In the Interest of H.M., H.M., L.M., L.M., L.M., R.H., and T.P., Mior Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1072
Filed September 17, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF H.M., H.M., L.M., L.M., L.M., R.H., and T.P.,
Minor Children,

S.H., Mother,
Appellant,

T.P., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County,

Charles D. Fagan, Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their respective

parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Sara E. Benson of Meldrum & Benson Law, P.C., Council Bluffs, for

appellant mother.

Eric A. Checketts of Checketts Law, PLC, Glenwood, for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Ryan M. Dale, Council Bluffs, guardian ad litem for T.P.

Norman L. Springer Jr. of McGinn, Springer & Noethe PLC, Council Bluffs,

attorney for all minor children and guardian ad litem for H.M., H.M., L.M., L.M.,

L.M., and R.H.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and

Sandy, JJ.
2

AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and fathers

to seven children. The mother of all children and the father of the oldest child

separately appeal.1 Both challenge the statutory grounds for termination and

argue termination is not in the best interest of their respective children.2

We conduct a de novo review of orders terminating parental rights. In re

Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). The juvenile court’s factual findings do not

bind us, but we give them weight, especially in assessing witness credibility. Id.

Our review follows a three-step process to determine if a statutory ground for

termination has been established, whether termination is in the children’s best

interests, and whether any permissive exception should be applied to preclude

termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021). But we do not address

any step not challenged by a parent. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

We address each parent’s appeal in turn.

I. The Father

The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights to his child under

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (f), and (j) (2025). When the juvenile court

terminates parental rights on multiple statutory grounds, we may affirm based on

any ground supported by the record. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012).

1 As no other fathers appealed, all references to “the father” in this opinion refer to

the oldest child’s father.
2 Both parents also attempt to challenge whether the Iowa Department of Health

and Human Services made reasonable efforts toward reunification. However, a
reasonable-efforts challenge must be raised to the juvenile court prior to the
termination hearing. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002). Because
neither parent raised a reasonable-efforts challenge prior to the termination
hearing, their respective claims are not preserved for our review. See id.
3

We choose to focus on section 232.116(1)(f), which permits termination when the

State proves: (1) a child is four years old or older; (2) the child has been

adjudicated in need of assistance; (3) the child has been removed from the

physical custody of a parent for at least twelve of the last eighteen months; and

(4) the child cannot be returned to the parent’s custody at the time of the

termination hearing. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018) (interpreting

the statutory phrase “at the present time” to mean at the time of the termination

hearing).

The father only challenges the fourth element, whether the child could be

returned to his custody. But in so doing, he only argues that the child could be

returned to him “within a reasonable period of time.” That is not the applicable

standard under section 232.116(1)(f)(4). Rather, the question is whether the father

could safely take custody of the child at the time of the termination hearing. See

A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 473. And the father was incarcerated at the time of the

termination hearing with his earliest opportunity for parole coming in January 2027

and a projected release date in 2045. So, it is apparent that the child could not be

placed in the father’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. As such, the

State proved a statutory ground for termination as to the father.

The father also argues that termination is not in the child’s best interests. In

assessing the father’s argument, we “give primary consideration to the child’s

safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of

the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the

child.” See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). The father

asserts termination is not in the child’s best interests due to their close bond. We
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consider the father’s bond with the child to the extent its severance would impact

the child’s mental and emotional condition and needs. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d

529, 535 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025).

There is little doubt that termination will impact the child’s emotional

condition and needs. The child testified at the termination trial that she loves her

father and wants him “to have a second chance.” But the reality is that the father

is not able to take on the everyday duties required of a parent due to his

incarceration.3 Termination of his parental rights will allow someone else to step

into that role and provide the child with necessary stability and structure that the

father simply cannot provide. We ultimately agree with the juvenile court that

termination of the father’s rights best serves the child’s interests.

II. The Mother

The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to

section 232.116(1)(e), (f), (h), and (l). We elect to address the statutory grounds

for termination under section 232.116(1)(h) with respect to the younger children

and section 232.116(1)(f) with respect to the older children.4 See A.B., 815 N.W.2d

3 At the termination hearing, the father suggested the child be placed in a
guardianship with one of three paternal relatives, but the child had never met any
of them. The father does not seek establishment of a guardianship as an
alternative to termination on appeal.
4 The State filed identical petitions for termination in the case files for each child.

