.R., and I.R. remained in the custody of the mother until a

permanency hearing in September 2022. During the hearing the mother became

extremely agitated. At one point she sent her attorney a message requesting that

the children be removed from her custody. She also asked her attorney to request

that her parental rights be terminated. The mother suggested to the juvenile court

that she was too mentally unstable to care for the children. Following this episode

the juvenile court placed the children in the custody of DHHS for purposes of

relative placement.

Shortly after the permanency hearing for M.D.’s children with mother, a

CINA petition was filed on behalf of T.R. The State then filed for temporary removal

from the mother’s custody. The juvenile court granted this request, and T.R. was

placed in the custody of the mother’s adult daughter—L.L. T.R. was adjudicated

(2021), which provides “[t]he department, juvenile court officer, county attorney or
judge may authorize the filing of a petition with the clerk of the court by any
competent person having knowledge of the circumstances without the payment of
a filing fee.”
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a CINA in February 2023 and placed in the custody of his father T.M. subject to

supervision by DHHS.

In September 2023, a contested permanency review and permanency

hearing was held for N.R., K.R., I.R., and T.R. The juvenile court heard testimony

from Andye Jones—the mother’s therapist for the past six years. Jones saw the

mother for therapy weekly. Despite the extensive work Jones has done with the

mother, Jones stated the mother’s condition “vacillates.” According to Jones, the

mother has “made progress, and then there’s times where she struggles again

depending on what’s going on.” Jones has personally diagnosed the mother with

generalized anxiety disorder, PTSD, and borderline personality disorder. Jones

explained during her testimony that the mother’s mental health is so unstable that

she cannot participate in EDMR therapy (a treatment modality for PTSD).

Following the permanency/review hearing, the juvenile court granted M.D.

custody of his children. The juvenile court also granted T.M. custody of T.R. M.D.

and T.M. then filed petitions to terminate the mother’s parental rights in early

December 2023. The State filed notice to join the termination petitions on January

2, 2024. K.R., I.R., T.R., and N.R.’s GAL and K.R., I.R., and T.R’s attorney—

Nicole Garbis Nolan—filed notice to join T.M.’s termination petition on the same

day, and subsequently orally moved to join M.D.’s petition on the first day of the

termination hearing. Garbis Nolan filed her GAL report on January 2, 2024.

The combined termination hearing occurred on January 3, 2024 (one day

after the State joined the petitions). The transcript reveals that the mother was

served with the TPR petitions on December 11 and 18 of 2023. Even so, counsel

for the mother acknowledged that all were aware of the pending termination trial
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before those dates of service. Of note, the mother’s counsel at the termination

hearing entered an appearance as the mother’s counsel on October 9, 2023, in

the underlying CINA case. The mother’s counsel made several motions in the

CINA case, including a motion to enlarge and reconsider.

Both fathers testified at the termination hearing and expressed concerns

over their ability to coparent with the mother and the state of her mental health.

T.M. asserted his belief that a coparenting relationship with the mother is

impossible. He recounted one incident in which the mother, despite clear

instructions not to do so, showed up at his home. She then hit him with her car

during a drop-off exchange. To be clear, she tried to run T.M. over with her car.

Moreover, T.M. noted that the mother was often divisive in her communications

and would start arguments over minor things relating to the care of T.R. T.M.

believed the mother would never be able to accept any arrangement in which she

was not the primary caretaker of T.R. He asserted the mother’s behavior has

consistently caused disruptions in his care for T.R. He also stated that he has

never seen the mother successfully manage her mental health for sustained

periods of time.

M.D. shared similar concerns. He testified a successful coparenting

relationship with the mother is impossible. He does not feel safe interacting with

the mother. He believes termination of the mother’s parental rights is necessary

to prevent her from harmfully interfering with the children’s lives. For example, he

recounted an incident in which the mother negatively interfered with a medical

appointment for the children. The mother told M.D. the children had been

scheduled for a dentist appointment. M.D. took the children to the dentist’s office
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but was informed by a receptionist that no appointment had been scheduled for

the children. The mother then sent M.D. a series of text messages asking why he

and the children were not at an eyecare appointment. M.D. then drove the children

to the eye doctor’s office, where the mother then caused a scene by erupting in

public at the eyecare center screaming. M.D. removed himself from the scene and

later apologized profusely to the staff and rescheduled the appointments.

