State of Iowa v. Jesse Tyrone Davis

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0837
Filed October 1, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JESSE TYRONE DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel Dalrymple,

Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his conviction and sentence following a jury

trial. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Sandy, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

Jesse Davis was involved in a brawl at a motorcycle club. As a result, he

was found guilty of assault causing serious injury following trial by jury. He

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the

admissibility of an in-court identification, and his sentence. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Tashieyana O’Neal and friends arrived at a Waterloo motorcycle club in the

early morning, as the club was beginning to close. A dispute was brewing outside

the club between two women. And a crowd began to gather, including Davis.

As the crowd grew, the dispute escalated. People tried to break up the fight

but became involved themselves. Collateral disputes arose. Heated words were

exchanged. And a group of people, including O’Neal, were knocked to the ground.

O’Neal escaped this first tussle with little or no injury.

When she got to her feet, O’Neal saw a man hitting her cousin. O’Neal

started yelling and, seconds later, Davis swung his arm and hit O’Neal in the face.

She fell to the ground, dazed. Davis kicked her at least once. And she was

confident no one else hit her after Davis did. When she made it to her car, O’Neal

saw in her visor mirror that her top row of teeth had all been knocked out and the

bottom row were all broken.

Davis described the first altercation as “two sets of females brawling.” He

said O’Neal was “trying to brawl with” a subset of the women and that soon men

jumped into the fray. Davis said he joined the brawl when someone tried to strike

him, and he intervened to protect his fiancée. From there, he said people were

striking him, and he was striking back. Davis admitted to striking O’Neal in the
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“side of her head” with his gun-shaped phone case—but he disputed whether he

hit her in the mouth. He also claimed he kicked someone next to O’Neal, rather

than O’Neal. In response to direct- and cross-examination questions, Davis

variously described the events of the night as a “brawl,” “fight,” and “melee.”

The jury—who was able to watch a video of the altercation—found Davis

guilty of assault causing serious injury, a class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code

sections 708.1 and 708.2(4) (2022), enhanced as a habitual offender pursuant to

section 902.8. The district court sentenced Davis to fifteen years in prison with a

three-year mandatory minimum. He appeals.

II. Discussion

Davis raises three claims on appeal: the sufficiency of the evidence, the

admissibility of an in-court identification, and the reasons given for sentence. We

consider each argument under the applicable standard of review.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We first consider Davis’s claim about sufficiency of the evidence, as

success on that claim would bar retrial. His specific contention is that there was

insufficient proof his acts caused O’Neal’s injuries.

We review for correction of errors at law. State v. Jones, 967

N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “In determining whether the jury’s verdict is

supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that

may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’” Id. (citation

omitted). “It is not our place to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the

credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh
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the evidence; such matters are for the jury. It is also for the jury to decide which

evidence to accept or reject.” State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022)

(cleaned up).

As a threshold matter, we observe that O’Neal’s testimony standing alone

was sufficient to support conviction: she testified that she saw Davis swing his arm

and hit her in the face, and that Davis’s strike is what knocked out her teeth.

O’Neal’s uncorroborated testimony was legally sufficient for a guilty verdict. E.g.,

State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 507 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025); Iowa R. Crim.

P. 2.21(3). But there was also additional evidence beyond O’Neal’s testimony.

Surveillance footage showed a man in a red shirt striking O’Neal in the face, and

it’s undisputed the man in the red shirt was Davis. Last, Davis admitted to hitting

O’Neal on the head, despite denying that he was the source of the injuries.

As his final argument on this point, Davis points to State v. Smith, 508

N.W.2d 101, 103–04 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993), in a bid to invalidate the victim’s

testimony. We doubt Smith is good law. See State v. Showers, No. 23-0390, 2024

WL 2317709, at *4–5 & n.4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 22, 2024) (summarizing criticism

of Smith from our court, the supreme court, and commentators). To the extent

Smith is a viable precedent, we—like every other Iowa court to consider the

issue—decline to apply the holding and substitute our judgment for that of the jury.

The verdict was supported by substantial evidence.

B. In-Court Identification

Davis next challenges O’Neal’s in-court identification of him, urging her

in-court identification was tainted by pretrial identification procedures. He grounds

his argument in the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
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U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. 1, § 9. But he never advanced this

argument below; instead, counsel described the objection as “essentially hearsay.”

