In re Marriage of Johanns

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1900
Filed July 2, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF AMANDA KAY JOHANNS
AND JARED JAMES JOHANNS

Upon the Petition of
AMANDA KAY JOHANNS,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
JARED JAMES JOHANNS,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Worth County, Colleen Weiland,

Judge.

Jared Johanns appeals multiple provisions of the decree dissolving his

marriage to Amanda Johanns. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Vanessa L. Arzberger (argued) of Arzberger Law Office, Mason City, for

appellant.

Terry D. Parsons (argued) of Olsen & Parsons Law Firm, Cedar Falls, for

appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Jared Johanns appeals multiple provisions of the decree dissolving his

marriage to Amanda Johanns. He contends their child’s best interests would be

served by placing their child in his physical care. In the alternative, he challenges

the visitation schedule and restrictions placed on his use of alcohol while the child

is in his care. Jared also challenges the property division and the denial of an

award of his trial attorney fees. Both parties request an award of appellate attorney

fees. Following review, we affirm the provisions of the decree relating to physical

care, property division, and trial attorney fees. We also affirm the default visitation

schedule but modify the decree to remove a provision restricting the parties’ use

of alcohol while the child is in their care. Finally, we decline to award either party

appellate attorney fees.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Amanda and Jared married in June 2018. They are each in their thirties

and in good health. Both have doctorate degrees in physical therapy and are

employed as physical therapists, earning similar incomes. They are the parents

of W.M.J., born in 2020.

During the marriage, the parties lived on an acreage in Grafton that Jared

bought from his mother in 2015. Jared’s mother sold him the home for $165,000

and gave him $28,000 to use toward its purchase. The property’s assessed value

is about $137,000.

In February 2023, Amanda petitioned for a civil protective order against

Jared, claiming that Jared shoved her in front of their child while intoxicated. The

court found Amanda’s testimony more credible than Jared’s and granted the
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protective order, placing the child in the parties’ joint physical care. The order

prohibits the parties from consuming or being under the influence of alcohol while

having physical care of the child.

After the protective order was entered, Amanda and Jared separated.

Amanda entered a one-year lease for a residence in Osage. In April 2023,

Amanda petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage. She relocated to Rochester,

Minnesota, in August 2023 but continued to maintain the residence in Osage.

Trial was held in early 2024, and the district court entered the dissolution

decree that July. The court granted the parties joint legal custody of the child and

placed the child in Amanda’s physical care. The court granted Jared visitation on

alternating weekends and holidays, plus additional time in the summer. The

decree prohibits the parties and any visitors to the home from consuming or being

under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances while the child is in their

care. After dividing the parties’ property, the court ordered Jared to pay Amanda

$14,675 to balance the equities.

II. Scope and Standard of Review.

We review dissolution proceedings de novo. In re Marriage of Mauer, 874

N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). We give weight to the district court’s fact findings

although they are not binding. Id.

III. Discussion.

On appeal, Jared challenges the provisions of the decree that address his

contact with the child. He also challenges the division of the parties’ property and

the district court’s denial of his request for trial attorney fees.
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A. Physical Care.

We begin with Jared’s challenge to the physical-care provisions of the

decree. In determining physical care, our first and governing consideration is the

best interest of the child. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(o). The objective “is to

place the children in the environment most likely to bring them to health, both

physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733

N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). In making this determination, the court considers

the factors set forth in Iowa Code section 598.41(3) (2023) and those identified in

In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974). See Hansen, 733

N.W.2d at 696 (stating the custodial factors in section 598.41(3) apply equally to

physical-care determinations). “[T]he courts must examine each case based on

the unique facts and circumstances presented to arrive at the best decision.” Id.

at 700.

In determining physical care, the district court found that both parties “have

a lot to offer” and that the child is “well-bonded to each.” Thus, the court found that

deciding physical care “is not an easy call.” But after weighing the relevant factors,

the court found Amanda was better equipped to act as physical caretaker.

The strongest factor in Amanda’s favor is her history as primary
caregiver. She acted as WMJ’s primary provider since his birth until
the parties’ separation. Jared—although he loves WMJ and
provided care—did not attend to the invisible load and everyday
drudgery of parenting in the same way that Amanda did. And
because Amanda picked up that load, Jared was able to maintain
other interests and activities. Second, Jared seems to feel entitled
to have his opinion count more than Amanda’s and dismisses her
position when they disagree. In short, he gets angry when she
challenges him. Finally, while the court believes that Amanda’s fear
leads her to exaggerate, Jared’s alcohol use is sometimes
problematic. The court believes that he can control drinking when
necessary to keep WMJ safe, but it has clearly interfered in his
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marriage and is an important part of his social life. And sometimes
when he drinks, he drinks a lot. That Jared remains in the family
home and the local support he has count in his favor but do not
outweigh the factors in Amanda’s favor.

Jared contends he is best equipped to serve as the child’s physical

caretaker. He argues that the child will be harmed by being “ripped away from the

close relationship with Jared and schedule the child has grown accustomed to for

just under a year and a half, in the shared care of Jared and Amanda.” But Jared

does not request joint physical care, and such an arrangement is no longer feasible

following Amanda’s move to Rochester. The concerns Jared raises will affect the

child no matter who has physical care.