M.D. also shared concerns over the mother’s mental health. M.D. testified

the mother’s mental health often cycles. M.D. stated, however, that “in the past

few years, I haven’t seen a cycle, I’ve seen a constant steady decline.” He added

that the mother’s mental health would often cause her to live her life as though

“she didn’t have children.”

During her testimony at the hearing, the mother admitted her mental health

often “cycles.” She also admitted to often dropping off the children in the care of

others when she was feeling “overwhelmed” with her mental health. The mother

stated she would prefer to coparent the children with their fathers. But the mother

also testified she did not want to share custody of N.R., K.R., and I.R. with M.D.

She stated she and M.D.’s “communication[s] cannot be amicable.” As for T.M.,

she also stated she did not want to share custody of T.R. with him. She suggested

she does not trust T.M. to properly care for T.R.

Finally, we find it worthy to mention the juvenile court observed the mother’s

erratic behavior during her testimony. The juvenile court noted that it was hard to

track the mother because her testimony would be objectively false or self-

contradictory. For example, the juvenile court wrote the “mother continued to be

manipulative and uncooperative when questioned by any attorney other than her
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own.” The juvenile court also found the mother gave deliberately false testimony,

such as claiming “she has always been amicable to both fathers.”

The juvenile court subsequently entered its termination order on April 30,

2024. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights to N.R., K.R., and

I.R. pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) and (f). The juvenile court

terminated the mother’s parental rights to T.R. pursuant to Iowa Code section

232.11(1)(d) and (h).

The mother appeals. N.R. appeals the termination of the mother’s parental

rights as to her.

II. Standard of Review

“We review proceedings terminating parental rights de novo.” In re A.S.,

906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). We are not bound by the

juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially when they

involve witness credibility determinations. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa

2014).

To the extent that a party raises a constitutional claim, our review on appeal

is also de novo. State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492, 498–99 (Iowa 2007).

III. Analysis

A. The Mother’s Motion for Full Briefing

We begin our analysis with a housekeeping matter. The mother has made

a motion for full briefing pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.205(1).

The State resisted. Given the nature of the current briefing now before us, we do

not find further briefing necessary nor believe such would be beneficial.
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B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Moving forward to the merits of the mother’s claims on appeal, she first

argues the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the termination

petitions because both were filed by the fathers of the children. She notes Iowa

Code section 232.111(1) provides that only a child’s “guardian, guardian ad litem,

or custodian, the department, a juvenile court officer, or the country attorney” may

file a petition for termination of parental rights. The mother contends because a

parent is not among those listed with authorization to file a termination petition by

section 232.111(1), the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. This is

incorrect.

Our supreme court has said that a juvenile court has subject matter

jurisdiction to adjudicate a termination petition filed by a parent, provided the State

or a GAL joined the petition. See In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 739 n.2 (Iowa 2011)

(allowing a termination petition filed by a parent to proceed because the State and

the GAL joined the petition). And our own case law suggests that juvenile courts

have subject matter jurisdiction to hear termination petitions filed by a parent of the

child if the State or a GAL joins the petition. See In re R.G., No. 21-0337, 2022

WL 468720, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022) (finding that the juvenile court

lacked jurisdiction to decide a chapter 232 termination petition filed by a parent

that was not joined by the State or GAL). Because the fathers’ petitions were

joined by the State and the GAL, we find the juvenile court had subject matter

jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute.
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C. Grounds for Termination

Under Iowa Code chapter 232, a parent’s parental rights may be terminated

if (1) grounds for termination under section 232.116(1) have been established by

clear and convincing evidence; (2) the best-interest framework—as provided for

by section 232.116(2)—supports termination of parental rights; and (3) none of the

exceptions under 232.116(3) apply to prevent termination of parental rights. A.S.,

906 N.W.2d at 472–73.

1. Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d)2

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) authorizes termination of parental rights

when each of the following have occurred:

(1) The court has previously adjudicated the child to be a
[CINA] after finding the child to have been physically or sexually
abused or neglected as the result of the acts or omissions of one or
both parents, or the court has previously adjudicated a child who is
a member of the same family to be a [CINA] after such a finding.
This paragraph shall not be construed to require that a finding of
sexual abuse or neglect requires a finding of a nonaccidental
physical injury.
(2) Subsequent to the [CINA] adjudication, the parents were
offered or received services to correct the circumstance which led to
the adjudication, and the circumstance continues to exist despite the
offer or receipt of services.

