State of Iowa v. Mathew Rohan Boon

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1328
Filed December 18, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MATHEW ROHAN BOON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, John M. Wright,

Judge.

Mathew Rohan Boon appeals his conviction after pleading guilty to

third-degree criminal mischief. AFFIRMED.

Stuart G. Hoover, East Dubuque, Illinois, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Mathew Rohan Boon appeals after pleading guilty to third-degree criminal

mischief. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On October 25, 2022, the Keokuk Police Department conducted a welfare

check on Boon. Boon was outside in the rain, dressed in a t-shirt and pants,

without shoes. When approached by officers, Boon reported a burglary but was

unable to provide details. The officers offered him assistance, but Boon declined,

and the officers left after twenty minutes.

A couple hours later, law enforcement responded to another dispatch at the

Budget Inn, where they discovered a motel room in complete disarray. The room,

which was rented by Boon, had a broken window and destroyed furnishings. The

sink and pipes were also damaged, resulting in “several inches of standing water

on the floor.” By the time officers arrived, the water had spread into adjacent

rooms. Boon again claimed that a burglary occurred. But video surveillance

showed that Boon was the only one who had entered or exited the room. Law

enforcement determined that Boon was responsible for the damage and arrested

him. During the booking process, Boon was not cooperative with officers,

expressing profanities and “exposing his genitalia to officers.”

The State initially charged Boon with first-degree criminal mischief, but after

calculating the repair costs, it reduced the charge to second-degree. As a result

of plea negotiations, Boon pled guilty to third-degree criminal mischief, and the

court accepted his plea.
3

After pleading guilty, Boon wrote several letters to the court, in which he

purported to make substantive motions and alleged his guilty plea was “entered in

duress as a direct result of terrorism.”1 He also accused the court of committing

numerous statutory and constitutional violations, including committing “identity

fraud” and participating in “a large corruption [and] sex scandal.” Because Boon

was represented by an attorney, the court acknowledged receipt of the documents

but did not consider them. See Iowa Code § 814.6A(1) (preventing the court from

considering documents filed by “a defendant who is currently represented by

counsel”). Two months after pleading guilty, Boon through counsel moved in arrest

of judgment, reasserting his previous claims. The court denied the motion, both

because it was untimely and on its merits. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(b)

(requiring a motion in arrest of judgment “be made not later than [forty-five] days

after a guilty plea”).

Nearly six months after pleading guilty2, the court sentenced Boon to an

indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed two years. Boon appeals again.3

1 During this same timeframe, Boon also appealed twice. But because Boon was
not yet sentenced, he was not entitled to a direct appeal; instead, the Iowa
Supreme Court treated his notices of appeal as applications for discretionary
review, which it denied. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.151(2) (permitting the appellate
court to treat misfiled documents “as seeking the proper form of review”); Iowa
Code § 814.6 (2022) (granting only discretionary review for “[a]n order denying a
motion in arrest of judgment”).
2 The sentencing hearing was delayed several times to allow Boon additional time

to peruse the presentence investigation report, to address his motion in arrest of
judgment, and to give the Iowa Supreme Court time to address his appeals.
3 Generally, defendants do not have a right to appeal after pleading guilty unless

they establish good cause. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). But good cause
exists when a defendant challenges the court’s alleged failure to order a
competency evaluation. See State v. Newman, 970 N.W.2d 866, 870–71
(Iowa 2022). We therefore proceed to the merits of Boon’s argument.
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II. Review.

“We review whether a trial court should have ordered a competency hearing

de novo.” State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Iowa 2018).

III. Discussion.

Boon’s only argument on appeal is that the district court should have sua

sponte ordered a competency evaluation. See Iowa Code § 812.3(1) (permitting

the court to “schedule a hearing to determine probable cause” of incompetency).

“Probable cause exists for a competency hearing when a reasonable person would

believe that there is a substantial question of the defendant’s competency.”

Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d at 779. To determine whether an evaluation should have

been ordered, we consider: “(1) [the] defendant’s irrational behavior, (2) demeanor

at trial, and (3) any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.” State v.

Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Iowa 1982). Because Boon’s counsel was “best

situated to know whether [his] impairments compromise the defense of the case,”

we also consider the fact that his attorney failed to raise the issue. Einfeldt,

914 N.W.2d at 780; accord Lucas, 323 N.W.2d at 233 (finding the defendant’s

attorney and court were “in a better position to observe these factors than our

examination of a cold record”).

Because we presume a defendant is competent unless proven otherwise,

Boon has the burden of establishing incompetence. See Newman, 970 N.W.2d

at 871. Upon our review, we do not find that he met this burden. While Boon

points to his behavior leading up to and during his arrest, we focus on his actions

during the proceedings and especially before the court. See id. at 871 (considering

the defendant’s actions during plea colloquy and sentencing hearing). We find that
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Boon’s behavior does not rise to such a level that it compelled the court to conduct

a competency evaluation. At the hearing, Boon testified in his own defense,

requesting access to deposition transcripts and his guilty plea to be set aside. He

further admitted to signing the plea agreement, read portions aloud when directed,

and even correctly explained the meaning of certain phrases. While he expressed

not understanding “all the rules of criminal procedure,” he could articulate a

rudimentary argument involving the rules’ application that, while misguided, was

not wholly illogical. In fact, Boon was coherent and fully responsive to questioning

throughout the entire hearing. Compare Newman, 970 N.W.2d at 871 (finding

competency hearing unwarranted when the defendant “demonstrated an

understanding of the proceedings and the role of the persons present” and “an

ability to communicate with his lawyer”), and State v. Kramer, 11 N.W.3d 794, 796,

798 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (finding competency hearing unwarranted when despite

“loosely espous[ing]” nonsensical theories, the defendant “responded

appropriately to the court’s directions and gave coherent responses”), with Einfeldt,

914 N.W.2d at 780 (finding a competency evaluation should have been ordered

after the defendant threatened to “stab her lawyer in the neck with a pen” and did

not understand “why the lawyer was seated beside her”). Most importantly, Boon

was able to meaningfully participate in own defense. See Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d

at 781 (interpreting section 812.3(1) to require the defendant “to effectively assist

in the defense”). Defense counsel stated that he was able “to speak to Mr. Boon

and confirm” his preferred strategy before filing the motion in arrest of judgment,

using near-identical language to Boon’s own pro se document. At no point during

the proceedings did Boon’s counsel express any concern that his client was not
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competent or able to participate. See Lucas, 323 N.W.2d at 232. And, despite his

past criminal history spanning “[o]ver the course of the last several years,” Boon

provided no medical opinion that he was deemed incompetent in any previous

proceedings. See State v. Morrison, No. 21-1647, 2022 WL 5067124, at *2 (Iowa

Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2022) (considering the defendant’s “lengthy criminal history” that

was devoid of any incompetency findings as part of its analysis). On this record,

we cannot find that a competency hearing was warranted. We therefore affirm.

IV. Disposition.

Because Boon failed to establish that he was not competent, we affirm his

conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED.