In re Marriage of Rasmussen

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0324
Filed May 21, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF MICHELLE L. RASMUSSEN
AND SCOTT M. RASMUSSEN

Upon the Petition of
MICHELLE L. RASMUSSEN,
Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

And Concerning
SCOTT M. RASMUSSEN,
Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Shelby County, Amy Zacharias,

Judge.

Former spouses appeal and cross-appeal the property division in the

decree dissolving their marriage. AFFIRMED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED AS

MODIFIED ON CROSS-APPEAL.

Theodore R. Wonio of Rasmussen, Nelson and Wonio, P.L.C., Atlantic, for

appellant/cross-appellee.

Jodee D. Dixon and Bryan D. Swain of Salvo, Deren, Schenck, Gross,

Swain & Argotsinger, P.C., Harlan, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.

In its decree dissolving the parties’ twenty-five-year marriage, the district

court ordered Scott Rasmussen to pay Michelle Rasmussen a cash equalization

payment of $100,000. Unhappy with this result, Scott appeals and Michelle cross-

appeals. They each challenge the amount of the cash equalization payment. Scott

argues the payment is too high because Michelle dissipated marital assets, while

Michelle argues the payment is too low because of an excluded asset and errors

in the court’s calculations. Scott also challenges the court’s decision to award an

empty lot at Lake Panorama to Michelle. On our de novo review of the record,1

we determine Scott’s equalization payment to Michelle should be increased.

1. Dissipation of Assets

Michelle’s spending habits have been a source of contention between the

parties since they married in 1998. By 2002, Scott said that Michelle “got in over

her head on credit cards,” to the tune of about $20,000. The couple paid the debt

off with a settlement that Scott had received from his work. Ten years later, they

separated their finances because each was frustrated with how the other was

spending money. From then on, Scott paid for most of the household bills—like

the mortgage and utilities—while Michelle took care of things like groceries and

presents. As the marriage went on, Michelle’s credit card debt built back up,

totaling $31,685.50 by 2021. Michelle didn’t know how she spent that much

1 Although our review in this dissolution proceeding is de novo, “we defer to the

factual findings of the district court.” In re Marriage of Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d 696,
698 (Iowa 2013). “However, those findings are not binding upon us.” Id.
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money, testifying, “that’s what my therapist and I are trying to figure out. I have—

I had spending issues.”

To pay off her credit cards, Michelle took out a $35,000 loan against her

401(k). A few weeks later, in November 2021, she was laid off from her long-time

employment and received a severance package totaling about $35,000. She

withdrew the rest of her 401(k)—about $38,000—and converted the loan to a

withdrawal. These withdrawals resulted in a tax burden of $18,819.89. Michelle

used the 401(k) funds to satisfy that tax debt and pay off her credit cards, as well

as a loan on her 2017 Jeep Cherokee for $11,352.43.

In February 2023, Michelle petitioned for divorce from Scott. She used

some of the money left over from her 401(k) withdrawal to retain an attorney and

establish a new residence for herself. By the dissolution trial in December,

Michelle only had $10,000 left in a savings account from the 401(k) money. When

asked at trial where the rest of it went, Michelle admitted: “Honestly, it’s frivolous.”

Scott testified that he did not know about much of this until the trial, stating he was

“floored” by the numbers that he was hearing. He asked the court to deny

Michelle’s request for a payment to equalize their mostly agreed-upon property

division because she dissipated marital assets.

The district court granted Scott’s request, to an extent. On Michelle’s side

of the property division ledger, the court included the total estimated value of her

401(k) account before its liquidation—$80,000, plus $3220 from her current 401(k).

See In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 106 n.6 (Iowa 2007) (“Typically, a

dissipated asset is included in the marital estate and awarded to the spouse who

wasted the asset.”). But it subtracted the $10,000 that Michelle still had in a
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savings account from that amount, plus the credit card debt of $31,685.50 that she

paid off with those funds. Although the court found that “[n]o one disputes that

paying off the Jeep was erasing a marital debt,” it did not subtract that amount from

the 401(k) balance assigned to Michelle.