When a criminal defendant objects below, “the defendant is bound by that

objection on appeal. A defendant cannot amplify or change the objection on

appeal.” State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1995) (citation omitted).

We conclude Davis’s due-process objection was not made below. And as a court

for correction of errors at law, we cannot hear it for the first time on appeal. See

Iowa Code § 602.5103(1); State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 1999)

(“Nothing is more basic in the law of appeal and error than the axiom that a party

cannot sing a song to us that was not first sung in trial court.”).

C. Sentencing

Davis last claims the sentencing court attributed other offenders’ conduct to

him when sentencing him to prison. This is the explanation offered by the district

court, with emphasis added to the portions Davis finds objectionable:

The court’s considered the mitigating circumstances with
regard to the passage of time from your more serious prior criminal
history to date, but you do have run-ins with the law even recently,
albeit not felony in nature.
The court also is cognizant of the fact that by way of mitigating
circumstances counsel continued to use the term “brawl” to the jury.
I wouldn’t necessarily describe this as a brawl until the club
members, you included, turned it into a brawl.
There were ladies there. There were ladies there that were
causing a disturbance. There were ladies there that were throwing
bottles. And I’m not mitigating or trying to intimate that throwing a
bottle is not a dangerous or a serious thing. Normal people would
pick up the phone and just simply call the police if they wanted
somebody to leave. You and your club members resorted to
violence.
The court was able to witness, albeit not by you, and I’m not
punishing you for this behavior, but witnessed one of your club
members brandish a gun and actually discharge a gun. Thereafter,
you produced whatever it is that you produced, clearly heavy enough
6

to knock out multiple teeth from Ms. O’Neal, and strike her, blindside
her as I said, sucker punch her, and caused serious injury to her from
that. And so I do believe that the imposition of that fifteen-year term
is appropriate given the circumstances of this case.

“[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within

the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only

be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate

matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). To show an abuse

of discretion, a defendant bears the burden to affirmatively show that the district

court relied on improper factors or clearly untenable reasons. State v. Sailer, 587

N.W.2d 756, 759, 762 (Iowa 1998).

We are not entirely persuaded mention of the other club members’ conduct

was an impermissible factor or unproven fact. That the assault happened during

a “brawl” was undisputed and ultimately admitted by Davis in his trial testimony.

And we observe the court’s characterization is entirely consistent with Davis’s. But

even if the court’s references to third-party conduct were improper, there is also

no affirmative evidence the district court relied on others’ acts when sentencing

Davis. To the contrary, the district court expressly indicated it was not punishing

Davis for the behavior of others mentioned in its description of the scene.

We take the district court at its word when it disclaims reliance on an

improper factor. This practice has been expressly encouraged by the supreme

court. State v. Matheson, 684 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 2004) (per curiam) (“As a

minimum the court should make it clear the [improper factor] was not a

consideration [at sentencing].”). And we frequently affirm sentences on this basis,

recognizing we generally believe a district court when it says it is not relying on an
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improper factor. See, e.g., State v. Herron, No. 22-1925, 2023 WL 8069491, at *3

(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2023); State v. Begle, No. 19-1119, 2020 WL 2986130,

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 3, 2020); State v. Horst, No. 17-1171, 2018 WL 542638,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2018); State v. Balderas, No. 16-0261, 2017 WL

2181198, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 17, 2017); State v. Ross, No. 16-1427, 2017

WL 936191, at *1 & n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2017). To reverse here would be

inconsistent with these precedents.

Beyond the case law, we also think this view is supported by sound public

policy. The reality of the busy district-court docket is that extemporaneous remarks

are frequently imprecise, and we must trust that district judges are being truthful

when they announce that they are not considering arguably improper factors that

may otherwise appear in the record. To conclude otherwise would require us to

find the district judge lied or was dishonest. While some records may support such

a conclusion, this one doesn’t. Cf. State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241, 242–43

(Iowa 2014) (per curiam) (vacating a sentence where the district court, after having

already been summarily reversed for relying on unproven facts, cited the same

unproven facts on remand and only partially disclaimed reliance on the unproven

facts after a defense objection).
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III. Disposition

Because the verdict was supported by substantial evidence, Davis did not

preserve his due-process challenge, and he did not prove the district court

affirmatively relied on an improper sentencing factor, we affirm Davis’s conviction

and sentence.