Those petitions did not break down with particularity what statutory grounds for
termination it sought to be applied to each child. The juvenile court followed this
practice, as it simply stated that the petition to terminate the mother’s rights was
granted “pursuant to section[] 232.116(1)(e), (f), (h)[,] and (l)” without specifying
what grounds apply to the mother’s rights to each child. We note that
section 232.116(1)(f) and (h) apply to children of differing ages, so both cannot
apply to the same child. Compare Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(1), with id.
§ 232.116(1)(h)(1). As a suggestion for future cases, it is best practice for the
State and the juvenile court to specify which grounds apply to each child.
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at 774 (recognizing an appellate court may affirm on any one ground found by the

juvenile court). These two grounds for termination are similar. Both require the

child to be previously adjudicated as in need of assistance and for the court to find

the child could not be returned to the parent’s custody at the time of the termination

hearing. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f), (h). They differ only with respect to the age

of the child at issue and the length of time the child must be removed from the

parent’s custody. Compare id. § 232.116(1)(f), with id. § 232.116(1)(h). Under

these statutory grounds, the mother only challenges whether the children could be

safely returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. See id.

§ 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 112.

This case began in September 2023 when the Iowa Department of Health

and Human Services learned that the oldest child, then just eleven years old, was

left for several days to serve as the sole caretaker for her six younger siblings,

which included two infants. Local police checked on the home and discovered

there was no functioning plumbing, mold throughout the residence, and human

excrement in several rooms. The mother was arrested and charged with child

endangerment. The children were placed in protective custody, and a no-contact

order was issued preventing the mother from contacting them. Eventually, the

no-contact order was modified to permit contact between the mother and children

at the discretion of the department.

But since that time, the mother has not made any sustained progress. She

tested positive for methamphetamine twice and failed to test ten of the nineteen

times she was offered drug testing, including the seven most recent testing
6

opportunities.5 The mother entered a residential program intended to address her

substance-use and mental-health issues and participated in that for several

months before she was discharged for failing to meet the program’s behavioral

expectations. Since her discharge from the program, the mother was ordered to

complete a new substance-use evaluation and a “full-scale psychological

evaluation, including an IQ test and parenting assessment.” She has not done so.

About a month before the termination hearing, the mother moved to a home

in Elkhorn, Nebraska. There, she lives with an individual who suffered a stroke

and requires care services as a dependent adult. The mother explained that she,

along with her godmother, are paid caretakers for the individual. The oldest child’s

guardian ad litem is the only other person involved in these proceedings who has

visited the Elkhorn home. After his visit, he contacted the adult dependent hotline

with concerns for the individual’s wellbeing.

Given the mother’s lack of stability and lack of meaningful progress, we

conclude that the children could not be safely returned to her custody at the time

of the termination hearing. Accordingly, the State established statutory grounds

for termination of the mother’s rights to all seven children.

The mother also argues termination is not in the children’s best interests,

citing her bond with the children. Again, we “give primary consideration to the

child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and

growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and

needs of the child[ren].” See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). And we consider the

5 Two tests were negative for all tested substances. The remaining tests were
positive for marijuana or marijuana metabolite.
7

mother’s bonds with the children to the extent that severance of those bonds would

impact the children’s mental and emotional condition and needs. See L.A., 20

N.W.3d at 535.

We understand that the oldest child stated that she loves her mother “very

much” and wants to return to her mother’s custody. But the bond between them is

not healthy, and its severance is necessary. See In re K.M., No. 21-1036, 2021

WL 4593210, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021) (describing a parent-child bond as

unhealthy when an elementary-school aged child intervened “in adult situations to

protect or defend the mother”). And we reject the mother’s contention that her

rights to the oldest child should not be terminated because the child has been

placed in various shelters or residential behavioral facilities and does not have an

adoptive home lined up. It is quite likely that many of the child’s behavioral issues

stem from the mother’s neglect and treatment. But regardless of the cause of the

child’s behavioral issues, there is clear and convincing evidence that termination

is necessary to protect the child from the mother.

Given the mother’s failure to appreciate the harm she has caused to all the

children and her failure to make any meaningful progress, she is not a safe person

to be around any of the children. Termination of her parental rights to all seven

children is necessary to provide for the children’s safety and their physical, mental,

and emotional conditions and needs. In short, termination of the mother’s rights is

in the best interest of all the children.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.