The mother only contests the second element—that prior circumstances remain.

We disagree. As the juvenile court noted in its thorough ruling, the evidence

supports the conclusion that the mother has numerous unresolved mental-health

issues that should preclude the children from being returned to her care. The

2 We note the mother’s parental rights were terminated for each child pursuant to

section 232.116(1)(d). We need only find grounds for termination under one of the
sections analyzed by the juvenile court to affirm its ruling. See In re R.K., 649
N.W.2d 18, 19 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). Therefore, we decline to analyze the other
grounds for termination found by the juvenile court.
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mother’s own therapist testified that her condition is not stable. The mother herself

admitted her mental health often “cycles.” And during the CINA case involving

these children, the mother suggested her mental health was not stable and

requested that the juvenile court remove the children from her custody and

terminate her parental rights. This history gives us little confidence that the mother

is able to properly care for the children at this time. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d

793, 798 (Iowa 2006) (noting courts should consider a parent’s past performance

because it may indicate the quality of care the parent can provide in the future).

2. Best Interests3

In considering the best interests of the child, we are to give “primary

consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-

term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional

condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We may also consider

whether the parent’s ability to care for the child is affected by parent’s mental

capacity or condition. In re B.T., No. 23-0988, 2023 WL 5605625, at *1 (Iowa Ct.

App. Aug. 30, 2023); accord Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(a). Additionally, if the child

can express a reasonable preference, we will consider their preference as well.

Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b)(2).

The mother contends termination is not in the children’s best interest. She

notes the close bond between herself and the children should preclude a finding

that termination is in their best interests. Further, she notes that three of the

children—N.R., K.R., and I.R.—have expressed a desire to maintain the parent-

3 Because the best-interest analysis is identical for each child, we analyze each

child’s best interests together including the basis of N.R.’s appeal.
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child relationship.4 The mother also contends the children all have a close sibling

bond that counsels against terminating her parental rights. She argues termination

would diminish or end the sibling relationships between the children.

We find termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of

each of the children. We begin our analysis by noting that most of the mother’s

arguments on this issue are more properly characterized as reasons for applying

exceptions to termination, which we address next. As we have previously stated,

“the child’s safety and the need for permanent home” are the quintessential

elements of a best-interest analysis. In re A.M., No. 20-0480, 2020 WL 4814170,

at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020). The mother’s unresolved mental-health issues

and previous actions have deprived the children of a permanent home and directly

led to them being placed in several homes with numerous people. This is not

healthy for the children, as stability is crucial for a child’s long-term best interests.

See In re J.H., No. 23-0756, 2023 WL 4752038, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 26, 2023)

(finding termination is in the children’s best interest because it would permit them

to find a home that could provide stability). Leaving the children in the care of their

fathers provides the children with the best opportunity of achieving permanency

and stability.

Additionally, while we are mindful that N.R. objected to the termination, a

child’s wishes are not controlling. See In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2019) (noting that child’s preference on termination is not controlling). We

respect N.R.’s stance, but the children’s long-term best interests must always

4 We note the record is conflicting over whether K.R. and I.R. opposed termination

of their mother’s parental rights.
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remain our primary concern. See In re A.S., No. 16-1984, 2017 WL 710562, at *3

(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2017) (“Our overriding concern must be the long-term best

interests of the children . . . .”).

Lastly, the mother is correct that sibling bonds are a factor for us to consider

when analyzing the best interests of a child. See In re L.W., No. 23-0326, 2023

WL 3861986, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2023) (stating that sibling relationships

is a relevant consideration in a best-interest analysis). That said, this consideration

is only one factor among many that we consider. See id. Both fathers expressed

a desire to maintain the sibling bond between the children. We find termination is

in the children’s best interests.

3. Exceptions to Termination

Moving on to the third step in our termination analysis, we consider whether

an exception to termination applies. Both the mother and N.R. assert arguments

as to why an exception to termination under section 232.116(3) should have been

applied. The mother contends the close bond between herself and the children

supports her argument that termination is not in the best interests of the children.