AFFIRMED.

Sandy, J., concurs; Schumacher, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
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SCHUMACHER, P.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I join in the majority opinion as to Davis’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence

challenge. And I also join with the majority’s conclusion that Davis did not preserve

his challenge to an in-court identification. But I respectfully dissent as to the

majority’s opinion that the district court did not rely on an improper sentencing

factor and would remand for resentencing in light of controlling supreme court

precedent set forth in State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Iowa 2014).

As noted by the majority, the sentencing court stated:

The court’s considered the mitigating circumstances with
regard to the passage of time from your more serious prior criminal
history to date, but you do have run-ins with the law even recently,
albeit not felony in nature.
The court also is cognizant of the fact that by way of mitigating
circumstances counsel continued to use the term “brawl” to the jury.
I wouldn’t necessarily describe this as a brawl until the club
members, you included, turned it into a brawl.
There were ladies there. There were ladies there that were
causing a disturbance. There were ladies there that were throwing
bottles. And I’m not mitigating or trying to intimate that throwing a
bottle is not a dangerous or a serious thing. Normal people would
pick up the phone and just simply call the police if they wanted
somebody to leave. You and your club members resorted to
violence.
The court was able to witness, albeit not by you, and I’m not
punishing you for this behavior, but witnessed one of your club
members brandish a gun and actually discharge a gun. Thereafter,
you produced whatever it is that you produced, clearly heavy enough
to knock out multiple teeth from Ms. O’Neal, and strike her, blindside
her as I said, sucker punch her, and caused serious injury to her from
that. And so I do believe that the imposition of that fifteen-year term
is appropriate given the circumstances of this case.

Davis claims the sentencing court attributed other offenders’ conduct to him

when sentencing him to prison. As in Lovell, the district court attempted to disclaim

consideration of certain factors. See 857 N.W.2d at 243. But as our supreme

court has stated, “we cannot speculate about the weight the sentencing court gave
10

to these unknown circumstances. Since we cannot evaluate their influence, we

must strike down the sentence.” Id. The court, citing the need to protect the

integrity of our judicial system from the appearance of impropriety, vacated the

defendant’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court for

resentencing. Id.

Likewise, because the district court here referenced conduct by others,

including brandishing and discharging a gun and turning the incident into a brawl,

Davis has proven the court relied on an improper factor at the sentencing hearing.

And like in Lovell, we cannot speculate about the weight given to these factors by

the sentencing judge even though the district court disclaimed reliance on the

same. See id.

As Davis’s argument urges, such statements by the district court can

reasonably be interpreted as “mistakenly indicat[ing]” the district court considered

an impermissible factor. State v. Horst, No. 17-1171, 2018 WL 542638, at *2 (Iowa

Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2018) (distinguishing Lovell, 857 N.W.2d at 243). Thus, Davis

has affirmatively demonstrated the statements create a reasonable “appearance

of impropriety.” Lovell, 857 N.W.2d at 243. Following our supreme court’s decision

in Lovell, “although the district court attempted to disclaim the reference to the

impermissible sentencing factor, ‘we cannot speculate about the weight the

sentencing court gave to [this impermissible factor]. Since we cannot evaluate [its]

influence, we must strike down the sentence.’”1 Id. (quoting State v. Black, 324

N.W.2d 313, 316 (Iowa 1982)).

1 The State did not address or attempt to distinguish the present circumstances

from Lovell. As a neutral arbiter, we will not craft arguments in opposition to one
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As for the majority’s position that remanding cases like this one would

somehow cast doubt on the integrity of our district court judges, I purposely decline

to engage in detail with that suggestion. But a brief response is necessary.

Certainly, our supreme court’s determination in Lovell was not that the district court

judge lied or was dishonest. And it is not the conclusion this dissent draws. But

to avoid the appearance of impropriety cited by the Lovell court, Davis’s sentence

should be vacated and this case remanded for resentencing.

side for the benefit of the other. See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa
1996).