In the Interest of M.T., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1009
Filed October 16, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF M.T.,
Minor Child,

K.B., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Peter B. Newell,

Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.

AFFIRMED.

Jamie L. Schroeder of Nelson & Toenjes, PLLC, Shell Rock, for appellant

mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Dion D. Trowers, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Mark A. Milder of Mark Milder Law Firm, Denver, attorney and guardian ad

litem for minor child.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, M.T.1

She contends the State failed to prove a statutory ground for termination and a

six-month extension should have been granted. Upon our de novo review, we

affirm termination of the mother’s parental rights.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services first became involved

with M.T. in May 2023 after his umbilical cord tested positive for amphetamine,

methamphetamine, and marijuana at birth. The mother admitted to using

methamphetamine during pregnancy and also tested positive for amphetamine

and marijuana. When M.T. was discharged from the hospital, the department

placed him with fictive kin pursuant to a stipulated safety plan. He was officially

removed and adjudicated a Child in Need of Assistance in August 2023.

The mother has an extensive history with the department involving several

children, and the department’s main concern has consistently been the mother’s

now-ten-year history of methamphetamine use. Her rights to her two oldest

children, Z.B. and L.B., were terminated in 2019 based on the mother’s addiction

and incarceration. After she was released, the department was involved again

with her third child, O.M., while she was pregnant with M.T. While the mother

initially complied with services, the department testified that she slowly stopped

attending when her pregnancy became harder to conceal. The mother confirmed

1 The parental rights of any putative fathers were also terminated. The State
published notice, but no one purporting to be the child’s father appeared at the
termination hearing. We therefore do not address any fathers on appeal.
3

this, admitting she did not seek prenatal care because she was actively using

methamphetamine and did not want the department to know she was pregnant.

The proceedings involving O.M. were resolved when the child was placed with his

biological father, and the mother has no formal custody or visitation. Two months

later, M.T. was born and the department became involved again.

Throughout the proceedings involving M.T., the mother was either

incarcerated or in a residential treatment facility, which impacted her ability to

engage in services. In October 2023, she was placed in a residential treatment

facility. The mother was able to participate in more services than she had while

incarcerated. She engaged in substance-use and mental-health programming and

had fully supervised visits with M.T. twice per week. The program also required

the mother to obtain employment and housing and spend considerable time in the

community. While she was originally scheduled to complete treatment by early

March 2024, the mother had to restart the program twice for rules violations, which

substantially delayed her discharge.

The department also expressed concerns about the mother’s boyfriend

based on its own prior history with him and because he had similar substance-use

issues leading to previous terminations. He was initially considered a putative

father for M.T. and the department offered him services, but he was not interested.

After paternity testing revealed that he was not M.T.’s biological father, the

department no longer attempted to engage him in services. But the department

testified that the paternity test did not alleviate its concerns because he and the

mother were still in a relationship.
4

In December 2023, the State petitioned for termination of the mother’s

parental rights.2 The termination hearing did not occur until May 2024 to provide

notice by publication to any putative fathers. While the guardian ad litem

acknowledged the mother was “objectively doing better than she has in years,” he

still recommended termination because the mother had not had any meaningful

period of sobriety outside of a treatment setting. By the time of the hearing, M.T.

was one year old and had not been in his mother’s care since he was four days

old. While the mother and M.T. had regular visits, the mother did not graduate

from fully supervised to unsupervised visits and missed three of the last four visits.

The mother was also still completing treatment, with an anticipated discharge date

approximately four days after the termination hearing. The department testified

the mother had not fully addressed the concerns leading to adjudication and was

not prepared for M.T. to return to her custody.

But the mother had also made progress. She maintained her sobriety and

a full-time job for ten months, albeit while in an institution. The mother completed

substance-use treatment and engaged in mental-health services as part of her

treatment program. She also secured a sober-living apartment suitable for M.T.’s

needs and outfitted it, including a crib, bottles, diapers, and other essentials. She

planned to move in four days after the termination hearing, when she was

discharged from treatment.

2 The State later amended its petition, adding additional statutory grounds for

termination and addressing the parental rights of any putative fathers.
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After the hearing, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s rights to M.T.

She appeals, contending the State failed to prove the statutory grounds for

termination and requesting more time.