N.R. also argues that the closeness of her relationship with her mother should have

led to an exception to termination being applied. In passing, the mother also

contends an exception to termination should have been applied by the juvenile

court because the children are in the custody of their respective fathers. See Iowa

Code § 232.116(3)(a) (stating a court need not terminate parental rights if a

“relative has legal custody” of the child).

Section 232.116(3)(c) provides that a court need not terminate the

relationship between a parent and child if the court finds “[t]here is clear and
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convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the

time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Even so, the exceptions

under section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory. See In re C.C., No. 23-

0976, 2023 WL 5949192, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2023) (noting the

exceptions to termination under section 232.116(3) are permissive rather than

mandatory).

We note the juvenile court never considered the exception under

section 232.116(3)(c) in its ruling. The mother did argue for the application of

section 232.116(3)(c) in her closing brief to the juvenile court. But the juvenile

court never ruled on the applicability of the exception, and the mother did not raise

the exception in her motion to enlarge and reconsider. Thus, error on this issue

was not preserved. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 539 (Iowa 2002).

Even assuming N.R. and the mother properly preserved this issue, the existence

of a close bond is not alone sufficient to justify applying the exception. See In re

R.P., No. 23-0419, 2023 WL 3612412, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 24, 2023) (“But

even if we were to assume such a bond exists, the existence of a bond is not

enough.”). The parties raising section 232.116(3)(c) must prove that termination

would be detrimental to the child due to the bond for the exception to be warranted.

That proof is not present here.

As to the mother’s section 232.116(3)(a) argument, we note “[a]n

appropriate determination to terminate the parent-child relationship is not to be

countermanded by the ability and willingness of the [other parent] to take the child.”

In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 1997) (alteration in original). The fathers

have custody of the children and have been providing the appropriate care for the
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children. And we agree with the juvenile court that the termination of the mother’s

parental rights is necessary, even though the children are in their father’s care.

The record is filled with evidence of the mother disturbing the stability of the

children by interfering unnecessarily with each father’s care of the children.

D. Six-Month Extension

Next, the mother argues she should have been granted a six-month

extension to permit additional time for reunification. She contends a six-month

extension would have been appropriate because she has made significant strides

in addressing her mental health. We conclude the mother has not preserved the

six-month-extension argument for our review.

The mother raised the issue of a possible extension for reunification in her

closing brief submitted to the juvenile court. But the juvenile court never made a

ruling on the issue. We also note the mother’s motion to enlarge and reconsider

did not raise the issue of an extension. A party “must still request a ruling from the

district court to preserve error for appeal on an issue presented but not decided.”

Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 539. And although the State does not contest error

preservation on this issue, we have independent authority to consider whether

error was preserved. See Top of Iowa Coop v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454,

470 (Iowa 2000).

E. GAL’s Conformance with Statutory Duties

The mother’s next claim of error is that Garbis Nolan—the GAL for all of the

children and the attorney for K.R., I.R., and T.R.—failed to meet the statutory

duties imposed by the Iowa Code. See Iowa Code § 232.2(25) (listing the duties

of a GAL). Specifically, the mother contends the Garbis Nolan’s report lacked
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sufficient explanation for how she reached her conclusions. The mother also

asserts that Garbis Nolan did not interview the children’s treating mental-health

professionals and educational providers as required by law. See Iowa Code

§ 232.25(b)(4) (providing GAL shall “interview[] any person providing medical

mental health, social, educational, or other services to the child before any

hearing”). Lastly, the mother contends the juvenile court should have bifurcated

Garbis Nolan’s roles as GAL and attorney for K.R. and I.R. because their views on

termination differed. She argues these errors amounted to reversible error. We

take each argument in turn.

1. Statutory Compliance

Iowa Code section 232.25(b)(8) provides that “unless otherwise enlarged or

circumscribed after a finding of good cause” by the juvenile court, the guardian ad

litem shall submit “a written report to the juvenile court and to each of the parties

detailing compliance with this subsection.” This section does not provide the

specificity or level of detail a GAL’s report should include. But we agree with the

mother that Garbis Nolan’s report here was sparse with details or reasoning for

her conclusions. And we have previously held that a GAL’s skeleton report was

not sufficient to comply with the demands of section 232.25(b) and could serve as

a basis for error when the juvenile court relied on the GAL’s position that

termination was in the child’s best interest. See In re A.D., No. 24–0232, 2024 WL

