Jonathan Critser v. CNH Industrial America, LLC, d/b/a CNH Industrial, and Joyce Stimpson, in her individual and representative capacity

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0682
Filed April 9, 2025

JONATHAN CRITSER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

CNH INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, LLC, d/b/a CNH INDUSTRIAL, and JOYCE
STIMPSON, in her individual and representative capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Wyatt Peterson,

Judge.

In his action for discharge in violation of public policy, an employee

challenges the district court’s instructions to the jury and its grant of his employer’s

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.

Leonard E. Bates (argued), Jill M. Zwagerman, and Jacquelyn M. Judickas

of Newkirk Zwagerman, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Emily A. McNee (argued) and Susan K. Fitzke of Littler Mendelson, P.C.,

Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellees.

Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly,
JJ.
2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

A jury found that Case New Holland Industrial America L.L.C. (CNH) fired

Jonathan Critser in violation of public policy. In the jury’s view, Critser engaged in

protected conduct when he received unemployment benefits after calling in sick

during the COVID-19 pandemic and that conduct was the determining factor in his

firing. The jury also decided CNH had neither a good-faith belief that Critser sought

benefits to which he was not entitled nor an overriding business justification when

it fired Critser. The jury awarded Critser $100,000 in damages.

But the district court granted CNH’s motion for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict (JNOV). The court found that Critser did not prove that he was engaged

in protected conduct when he sought unemployment benefits that he was not

entitled to receive. The court reasoned that because Critser called in sick, he was

unavailable for work and thus ineligible for benefits. The court also found that he

was ineligible for benefits under the federal Pandemic Unemployment Assistance

(PUA) program for people who lost work because of COVID-19.

Critser now contests the district court’s decision to upend the jury’s verdict.

He contends that he qualified for benefits under the PUA or, at a minimum, made

a good-faith claim for benefits. But under the instructions given to the jury, Critser

did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was engaged in

protected conduct. Thus, we affirm the district court’s JNOV grant.

While we cannot reinstate the verdict, another remedy is proper. Because

the district court provided the jury with a faulty definition of protected conduct, we

remand for a new trial where the jury may decide whether Critser acted in good

faith in making his claim for unemployment benefits.
3

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

CNH manufactures farming and construction equipment. Critser started

working at its Burlington plant in 2013, moving through several different roles. His

last job involved moving painted tractor parts from a conveyor system.

Critser testified that, at various times of the year—for example, through the

summer and holiday production slumps—CNH would lay off its employees, and

they would be eligible for unemployment benefits. Critser collected unemployment

benefits in that way a few times before 2020. CNH’s hourly employees were not

paid sick leave. When they were sick, employees called the company’s absence

reporting line.

In the spring of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic shuttered the Burlington

plant. During that shutdown, employees could collect unemployment benefits

through Iowa Workforce Development (IWD). Critser filed for weekly benefits

during the closure, which lasted roughly from March to July.

In late June, Critser and his fellow employees received letters informing

them the plant would reopen in a week. Along with that letter, the employees

received instructions on how the company would handle COVID risks. For

example, the company would check employees’ temperatures each morning and

enforce distancing measures. The mailing also instructed employees who felt ill

to contact their physician or use the medical services or telehealth resources

provided by CNH. If those health professionals recommended that the employee

stay home, the employee was directed to request documentation and contact

human resources (HR). The instructions then provided the phone number for the

plant’s HR manager, Joyce Stimpson.
4

When Critser returned to full-time work as scheduled on Monday, July 6, he

noticed two prominent signs. At the factory’s entrance hung this sign:

And posted in several places throughout the factory was this sign:

At trial, Critser testified that he was aware of both signs and understood the

direction not to enter if he had the listed symptoms. He also knew to call HR for

further instructions if he had those symptoms.
5

Critser went to work as scheduled on Monday, July 6, and Tuesday, July 7,

showing no fever at check-in. But he recalled feeling “off” on Tuesday night and

woke up on July 8 feeling exhausted, groggy, and with a mild fever. He suspected

he was coming down with COVID. The next day, his symptoms advanced to fever,

muscle aches, and fatigue. Because the signs at work instructed employees not

to enter the factory with symptoms, he stayed home on Wednesday, July 8 and

Thursday, July 9.