II. Review.

Our review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo. In re

A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s

findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility

of witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Discussion.

Iowa courts use a three-step analysis to review termination of parental

rights, including whether (1) grounds for termination have been established,

(2) termination is in the best interests of the child, and (3) we should exercise any

permissive exceptions to termination. Id. at 472–73. But our primary concern is

always the best interests of the child. In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2020).

The mother only challenges one of the three: whether the State adequately proved

the grounds for termination. She also asks for additional time to work towards

reunification.

A. Statutory Grounds for Termination.

The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights to M.T. under

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h). The court may terminate under

section 232.116(1)(g) if it finds:

(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The court has terminated parental rights pursuant to
section 232.117 with respect to another child who is a member of the
same family or a court of competent jurisdiction in another state has
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entered an order involuntarily terminating parental rights with respect
to another child who is a member of the same family.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent
continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services
which would correct the situation.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional
period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.

The mother challenges only the juvenile court’s findings that that she has not

responded to services and additional time will not make a difference. See Iowa

Code § 232.116(1)(g)(3)–(4). The court may terminate under

section 232.116(1)(h) if it finds:

(1) The child is three years of age or younger.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months,
or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided
in section 232.102 at the present time.

The mother challenges only the fourth element: whether the child could be returned

to her custody. See id. § 232.116(1)(h)(4).

While the mother claims that M.T. could be returned to her custody, this is

incorrect. The mother had not been discharged from treatment, and the

department testified children cannot be placed at the facility. While she was only

four days from her scheduled discharge date, when determining whether statutory

grounds have been met, our focus is on “the time of the termination hearing.” In

re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa 2021) (interpreting section 232.116(1)

language to mean the time of the termination hearing). On this basis alone, we

may affirm under section 232.116(1)(h) without addressing the other ground. Id.
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(permitting the court to affirm on any ground supported by the record). But we

further note that her housing was not the only concern.

The mother has a lengthy history of substance use and failing to

substantially comply with services. She also has not fully addressed the concerns

that initiated these proceedings in the first place. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(g)(3) (considering whether the parent is able to respond to services

offered); see also J.H., 952 N.W.2d at 167 (considering the parent’s “history of

inadequate parenting” as part of section 232.116(1)(g) analysis). While she had

accomplished ten months of sobriety, the mother had not proved that she was able

to maintain this progress outside of treatment. She also had not been consistent

with visits, particularly those occurring just before the termination hearing, nor had

she graduated from fully supervised to unsupervised visits. The department

testified that while the mother recently started bringing essentials for M.T., she still

required “prompts” from the provider; it was not prepared to move to even

semi-supervised visits until she was able to independently care for M.T.’s basic

needs. “Without this necessary progression [to unsupervised visits],” we are not

convinced that the mother is able to care for M.T. See In re C.N., No. 19-1861,

2020 WL 567283, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020). Based on the mother’s lack

of progress in her previous termination cases and her history of instability, we are

not convinced that she is able to adequately care for M.T. in the future. See J.H.,

952 N.W.2d at 171 (considering “the parents’ past performance because it may

indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future” (citation

omitted)); see also Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(g)(4). Accordingly, we affirm on both

statutory grounds.
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B. Extension of Time.

The mother also contends the court should have granted her a six-month

extension. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (permitting the juvenile court to grant

an extension to work toward reunification if “the need for removal of the child from

the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period”).

She cites her recent progress and sobriety as reasons for the extension,

particularly when compared to her previous attempts in treatment.

But the juvenile court found that a six-month extension would not change

the outcome, and we agree. While we commend the mother’s progress, it comes

too late. See In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (“A parent cannot wait

until the eve of termination, after the statutory time periods for reunification have

expired, to begin to express an interest in parenting.” (citation omitted)). For the

reasons stated previously, we are not convinced an additional six months will make

a difference. Even more importantly, M.T. has already waited a substantial portion

of his short life for his mother to learn to care for him. “[W]e cannot deprive a child

of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination . . . by hoping

someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home

for the child.” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we find that a six-month

extension is not appropriate.

IV. Disposition.

Having found the statutory grounds satisfied and no extension is warranted,

we affirm termination of the mother’s parental rights to M.T.

AFFIRMED.