2045988, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024) (“Because the GAL did not meet the

statutory requirements, we agree with [father] that the juvenile court was remiss in

relying on the GAL’s position that termination is in [the child’s] best interest.”).
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But we believe this case is distinguishable because the juvenile court never

relied on Garbis Nolan’s recommendation in its analysis. See In re Z.H., No. 24-

1225, 2024 WL 4370058, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2024). Instead, the juvenile

court focused on the mother’s unresolved mental-health issues to determine that

the statutory grounds were satisfied and that termination was in the best interest

of the children. And such conclusions were supported by the overwhelming

evidence in the record. Accordingly, we do not find the mother’s rights were

prejudiced. See Iowa Code § 619.16 (stating errors which do not affect the

substantial rights of a party should not be a basis for reversal).

For similar reasons, we find the mother’s arguments as to Garbis Nolan’s

alleged failures to speak with K.R.’s and I.R.’s mental-health professionals and

educational providers pursuant to section 232.25(b)(4) are misplaced. While we

acknowledge Garbis Nolan’s conduct and report likely did not comport with the

requirements under section 232.25(b), we cannot discern reversible error. The

mental-health providers provided live, in-person testimony. In this unique case,

much of the collateral third-party information usually included in a report to the

juvenile court was provided by sworn witness testimony—the juvenile court did not

need a GAL report as it had a front row seat to the providers’ information. Any

error is therefore mitigated accordingly.

2. Bifurcation of GAL and Attorney Roles

In In re A.T., we held the juvenile court erred by not ordering bifurcation of

the roles of a child’s GAL and attorney because the child’s views on termination

and GAL/attorney’s were clearly contradictory. 744 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2007). Key to our reasoning was the fact that the child at issue was a
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teenager who was of sufficient age and maturity to meaningfully express her

wishes to the juvenile court. See id. at 663 (“It would appear that the older, more

intelligent, and mature the child is, the more impact the child’s wishes should have,

and a child of sufficient maturity should be entitled to have the attorney advocate

for the result the child desires.”).

But that is not the case we face here. K.R. was ten years old at the time of

the termination, while I.R. was seven years old. Garbis Nolan, in her report, stated

K.R. and I.R. were not of sufficient age or maturity to have an informed position on

termination. Cf. Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(b) (providing as an exception to

termination when a “child is over ten years of age and objects to the termination”

(emphasis added)). And Shannon Sandahl—K.R.’s and I.R.’s therapist—agreed

with such assessment. Sandahl testified she never asked K.R. and I.R. “where

would you like to be” because she believed they were not sufficiently mature to

make such a determination. And we note section 232.116 provides that the wishes

of the children should be considered only if they are of sufficient maturity to express

their wishes. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b) (noting in considering termination, a

court may consider “[t]he reasonable preference of the child, if the court

determines that the child has sufficient capacity to express a reasonable

preference” (emphasis added)). Therefore, we conclude the juvenile court did not

err by denying the motion for bifurcation.5

5 For similar reasons, we cannot find Garbis Nolan acted inappropriately by
refusing to reschedule K.R. and I.R.’s meeting with the juvenile court. Initially,
Garbis Nolan filed a motion requesting the juvenile court meet with K.R. and I.R.
to discuss their wishes. This motion was granted and hearing was scheduled for
the juvenile court to meet with the children. The record discloses the meeting did
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F. Structural Error

The mother next claims the proceedings were infected with two defects that

amounted to structural error. She first contends her counsel was not given

adequate time to prepare for the termination hearing. She notes her attorney was

appointed on the first day of the hearing and subsequently moved to withdraw

because of lack of preparation. Second, she notes she was never served with

joinder notice. She argues the lack of joinder notice allowed a surprise attack that

eliminated the possibility of a fair hearing. She claims these two errors combine

to amount to structural error. We disagree.

We address the mother’s argument related to her counsel first. Iowa Code

section 232.113(1) provides “[u]pon the filing of a petition the parent identified in

the petition shall have the right to counsel in connection with all subsequent

hearings and proceedings.” “We have recognized that due process requires that

the statutory right to counsel comes with it the right to effective counsel.” In re

W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Iowa 2021).