On appeal, Scott contends the district court should not have subtracted the

credit card debt of $31,685.50 from the 401(k) balance assigned to Michelle. And

he says the court should have included the $20,000 in credit card debt the couple

paid off early in the marriage on Michelle’s side of the ledger. We disagree. “The

dissipation doctrine applies when a spouse’s conduct during the period of

separation ‘results in the loss or disposal of property otherwise subject to division

at the time of divorce.’” Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d at 700–01 (emphasis added) (citation

omitted); see also In re Marriage of Balik, No. 17-0805, 2018 WL 3912104, at *1

(Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018) (“Kimbro identified the time frame for analysis of

dissipation as the period of separation.”). Because both debts accumulated over

the course of the marriage and before the parties separated, the dissipation

doctrine does not apply. Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d at 700–01; see also In re Marriage

of Oyadare, No. 24-0280, 2025 WL 1066418, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2025).

As we stated in In re Marriage of Bloomquist,

We imagine that many spouses—whether still married or going
through a divorce—are disgruntled with their partners’ spending
habits, but, if they divorce, we generally do not look back to try to
account for past spending. Instead, we simply divide up what’s left
because marriage does not come with a ledger.

No. 21-1631, 2023 WL 1812846, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023); see also

Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 103 (“It is important to remember marriage does not come

with a ledger.”).
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On cross-appeal, Michelle’s only challenge to the inclusion of the liquidated

401(k) funds in the property division is the district court’s failure to subtract the

$11,352.43 that she used to pay off the debt on her 2017 Jeep Latitude. Scott

agrees the court should have accounted for that payment, contending: “The only

expense that was reasonable was the vehicle loan payoff in the amount of

$11,352.43.” We accordingly make that adjustment to the property division.

2. Division of Assets

The Rasmussens bought an empty lot at Lake Panorama in 2012 for $8000,

with hopes of building a home and retiring there someday. But as of the time of

trial, the lot was still undeveloped and without utilities or a sewer system. Michelle

described it as a “C lot”:

An A lot is a lot on the lake. It’s got lakeshore. A B lot,
basically is like across the road, so you can see the lake but it’s not
considered on the lake. And then a C lot is the next step away from
a B lot. So you can see the lake from our property, but you have to
stand at a certain angle and squint between two houses in order to
see it.

Michelle valued the lot at its assessed value of $16,300 and asked that it be

awarded to her. Scott thought it was worth $50,000 and said that Michelle “can

have it” at that value, although he also testified that he would take it for $30,000

so that he could “turn around and sell it for more.” Now, on appeal, Scott claims

the district court should have valued the lot at $30,000 and awarded it to him. We

find the court’s value to be within the range of evidence and decline to disturb its

award of the lot to Michelle. See In re Marriage of Keener, 728 N.W.2d 188, 194

(Iowa 2007) (“A trial court’s valuation will not be disturbed when it is within the

range of evidence.”).
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This leaves Michelle’s claim on cross-appeal that the district court failed to

include a $30,000 service truck that Scott used in his farm equipment repair

business. Although Scott did not include the truck in his financial affidavit, he

disclosed it in response to a discovery interrogatory from Michelle. Scott confirmed

that discovery response at trial, testifying he bought the truck for $30,000 to get

his business started. And he agreed that it should be valued at that amount. We

adopt Scott’s value and assign that asset to him. See Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 102

(stating that Iowa Code section 598.21(5) requires “‘all property, except inherited

property or gifts received by one party,’ to be equitably divided between the

parties”). Michelle also claims the court made a computing error in its calculation

of Scott’s net assets, incorrectly finding the total added up to $279,389.76 when it

actually added up to $304,054.03. We agree and make that adjustment as well.

With the addition of the truck, the modification to the 401(k) funds, and the

correction of the property award calculations, Scott’s total net property award is

now $334,054.03, while Michelle’s is $67,782.07. To equalize the division in this

twenty-five-year marriage, we conclude Michelle is entitled to the additional

$33,000 she requests on appeal, bringing Scott’s total cash equalization payment

to $133,000.2 See In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 682 (Iowa 2013)

(stating that because equality is often most equitable, “we have repeatedly insisted

upon the equal or nearly equal division of marital assets”).

We modify the decree to order Scott to pay Michelle the additional $33,000

within 180 days after procedendo issues in this appeal. Although Michelle was

2 The exact amount to equalize the division is $133,135.98, but we adopt Michelle’s

rounded figure.
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successful on appeal, we deny her request for appellate attorney fees after

considering the relevant factors. See In re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d 630,

639 (Iowa 2013).

AFFIRMED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED ON CROSS-

APPEAL.