As he had done before the pandemic, he called the CNH absence reporting

line each day to say he would miss work. He was not scheduled to work on Friday.1

But the following Monday, because he was feeling better, he returned to the

factory. During his absence, he didn’t check his temperature, take a COVID test,

or contact a medical provider. And he didn’t inform anyone at CNH that he had

COVID symptoms until after his firing. He only told the absence line he was “sick.”

Critser applied for unemployment benefits for the two days he was absent.

He testified that he consulted the IWD website for policies on unemployment

eligibility and determined that he “could be eligible.” He explained:

It said on there if you’re off work for a reason and not a fault
of your own that you may be eligible for unemployment benefits, and
those signages makes it not my fault because I’m honest on their
policy with the signs that someone is giving me the option that I can

1 Critser worked ten-hour shifts, four days per week.
6

collect unemployment for the two days that I stayed home, so I
applied.

He submitted those two days under the same claim he had been using during the

shutdown, so CNH did not view it before it went to IWD. IWD approved the claim,

finding that Critser was eligible for $861 in benefits.2

In early August, Critser received a letter from CNH stating that he was being

fired:

This letter is to inform you[] that your employment with CNH
has been terminated effective 8/5/2020. It has been reported to CNH
by the State of Iowa, that you filed for unemployment benefits against
the CNH account and were paid unemployment benefit[s] the week
of 7/6/2020 when you were recalled to fulltime work on 7/6/2020.
....
According to the standards of conduct #29 [y]ou are expected
not to provide false and/or misleading information to the Company.
You are expected to abide by Company policies and to cooperate
fully in any investigation the Company may undertake.

At an August 12 meeting with HR manager Stimpson, Critser explained for the first

time that he had COVID symptoms on July 8 and 9 and did not come to work

because of the signs that told him to stay home. He also offered to repay the $861

in benefits to keep his job. But Stimpson declined to reconsider the termination

decision. Stimpson testified that Critser’s disclosure at the meeting of COVID

symptoms was a “revelation” that confirmed he “misrepresented himself when he

received those benefits.”3 Still, CNH did not challenge IWD’s grant of his claim for

unemployment benefits in administrative proceedings.

2 Critser’s normal rate of pay for those two days would have been $360.
3 Stimpson also criticized Critser for not disclosing his symptoms earlier and
“potentially expos[ing] many other employees” to COVID.
7

After being fired, Critser experienced emotional and personal upheaval,

according to his testimony. Losing his job hurt his mental health, exacerbated his

substance use, and damaged his relationship with his son.4 But his unemployment

was short-lived; Critser started a new job at Continental, a manufacturing plant in

Mount Pleasant, that October.

One year later, Critser sued CNH and Stimpson—alleging one count of

wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The petition asserted that CNH

retaliated against him for exercising his statutory right to claim unemployment

benefits, a protected employee activity. Stimpson moved for summary judgment,

which the court denied. Critser then moved for summary judgment, but the court

found several genuine issues of material fact that the jury would have to resolve. 5

The parties tried the case to a jury, which was persuaded by Critser’s

position. In a series of interrogatories, the jury found:

1. Critser engaged in protected conduct when he sought
unemployment benefits.
2. Stimpson and CNH did not have a good-faith belief that
Critser knowingly sought unemployment benefits to which he was not
entitled and this was not the determining factor in his termination.
3. Critser’s protected conduct was the determining factor
causing his termination.
4. CNH did not have an overriding business justification for
terminating Critser.
5. Critser appropriately mitigated his damages.

And the jury awarded Critser $100,000 for mental pain and suffering going back to

the date of his termination, but no damages for future pain and suffering.

4 Critser also offered testimony about the fallout from his son, brother, and sister.
5 These included “what is the true reason CNH fired Critser?”, “[w]as it because he

filed for unemployment benefits” or “because he failed to follow proper procedure
when calling in sick and instead sought unemployment in a fraudulent manner,”
and whether CNH had an overriding business justification for the termination.
8

CNH moved for JNOV, or for new trial and remittitur, arguing that the verdict

was contrary to the weight of the evidence and inflammatory comments from

Critser’s counsel during closing argument persuaded the jury to decide on an

improper basis. The court granted CNH’s motion JNOV, finding the record did not

support the jury’s finding that Critser was engaged in protected conduct. From

there, the court dismissed Critser’s petition. Critser appeals.6

II. Scope and Standards of Review

We review the JNOV grant for the correction of errors at law. Clark v. State,

7 N.W.3d 740, 749 (Iowa 2024). When considering a JNOV motion, the district

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Critser. Id. In doing

so, it must afford him every legitimate inference that may be reasonably deduced

from the record. Id. We consider the evidence in the same manner as the district

court, asking whether there was sufficient evidence to generate a jury question.