Applying these principles, we cannot conclude a structural error occurred

based on unpreparedness by the mother’s counsel. While the mother claims her

counsel was unprepared for the termination proceedings, the record belies that

claim. Counsel for the mother zealously advocated on her behalf during the

proceedings. Counsel filed a litany of motions, called many witnesses, and offered

various exhibits on the mother’s behalf. Moreover, counsel for the mother made

an appearance in the underlying CINA case and filed numerous motions with the

not occur because the mother and her attorney showed up to the juvenile court
shortly before the meeting was set to begin with food and drinks for the children.
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juvenile court. This all occurred nearly four months before the termination hearing

began. Structural errors are errors that “infect the entire trial process” and

“undermine the ultimate ‘determination.’” State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 270

(Iowa 2022) (citations omitted). No such error occurred here because of the

mother’s counsel’s alleged unpreparedness.

Next, we address the mother’s claim that a structural error occurred

because she was never served notice of the State’s and GAL’s joinders. We begin

by recognizing notice of termination proceedings “by personal delivery and notice

sent by electronic mail or other electronic means” shall be “served not less than

seven days prior to the hearing on termination of parental rights.” Iowa Code

§ 232.112(3). This statute only refers to notice of the termination hearing itself, not

notice of joinder by a party such as the State or a GAL. See Schultze v. Landmark

Hotel Corp., 463 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa 1990) (“Ordinarily, we may not, under the

guise of judicial construction, add modifying words to the statute or change its

terms.”). And we note the mother has cited no authority for the proposition that

she was entitled to joinder notice.

Even assuming the mother was entitled to notice of joinder, we cannot

conclude that a structural error occurred because the motion to dismiss filed by the

mother was only ruled on after the joinder.

G. Constitutional Claims

Finally, the mother makes a host of constitutional claims. First, she asserts

the State violated section 232.114(2) by failing to present case-in-chief evidence

to support termination. She claims this violated her due process rights. The

mother also makes broad constitutional arguments that her and the children’s
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substantive due process and equal protection rights were violated. We reject each

argument.

We begin first with the mother’s section 232.114(2) argument. “Upon the

filing of a petition the county attorney shall represent the state in all adversary

proceedings arising under this subchapter and shall present evidence in support

of the petition.” Iowa Code § 232.114(2). This is exactly what the State did here.

The State filed a witness list, elicited testimony from those witnesses, and

submitted thirteen exhibits that were admitted into evidence. We fail to see how

the State did not comply with this statute. Consequently, we fail to see how the

mother’s due process rights were violated on this ground.

As for the mother’s substantive due process and equal protection claims,

we find they are waived on appeal as they are sweeping arguments with no citation

to legal authorities. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (2024) (“Failure to cite

authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”); see also In

re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all-encompassing argument

is insufficient to identity error in cases of de novo review). Thus, we decline to

address the mother’s constitutional arguments.

Finally, for the first time in her motion for full briefing, the mother raises a

new argument that Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.201(1)(c) violates her

constitutional rights. This rule provides that a petition on appeal of a termination

order entered under Iowa Code chapter 232 “may not exceed 20 pages.” The

mother argues that the application of rule 6.201(1)(c) violates her procedural due

process, substantive due process, and equal protection rights under the state and

federal constitutions. She contends the twenty-page limit imposed by rule
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6.201(1)(c) denied her a “meaningful opportunity to identify sufficient facts and law

to preserve both her statutory and constitutional arguments on appeal.” We find

the mother failed to preserve these arguments on appeal.

Constitutional questions must be preserved “at the earliest opportunity after

the grounds for the objection become apparent.” State v. Yaw, 398 N.W.2d 803,

804 (Iowa 1987). As soon as the mother filed her notice of appeal, the procedures

she challenges were applicable to her. Because the mother did not include such

challenges to the rules of appellate procedure in her original petition, we find these

arguments have not been properly preserved for appeal. See In re C.M., 652

N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 2002) (“Having failed to include her constitutional claims in

her petition, those issues are not preserved for review.”).

IV. Conclusion

In sum, we affirm the juvenile court’s ruling because we find (1) the juvenile

court had subject matter jurisdiction; (2) clear and convincing evidence supported

termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) and the termination is in the

children’s best interest; (3) the mother did not preserve her claim that the juvenile

court erred in declining to grant her a six-month extension for unification; (4) the

GAL’s failure to comply with statutory duties did not amount to reversible error; (5)

no structural error occurred; and (6) the mother’s constitutional arguments were

waived on appeal.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.