Of the relevant factors enumerated in section 598.41(3), most weigh equally

in favor of each parent. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(a) (suitability of each parent

as custodian), (b) (suffering of the child based on lack of active contact with both

parents), (d) (actively caring for the child since separation), (h) (geographic

proximity). For example, Jared remains in Grafton, where much of his family lives.

But the record also shows that Amanda has friends and family in Rochester. Jared

argues that the child would benefit more from a smaller school system over a

“much larger school” in Rochester, but there are advantages and disadvantages

to each.

The district court’s physical-care determination can be attributed to three

factors. First, it found Amanda’s history as the child’s physical caretaker since

birth weighed in her favor. Because her history shows both Amanda’s capability

as a parent and her ability to sustain an interest in the “everyday drudgery of

parenting,” we agree. Second, the court was concerned that Jared “seems to feel
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entitled to have his opinion count more than Amanda’s and dismisses her position

when they disagree,” which raises concerns regarding his ability to communicate

with Amanda about the child’s needs and foster the child’s relationship with her.

See id. § 598.41(3)(c), (e). Finally, while the court acknowledged that Amanda

may exaggerate Jared’s behavior, it noted that Jared’s use of alcohol raises safety

concerns.1

The record supports the district court’s concerns. Jared presents a different

view of the evidence, arguing that it shows Amanda is unable to communicate

about the child’s needs or foster his relationship with the child. Although there may

be some basis for his concern, we give great weight to the trial court’s findings.

See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g).

There is good reason for us to pay very close attention to the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. A trial court
deciding dissolution cases “is greatly helped in making a wise
decision about the parties by listening to them and watching them in
person.” In contrast, appellate courts must rely on the printed record
in evaluating the evidence. We are denied the impression created
by the demeanor of each and every witness as the testimony is
presented.

In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984) (internal citation

omitted).

1 Jared notes that the district court did not make a finding that there was a history

of domestic abuse as defined in section 236.2. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(j). But
the record shows that Amanda sought and was granted a protective order under
chapter 236. The allegations in Amanda’s petition state that Jared was intoxicated
when he shoved her, and the protective order notes that Jared admitted consuming
alcohol before the altercation. The court considered Jared’s alcohol use and the
impact it may have on the child’s safety in granting Amanda physical care. See id.
§ 598.41(3)(i) (weighing “[w]hether the safety of the child . . . will be jeopardized
by the awarding of joint custody or by unsupervised or unrestricted visitation”).
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We affirm the district court’s grant of physical care to Amanda with one

caveat. Because our determination is premised on the belief that Amanda can

communicate with Jared about the child’s needs and support his relationship with

the child, evidence of her inability to do so going forward may serve as a basis for

modifying physical care. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Grantham, 698 N.W.2d 140,

146 (Iowa 2005) (affirming modification of physical care when, “beginning almost

immediately following the dissolution decree, [the father] has maintained a

persistent pattern of conduct that served to diminish the children’s relationship with

their mother”); In re Marriage of Gratias, 406 N.W.2d 815, 817–18 (Iowa Ct. App.

1987) (affirming grant of physical care to the mother based on district court’s

finding that parties’ testimony showed a willingness to cooperate, despite father’s

claim that the mother attempted to destroy the father’s relationship with the

children, but warning that the finding would not foreclose future reassessment if

the mother interfered with the father’s relationship with the children).

B. Visitation.

Jared next challenges the default visitation schedule set out in the decree.

He asks the court to grant him extraordinary visitation as stated in his motion to

enlarge or amend the decree. He argues that his “visitation should not be

minimized so significantly to provide for graduated, increasing time after having

successfully shared care of the child for over a year.”

When the court grants physical care to one parent, it should provide liberal

visitation to the other parent to “assure the child the opportunity for the maximum

continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents.” Iowa Code
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§ 598.41(1)(a). The visitation schedule must serve the best interests of the child.

In re Marriage of Gensley, 777 N.W.2d 705, 718 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).

The district court noted the importance of allowing the child continuing

physical and emotional contact with both parents and encouraged Jared and

Amanda to be flexible with their parenting time, “especially as [the child] moves

into his adolescent years with the attendant activities in social life.” But if the

parties cannot agree about parenting time, the decree provides a set schedule for

Jared, providing an “every-other weekend schedule” with additional days between

the school year and summer. The default schedule provides Jared weekly

overnight visits from Thursday evening to Friday in addition to alternating weekend

visits before the child starts kindergarten. The visitation schedule removes those

weekly Thursday overnight visits to accommodate the child’s school schedule once

he begins kindergarten. The schedule also allows longer visits in the summer,

increasing the length of those visits as the child ages.

Jared complains that he should have one other evening on alternating

weekends in lieu of the weekly Thursday night visits in the weeks he does not have

weekend visits because of the amount of driving involved. He also contends he

should be allowed an equal amount of parenting time during the summer.

The parties only need to follow the default visitation schedule if they cannot

mutually agree on an alternative. Because the default schedule provided in the

decree is fair and intended to maximize Jared’s contact with the child, we affirm.