Schlegel v. Ottumwa Courier, 585 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Iowa 1998).

We also review Critser’s challenge to jury instructions for the correction of

legal error. See State v. Johnson, 7 N.W.3d 504, 510 (Iowa 2024).

III. Analysis

Iowa recognizes the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

Koester v. Eyerly-Ball Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 14 N.W.3d 723, 729

(Iowa 2024). This cause of action is a narrow exception to the rule that either party

may end an employment relationship “at any time, for any reason, or no reason at

6 Critser’s brief asks for one of three remedies: (1) grant his motion for summary

judgment; (2) reverse the JNOV, reinstate the jury award and remand for new trial
on punitive damages; or (3) find the court erred in instructing the jury and remand
for a new trial on liability and damages.
9

all.” Dorshkind v. Oak Park Place of Dubuque II, L.L.C., 835 N.W.2d 293, 300

(Iowa 2013) (citation omitted). This exception prevents employers from coercing

employees to give up certain statutory rights. Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777,

782 (Iowa 1994).

To prevail on his tort claim, Critser had to prove four elements: (1) the

existence of a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy that protected his

conduct; (2) that the public policy would be undermined by CNH’s decision to fire

him; (3) that he engaged in the protected conduct, which was the reason he was

fired; and (4) that CNH had no overriding business justification for the discharge.

Id. The first two elements are legal questions for the court. Id.

On the first element, there’s no question that seeking unemployment

benefits can be protected conduct. Id. But this case has a twist not presented in

Lara. In Lara, it was undisputed that the employee was eligible for partial

unemployment benefits after the employer reduced her hours. Id. at 780. But

here, a question loomed whether Critser was eligible for benefits for his two-day

COVID-19 absence. CNH insisted that Critser was engaged in protected conduct

only if he was eligible for the benefits sought. In contrast, Critser argued it was

enough for him to show a good-faith belief that he was eligible when he applied to

IWD and received unemployment benefits.

Over Critser’s objection, the court advised the jury that an employee

engages in protected conduct “by seeking unemployment benefits to which the

employee is entitled,” and “[a]n employee who has made a claim for unemployment

benefits to which the employee is entitled has engaged in protected activity.” But,

according to that jury instruction: “[a]n employee who has made a claim for
10

unemployment benefits to which the employee is not entitled has not engaged in

protected activity.”

The court also instructed the jury that an unemployed individual is “eligible

to receive unemployment benefits . . . only if . . . [t]he individual is able to work, is

available for work, and is earnestly and actively seeking work,” or if the individual

is “employed at the individual’s then regular job and available for work,” “works

less than the regular full-time week” for that week, and “earns less than the

individual’s weekly benefit amount plus fifteen dollars.” (Emphasis added). In any

case, “[a]n individual who is ill and not able to perform work due to illness is not

considered available for work.”

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic

Security (CARES) Act allowed unemployment benefits if the applicant’s work was

affected by the pandemic under some circumstances. Those complex provisions

were summarized in a jury instruction explaining that PUA benefits were available

to some employees who were otherwise ineligible for unemployment benefits

under their governing state law. Such employees had to certify that they were

“otherwise able to work and available for work” and “unemployed, partially

unemployed, or unable or unavailable to work because” of one of ten COVID-

related circumstances.
11

Three scenarios were potentially relevant to Critser:

(a) the individual has been diagnosed with COVID-19 or is
experiencing symptoms of COVID-19 and seeking a medical
diagnosis;
....
(f) the individual is unable to reach the place of employment
because the individual has been advised by a health care provider
to self-quarantine due to concerns related to COVID-19;
(g) the individual was scheduled to commence employment
and does not have a job or is unable to reach the job as a direct result
of the COVID-19 public health emergency.

The court further instructed that employees were ineligible for PUA benefits if they

were “receiving paid sick leave or other paid leave benefits,” even if they met any

of the qualifications described.

Despite the court siding with CNH on how to define protected conduct for

the jury, the jury returned a verdict for Critser. But the court did not allow the verdict

to stand, finding “under the instructions given, Mr. Critser did not engage in

protected conduct.”

On appeal, Critser attacks the district court’s rulings on two fronts.7 First,

he contests the JNOV grant. He contends the court did not view the facts in the

light most favorable to him. See Larsen v. United Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n of

Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Iowa 1981). On that contention, Critser argues

the court ignored the “reasonable conclusion” that he qualified for benefits under

PUA’s paragraph (g).8 He claims that given the signs posted by CNH restricting

plant access to people with symptoms, he was “unable to reach the job as a direct

7 In his appellant’s brief, Critser challenged both the denial of his motion for
summary judgment and the grant of JNOV. But at oral argument, his counsel
conceded that the first claim is subsumed under the JNOV issue.
8 Although the district court also assessed paragraphs (a) and (f), Critser advances

no substantive argument on those criteria on appeal.
12

result of the COVID-19 public health emergency.” Critser also emphasizes that

IWD awarded him benefits and he was never asked to repay them.

On the administrative law question, we agree with CNH that IWD’s payment

of benefits was not dispositive, and the employer did not need to litigate the validity

of Critser’s unemployment claim to defend itself in the wrongful termination action.

See Caras v. Fam. First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. Utah 1988)

(finding defendants did not have an incentive to litigate the issue in administrative

proceedings “as the only adverse effects to the defendants would be payment of

unemployment compensation, a minimal amount compared to the amount in

controversy in this case”).

Returning to the PUA benefits, we find no error in the district court’s grant

of JNOV. As the jury instructions defined protected conduct, substantial evidence

did not support Critser’s claim that he was entitled to unemployment benefits. See

White v. State, 5 N.W.3d 315, 323 (Iowa 2024) (viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, sufficient evidence must justify submitting the case to the

jury). The evidence shows that Critser was sick on July 8 and 9 and informed CNH

of his illness on the absence reporting line. As CNH argues, because Critser was

sick those two days and not available for work, he was ineligible for unemployment

benefits under the state and federal provisions. Iowa Code § 96.4(3)(a) (2020); 15

U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I) (2020). So we cannot restore the verdict.9

Failing a reversal of the JNOV grant, Critser moves to a second front. He

argues that the court provided the jury with a faulty definition of protected conduct.

9 Because we affirm the JNOV grant, we need not reach Critser’s argument on

punitive damages.
13

He maintains that the correct inquiry was not whether he was eligible for

unemployment benefits but whether he had a good-faith belief that he was eligible.

He relies on Teachout v. Forest Community School District, where the Iowa

Supreme Court reasoned that a teaching assistant’s good-faith intent to report

child abuse could be considered protected conduct. 584 N.W.2d 296, 301

(Iowa 1998).

CNH counters that Teachout stands for the proposition “that employees

need only have a good faith basis for reporting illegal or fraudulent actions” to

engage in protected conduct. By contrast, CNH argues, filing false and misleading

benefit applications is not protected activity. It cites a federal case to emphasize

that the wrongful-discharge tort is “not designed to protect employees making false

claims or false representations.” Napreljac v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 461

F. Supp. 2d 981, 1036 (S.D. Iowa 2006), aff'd, 505 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2007). At

bottom, CNH defends the definition given to the jury that employees engage in

protected activity only when filing for benefits to which they are entitled.

In reply, Critser points to this holding in Lara: “[R]etaliatory discharge of an

employee who files a claim for partial unemployment benefits ‘serves to frustrate

a well-recognized and defined public policy of the state.’” 512 N.W.2d at 782

(emphasis added) (quoting Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560

(Iowa 1988)); see also Koester, 14 N.W.3d at 730 (“Koester wasn’t discharged for

engaging in statutorily protected activity, such as claiming unpaid wages, filing an

unemployment claim, or filing a workers’ compensation claim.”). Critser stresses:

“If the goal is to enforce a statutory right to file for unemployment benefits, it would
14

make little sense for protection from employer retaliation to extend only to those

employees who happen to have a successful partial unemployment claim.”