C. Restrictions on Alcohol Use.

Jared challenges the provision of the decree restricting his use of alcohol

while the child is in his care. That provision states:
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Neither party may consume or be under the influence of alcohol or
any unprescribed controlled substance while the children are in his
or her care. Neither party may allow the use of any unprescribed
controlled substance or the excessive use of alcohol by anyone
visiting his or her home when the children are present.

The supreme court disapproved of a similar restriction on visitation as

“demeaning” in In re Marriage of Fite, 485 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Iowa 1992).

The district court was correct in providing that Richard should not be
permitted visitation with Janelle if he has been drinking excessively.
We believe, however, that it is unwise to place in the court’s decree
any formal procedure for resolving this question or to formalize a right
to abort visitations based on the subjective belief of the child.
Consequently, we delete those conditions as formal provisions of the
decree. If Richard behaves irresponsibly in the manner specified in
the deleted conditions, his conduct may be made the subject of
further proceedings in the district court and may be grounds for
reduction or elimination altogether of his child visitation rights.

Fite, 485 N.W.2d at 664; cf. In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492, 493 (Iowa

1990) (rejecting requirement that father could only exercise visitation when no

unrelated adult was present); In re Marriage of Jenkins, No. 22-0656, 2023 WL

382301, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2023) (eliminating language placing

conditions on father’s visitation concerning alcohol or substance usage); In re

Marriage of Strang, No. 99-1402, 2001 WL 195071, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 28,

2001) (declining to limit visitation to times when a parent has not been drinking);

In re Marriage of Ullerich, 367 N.W.2d 297, 299–300 (Iowa Ct.App.1985) (rejecting

requirement that mother could only exercise visitation when no unrelated adult

males were present). “[A] court should place conditions on a parent’s visitation

rights only when visitation without the placement of conditions is likely to result in

direct physical harm or significant emotional harm to the child, other children, or a

parent.” In re Marriage of Rykhoek, 525 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
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Because the district court found that Jared “can control drinking when necessary

to keep WMJ safe,” the restriction is unnecessary. If Jared’s alcohol use

endangers the child, it may justify future modification of visitation. Id. at 4. (“Even

without formal conditions in the decree, if a parent behaves irresponsibly during

visitation, his or her conduct may be grounds for reduction or elimination of

visitation.”). We modify the decree to remove the restriction.

D. Property Division.

Jared contends the district court failed to equitably divide the parties’

property. He claims there was $68,472.28 in home equity before he married

Amanda, which he argues should not be included in the property division. When

the property award is adjusted accordingly, Jared argues that Amanda should be

made to pay him a property settlement of $6082.78.

The goal of property distribution is to divide the parties’ property equitably

based on the facts of each case rather than making an equal or percentage

distribution. See In re Marriage of Hansen, 886 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Iowa Ct. App.

2016). The court considers the factors set forth in Iowa Code section 598.21(5) in

determining an equitable distribution. But before dividing the property, the court

must identify and value the assets subject to division. See In re Marriage of

McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Iowa 2013). All property is subject to division,

including property brought into the marriage. See id. The only exception is for

property gifted to or inherited by one party. See id. But even gifted and inherited

property can be divided if the court finds failing to do so would be inequitable to

the other party. In re Marriage of Miller, 966 N.W.2d 630, 635–36 (Iowa 2021).
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The district court set off $55,000 from the property division, representing

two gifts Jared received from his mother: $28,000 in cash she gave Jared to buy

her home and a $27,000 reduction in the home’s sale price. The court declined to

set aside the premarital equity Jared held in the home, noting that it is not set aside

like gifted or inherited property. The court found, “To additionally set aside Jared’s

premarital mortgage payments when the parties increased the debt load during the

marriage would unjustly ignore Amanda’s financial contributions toward the

mortgage and home improvements.”

“Premarital property may be included in the divisible estate.” McDermott,

827 N.W.2d at 678. But Iowa law does not credit a party for the value of the

property brought into the marriage. In re Marriage of Brainard, 523 N.W.2d 611,

616 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). “To the contrary, the property brought to the marriage

by each party is only a factor to consider together with the other relevant factors in

determining an equitable property division.” Id.

Because Jared has no right to credit for the value of premarital equity, we

affirm the property division set out in the dissolution decree.

E. Trial Attorney Fees.

Jared contends the district court abused its discretion by denying him trial

attorney fees. See In re Marriage of Towne, 966 N.W.2d 668, 680 (Iowa Ct. App.

2021). “Whether attorney fees should be awarded depends on the respective

abilities of the parties to pay.” Id. (citation omitted). Finding no abuse of discretion,

we deny his request for trial attorney fees.
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IV. Appellate Attorney Fees.

Both parties request an award of appellate attorney fees. Appellate attorney

fees are not a matter of right. McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 687. In deciding whether

to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the requesting party,

the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the requesting party had to defend

the district court’s decision on appeal. See In re Marriage of Hoffman, 891 N.W.2d

849, 852 (Iowa 2016).

Because neither party has completely prevailed on appeal and they are in

similar financial positions, we decline to award appellate attorney fees.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.