Critser overstates his point. We don’t read Lara as concluding that any filing

for unemployment benefits—no matter how fraudulent—would be the exercise of

a protected right. But CNH also goes too far. Not every unsuccessful claim for

benefits should subject a worker to retaliatory discharge. See Napreljac, 505 F.3d

at 803 (distinguishing between “false” claims and those that are just not

compensable).

The law rests in the middle. In Lara, our supreme court highlighted the

legislature’s declaration that economic insecurity from unemployment poses a

“serious menace” to the welfare of Iowans. 512 N.W.2d at 782 (quoting Iowa Code

§ 96.2 (1989)). From there, the court found that “permitting an employer to

indirectly force an employee to give up” the statutory right to seek unemployment

benefits would have a chilling effect on the exercise of that right. Id. Those

economic security protections advanced in Lara would apply equally to employees

entitled to unemployment benefits and to employees who in good faith believed

they were entitled to unemployment benefits. Cf. Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem.,

Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 287 (Iowa 2000) (viewing good-faith intent to engage in

protected activity, for example, giving truthful testimony, the same as actually

engaging in that protected activity).

Further, the supreme court has found “it is also against public policy to

discharge an employee solely on the employer’s subjective judgment as to the

bona fides of a pending claim” because “there may be situations where a workers’

compensation claim is ultimately unsuccessful” but discharging the employee
15

“based on the filing of the claim would violate public policy.” Springer, 429 N.W.2d

at 562. The employer’s assertion that the employee filed a “groundless and false

workers’ compensation claim . . . can be viewed as reinforcing [the employee’s]

contention that the filing” of the claim was the reason for the termination. Id.

The statutes and regulations governing unemployment compensation are

“complex” and the “conditions for benefit entitlement” are not always clear, even

for seasoned legal and HR professionals. Hart v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 394

N.W.2d 385, 388 (Iowa 1986). Those complexities were only compounded by the

special allowances for benefits during the pandemic.10 Charging employees acting

in good faith with a perfect understanding of those complexities would chill the

exercise of their statutory rights, as Lara cautioned. See 512 N.W.2d at 782.

Given these considerations, the jury instruction’s definition of protected

conduct was too narrow. The district court should have instructed the jury that

Critser engaged in protected conduct if he applied for unemployment benefits with

the good-faith belief that he was entitled to receive them. See Carter v. Lee Cnty.,

No. 13-1196, 2015 WL 161833, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2015) (citing O’Brien

v. Emp. App. Bd., 494 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1993), which equates a claimant’s

good-faith defense with an objective reasonable belief standard).

Having found an erroneous and prejudicial jury instruction, we must settle

on the remedy. As his favored route, Critser insists that we can just reinstate the

10 Critser testified that he answered the questions on the unemployment claim form

as honestly as he could. He told the jury that he believed he was available for
work on July 7 and 8, recounting that before the pandemic he still went to work
when he was sick. But the signs at the plant during the pandemic prevented him
from working because they directed him not to enter with COVID symptoms.
16

verdict. He argues that “where an errant jury instruction makes it more difficult for

a party to prove their case, yet they prevail at trial anyway, Iowa’s appellate courts

have held that instructional error to be harmless.” See Rivera v. Woodward Res.

Ctr., 865 N.W.2d 887, 903 (Iowa 2015). As its fallback position, CNH contends

that if we reject the district court’s definition of protected conduct, it is entitled to a

new trial where the jurors would decide whether Critser acted in good faith. We

agree with the course urged by CNH. The harmless-error principle mentioned in

Rivera does not apply here. The faulty definition of protected conduct made it

impossible for Critser to prevail on this record. That is why we are affirming the

JNOV grant. This case must go back for retrial so that the jury can consider the

correct definition of protected conduct.11

To recap, we affirm the district court’s grant of JNOV, we reverse the court’s

ruling on the jury instructions, and we remand for a new trial.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR NEW

TRIAL.

11 We decline to address Critser’s claim that the district court abused its discretion

by excluding evidence of an alleged pattern of disregard for the rights of employees
through the testimony and text chains of former coworkers. The record will be
different on retrial and the question will arise, if at all, in new context. See Sauer
v. Scott, 176 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 1970).